In his first official visit following the earthquake in Turkey and Syria on 6 February, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad landed in the Sultanate of Oman on 20 February, his second visit to a Gulf country after his visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in March 2022. During his one-day visit, Assad held a series of talks in Baraka Palace in Muscat with Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al-Said with the participation of officials from both countries. Talks tackled bilateral relations, potential fields for mutual cooperation, developments on regional and international arenas and efforts to enhance regional security and stability.
Sultan Al-Said asserted that Syria is a sister Arab country, and that he is looking forward to normalizing relationships between Syria and all other Arab countries. He reiterated his condolences to the Syrian President and people over the victims of the earthquake, emphasizing his country’s support to Syria to overcome the repercussions of the devastating earthquake and the impacts of the war and blockade imposed on Syrians. On his part, Assad highlighted that Oman has maintained a balanced and credible policy, and that the region is currently in need of such a role to foster relationships between Arab countries based on mutual respect and non-interference in domestic affairs. He also expressed his gratitude for the support of the Sultan and the Sultanate in Syria’s war on terrorism and the offered relief aid in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake.
Pillars of Rapprochement
A number of political and historical factors contributed to making the Sultanate of Oman one of the main gateways of Arab openness towards Syria:
- Historical legacy: Since the establishment of the Sultanate of Oman in 1970, the Syrian-Omani relationships were positive and stable, characterized by continuous conversation and mutual support, regardless of regional variables and turbulent political context in the Middle East. This led to consolidation of relations and more understanding of the interests of both parties. When the Sultanate’s membership in the League of Arab States (LAS) was partially objected, Syria’s then representative Abd El-Hakim Khaddam rebuked opponents, asserting that “Oman is an Arab country”. In turn, Oman maintained its support to the Syrian standpoint demanding the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in all regional and international conventions.
- The lack of the ideological dimension in the Omani policy towards Syria: Regional and international parties have supported opposing parties in the Syrian conflict on ideological and sectarian basis, thus contributing to geopolitical discrepancies. However, Oman has neither Sunni nor Shite majority, but rather an Ibadi one; thus has no interest in siding with a certain party in the conflict and did not support any political or military opposition fraction. In addition, Oman considers Iran not very threatening, unlike other Gulf countries which regard Iran as an existential threat. Oman believes it is better to establish more open and cooperative relationships between Iran and Arab states. It functions as a diplomatic bridge between Iran on the one hand and Arab and Western countries on the other hand.
- Oman’s non-interference policy: Since its independence in 1970, Oman maintained a pragmatic foreign policy emphasizing non-interference, balancing competing interests of other countries in the region and disassociation from conflicts in neighboring countries. Such policy aims at maintaining friendly relationships with its neighbors and developing its role as a regional diplomatic mediator, hence protecting its security interests being a small state in a strategically important location. This was applied to the Syrian crisis. Despite Oman’s recognition of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in 2011, part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) recognition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, it has slowly retained its traditional policy based on non-interference, maintaining its diplomatic and humanitarian approach to the Syrian war, and not funding opposition fractions nor armed militias. Oman also maintained diplomatic relationships with the Syrian government, regarding the Syrian crisis as an internal affair and as such only Syrian should decide how to address their issues as they see fit and only Syrians should draw their future. In October 2012, former Omani Foreign Minister Yousef bin Alawi stated that the killing of Syrian civilians, their displacement and the destruction they experience is unacceptable. He announced that the role of the Sultanate would only be restricted to providing humanitarian aid, not arms to fractions.
- The role of the regional mediator: Early on, the Sultanate sought to play a mediatory role to narrow the gaps between regional and international actors in the Syrian crisis, and normalize Arab-Syrian relations. In August 2015 and upon Tehran’s request, a triparty meeting was held in Muscat between the foreign ministers of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Omani’s mediatory moves were among the results of the US-Iran rapprochement due to the Omani mediatory efforts in the Iran nuclear file. Russia has also sought Omani mediation to put an end to freezing Syria’s LAS membership during Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Muscat in May 2022. The most recent Assad visit followed meetings between Omani and Syrian officials to foster Syria’s regional integration, against the backdrop of reports that Oman conveys Syrian messages to some Arab and Gulf countries.
- Continued diplomatic and economic communication: Muscat inaugurated the Arab initiative to open to Syria when former Omani Foreign Minister Yousef bin Alawi visited Damascus in 2015 to discuss ways to resolve the Syrian crisis. Talks resumed in 2018 when late Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Mualem visited Muscat to hold further negotiations with his Omani counterpart. Upon Muscat’s invitation, such was the first visit of the Syrian foreign minister to a GCC state since 2011, and it highlighted Oman’s interest in contributing to resolving the Syrian crisis. The two officials agreed on continuing collaboration and coordination towards common objectives. The year 2020 witnessed a breakthrough when the Sultanate was the first Arab country to return its Ambassador in Syria. Ambassador Turkey bin Mahmoud Al-Bousaidy presented a copy of his credentials to the then Syrian Foreign Minister to become the first representative of an Arab country to resume his post in Damascus. Diplomatic communication continued with Al-Mualem’s visit to the Sultanate to offer condolences on the passing of the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq congratulations to Assad on his re-election in 2021, and the three-day visit of the current Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad to Muscat in March 2021 to support Damascus’ aspirations to regain its LAS seat, and accelerate normalization with Arab countries. The visit also witnessed signing agreements on visa-free travel for diplomats and special passports holders. This was followed by Omani Foreign Minister Bader Al-Bousaidy’s visit to Damascus in January 2022 in which he also met with President Assad.
