By using ECSS site, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.
Accept
ECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic StudiesECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies
  • Home
  • International Relations
    International Relations
    Show More
    Top News
    Another obstacle on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam?
    June 5, 2020
    Varied paths of reform in Africa
    March 22, 2019
    G20 Membership Justified: Africa and the Road to the G20
    June 14, 2020
    Latest News
    2025 Yearender: Flood fallout
    January 20, 2026
    A Strategic reorientation: A critical reading of the 2025 US National Security Strategy
    January 18, 2026
    A diplomatic maneuver: Israel’s recognition of Somaliland
    January 17, 2026
    2025 Yearender: China’s multipolar world
    January 15, 2026
  • Defense & Security
    Defense & Security
    Show More
    Top News
    A Multi-dimensional Affair: Women and Terrorism in Africa
    June 14, 2020
    On deradicalisation: Marc Sageman and the psychology of jihadists
    June 22, 2020
    Assessing Deterrent Measures and the Prospects of War: US Military Movement in the Gulf to Confront Iran
    June 22, 2020
    Latest News
    Israel-Iran War: Does Israel Stand Alone?
    June 18, 2025
    Navigating Security and Diplomacy: What Russia’s Delisting of the Taliban Means for Bilateral Ties
    May 17, 2025
    Lakurawa: Armed Bandit Violence in Nigeria
    May 12, 2025
    Europe amid US–Iran Escalation: Can It Play the Diplomat or Become Entangled in the Crisis?
    April 13, 2025
  • Public Policy
    Public Policy
    Show More
    Top News
    Sinai: A Strategy for Development amid Fighting Terrorism
    June 17, 2020
    Egypt’s Comprehensive Vision for Human Rights
    June 22, 2020
    The Right to Health in Egypt
    June 22, 2020
    Latest News
    Weaponization of Resources: The Role of Rare Earth Metals in the US-China Trade War
    May 25, 2025
    The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: A Catalyst or a Challenge for Egypt’s Export Ambitions?
    May 15, 2025
    The Suez Canal amidst Global Competition (3): National Strides Outpacing Time
    April 29, 2025
    Gaza’s Changing Demographics: The Toll of War and Blockade
    March 9, 2025
  • Analysis
    • Opinion
    • Analysis
    • Situation Assessment
    • Readings
  • Activities
    • Conferences
    • ECSS Agenda
    • Panel Discussion
    • Seminar
    • Workshops
  • ECSS Shop
  • العربية
  • Defense & Security
  • International Relations
  • Public Policy
All Rights Reserved to ECSS © 2022,
Reading: Drones and the Kremlin Bring Back Excitement to the Ukraine War
Share
Notification Show More
Latest News
Book Review | The struggle for economic sovereignty: Who owns the instruments of power?
Readings
Displacement from Gaza: Deconstructing the idea, doctrine, and plan
Readings
The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies participates in the 57th Cairo International Book Fair for the sixth year
Readings
2025 Yearender: Flood fallout
Iranian Studies Palestinian & Israeli Studies
A Strategic reorientation: A critical reading of the 2025 US National Security Strategy
Palestinian & Israeli Studies
Aa
ECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic StudiesECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies
Aa
  • اللغة العربية
  • International Relations
  • Defense & Security
  • Special Edition
  • Public Policy
  • Analysis
  • Activities & Events
  • Home
  • اللغة العربية
  • Categories
    • International Relations
    • Defense & Security
    • Public Policy
    • Analysis
    • Special Edition
    • Activities & Events
    • Opinions Articles
  • Bookmarks
Follow US
  • Advertise
All Rights Reserved to ECSS © 2022, Powered by EgyptYo Business Services.
Opinions Articles

Drones and the Kremlin Bring Back Excitement to the Ukraine War

Khaled Okasha
Last updated: 2023/07/23 at 2:10 PM
Khaled Okasha
Share
8 Min Read
SHARE

The recent entrance of two drones into the Kremlin has caused much speculation. It is a peculiar attack for which there is no apparent explanation, given the drones’ ability to fly hundreds of kilometers over Russian territory, assuming they were launched from inside Ukraine, and the failure of the Russian security and air defense systems, which are supposed to provide a strict fence of protection on the strategic sites of the Russian state, and there is nothing more important than the Kremlin citadel that houses the Russian president’s office, residence, and key institutions like the Security Council of Russia. 

The Pantsir-S1 air cover system, which gained prominence and significance as the most effective Russian product in the field of air defense, has been thoroughly embarrassed after the attack, as it was promoted as a robust anti-aircraft and anti-missile system capable of striking lightly armored ground targets and enemy manpower during the Ukrainian war.

The recent attack had immediate consequences, even before the perpetrators were identified, as it exposed the entire Russian Air Defense Force to great embarrassment after having been promoted at the outset of the Ukrainian war as being a robust anti-aircraft and anti-missile system, capable of striking lightly armored ground targets and enemy manpower, by this, NATO’s capabilities, not Ukraine alone, were intended. The Pantsir system is also the last line of defense for Russian military and civilian installations, as well as Moscow’s most vulnerable geographic areas. For this reason, the Russian military has been using it in Crimea since 2018.

This system is the last line of defense because it is designed to shield Russian long-range air defense systems such as the S-300 and S-400 from being attacked by cutting-edge, high-tech air attack weapons, especially because it has ultraviolet rays that can be used to destroy ammunition against hostile targets approaching from low and very low altitudes. When that advanced Russian system went into service in 2010, it was said to have outstanding capabilities.

