



RESEARCH PAPER

EGYPT AS A BALANCING POWER:

WHY CAIRO REJECTS THE LOGIC OF WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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At present, Egypt stands as a pivotal regional power and a firmly established strategic pillar of security and stability in the Middle East, drawing on an accumulated reservoir of diplomatic, political, and intelligence experience shaped over decades of direct engagement with the region's crises and complexities. This legacy has enabled Egypt to develop a diverse toolkit for crisis management and to act effectively across active conflict theaters – not only within its immediate geographic periphery to the south, north, east, and west, but also within its broader sphere of strategic influence, which extends to the Horn of Africa, the Nile Basin, the Red Sea, the Arab Levant, the Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean. These interconnected arenas are characterized by an overlap between conventional and non-conventional threats, while simultaneously offering opportunities to reshape regional balances.

The complex and hybrid challenges and threats Egypt has faced over the past fifteen years have constituted a genuine test of the state's capacity for resilience and adaptation, whether in terms of institutional cohesion, the effectiveness of its political management, or its ability to maneuver within a highly fluid and uncertain regional environment. Within this context, Egypt has, to a considerable extent, succeeded in restoring its internal balance, enhancing its comprehensive national capabilities, consolidating the foundations of stability, and embarking on an integrated path of comprehensive development. This trajectory has unfolded in parallel with the restoration of Egypt's capacity for active regional engagement and its involvement in managing surrounding crises. Such engagement has not merely reflected a traditional role, but rather an expression of a deep awareness of Egypt's position as a central state that cannot be bypassed in regional stability equations, and as a cornerstone in any existing or prospective arrangements aimed at reshaping the Middle East.

Conversely, the regional environment is undergoing rapid transformations driven by influential international and regional actors, foremost among them the United States and Israel, aimed at reshaping the balance of power through efforts to dismantle or reengineer the regional security architecture that has endured for decades. This trajectory ultimately seeks to "entrench Israeli superiority" and enable Israel to assume a dominant role over political and security decision-making in the region. It is underpinned by qualitative shifts in US foreign policy, reflecting a transition from managing balances to imposing arrangements – even at the expense of Washington's strategic relationships with its traditional regional partners – and unfolding within a context that clearly intersects with the agendas of the ruling religious far right in Israel.

Against this backdrop, Egypt views the US-Israeli war against Iran as a highly consequential and dangerous inflection point, not only because of its implications for the balance of power among its direct parties, but also due to its far-reaching repercussions for the structure of regional security and the global economy, as well as its direct impact on Egyptian and Arab national security. This war is not merely another round of military escalation; rather, it reflects an attempt to redefine the rules of engagement in the region and impose a new reality that could open the door to prolonged waves of instability.

Accordingly, this analytical paper seeks to deconstruct Egypt's approach to this war through a careful examination of the determinants of its position and its strategic and diplomatic movements. It further assesses whether this stance represents a shift in Egyptian strategic behavior or constitutes a continuation of an established pattern of crisis management, as evidenced by previous positions across multiple files – most notably Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria – thereby reflecting continuity in vision and coherence in the tools employed to navigate a highly complex regional environment

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Foundations of the Egyptian Position

With the outbreak of the US-Israeli war against Iran on February 28, 2026 – a confrontation Egypt had previously sought to avert – Cairo moved swiftly across political, diplomatic, and security levels in an effort to contain the escalation, prevent the expansion of the conflict, and push for a return to the negotiating table, viewing political and diplomatic solutions as the only viable path capable of securing the interests of all parties. The foundations of Egypt’s approach to this war can be outlined as follows:

1- Safeguarding Egyptian National Security:

Preserving Egyptian national security and protecting the state’s strategic interests constitute the central and governing pillar of all foreign policy decision-making, representing a constant principle that has remained unchanged despite shifting regional and international contexts. Within this framework, Cairo views any large-scale confrontation—such as the ongoing war—as a direct, multidimensional threat that extends beyond the military domain to encompass economic, security, and strategic dimensions.

