In April 2014, former British Prime Minister David Cameron commissioned a review of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK, including its history, ideology, hierarchy and activities in Britain and overseas. The preliminary results were issued on 17 December 2020.
The review was conducted by two of the UK’s highest government officials: Sir John Jenkins, the UK Ambassador to Saudi Arabia at that time, and Charles Farr, then Director-General of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the UK Home Office. Sir Jenkins assessed the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates overseas, while Farr looked into its history, activities, ideology, influence and affiliates in the UK.
The report relied on a methodology based on a wide range of consultations, where Sir Jenkins visited 12 countries and met representatives of governments, political movements, religious leaders, academics and other independent commentators. Information was provided by many Foreign and Commonwealth Office posts and security and intelligence agencies.
Both authors consulted representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements in the UK and overseas and invited interested parties to make written contributions. They consulted a wide range of academic and online sources in English, Arabic and other languages.
In response to the report, the British House of Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee published its Sixth Report of Session 2016-17 on political Islam, and the Muslim Brotherhood Review on 7 November 2016. The report focused on a review of important points, including: Defining political Islam, transparency and political Islam and violence and political Islam, as well as refuting the “Review of the Muslim Brotherhood”. In response, it referred to that the Political Islamists and their sympathizers believed that the UK had undertaken the Muslim Brotherhood Review to appease regional allies that had designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, principally Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. This matter led some witnesses to conclude that the findings of the inquiry were pre-ordained.
Hence, this research attempts to review the main results of the report on the Muslim Brotherhood through four axes, shedding light on the response of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in an effort to interpret this intertwining scene.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
Sir Jenkins addressed the history, ideology and organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928. He adopted gradual religious and moral reformation rhetoric of Muslim societies, and their eventual political unification in a Caliphate under sharia law. Al-Banna and others argued that secularisation and Westernisation were at the root of all contemporary problems of Arab and Muslim societies, and that nationalism was not the answer.
The UK official traced the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt through its dissolution by Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1954 to its rehabilitation under Anwar Al-Sadat 20 years later. In the 1970s the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt expanded, established a foothold within the Egyptian political system and took a firm hold on student organizations, professional syndicates and trades unions. It also developed a large, sophisticated and often clandestine network of commercial enterprises, small businesses and charities.
Given the Muslim Brotherhood’s experience in power — via the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) — in Egypt, Sir Jenkins concluded that the Muslim Brotherhood did not do enough to demonstrate political moderation or a commitment to democratic values and had failed to convince Egyptians of their competence. Highlighting the organization structure of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sir Jenkins concluded that the Muslim Brotherhood organized itself into a secretive cell structure, and this clandestine, centralized and hierarchical structure persists to this day.
However, in commenting on those findings, the Foreign Affairs Committee interpreted that the group’s clandestine structure is due to the repression that the Brotherhood has faced in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East since its inception.
The International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood
Sir Jenkins reviewed the international expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood, referring to its establishment of an international network within and outside the Muslim world since the 1950s. Europe became an important base for the growing Muslim Brotherhood global network. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide remained, at least in theory, the spiritual leader of the movement as a whole. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood dominated (and continues to dominate) the International Guidance Bureau, whose influence has waxed and waned. Thereby, a dispersed international presence has provided the means for the Muslim Brotherhood to regroup and recover from setbacks in Egypt and elsewhere.
He tracked the complex historical relationships between Muslim Brotherhood chapters and governments in the Islamic world. Sir Jenkins concluded that the situation of the group was different according to the contexts in which it existed. In some Arab states the Muslim Brotherhood is now a proscribed organization. In others, it is legal and politically active. In a third context, the group is associated with Hamas (which its military wing in the United Kingdom has been banned as a terrorist organization), where Hamas founding charter claims they are the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. So, support for Hamas (including in particular funding) has been an important priority for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood international network in the last 10 years.