But is it practically possible for two drones to penetrate an air defense system operating at this level of effectiveness? That’s why some people have cast doubt on whether or not Ukraine was responsible for the attack. The initial US perspective was that President Putin required such a “symbolic” attack in order to invest it internally in an anticipated escalation. Russia’s firm response to the attack, which was widely seen as an attempt to kill President Putin, and the escalating threat that accompanied it gave rise to the impression that Russia would launch a major retaliation.

As per usual, Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of the Russian Federation’s Security Council, presided over the event. In his opening remarks, he said that as a result of the drone attack, Russia had no choice but to eliminate President Zelensky and his advisors. Meanwhile, the US Secretary of State confirmed his familiarity with the initial details of the attack, but he expressed the desire to proceed with extreme caution given the peculiarity of what had occurred. Russia’s accusation against Washington of being behind the attack became a stable reality starting the day after it occurred, Dmitry Peskov outlining the roles of those involved in the attack, emphasizing that American planning and decision-making were involved, while the Ukrainian role in the operation, which he described as terrorist, was limited to implementation only. Considering the unrestricted intelligence assistance provided by the United States to Kiev, this is a reasonable assumption; however, if we accept it at face value, we are once again confronted with the square of the Russian defense failure and the questions that surround it.

During times of war, similar precise questions remain unanswered, shrouded in ambiguity that is typically not resolved in the short term, and accusations remain pending even if intelligence services discover who the perpetrator is, as they usually become reluctant to disclose this information as long as they do not gain an operational advantage from it. It is, nevertheless, still true that two drone attacks, with a 16-minute gap between them, occurred. A small explosion was caused by the first drone attack, which happened at 2:27 am Moscow time, over the Kremlin Senate palace. With the second assault, the anti-aircraft defenses appeared to have awakened. The drone debris hit the Kremlin grounds at 2:43 am, indicating that it was shot down before it reached its intended destination. The attack and its location were widely broadcast in the media, without the logically anticipated Russian attempt to conceal it, which forms the basis of the skeptic’s perspective. Russia’s response disregarded the logically assumed embarrassment and demonstrated Moscow’s coherence and indifference towards a precise attack that touches the lair of “sovereignty” in wartime, which is really exciting and suspicious, especially since the attack occurred only a few days before 9 May, which marks Victory Day, and a few meters also separate the site of the attack from the location of the most significant national celebration.

Given the symbolism of such an attack and disregarding potential moral losses for the Russian people, is Moscow genuinely attempting to set the scene, bearing in mind that the Ukraine conflict is “existential” to the Russian people? In reality, the majority of the Russian public has been adamantly calling for months to intensify military operations in order to end the conflicts with a decisive field victory that will ensure their safety and psychological satisfaction. However, given numerous indications of armament and ammunition shortages, it appears that Russia was unable to accomplish this. The lack of readiness put the commander of Wagner’s forces, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a very bizarre position, as he claimed that the Ukrainian counterattack had begun on 3 May, which was implausible. Then, does this claim have any relation to the events on Kremlin Square? The temporal synchronicity is intriguing. Furthermore, Prigozhin never stopped upsetting Moscow and humiliating the army generals, so where is the truth, and what are its dimensions?

The Arabic version of this article was originally published in Al-Ahram on 6 May. 

Related Posts

Gaza Crisis between Israeli and American Perspectives

The End of Globalization?

Troubled Waters in Jenin Camp

Is It Time for the Arab Deal of the Century?

Khaled Okasha May 10, 2023
Share this Article
Facebook Twitter Whatsapp Whatsapp LinkedIn Telegram Email Copy Link Print
Khaled Okasha
By Khaled Okasha
General Manager

Stay Connected

Facebook Like
Twitter Follow
Instagram Follow
Youtube Subscribe

Latest Articles

Ukraine Crisis: Deeper Collision Under Murky Water?
Opinions Articles February 23, 2022
Effective protection: Egypt counters coronavirus repercussions on women
Public Policy December 7, 2020
Achievements of the 2020 elections
Public Policy January 9, 2021
Reading into the Global Terrorism Index 2024: Terrorism and Organized Crime in the African Sahel (4)
Terrorism & Armed Conflict March 20, 2024

Latest Tweets

//

The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies is an independent non-profit think tank providing decision-makers by Policy alternatives, the center was established in 2018 and comprises a group of experts and researchers from different generations and scientific disciplines.

International Relations

  • African Studies
  • American Studies
  • Arab & Regional Studies
  • Asian Studies
  • European Studies
  • Palestinian & Israeli Studies

Defence & Security

  • Armament
  • Cyber Security
  • Extremism
  • Terrorism & Armed Conflict

Public Policies

  • Development & Society
  • Economic & Energy Studies
  • Egypt & World Stats
  • Media Studies
  • Public Opinion
  • Women & Family Studies

Who we are

The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS) is an independent Egyptian think tank established in 2018. The Center adopts a national, scientific perspective in examining strategic issues and challenges at the local, regional, and international levels, particularly those related to Egypt’s national security and core national interests.

The Center’s output is geared toward addressing national priorities, offering anticipatory visions for policy and decision alternatives, and enhancing awareness of various transformations through diverse forms of scientific production and research activities.

All Rights Reserved to Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies - ECSS © 2023

Removed from reading list

Undo
Welcome Back!

Sign in to your account

Lost your password?