The outbreak of a conflict of this magnitude opens the door to complex scenarios, including disruptions to vital maritime corridors, rising energy and transportation costs, declining investment and tourism flows, and mounting pressure on the national economy amid an already volatile global environment. Moreover, the expansion of hostilities contributes to deepening the state of fluidity and instability across the Middle East, creating a more conducive environment for the proliferation of both conventional and non-conventional threats, including terrorism, irregular migration, and the fragmentation of certain nation-states.

Accordingly, Egypt’s response has been driven by preventive and proactive considerations aimed at containing the repercussions of the conflict before they evolve into direct threats to domestic security, while

emphasizing that regional stability remains a fundamental prerequisite for ensuring the stability of the Egyptian state and safeguarding its vital interests in both the short and long term.

2- Arab Interests:

Cairo is fully cognizant that this war among its three principal parties—Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran—carries deeply destructive implications for Arab interests and capabilities, particularly in the Gulf states, which would bear the greatest burden in terms of security, stability, and national resources should the war persist or expand. This risk is further heightened in the event of alignment between the Trump administration and the ambitions of Netanyahu and the Israeli far right to bring about the collapse of the Iranian regime, regardless of the consequences and outcomes.

Despite the risks posed by Iran's aggressive behavior toward Gulf states and its actions over the past four decades in weakening four Arab capitals, Cairo maintains that there remain viable Arab pathways and strategies that can be pursued—provided intra-Arab divisions are overcome—that could ultimately deter Tehran and steer it toward choosing cooperation and coexistence with its neighbors, rather than pursuing ambitions and illusions of regional hegemony.

3- The Risks of Coercive Reengineering of Regional Security and Disrupting the Balance of Power:

Early anticipation of the evolving transformations in the regional security architecture constitutes a key driver of Egypt's response, particularly in light of Cairo's recognition of a US-backed trajectory—within the framework of Trump-era policies—aimed at forcibly reengineering the Middle East's security system in a manner that produces a structural imbalance in favor of Israel. This approach is predicated on positioning Tel Aviv as the dominant actor in regional political and security decision-making, while promoting it as the principal actor—and even the exclusive proxy—for US interests, at the expense of the roles and interests of other regional powers.

The danger of this trajectory lies not only in redistributing centers of influence, but also in reshaping the very rules governing regional interaction in ways that marginalize Arab roles and undermine the concept of balance which—despite its fragility—has served as a relative guarantor of stability. Moreover, such “coercive reengineering” grants Israel expanded strategic latitude with minimal constraints, whether through the imposition of new facts on the ground in neighboring states or through the adoption of expansionist policies with geographic and security dimensions, facilitated by the absence of counterbalancing forces.

This trajectory is closely linked to efforts to liquidate the Palestinian cause by effectively dismantling the concept of a sovereign Palestinian state and imposing unilateral arrangements that are not grounded in the frameworks of international legitimacy, but rather in asymmetrical power dynamics. Egypt views this as a dual threat—one that not only undermines Palestinian rights, but also erodes the foundations of regional stability and opens the door to prolonged cycles of conflict and uncertainty. Accordingly, Egypt’s actions have been driven by a clear intent to restrain this trajectory, preserve a minimum degree of balance of power, and prevent the region from sliding into a model of unipolar dominance that is inherently unstable and perpetuates a state of persistent, combustible tension.

4- Doubts Regarding the Effectiveness of the US Security Umbrella for the Gulf States:

Doubts have increasingly emerged regarding the strategic effectiveness of the US military infrastructure, bases, and logistical deployments in the Middle East, particularly in light of the practical test imposed by the ongoing war. Developments on the ground have revealed a clear gap between the scale of this military presence and its actual capacity to provide a comprehensive and effective security umbrella for the Gulf states. A significant portion of US defensive capabilities appeared to be directed toward shielding Israel from Iranian missile strikes, while Gulf states, along with Jordan and Iraq, remained exposed to direct threats without the expected level of protection.