Collaboration extended to the economic level. During the visit of the Syrian Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources Ali Ghanem to the Sultanate in November 2017, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to expand joint cooperation in oil and gas. In August 2022, the Syrian Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade Mohamed Samer Al-Khalil decided to form the Syrian-Omani business council in an aim to advance the role of the private sector and utilizing its potential in developing economic relations between both countries in different areas of trade, investment, industry, agriculture and tourism.
A Stimulating Context
The regional and international context of President Assad’s visit to Oman was reflected in the dynamics of the Syrian crisis, providing justifications to more openness towards the Syrian government as follows:
- Arab openness towards Syria: The visit came when Arab-Syrian communication enhanced during the past 2 years, manifested in: UAE and Bahrain re-opening their embassies in Damascus and re-sending their ambassadors, Jordan sending a chargé d’affaires to Damascus in conjunction with presenting initiatives to the USA and Russia to put forward a political solution to the Syrian crisis, the advancement of Arab, Russian and Iranian demands to have Syria regain its LAS position, and the mitigation of the Saudi previously extreme position of the Syrian Arab integration as manifested in Saudi Foreign Minister Faisel bin Farhan statement, on the fringe lines of Munich Security Conference, concerning an Arab consensus on the importance of ending Syria’s isolation. This shift in Gulf and Arab positions may be due to the increasing Arab political realization and awareness of the dangers of a continued isolation of Syria, and leaving the Syrian file in the hands of regional and international projects, posing a threat to the Arab national security system. Such a vision reveals benefiting from lessons in modern and contemporary Arab history, especially the situation in Iraq. The most prominent objective of the Arab moves in Syria is restricting Iranian influence, as Syria’s Arab isolation presented an opportunity for Iran to foster its presence there.
- Regional and international variables: The accelerated Arab openness towards Syria is inseparable from regional strategic repositioning. Arab states are revising their strategic calculations, especially in light of regional and international variables, the continuous shift in the international system, and changes in the US foreign policy towards the Middle East where its interest retreated in favor of more US presence in the Indo-Pacific region to counter the emerging Sino threat. The Arab countries realize the importance of forming a unified Arab stand, and narrowing gaps in the Arab regional system to face international variables. This requires calming regional conflicts. The priority of the Syrian file in the US regional agenda has retreated, tension overshadowed US-Arab relations as a result of the most recent developments in the Ukrainian war, and the US has more tendency to adopt more independent and balanced policies, prioritizing pragmatism over ideological factors. All these positioned the US opposition to Syria’s Arab reintegration as a standpoint statement without any intention of sanctions or further measures towards Arab countries. In addition, the Arab-Turkish rapprochement — manifested in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and attempts to overcome tensions with Cairo — can make room for Arab-Turkish understanding over Syria.
- The political use of the 6 February earthquake: The humanitarian approach was an apt entry point to fostering Arab political relationships with the Syrian government and an attempt to break its regional isolation and reintegrate it in its Arab context, within a path that started almost 2 years ago. The earthquake hence acted as a stimulus, not initiator, providing a humanitarian justification to put political disputes aside. The catastrophe fostered political communication with the Syrian government; Assad received the first telephone call from the Egyptian president since 2011, met a Lebanese delegation headed by the Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Bou Habib in Damascus, hosted Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ayman AlSafady in the first visit since 2011, and received UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah bin Zayed AlNahyan in the third visit in almost a year. Furthermore, the Iraq, UAE, Bahrain, Lebanon, Oman and Algeria renewed their calls for Syria’s return to the Arab League, Algerian and Palestinian rescue teams emerged reflecting pan-Arab solidarity, and Tunisia upgraded its diplomatic representation with Damascus. It is within such context that Assad’s visit to Oman should be analyzed.
- Turkish–Syrian rapprochement: Assad’s visit parallels the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement path with Russian pressure and Iranian support. Reports estimate that the diplomacy of catastrophe would stimulate political communication between the two governments, especially with reports that Russian research institutes and think tanks have published messages encouraging Erdoğan to seize the opportunity to renew direct talks with Assad. Russia announced an anticipated meeting between the ministers of Foreign Affairs of Syria, Turkey and Iran in that regard. All these will no doubt change the dynamic patterns between conflict parties, hence change political and military power equations on ground. The success of such reconciliation will lead to a rehabilitation of the Syrian regime and a decline in its regional rejection, thus paving the way to its regional inclusion and a normalization of the Arab Syrian relations.
In conclusion, a breakthrough in Arab-Syrian relations is likely due to a shift in Arab strategic calculations as a result of regional and international variables. However, some challenges hinder the full return of Syria to the Arab incubator with a collective Arab decision, foremost among which is the US opposition to any normalization with the Syrian government, especially coinciding with the current Muscat’s efforts to mediate in Syrian-Turkish rapprochement. It also seems that the EU has no intention to support normalization with Damascus, and Western sanctions imposed on Syria- especially the US Caesar Act- hamper Arab normalization with Syria, especially in trade and economy. The Iranian role cannot be neglected. Though Tehran welcomed the advancement of the Arab Syrian relations, according to its Minister of Foreign Affairs Hossein Amir Abdollahian it recognizes that it is the primarily target of the Arab movement towards Damascus. Hence, it will not allow Arab-Syrian relations to cross a line or threaten its interests and power in Syria- its most important strategic pillar in the region- through activating its influence tools that it compiled over the past years.
Moreover, the Arab consensus on Damascus retaining its LAS membership is still absent. Qatar refuses unfreezing Syria’s membership seeing that the reasons are still valid, and cooperation should only concern refugees. Saudi Arabia is still doubtful. Finally, Oman’s mediation attempts did not resonate in the US, unlike its mediation between Washington and Tehran. Muscat has not yet presented an agreed upon initiative by all regional and international parties involved in the Syrian crisis.