The wider international network of the Muslim Brotherhood now performs a range of functions. It promotes Muslim Brotherhood ideology (including through communications platforms), raises and invests funds, and provides a haven for members of the Brotherhood who have left their country of origin. However, in its response to the review, the Foreign Affairs Committee noted that those findings reduced the degree of networking used by the Muslim Brotherhood’s global networks, as there were concerted efforts to conceal the identity of those networks. It concluded that the ambiguity of this international structure makes it difficult to tell which groups around the world are Muslim Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood, violence and terrorism
Sir Jenkins assessed the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorism, concluding it was complex and circumstantial. He reached those finds:
1- Hassan Al-Banna accepted the political utility of violence, and the Brotherhood conducted attacks against Egyptian state targets and British and Jewish interests.
2- The key Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, Sayed Qutb, drew on the thought of the Indo-Pakistani theorist, Abul Ala’a Mawdudi, the founder of the Islamist party Jamaat-eIslami, to promote the doctrine of takfirism, and the use of extreme violence in the pursuit of the perfect Islamic society. Many contemporary Islamic states were regarded as ‘UnIslamic’, so the confrontation with their ‘unjust’ rulers was legitimate and inevitable.
3- Qutb’s views have at times been reinterpreted by some in the Muslim Brotherhood. But they have never been institutionally disowned. They continue to be explicitly endorsed by many senior Muslim Brotherhood figures, and have inspired many terrorist organizations.
4- The Muslim Brotherhood at all levels has repeatedly defended Hamas attacks against Israel and facilitates funding them.
5- Some members of the Muslim Brotherhood (mainly in non-Muslim countries) have strongly criticized Al-Qaeda. But leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood have claimed that the attacks on 09/11 were fabricated by the US, and that the so called ‘war on terrorism’ is a pretext to attack Muslims.
Sir Jenkins concluded that the Muslim Brotherhood have preferred non violent incremental change on the basis that political opposition will disappear when the process of Islamisation is complete. But they are prepared to countenance violence, where gradualism is ineffective. They have deliberately, wittingly and openly incubated and sustained an organization — Hamas — whose military wing has been proscribed in the UK as a terrorist organization (and which has been proscribed in its entirety by other countries). The writings of the leading Muslim Brotherhood ideologue have been used to legitimize Al-Qaeda’s terrorism. Some leading Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters have endorsed attacks on Western forces. Sir Jenkins concluded that it was not possible to reconcile these views with the claim made by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that “the Muslim Brotherhood has consistently adhered to peaceful means of opposition, renouncing all forms of violence throughout its existence”.
In its response, the Foreign Affairs Committee reported that the review had overstated the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and violence. It also found that the review and its main findings would harm the UK’s image abroad, as the UK investigated the perceived practice of “Muslim Brotherhood” violence, but not the violence perpetrated against them after their removal from power in 2013, through military intervention. The committee sought to explain the relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood with Hamas, in the light of what has been pointed out by many witnesses, who have stressed that the Muslim Brotherhood is not alone in supporting Hamas, particularly in the light of the importance and sensitivity of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Regarding Qutb’s writings that inspired the terrorist organizations, the Committee noted that Qutb wrote on a wide array of subjects, and he is held in high esteem by some Islamists for other aspects of his broad work that do not necessarily relate to violence. The committee also confirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership has formally repudiated Qutb’s writings where they are associated with violence, principally through the publication of the book “Preachers not Judges” by Hassan Al-Hudaibi, the then-Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood, in 1969. The committee also confirmed that based on the experience of Tunisia, political Islam could in some countries be a way of providing a democratic alternative for political, social, and economic development and a counter-narrative against more extremist ideologies. The committee characterized the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a fundamentally non-violent group, and recommend to the FCO to open channels of communications with Muslim Brotherhood officials.