In light of this assessment, Egyptian decision-makers developed an early awareness that reliance on this security umbrella is no longer sufficient or guaranteed in its outcomes, and that direct Gulf engagement in offensive military operations alongside the United States and Israel entails substantial strategic risks. Accordingly, Cairo has adopted a cautious approach that seeks, as much as possible, to insulate Gulf states from the trajectory of escalation, confining their role to a defensive framework aimed at protecting their territories and critical infrastructure without being drawn into direct confrontation.

This approach is grounded in a realistic assessment of potential escalation scenarios. Had Gulf states become directly involved in offensive strikes, they would likely have emerged as primary and immediate targets of Iranian retaliation, including attacks on critical infrastructure—foremost among them energy production and export facilities, oil and gas fields, desalination plants, as well as ports and logistical hubs. Such developments would have risked paralyzing key pillars of economic and service life, directly threatening the security and stability of more than 50 million citizens and residents across these states, while also generating severe repercussions for global energy markets and international supply chains.

From this perspective, Egypt's position was not merely a situational reading of wartime developments, but rather an expression of a deeper understanding of shifting patterns of security guarantees and alliances, and the necessity of reassessing reliance on external powers in favor of more balanced and autonomous regional security approaches capable of managing risks without sliding into high-cost open conflicts.

5- Early Anticipation of the Iranian Response:

Cairo's posture was informed by an early strategic assessment—later validated in practice—that a direct confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other would compel the Iranian regime to treat the war as an existential struggle, one that precludes compromise or retreat. The nature of Iran's political system and its historical

experience in crisis management suggest that it would not, under any circumstances, accept a scenario of capitulation or regime collapse; rather, it would seek to maximize the cost of such an outcome by expanding the scope of the conflict and internationalizing its repercussions.

Accordingly, Egypt anticipated that Iran would adopt a strategy centered on externalizing pressure beyond its borders by targeting vital interests across the region, threatening international maritime corridors, and employing non-conventional pressure tools capable of disrupting the military and political calculations of its adversaries. The objective would extend beyond immediate military retaliation to ensuring that the cost of toppling the Iranian regime becomes prohibitively high for all actors, thereby forcing both regional and global stakeholders to bear the consequences of such a course of action, whether in security or economic terms.

These assessments were borne out in Iran's conduct during the course of the war, as Tehran escalated by disrupting maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and launching direct and indirect attacks affecting Gulf states, resulting in significant disruptions to global energy supplies, dislocation of supply chains, and the emergence of a broad inflationary wave. The repercussions of these actions were not confined to the region, but extended to Europe, Asia, Africa, and even the United States itself, underscoring that any open conflict with Iran cannot be geographically contained and rapidly evolves into a multidimensional international crisis.

Egypt's assessment was thus guided by a realistic understanding of the nature and limits of the conflict—namely, that the option of a decisive military resolution against Iran entails not only a high risk of failure, but also profound global strategic and economic costs. This, in turn, reinforced Cairo's inclination to promote de-escalation pathways and to avoid slipping into uncontrollable escalation dynamics.

6- The Risks of Israeli Strategy:

Since the October 7, 2023 attacks, and Israel's subsequent engagement in a large-scale and highly destructive war in the Gaza Strip, the contours of a broader and more far-reaching Israeli strategy have come into focus—

one that extends beyond eliminating the prospect of a Palestinian state to encompass an attempt to reshape the entire region. This has been reflected in repeated statements by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the need to “change the face of the Middle East,” alongside Israel’s pursuit of transformation into a dominant regional power, and even its ambition to emerge as a globally influential actor. This vision aligns with clear efforts to definitively undermine the concept of a Palestinian state and to impose a model of “peace through strength” as the governing framework for Israel’s relations with its regional environment.

This trajectory has not remained confined to political rhetoric, but has been translated into operational strategies and actions on the ground. These include the adoption of an extended “security belt” concept across Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon, the expansion of security and military operations beyond Israel’s borders, including the targeting of resistance movement leaders in regional capitals such as Doha and Tehran, as well as the exploitation and deepening of ethnic and sectarian divisions within regional states in ways that weaken their internal cohesion and render them more susceptible to reshaping in line with Israeli strategic objectives.

