Over recent decades, Beijing has become increasingly engaged in global affairs. So much so that many observers believe it is on track to leading the world away from monopolar hegemony to a fairer multipolar order, one that Beijing describes as “a community with a shared future for humanity.”
The Chinese leadership has consistently stressed that it does not seek to become a global hegemon. Rather, it seeks to promote a world characterised by a communal spirit based on mutual benefits. It argues that its own development relied on the international community and that it has not forgotten the debt it owes, which it now seeks to reciprocate by giving back. Therefore, so the argument goes, China’s global rise should be seen as an opportunity for the international community, not a threat or a challenge.
The model of global leadership China aims to embody is in stark contrast with that of the US. Major powers should shoulder responsibilities in ways that suit their status. They should dedicate themselves to creating a better future for humankind, which means advancing efforts to promote global peace and development. Their relations with others should be guided by dialogue rather than confrontation, partnership rather than adversarial alliances, a vision of the international community as a space for shared human development and peaceful coexistence rather than a geo-strategic game board and a battlefield.
In his speech at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) “Plus” meeting in Tianjin on 1 September 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), which calls on countries to work in concert for a more just and equitable global governance system. The GGI consists of five core principles: Commitment to sovereign equality to ensure the inclusion of all states in international decision-making; Abiding by international law and being committed to the equal and uniform application of its rules; Practising multilateralism through extensive consultation, collaboration, and shared benefits; Promoting people-centred approaches that place the citizens of every country front and centre as both actors in and beneficiaries of global governance; and Focusing on taking real action through comprehensive and coordinated global measures with the full mobilisation of available resources.
The GGI is the fourth landmark global initiative proposed by Xi in recent years, after the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilisation Initiative. Together they form the pillars of a comprehensive political, economic, security, and cultural vision for an international order in which China is a gravitational force. China is acting on its official multipolar discourse. Its ambition to pioneer such a new order is a main driver of its diplomatic, political and economic engagements in both bilateral and multilateral contexts. In addition to rallying international support for multilateralism, Beijing’s actions aim to achieve two principal objectives. One is to secure access to the resources it needs to sustain its astounding economic growth and development. The other is to ensure a continued global consensus regarding its sovereignty over Taiwan, and hence its right to unify the island with the Chinese mainland and counter Taiwanese separatist forces and others that might obstruct this goal.
Over the past few decades, China has built a vast and increasingly influential global economic presence. It has become the largest trading partner of more than 128 countries and a major source of foreign direct investment and infrastructure financing. Chinese economic initiatives – above all the Belt and Road Initiative – have become a chief component of the development strategies of many countries in the Global South.
In its drive to promote multilateralism, China has pursued two parallel tracks. The first involves bringing partners aboard new international organisations that can lay the groundwork for a multipolar order. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS are the most salient examples. Both have expanded in membership and scope in recent years, becoming SCO Plus and BRICS Plus. The second track entails engaging with other regional cooperation organisations in which it is not a member. Examples include the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, the China-CELAC (Latin America and Caribbean) Forum, and the China-Arab Cooperation Forum. China has a partnership with ASEAN and engages with the EU through a strategic dialogue and summits.
The outcomes of these many interactions demonstrate China’s ability to establish common ground with partners based on mutual respect and shared interests. Moreover, Beijing has also demonstrated its ability to manage disputes in these contexts. For example, despite longstanding disagreements over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN signed, in late October 2025, an agreement to expand free trade. The agreement testifies to the success of the Chinese approach of setting aside differences and rejecting confrontationism in favour of prioritising common interests.
As it expanded its global presence, China has shown a particular interest in the Middle East. Its relationship with this region has recently shifted gears, from “presence building” to “proactive engagement.” In other words, China has shifted from quietly but steadily expanding its political and economic relations to developing military and security ties while simultaneously involving itself as a mediator in the region’s crises.
