Three days after armed conflict broke out between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement declaring that “Israel wants stability and security for Sudan,” requesting a cease-fire from all parties.
Israeli media outlets, including Israel Hayom and the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, reported that Israeli delegations are taking part in efforts to defuse tensions and mediating between the warring parties in Sudan.
Prior to the crisis, Sudan had entered a sphere of new normalization known as Abrahamic normalization. Israel was able to sign an Abrahamic pact with the UAE and Bahrain, both of which look out over the Arabian Gulf, and with Morocco, which overlooks the Strait of Gibraltar, the southernmost point in the Mediterranean. Israel is working to strengthen the Red Sea border agreement with neighboring Sudan.
This paper examines Israel’s geostrategic calculations in the Red Sea and their relationship to recent events in Sudan.
Israel’s Red Sea Geostrategic Ambition
The Red Sea is now more than just a Middle Eastern commercial shipping lane; it also serves as a strategic passageway connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean and a key theater for the operations of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), whose operational scope includes the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia.
Israel desires to follow this new geopolitical path, which involves the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, by establishing new relationships with the countries of these regions. This explains a) the formation of the I2U2 Quartet Forum, which brings together the United Arab Emirates, India, Israel, and the United States; b) the warming of relations between Israel and Central Asian countries, most recently Turkmenistan; and c) the Israeli efforts to reach a normalization agreement with the Asian Muslim countries in South Asia.
A conflict scene permeates this setting, involving Israel and Iran in a framework of shadow war between the two parties and turning the Red Sea into a battlefield. Defense Minister Benny Gantz voiced Israeli concerns that Iran is planning to establish a military command in the Red Sea in order to threaten the countries of the region, and he noted that Iranian attacks on Israeli and American vessels, including commercial ships and oil tankers, have been on the rise.
For Israel, the Red Sea is more than just a strategic corner of its national security that could be vulnerable to a missile attack within the context of its covert wars with Iran. Instead, it grows in significance as a potential site for the expansion of economic ties between Israel and the Gulf states, which hope to lure major international corporations operating in the high technology sector.
Figure 1: Raman and Blue submarine cable systems
The above map depicts Google’s marine communication line (submarine cable), the Blue and Raman Submarine Cable Systems, which are divided into two parts: the Blue Cable System, which connects Italy, Greece, and Israel from the eastern Mediterranean side, and the Raman Cable System, which connects Israel with Jordan and Saudi Arabia from the side of NEOM and then the Sultanate of Oman to end in India (which has entered into a political agreement with Israel, the UAE, and the United States). This line will be completed in 2024.
Notably, official data suggests that Egypt will announce the debut of the Hybrid African Ring Path (HARP) in 2023. This is a new submarine cable system that resembles a harp and, when laid out, will form the shape of the African continent. Given that Egypt is a global hub through which a vast network of submarine cables passes, this project will integrate Telecom Egypt’s ongoing and future projects to provide seamless communication services to the African continent.
With the backing of powerful regional and global actors, Israel could play a significant role in the regional concentration points of the submarine cable network in the Middle East if it is successful in luring a large network of submarine cables for significant multinational technology companies (even though it hasn’t yet caught up to Egypt’s competition, especially after the reduction of traffic fees). This could be accomplished provided that:
a) Israel is integrated into a network of strong Gulf relations, which includes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (which aspires to implement digitization plans and become a regional hub in the Middle East). This explains Israel’s eagerness to normalize relations with the largest Arabian Peninsula Gulf state.
b) The electrical infrastructure, which is represented by the submarine cables that cross the Red Sea, as well as the technological infrastructure, should be protected from any hostile attacks, especially those from Iran. This is one of the reasons Riyadh decided to normalize relations with Iran in order to protect the Saudi technological infrastructure in the future. To successfully protect its interests in the Red Sea, including its infrastructure, commercial shipping lanes, and access to new markets in the region, Israel needed to establish new concentration points commensurate with its current capabilities. Eastern Sudan is one of these new areas, which explains Israel’s interest in the military situation there and its stance on the establishment of new military bases, especially the Russian one.