Collectively, these dynamics have prompted Egypt to undertake swift and calculated action to contain this trajectory, driven by an awareness of its long-term risks to the structure of the regional order and to the very concept of the nation-state. Cairo views the continuity of this approach as a direct threat to the balance of power and a persistent source of instability and disorder. Accordingly, Egypt’s objective has centered on de-escalating flashpoints, preventing the expansion of conflict, and working to revive political and diplomatic pathways as an alternative framework for managing complex crises.

This approach is grounded in a firm conviction that the continuity of cycles of violence and instability is not merely a consequence of conflict, but also serves as a conducive environment that sustains and reinforces Israeli strategy. Such conditions enable Israel to benefit from regional fragmentation and the erosion of collective state capacity, thereby allowing it greater freedom of action to impose new realities without encountering effective counterbalancing forces. Egypt’s response, therefore, represents

an effort to break this cycle by reducing levels of escalation, preserving a minimum threshold of stability, and preventing the region from descending into an open-ended trajectory of unbalanced dominance.

7- A New US Policy:

Cairo recognized at an early stage—alongside a number of influential regional actors—that US policy under the new administration is moving toward redefining its priorities in the Middle East in a manner that reflects a qualitative shift in the nature of American engagement in the region. This engagement is no longer primarily centered on managing delicate balances among allies, but is increasingly oriented toward reengineering those balances in a way that places Israel in a more advanced and central position, even at the expense of traditional US partners in the region.

This shift reflects a clear transition from a model of “managing balances,” which sought to preserve a degree of stability through the distribution of roles and influence, to a more assertive model based on “imposing arrangements,” whereby Washington aims to reshape the structure of the regional order according to a predefined vision that closely aligns with the priorities and agendas of the Israeli government. The core risk inherent in this transformation lies in the fact that it does not merely redistribute power balances, but threatens to undermine the very foundations upon which traditional alliance relationships have been built, thereby introducing a heightened state of strategic uncertainty among US partners in the region.

At the same time, there has been a growing Egyptian recognition that continuing to address these transformations through unilateral approaches or reactive, ad hoc responses will be insufficient to safeguard Arab interests. This has reinforced the need to develop more cohesive and effective regional frameworks, grounded in narrowing intra-Arab divisions and enhancing political and security coordination among Arab states. Such an approach would enable them to acquire greater negotiating leverage and exert more meaningful influence over the trajectory of international policies, rather than remaining passive recipients of their consequences.

This orientation is also informed by an increasing awareness that both the regional and international systems are undergoing unprecedented transformations, necessitating a deliberate repositioning by key regional powers—foremost among them Egypt—in a manner that preserves their strategic interests and prevents the marginalization of their role in the evolving equations of Middle East restructuring. Accordingly, Egypt’s actions in this context are part of a broader vision aimed at restoring balance to regional and international relations and preventing the region from drifting toward unilateral arrangements that fail to reflect the diversity of interests and power balances among its principal actors.

Early Moves



Signing an agreement to restore technical cooperation between Tehran and the IAEA, Cairo, September 2025

Recent developments have demonstrated that Egypt did not adopt a passive stance; rather, it initiated early and intensive contacts with various direct and indirect actors well before the outbreak of war, in a clear effort to de-escalate tensions and prevent an explosion months in advance. Accordingly, Cairo's current position on the war reflects no shift or departure from its established posture—particularly its consistent rejection of military options as a means of resolving crises, and its emphasis on returning to negotiation and diplomatic tracks to achieve sustainable solutions that safeguard the interests of all parties. Egypt's "early" movements can be outlined as follows:

1- Rebuilding Trust Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency:

On June 2, 2025, shortly before the outbreak of the Twelve-Day War, relations between Tehran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were experiencing a heightened state of mistrust amid escalating disagreements over levels of cooperation and compliance with international oversight of Iran's nuclear program. This tension emerged at an extremely sensitive moment, coinciding with intensive diplomatic efforts led by the Sultanate of Oman to revive negotiations between Iran and the United States in Geneva, reflecting a growing regional awareness of the risks associated with the collapse of the diplomatic track and the potential slide toward escalation.