The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK
Charles Farr examined in detail the Muslim Brotherhood’s development, ideology and activities in the UK. He found that organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood were established in the UK (and elsewhere in Europe) over fifty years ago. They mainly comprised exiles and overseas students. In the UK these organizations worked very closely with like minded counterparts from South Asia, especially Jama’at-e-Islami. They regarded themselves as a single Islamic movement. In their earliest phase these organizations were not politically active in the UK. Many of their members assumed they would return to their country of origin. Their priorities were to recruit and educate new members (through study groups) and support the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world.
Farr noted that in the late 1980s and early 1990s the Muslim Brotherhood and its associates developed a new strategy of domestic engagement in western countries. The Muslim Brotherhood faced a significant challenge for community support from radical Salafists who had returned to the UK after fighting in Afghanistan and who regarded the Brotherhood as ineffective. But the Muslim Brotherhood was cautious: the stated purpose of engagement was not just to promote the Muslim Brotherhood overseas but also to preserve the autonomy of Muslim communities in the UK. In this context, in the 1990s the Muslim Brotherhood established organizations in the UK to promote their views, where they established the new Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), dominated the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and played an important role in establishing and then running the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB).
Given the activities of these organizations, in 2009 the then government suspended dialogue with the MCB after an office holder signed a public document which appeared to condone violence against any country supporting an arms blockade against Gaza. There has been no substantive dialogue since then between any part of the Brotherhood in the UK and government.
Concerning the MAB, it appears much less active than it was between 2002 and 2006. It has little political profile and no obvious connection with groups which have recently arrived from Egypt or the UAE.
In 2014, the MAB claimed a membership of just 600 people and maintains eight welfare houses (first established here in the 1960s) and associated mosques. It has nine UK branches. The MAB has links to the Cordoba Foundation, a think tank which is associated with the Brotherhood (though claiming to be neither affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood). As for the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), it has distanced itself from the Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim Brotherhood ideology since 2001 and set out to try to promote a British Muslim identity and to support British values.
Farr found that as of mid-2014 the Brotherhood in the UK comprised a range of organizations, loosely associated together but without common command and control or a single leader. Some of these organizations have extended their activities to other states using London as a base for overseas activities. The Egyptian Brotherhood ran some Muslim Brotherhood communications from London and has been supported here by several lobbying and protest movements in the UK. A complex network of charities associated with the Muslim Brotherhood has developed here over many years. Whilst some of these seem to be raising funds only for the Brotherhood in the UK others have been linked to Hamas.
In this context, in 2003 the UK charity Interpal was designated as a terrorist entity by the US Treasury, primarily on the grounds of alleged links to Hamas. Interpal has been investigated three times by the Charity Commission in the UK. In 2006 the Charity Commission found that Interpal was a member of the Union of Good, a wider group of charities believed to have Hamas links and that in 2003 it was designated as a terrorist entity under UK law. The Charity Commission took regulatory action against Interpal in 2009. Though never publicly acknowledged by the Muslim Brotherhood charities in the UK are an important part of the Hamas and Brotherhood infrastructure.
Farr concluded that Muslim Brotherhood organizations in the UK – including charities – are connected to counterparts elsewhere in Europe. The MAB are associated with the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE), established by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1989. FIOE subsequently created the European Council for Fatwa and Research, another pan European Muslim Brotherhood body, intended to provide religious and social guidance to Muslims living in Europe. Farr confirmed the operation of the organizations which were originally associated with Mawdudi ideology in Britain.
Ideology and outlook
Farr found that groups and people in the UK linked to the Muslim Brotherhood had in the past held out the prospect and ambition of an Islamic state in Britain. But currently there was no indication that the Muslim Brotherhood itself still held this view or at least openly promoted an Islamic state in Britain. The public narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood focused more on the task of Islamizing the individual and community than the state.
He referred to the MAB written report submitted to review, where it stated that it supported social integration and encouraged young people to be active and responsible citizens. There is some evidence that MAB have tried to do so in specific areas of the UK. But as of July 2014 neither MAB nor other organizations related to the Muslim Brotherhood had clearly and publicly promoted a vision of Muslims living in this country as integrated British citizens. In this context, the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM) continued to explicitly claim that it is not possible for an observant Muslim to live under a non-Islamic system of government.