On the other hand, in order to access new African and Asian markets via the Red Sea, Israel must secure new shipping lines.
On the other hand, Israel needs to secure new shipping lines in the Red Sea in order to penetrate new African and Asian markets through the Red Sea.
In order for Tel Aviv to achieve trade security for this Israeli geostrategic goal, it needs to a) diversify supply chains; b) diversify sailing and navigation techniques; c) ensure a maritime connection between the Israeli ports overlooking the Mediterranean Sea and the port of Eilat; and d) ensure a maritime connection between the port of Eilat and the regional ports overlooking the Red Sea.
The last two points above elaborate on why it’s important for the Israeli government to build a rail line and a land route between the Ashdod Port and the Eilat Port, which despite lacking practicality on the economic front, has significant political and security feasibility from an Israeli perspective.
Nonetheless, Israel must continue to assess the security situation in the Red Sea as a new commercial outlet for Tel Aviv and an important strategic area for Israel’s foreign policy and strategic planning.
Israel’s Maritime Control Concept
Israeli geostrategic ambitions in the Red Sea necessitate a set of military guarantees, which calls into question Israel’s current military capability.
Israel’s military faces a wide range of difficulties, from security threats posed by the proliferation of war fronts that almost surround the country (for example, Iranian attacks on Israeli ships in the Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Oman) to military technical difficulties (e.g. the large number of naval military vessels owned by Israel, the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) logistical capabilities are limited to continuing operations with a small number of ships, and so on).
The Israeli army faces a vast array of challenges, whether at the level of security challenges posed by the multiplicity of war fronts that almost surround Israel, as Israeli ships were subjected to Iranian attacks in Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Oman, or at the level of military technical challenges such as: the number of naval military vessels owned by Israel, the limited logistical capacity of the Israeli army so that it can continue operations within Israel itself or in the immediate vicinity.
I – Israeli Naval Forces (Equipment)
- Three submarines of the Dolphin class and two advanced submarines of the Dragon class.
- Seven frigates (two Sa’ar 5 models outfitted with Barak-1 air defense batteries, one Sa’ar 6 model outfitted with the superior Barak-8 air defense battery, and four Sa’ar 5 models outfitted with C-Dome batteries upgraded from the Iron Dome version).
- Eight frigates of the Sa’ar 4.5 class with Barak-1 air defense batteries.
The Israeli Navy is ranked 44th worldwide.
II- The Evolution of the Naval Supremacy Concept
Israel has extensive coastlines along the Mediterranean Sea, which explains why maritime trade is of such strategic importance to the Israeli economy and why the Israeli military has prioritized the development of naval weapons.
The most significant barrier to this development was the change brought about by the Memorandum of Understanding between Israel and the United States that was signed in 2016. This document limited Israel’s ability to take advantage of American funding for Israeli military industries by operating Israeli military development companies.
This final factor did not have as much of an impact on large Israeli military development firms like Elbit Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) as it did on Israeli middle-sized firms and workers. The fact that the affected companies are involved with Israeli naval fleet-related industries prompted the Israeli army to exert pressure on the Israeli government to continue negotiations with the Pentagon in order to develop naval military industries. This pressure resulted in the successful development, modification, and production of a marine version of the Iron Dome that can be installed on Israeli ships, particularly the Sa’ar 6 frigate.
Nevertheless, the Israeli army persisted in advancing the idea of naval superiority in the area, particularly in the Red Sea region, which is crucial for securing Israel’s integration with the Gulf states.
Within the context of the naval force, a number of strategic concepts were introduced to the Israeli military’s strategic thinking. The first of these was the idea of a “naval strike”, but it required a significant investment on the part of Israel to increase the power of its navy. Then, “maritime surveillance” took its place. However, like “command of the seas”, which the United States adopted in strategic seas through multiple fleets, it necessitates a continuous presence on the high seas.
A review of articles written by current Israeli military officials reveals that this concept was developed to mean “maritime dominance”, but with new methods and tactics that differ from the concept’s traditional definition prior to the October 1973 war. Naval supremacy can now be attained using new strategies rather than a constant military presence in the oceans.