Cairo moved in line with its traditional role as an active actor capable of building bridges between divergent parties, aiming to narrow trust gaps—particularly between Tehran and the IAEA—on the basis that this track represents a key entry point for containing the nuclear crisis and preventing its escalation. In this context, Egypt hosted a series of high-level meetings that brought together Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi², as part of a structured effort to reactivate channels of technical and political dialogue.

These efforts gained additional momentum with the engagement of Egypt's political leadership. President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi received the IAEA Director General at Al-Ittihadiya Palace¹, in the presence of Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and Director of the General Intelligence Service Hassan Rashad, signaling the seriousness of Egypt's involvement in this file and the level of attention it commands at the highest levels. This diplomatic engagement contributed to creating a shared space for dialogue and succeeded—albeit partially—in easing tensions and rebuilding a degree of trust between Tehran and the Agency, particularly with regard to mechanisms of cooperation with international inspectors.

Although these efforts ultimately proved insufficient to prevent the subsequent slide into confrontation, they clearly demonstrated Egypt's capacity to play an effective role in managing complex files through the

deployment of accumulated diplomatic and intelligence tools, as well as its consistent pursuit of containing crises before they escalate into open conflicts.

2- Cairo and the Twelve-Day War:

Cairo viewed the Israeli war launched against Iran on June 13, 2025—with support from the Trump administration and culminating in limited US participation targeting Iranian nuclear capabilities—as carrying significant risks should it persist or expand. The conflict also undermined mediation efforts led by the Sultanate of Oman, alongside Egypt’s own backchannel initiatives aimed at rebuilding trust among the various parties—the United States, Iran, and the IAEA. Accordingly, Egypt moved politically, diplomatically, and through security channels with multiple actors during this brief war, issuing clear warnings about the dangers of its continuity, potential expansion, and the far-reaching consequences it could have for both the region and the global system.

3- Preventing the Risks of Renewed War:

Following the conclusion of the Twelve-Day War—which represented a fundamental shift in the dynamics of competition and the struggle for influence and dominance in the Middle East—Egypt recognized that this would not be the final confrontation, but rather the first round in a broader trajectory of conflict requiring decisive efforts and coordinated action to prevent renewed escalation. Consequently, Cairo intensified its engagement with Iran, the United States, and other regional and international actors in a serious and pragmatic effort to avert another outbreak of hostilities. In the months immediately following the war, channels of communication and trust between Tehran and Washington, as well as with the IAEA, had effectively collapsed, amid a clear hardening of positions—both from the Trump administration, which imposed stringent conditions on Iran for any potential agreement, and from Tehran, which announced the suspension of its engagement and cooperation with the Agency.

4- Rebuilding Bridges of Trust Between Iran and the IAEA:

Egyptian diplomacy intensified its efforts, culminating in September 2025 with Cairo hosting a trilateral meeting that brought together the Iraqi Foreign Minister and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi . This engagement resulted in an agreement between Iran and the Agency to resume technical cooperation and to adopt practical steps for verifying activities at Iranian nuclear facilities, alongside enhanced transparency measures. The agreement constituted a new operational framework for restoring mutual trust between Iran and the IAEA and served as a launching point for a more transparent phase in their relationship, contributing to the resolution of outstanding technical concerns. Its announcement underscored the success of Egypt's intensive diplomatic efforts in a serious attempt to prevent a renewed military confrontation. Notably, following this agreement, Egypt maintained ongoing communication with Tehran, the Agency, the United States, and various regional and international actors to build momentum and support for the resumption of negotiations.

5- Rejection of Nuclear Weapons:

Egypt's position stands out as one of the most historically consistent, grounded in its principled rejection of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East and its call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone without exception or selectivity. This stance reflects a strategic vision aimed at addressing the root causes of regional tension rather than merely managing its consequences, by preventing the emergence of a nuclear arms race that could lead to catastrophic confrontations. It is also closely linked to Egypt's longstanding demand for the comprehensive and equitable application of the non-proliferation regime, ensuring that all parties—including Israel—are subject to the same international rules and standards, and preventing the double standards that exacerbate instability.