He argued that although the Muslim Brotherhood has not been linked to terrorist related activity in and against the UK, Muslim Brotherhood-related organizations and individuals in the UK have openly supported the activities of Hamas on one hand. On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood organizations and associates in the UK have neither openly nor consistently refuted the literature of Brotherhood member Sayyid Qutb, and on the third hand, MAB have consistently opposed programs by successive Governments to prevent terrorism.
Both Sir John Jenkins and Charles Farr drew the following conclusions from their work:
1- The Muslim Brotherhood have promoted a policy aimed at imposing its ideology and vision by relying on the reconstruction of individual identity as the first step towards changing the status quo on which modern nation states were based.
2- The Muslim Brotherhood historically focused on remodeling individuals and communities through social and political activism. They have engaged politically where possible. But they have also selectively used violence and sometimes terror in pursuit of their goals. Their public narrative – notably in the West – emphasized engagement not violence. But there have been significant differences between Muslim Brotherhood language with the West and their language with the Arab States.
3- The experience of power in Egypt has not caused the Muslim Brotherhood to rethink its violent ideology or behavior, where statements from Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood-linked media platforms seem to have deliberately incited violence.
4- Much about the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK remains secretive, including membership, fund raising and educational programs. But Muslim Brotherhood associates in the UK have at times had significant influence on the largest UK Muslim student organization, national organizations which have claimed to represent Muslim communities, charities and some mosques. Though their domestic influence has declined organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood continue to have an influence.
5- The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK claimed to act in support of Muslim communities in the UK, and use London as a base for activism elsewhere, notably with other Muslim Brotherhood organizations in Europe, Egypt, the occupied Palestinian territories and the Gulf. This activity is considered clandestine activity.
6- The Muslim Brotherhood has been publicly committed to political engagement in the UK. Engagement with Government has at times been facilitated by what appeared to be a common agenda against Al-Qaeda and (at least in the UK) radical Salafism. But this engagement did not take account of Muslim Brotherhood support for a proscribed terrorist group and its views about terrorism. So, aspects of Muslim Brotherhood ideology and tactics, in the UK and overseas, are contrary to the values, national interests and national security of the UK.
In light of the foregoing, there are a number of key observations, which can be reviewed as follows:
I) The review’s findings provided a brief reading of the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna, referring to the adoption by Al-Banna of a rhetoric based on the progressive religious and moral reform of Muslim societies. However, the truth of his ideas requires a more in-depth analysis of his letters and writings, which reveals his goals and motives. In this context, it is worth mentioning that, in the letter of the Fifth Congress of 1938, Al-Banna said, “Power is the slogan of Islam, and its first level is the strength of belief and faith, followed by the strength of unity and loyalty, and then the power of persons and weapons. The Muslim Brotherhood will use practical force where nothing else will work”. That presentation therefore illustrates the ingrained notion of violence in its convictions and its extension to the practices of the Muslim Brotherhood.
II) The Foreign Affairs Committee justified that group’s clandestine structure with the repression that the Brotherhood has faced in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East, but this proposition has much to explain in the light of three determinants; The first concerns the combination of secrecy in the organizations with their desire to form armed military wings, the course which was followed by the Muslim Brotherhood, starting from the formation of the special apparatus to the use of specific committees after the dispersal of Rabaa sit-in. Second, the group was not suppressed at the time of its creation of the special apparatus in 1939. Hassan Al-Banna participated in person in the parliamentary elections in Egypt. The third is related to the involvement of its elements in a large number of terrorist operations and has been prosecuted in accordance with Egyptian law.