According to the literature on naval supremacy strategies, there are five distinct types of naval control: absolute control, control of naval work, control of the disputed sea, actual control of the enemy at sea, and absolute control of the enemy at sea.
III- Israel’s Tactics in the Red Sea
On 23 April 2023, in light of Iran’s presence in the Red Sea, the Israeli military announced that it is preparing for a scenario in which maritime security deteriorates. Israel later increased the military alertness in the Red Sea.
1. Developing Quality Weapons
Israel has developed unmanned ships and submarines that are capable of performing a variety of missions, including offensive and espionage ones, in the Red Sea, embracing military applications of artificial intelligence.
Additionally, it joined CENTCOM, giving it access to US military technology, particularly that associated with Force 59 of the Fifth Fleet, and the chance to interact with it. Task Force 59 is a military innovation band tasked with the development of artificial intelligence capabilities, including the production of unmanned ships (military marine robots). Devil Ray T38 and Saildrone Explorer are the first two military pieces to be launched.
In November 2021, the Israeli aerospace and aviation company IAI and EDGE Group signed a strategic partnership agreement to develop cutting-edge unmanned ships. The agreement covers the joint design of a series of drone ships in the 170m class that are adaptable for a wide variety of military and commercial uses.
IAI will develop the independent control system and integrate the various mission payloads into the control system modules in accordance with the requirements of those missions, while Abu Dhabi Ship Building will construct the platform, work on integrating the control and payload systems, and develop the operational concept.
2. Maneuvers
Between 2021 and 2022, Israel carried out six significant naval exercises in the Red Sea, some in partnership with the US and others with Arab and European countries. The most significant of these was the Digital Shield exercise between the Israeli and US armies in September 2022. This was the first exercise of its kind to include Israeli naval vessels and unmanned naval vessels from Force 59 of the United States Fifth Fleet. The drill represents a new variable in Israeli-US military relations, which is reflected in interactions in the region, particularly in the Red Sea.
By stepping up maneuvers in the Red Sea, especially with the United States, Israel aims to achieve several fundamental objectives, including:
- Improving the Israeli army’s logistical capabilities in the far-flung theaters of operations, whether for military support or refueling, given the logistical impossibility of continuing Israeli operations there.
- Incorporating AI-based military applications into traditional military operations.
- Expanding the purview of military action and combining various simulations of attacking enemy targets with ships, missiles, and aircraft.
- Establishing a distinct military presence.
Israel’s goal in signing the Abrahamic normalization agreements (especially with the UAE) is to set up a network of logistical bases in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. In September 2020, information about the UAE and Israel’s plans to build new military and intelligence facilities in Socotra was posted on the US SouthFront website.
According to the Intel Lab, a US website that specializes in intelligence data, the UAE is relying on Israeli experts to set up military bases in Yemen on the Gulf of Aden side as part of a strategic move against Iran.
According to senior Israeli army officials’ strategic readings, it is necessary to build a base of operations on the Sudanese side of the Red Sea. This explains Israel’s initiatives to quicken the normalization process with Sudan.
Normalization with Sudan: Deadlock
In October 2020, Sudan’s president of the transitional Sovereign Council, Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan and Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok signed a normalization agreement with Israel, making Sudan the fourth country to do so after the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco.
However, contacts remained open between Sudanese officials and Israel through covert channels, whether they came from Al-Burhan’s side or Mohamed Dagalo, the RSF commander. This is evidenced by the visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen to Khartoum and his meeting with Al-Burhan with the primary objective of activating the normalization agreement within the framework of economic partnership in the energy and agriculture sectors. Israel is aware that the economic benefits and their impact on the Sudanese people’s standard of living are the first step in achieving penetration of Sudanese society and the Sudanese people’s approval of normalization.
On the other hand, Dagalo visited Israel and met with Israeli Mossad officials several times in order to gain Israeli recognition that would enable him to gain legitimacy and approach the US capital. However, he soon started scheming by traveling to Moscow and starting a political, economic, and security rapprochement with Russia, where he expressed support for the construction of a Russian military base on the Red Sea.