Taken together, these determinants and considerations confirm that Egypt's position on the ongoing US-led war does not reflect a sudden shift

or departure from prior stances, but rather constitutes a natural extension of a consistent approach characterized by early engagement—months before the outbreak of hostilities—in de-escalation and mediation efforts, sustained attempts to prevent the reactivation of a military trajectory, and a continuous push to keep channels of communication open in order to reduce the likelihood of escalation and preserve the prospects for political solutions.

Egypt and Support for the Gulf States



A close examination of Egypt's position on the US-Israeli war against Iran reveals that it has been anchored in three principal pillars: rejection of war, rejection of aggression against Arab states, and rejection of transforming the region into an arena for settling scores. From this perspective, Cairo has approached the crisis as a test of the concept of the responsible regional state, rather than a temporary management of a passing crisis. It has also represented a practical test of the core tenets of Egyptian foreign policy, which views Arab national security as an indivisible whole, with Gulf security constituting an integral component of the broader Arab national security framework. This has been reflected in the following:

1. Rejection of Iranian Aggression Against Gulf States:

With the outbreak of war on February 28, and Iran's subsequent targeting of Gulf states, alongside Jordan and Iraq, in response to US-Israeli strikes that on their first day resulted in the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and a number of senior figures, Cairo moved immediately to intensify its contacts with Arab states. On the same day, President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi conducted a series of telephone calls³ with the leaders of Gulf states—including Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the Sultanate of Oman—as well as with Jordan and Iraq. These discussions focused on reaffirming Egypt's full support for these countries in confronting Iranian attacks and its categorical rejection of any violation of their sovereignty or threat to their security and stability. At the same time, Cairo underscored its consistent position on the necessity of returning to dialogue and diplomatic channels as the sole viable path for resolving the crisis, warning that military solutions would not serve the interests of any party, but would instead drive the region toward greater instability and disorder.

Presidential communications conducted and received by President El-Sisi during the first three weeks of the war also reflected the breadth of Egypt's engagement at both the regional and international levels. In this context, on March 13, the President received a phone call from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian⁴, during which he reiterated Egypt's clear condemnation of Iran's targeting of Gulf states, as well as Jordan and Iraq, emphasizing that these countries were not parties to the conflict but had instead sought to promote de-escalation and support negotiation efforts. He further stressed the necessity of an immediate cessation of attacks and a return to the principles of good neighborliness and political solutions.

In parallel, Egypt's efforts included intensive diplomatic engagement led by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty with various parties to the crisis, as well as with his counterparts from Arab and regional states and major international powers, including the United States, Russia, China, and several European countries, as part of a comprehensive effort to contain escalation and expand avenues for de-escalation.

2. Shuttle Diplomacy:

Two weeks after the outbreak of the war, and in parallel with Egypt's intensive efforts to de-escalate tensions and revive the negotiation track, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty undertook a regional tour on March 13, 2026, that included several Gulf states—Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the Sultanate of Oman—as well as Jordan, at a time when hostilities and tensions were continuing to escalate. This tour reflected Egypt's supportive stance toward these countries, its firm rejection of any aggression targeting them, and its refusal to allow them to bear the costs of a conflict to which they were not a party. These efforts continued through subsequent rounds of shuttle diplomacy, including meetings in Saudi Arabia and visits to Pakistan, Iraq, Russia, and Kuwait, as part of an active diplomatic endeavor to coordinate positions, contain the crisis, and advance de-escalation pathways.

3. Presidential Visits to the Gulf:

Following the diplomatic initiatives led by the Foreign Minister, President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi⁵ undertook a solidarity tour on March 19 and 21, visiting Qatar, the United Arab Emirates⁶, Bahrain⁷, and Saudi Arabia⁸. These visits conveyed clear political messages⁹ affirming Egypt's full support for Gulf states and its categorical rejection of any aggression targeting them or undermining their sovereignty. The tour further underscored Egypt's unequivocal position that the security of the Gulf states constitutes an integral part of Egyptian national security, as well as of the broader framework of Arab national security.