III) The results of the review explained the failure of the group’s experience when it came to power in Egypt, in the light of the group’s failure to demonstrate political moderation or commitment to democratic values, and thus failed to convince Egyptians of the efficiency of its elements. However, this interpretation omits much of the failures of the political, ideological and organizational group. At the political level, it has moved towards political hegemony and has sought to exclude various political factions and has not contained the full diversity of Egyptian society. At the ideological level, it lacked the ideological flexibility to formulate its own political model. At the organizational level, its strict hierarchical structure prevented it from responding successfully to rapid societal changes, prioritizing loyalty rather than efficiency.
IV) The findings of the review pointed to the ambiguity of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorism, which could be explained in the light of the group’s attempt to present it with having splits within. It presents itself to the international community as a peaceful political wing and presents itself to extremists and terrorists as a military wing pursuing its objectives through the use of terrorism as a means. In this particular context, it is worth mentioning some of the practices of the group with assuming power in Egypt, which have demonstrated its clear association with other terrorist organizations:
- With Mohamad Morsi assuming power as the President of the Republic in 2012, he issued pardons for elements clearly linked to terrorism. He issued “five” pardons for specific names within five months, which is contrary to the customary, where the competent authorities review the prisoners situation and submit it to the President of the Republic. However, 810 persons have been immediately released without review by the competent authorities, including: Sayed Imam Abdul Aziz (the Mufti of Jihad organization) and Mustafa Ahmed Hamza (Commander of the military branch of Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya).
2- During the time of Mohamed Morsi in office, the presidency pressured the security services not to take any action against the leader of the Ezzeddin Al-Qassam Brigades (the military branch of Hamas), the Palestinian Abdel Salam Al-Bantiji (Abu Albraa) and allowing him to enter Gaza strip, after being arrested in 2012.
3- The Muslim Brotherhood supported sending young elements to Syria as Jihad in response to a request by the Syrian Brotherhood organization and some jihadist Salafist currents to gain their support in the political movement inside the country, and to give official cover during the 2014 Syria Solidarity conference, attended by Mohamed Morsi, while he headed the country with symbols of Islamic currents.
4- The Muslim Brotherhood led the Rabaa and Nahda squares sit-ins. The Rabaa square sit-in platform announced on 1 August 2013 the establishment of what it called (the Sinai War Council) as a response to the government’s authorization of the Ministry of Interior to disperse the two sit-ins. The platform affirmed the principle of no peace after today, in addition to the famous statement of the Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Al-Beltagy of “What happens in Sinai would stop at the moment ousted president Morsi returns back to power.”
5- Following the Rabaa armed sit-in, the Muslim Brotherhood formed qualitative terrorist committees, which operate in a non-centralized manner, in accordance with a general scheme of organization, to carry out acts of violence, sabotage and encroachment on public facilities, police and military installations in particular, and to target police and military personnel. The work of these committees became more obvious with founding the Hasm Movement and Lewaa Al-Thawra, which resulted in Britain (December 2017) and the United States (February 2018) including these terrorist organizations on terrorism lists.
V) The Foreign Affairs Committee’s description of the revolution of 30 June 2013 as a military intervention aimed at removing the Brotherhood from power ignores the protest of more than 30 million Egyptians to demand the removal of the Brotherhood President on the one hand, and the omission of the privacy of Egyptian and Arab realities on the other. Therefore, those indicators should not be ignored when it comes to the 30 June Revolution, as this is contrary to the people’s freedom of self-determination, their right to choose their own rulers, in accordance with their vision, convictions and the means they deem appropriate to achieve this. Concepts and terms are the product of their local and regional context and reality.
VI: The Foreign Affairs Committee noted that Sayed Qutb has written on a wide array of subjects, and is held in high esteem by some Islamists for other aspects of his broad work that do not necessarily relate to violence. However, this presentation omits clear facts about his writings. His writings on Hakimiya (Soverignity of Allah), Jahiliya (Pre-Islamic Ignorance) and Iluhiya (Divinity) established the governing details of life and the basis for the idea of rebellion on the state, and the nation and put the Sharia law in confrontation with them. His writings were characterized by a dynamic approach to the work of terrorist organizations, where Al-Qaeda was influenced by the “Qutbism” and sought to be its actual heir, as it began to oppose and expand its campaign against Middle Eastern regimes, considering them as “jihali” societies, the term that Qutb has coined. In this context, it is worth mentioning that in his book “Knights under the Flag of the Prophet”, Ayman Al-Zawahiri (leader of Al-Qaeda) said that the ideas of the Qutb represent the beginning of the nucleus of the contemporary jihadist movement.