According to the initial Israeli readings, the civil war between Al-Burhan and Daglo appears to have put the Israeli normalization of relations with Sudan back into a state of stagnation.
Estimates abound regarding Israeli interests in Sudan, which include neutralizing an Arab country that played a major role in assisting Hamas in its resistance to Israel, which increases the growth of cooperation and coordination with Iran and the service of its activity in East Africa or the Red Sea, expanding trade and economic cooperation in the energy and agriculture sectors, establishing projects linking Sudan with Ethiopia (the landlocked country), and utilizing Sudan as a strategic gateway to Saharan nations such as Chad, Niger, and Mali, with whom Israel would like to establish full relations.
Israel is placing its bets on Sudan’s military for a number of reasons, including the latter’s recognition of the importance of improving ties with Israel and bolstering joint military and security relations in order to fortify the armed forces and counter non-traditional security threats, and the civilian component’s reluctance to normalize relations with Israel until a permanent resolution to the Palestinian conflict is provided.
Notably, the Sudanese military is divided between the wings of Al-Burhan, commander of the SAF, and Dagalo, commander of the RSF. For Israel, the RSF enjoys several merits, including its proximity to the civilian component when compared to Al-Burhan and its location near the development of eastern Sudan, which is the area bordering the Red Sea.
As such, through the Sudanese military component’s two wings, Israel seeks to expedite normalization and establish Israeli military concentration points on the Red Sea.
Assessment of Israeli efforts
Israel faces challenges on its path to establishing a permanent naval presence in the Red Sea. The most significant barriers can be evaluated as follows:
I- The Palestinian Cause and Policies of the Right-Wing Government
- Due to its reliance on Arab drivers for its land and rail transportation networks, Israel runs the risk of a possible strike by this group during periods of heightened Palestinian-Israeli tension or when right-wing policies are detrimental to the Negev desert’s Palestinian Bedouin community, where future logistics and transportation projects connecting Ashdod and Eilat are planned.
- In emergency situations, the logistical link projects between northern and southern Israel are vulnerable to potential missile attacks from the Palestinian factions.
- Israel’s slow integration into regional military formations, such as its failure to join CTF 153, a combined maritime force operating in the Red Sea under the auspices of the US Army’s Central Command.
- Frequent cyber-attacks targeting Israel’s infrastructure, including its ports, result in financial losses.
- The right-wing policies of the Netanyahu government have caused widespread social unrest among Israelis, leading to waves of strikes and other negative economic effects, such as a reduction in investment in Israel’s critically important infrastructure and high-tech industries.
II. Ambiguity in Israel’s Relationship with Sudan’s Civilian Component
- As part of its repositioning in the Middle East, the United States has become dependent on the civilian components of the region’s countries. This explains the rapidity with which the United States instructed Israel to establish contact with the civilian component in Sudan and not restrict the relationship to the military component (Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Mohamed Dagalo).
- Political reconciliation or normalization of relations with Israel is widely disapproved of by the Sudanese public at large. This explains why Israel currently uses an economic strategy in its dealings with Sudan that places agriculture as a top priority.
Possible Israeli Government Courses of Action in Sudan
The following are the most likely possible paths for the current Israeli government in Sudan:
- Continued Israeli concern for the success of Tel Aviv’s offer to mediate between the warring military factions in Sudan.
- Continued efforts to maintain covert contact with the civilian component in Sudan, beginning with political groups in eastern Sudan, in order to exert pressure on the two warring military components, while preparing to win public support for normalizing relations with Israel.
- Israel will likely seek Israeli-Gulf-US contacts in order to reestablish understanding regarding the formation of a Red Sea regional security formation.
- Israel will make an effort to coordinate with the UAE in order to launch a phase of mediation between the two opposing military sides in Sudan.
Sudan represents an important strategic point in Israel’s geostrategic calculations in the region, particularly in the Red Sea, for a number of reasons, the most important of which are the formulation of Israeli military movements in the Red Sea and the implementation of mega economic projects that would allow Israel to become an important regional hub.