This stance is not merely a transient diplomatic expression, but rather reflects a deeply rooted strategic equation that has guided Egyptian behavior for decades, as demonstrated through its historical roles in supporting the security and stability of Gulf states. Accordingly, the challenges facing the concept of building a unified Arab force do not diminish this constancy; rather, they reinforce the need to develop more effective mechanisms for Arab security coordination and integration that

transcend intra-Arab divisions, ensuring the capacity to confront escalating threats and preserve regional stability. Egypt's consistent calls for political and diplomatic solutions further underscore its view that any fragmentation of the Arab position or erosion of the concept of collective security ultimately serves the logic of regional disorder, benefiting non-Arab powers with ambitions of hegemony and control over Arab resources.

Consistency of Position Across Other Files

Egypt's reading of the war against Iran stems from the same perspective that has governed its handling of the Gaza crisis for more than two and a half years: that there is no definitive military solution, no genuine stability without a political track, and no regional security absent arrangements that preserve state sovereignty and dignity while preventing unrestrained military expansion. This logic underpins Cairo's self-perception as a force for de-escalation rather than confrontation, and as an actor that extinguishes rather than ignites crises, while maintaining clear and consistent positions across various files in alignment with the higher interests of Egypt and the Arab world. This has been clearly reflected in the following:

1. Egypt and the Rejection of Displacement and the Liquidation of the Palestinian Cause:

For more than two and a half years since the October 7, 2023 attacks, Egypt has maintained a firm and unwavering position—one it has neither retreated from nor intends to abandon—rejecting any strategies aimed at displacing the population of Gaza from their land, whether to Egypt or to any third country, given the implications such actions would have for Egyptian sovereignty and national security, as well as their ultimate effect of liquidating the Palestinian cause. This decisive and consistent position has been reflected in all of Egypt's political, diplomatic, and security efforts throughout the months of the war, during which Israel waged a campaign that targeted more than two million Palestinians.

With the arrival of the Trump administration in January 2025, and amid indications of a clear alignment by the White House with the aspirations of the Israeli far right regarding the displacement of Gaza's population and the liquidation of the Palestinian cause, Egypt stood alone in clearly articulating its categorical rejection of any measures

that would undermine Palestinian rights. It maintained this stance in the face of considerable pressure, adhering to its principles and to the same determinants that ultimately shaped the ceasefire track and the peace agreement signed in Sharm El-Sheikh¹⁰ in October 2025, in a manner consistent with Egyptian and Arab interests. Cairo subsequently continued its efforts to consolidate de-escalation, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and prevent the collapse of the process—demonstrating that its accumulated experience in managing complex files is not merely rhetorical, but a sustained practice.

2. Consistency of the Position on Syria Before and After Assad’s Departure:

Contrary to some prevailing interpretations that suggest a shift in Egypt’s position toward the Syrian crisis—whether during the tenure of former President Bashar al-Assad or following the fall of the regime on December 8, 2024—available evidence indicates that Egypt’s stance has remained fundamentally consistent, with no substantive change. Cairo has continued to emphasize the necessity of a comprehensive political process that includes all components of the Syrian people, ensuring the preservation of Syria’s unity, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, alongside its categorical rejection of external violations—foremost among them ongoing Israeli attacks, the occupation of the Golan Heights, and expansion in southern Syria in violation of international law.

This consistency reflects a deep Egyptian understanding that the stability and unity of Syria constitute a cornerstone of regional security balances, and that any disruption to this equation would open the door to further fragmentation and instability across the region. Accordingly, Cairo has maintained its approach based on supporting comprehensive political solutions and rejecting scenarios of partition or the imposition of faits accomplis, underscoring the coherence and continuity of Egyptian policy in addressing one of the most complex crises in the region.