VII: The Committee on Foreign Affairs omitted the founding charter of Hamas, which refers to it as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this context, it should be noted that the Muslim Brotherhood, in coordination with Hamas, has carried out terrorist operations targeting the military positions of the Egyptian army, the security check points in the Sinai Peninsula and the remaining governorates of the republic. Also elements of the brotherhood and Hamas helped elements, known for intelligence agencies as dangerous, to escape from the prisons in Egypt. In addition to information available to the security services, that Mumtaz Dughmush (commander of the Army of Islam) entered Sinai before the revolution of June 30, met with the Brotherhood leader, Khairat Al-Shater, and received $1 million to ignite the Sinai front if the Brotherhood regime in Egypt fell.
VIII: The review report underestimated the nature of the role of international organization, where its influence transcends many States, given that it has branches in various countries of the world. In light of that expansion, the international organization adopts a strategy of soft penetration in Western societies through many means; cultural, media and social. The group could therefore promote its ideology on the one hand, and inciting on hostile regimes on the other, by employing the above-mentioned means within the states in which they were expanding.
IX: The Foreign Affairs Committee argued that that based on the experience of Tunisia, political Islam could in some countries be a way of providing a democratic alternative for political, social, and economic development. But the results of the Tunisian experience proved this proposition wrong. This is presented in the failure of the “Muslim Brotherhood” represented in Ennahda Party in Tunisia, where the later sought to control the political life and insisted on excluding and marginalizing other political factions. Thus, Ennahda party puts the Tunisian people before two choices; the first is its full acquisition of the change in the system of government and the autonomy of power vis-à-vis the illusory stability of the state. The second is its continued rivalry with other parties and inability to fully control all institutions in return for its destruction of political life.
X: The British Government’s response to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s comments was in light of two determinants. The first is concerned with the purpose of the review was to understand the philosophy, activities and impact of the Muslim Brotherhood Group on UK national interests, and the mandate of the review did not include an examination of events in Egypt after the fall of the Morsi Government. The second is that the findings of the review of the Muslim Brotherhood concluded that The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood did not do enough to demonstrate political moderation or a commitment to democratic values when it came to power in Egypt. It also found that the group of the Muslim Brotherhood has vague ties to violent extremism. Thus, the British government should not deal with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood at this time.
XI: The fact that the UK does not designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, although the British government emphasizes that being related to the Muslim Brotherhood is an indication of extremism, can be explained in three determinants. The first is related to the expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK, especially with the immigration of some Muslim Brotherhood leaders to Britain and the increase of their investments on one hand, and their presence in British universities on the other. The second is related to the different language the Muslim Brotherhood uses in European societies from that of the Arab societies, where in the first it presents a model based on participation and dialogue, while in the second it presents a model that employs and uses violence and terrorism. The third is related to the UK’s desire to use the Brotherhood as a pressure card on some Arab regimes.
- “Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings”, 17 December 2015 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486948/53163_Muslim_Brotherhood_Review_-_PRINT.pdf
- “Political Islam, and the Muslim Brotherhood Review”, Sixth Report of Session 2016–17, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, November 2016 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/118/118.pdf
- “Political Islam, and the Muslim Brotherhood Review: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report Eighth Report of Session 2016–17”, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 February 2017https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/967/967.pdf
- “Political Islam, and the Muslim Brotherhood Review: Government Response to the Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2016–17 Third Special Report of Session 2017–19”, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 12 September 2017 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/334/334.pdf