3. Consistency of the Position on Lebanon:

Egypt's vision and engagement strategy regarding Lebanon are clearly grounded in supporting the stability of the Lebanese state and preserving its unity and national institutions. Cairo has consistently emphasized the need for Israel to cease all military attacks on Lebanese territory, given that such actions constitute a flagrant violation of sovereignty and a direct threat to state stability. Egypt also reiterates its firm support for Lebanon's unity, the necessity of respecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the importance of enabling its national institutions to perform their roles without external interference or pressure. In this context, Cairo has repeatedly called for Israel's full and immediate withdrawal from Lebanese territory and for the comprehensive and non-selective implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, in a manner that ensures the consolidation of de-escalation and prevents renewed escalation. This approach underscores that Egypt's position is rooted in a consistent strategic vision that supports the nation-state and rejects any efforts to undermine it or compromise its sovereignty.

Taken together, these positions—including Egypt's handling of escalation with Iran—demonstrate that Egyptian foreign policy operates according to a consistent framework not dictated by immediate developments, but by a deeply rooted strategic vision centered on preserving the nation-state, rejecting hegemony and open-ended conflicts, and prioritizing political solutions as the sole pathway to stability. The coherence of Egypt's stance across the Gaza, Syrian, and Lebanese files, alongside its position on the war, reflects a clear orientation aimed at containing crises, preventing regional fragmentation, and preserving balance in the face of successive waves of escalation.

Egypt is an Indispensable Actor

Conclusion

This analysis demonstrates that Egypt does not operate as a passive observer, but as a central actor possessing a coherent vision and effective tools for crisis management, grounded in preventing escalation, safeguarding Egyptian and Arab national security, and preserving regional balances. Its approach to the war against Iran—much like its positions on Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon—reflects a consistent strategy that rejects military solutions and relies instead on political and diplomatic pathways to achieve genuine and sustainable stability.

This role extends to defending the continuity of the nation-state, preserving regional cohesion, and preventing the region from sliding into chaos or being subjected to unilateral arrangements, thereby reinforcing Egypt's position as a fundamental pillar in the regional security equation. Accordingly, Cairo is not a marginal actor, but an indispensable one—present with its weight and experience in the most complex files—operating according to a clear logic: safeguarding Arab interests, containing conflict, and rejecting the governance of the region through military force alone.

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1. President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi receives the Director General of the IAEA- June 2, 2025 [https://www.presidency.eg/ar/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news2620251/-](https://www.presidency.eg/ar/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news2620251/)
2. Cairo hosts a trilateral meeting between the Egyptian and Iranian foreign ministers and the Director General of the IAEA. Iran and the IAEA sign an agreement to resume cooperation – Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – September 2025 <https://www.mfa.gov.eg/ar/Ministers/Details/ForeignMinisterMeetings/2915>
3. President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi holds telephone calls with leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, as well as Jordan and Iraq – February 28, 2026 <https://www.presidency.eg/ar/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news28022026-4/> [https://www.presidency.eg/ar/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news280220265/-](https://www.presidency.eg/ar/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news280220265/)
4. President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi receives a phone call from the Iranian President – March 13, 2026 [https://www.presidency.eg/ar/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news130320261/-](https://www.presidency.eg/ar/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news130320261/)
5. President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi pays fraternal visits to both the United Arab Emirates and the State of Qatar – March 19, 2026 <https://www.presidency.eg/ar/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news1932026/>
6. President El-Sisi visits the UAE and Qatar, and affirms: Gulf security is an extension of Egyptian national security. <https://www.youm7.com/story/202619/3/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%89-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%7348032/86>
7. Egyptian President and King of Bahrain: Protecting Maritime Routes is a Shared International Responsibility – March 21, 2026 <https://asharq.com/politics/176410/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9/>
8. President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi pays a short fraternal visit to the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – March 21, 2026 [https://www.presidency.eg/ar/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news210320261/-](https://www.presidency.eg/ar/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news210320261/)
9. Saudi News Channel - Egyptian President arrives in Jeddah, Crown Prince foremost among his recipients - March 21, 2026 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e-cJQH_l1bk
10. Sharm El-Sheikh Summit: Mediators sign Donald Trump's Gaza ceasefire agreement – October 13, 2025 <https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/ckgkzj99zx3o>