This transformation reflects China’s growing global standing: a developing nation that is now head-to-head with the US in many crucial areas. Given its own background, China’s views on many regional and global issues often align with those of many states in the Middle East, which are acting on the need to diversify their relations rather than continuing to depend solely on the US.
China is now one of the largest trading partners of all the countries in the region. In view of China’s rapidly expanding industrial base since the late 20th century and its consequent growing demand for oil, it has turned to the Middle East as the only region capable of meeting this need. Hydrocarbons and chemicals, including petrochemicals, account for about 90 per cent of total Middle East exports to China, which imports around half its oil needs from the Middle East.
China’s success in mediating a landmark reconciliation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023 marked a turning point in its role in this region. Now, in addition to relations based on promoting sustainable development, Beijing presented itself as a force for peace and stability in the region. In the process, it demonstrated the effectiveness of its dispute resolution approach, based on peaceful dialogue and consultations, in contrast to the American unilateral sanctions and confrontationist approach.
China’s mediation success was crowned by the recent expansion of BRICS, with the addition of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran. BRICS Plus is further testimony to the fact that regional stability is best ensured through broader spaces for cooperation and dialogue.
During the recent Israeli war on Gaza and the consequent regional escalation, China’s positions echoed that of most regional powers. It stressed the need to halt hostilities to avert further escalation and reaffirmed the call for the two-state solution as the legitimate path to resolving the conflict. China also drew attention to Washington’s responsibility for the conflict through its long and unflagging pro-Israeli bias and its total disregard for the lives and welfare of the Palestinians.
In its quest to serve as a model of what a major power can be, China has enhanced its image as a world power that supports world peace and stability, mutual benefits and shared prosperity. This is indeed a polar opposite of the US model.
However, the train of international crises – from the war in Ukraine, the recent India-Pakistan confrontation, and the Pakistan-Afghanistan flareup, to the regional repercussions of the Israeli genocide in Gaza – have shed light on the limits China appears to have set for its role on the global stage.
China is aware of the heavy costs the US has sustained as the unipolar hegemon. It would not want such costs to encumber its own economic growth plans and therefore seems to prefer to let Washington continue bearing the burden of security guarantor, especially in the Middle East. This allows China to pursue its interests in this region – especially its economic interests – without being shackled with additional political-security costs. Moreover, the more Washington is preoccupied with security in this region, the less attention it can pay to the Indo-Pacific, Beijing’s core area of strategic concern.
In this spirit, China has consistently refrained from militarising its foreign policy, especially in regions far from its geopolitical neighbourhood – which, understandably, remains its top priority due to security concerns and challenges to its sovereign claims to Taiwan and in the South China Sea. China’s foreign policy, even with adversaries, will always turn first to diplomatic messaging and its considerable political and economic tools. It has always avoided any form of military entanglement in distant international crises.
Nevertheless, China’s growing military capabilities – which were on full display during the Victory Day military parade on 3 September 2025 – have raised concerns among states with overlapping territorial claims. The parade drove home what it could cost others should they venture to confront China. The message was that China would not avoid conflict, if conflict is thrust upon it. It is precisely for such an eventuality that it has been building its military, economic, technological, and political strengths. Beijing has made it clear that it will not let others impose conditions that are inimical to its interests and that all stood to benefit by responding positively to China’s initiatives in the constructive spirit that inspired them.
On the other hand, China has demonstrated that it will not shrink from escalation in other ways in response to escalatory behaviour towards it. This was evidenced in Beijing’s answer to Trump’s decision to ban exports of advanced semi-conductor chips and chip manufacturing technologies to China: to tighten export controls on many of the rare earth and other materials that go into the chip manufacturing machinery itself. In other words, China demonstrated its ability to leverage the advantage of being at the beginning of the semiconductor supply chain – and its willingness to do so to counter challenges to its sovereignty and national interests.
Of course, China is not the only country targeted by Washington’s hegemonic practices. In fact, opposing US unilateralism is one of the main themes connecting China with its international partners. These partners, in turn, might face pressures from Washington through combinations of the carrot (incentives) or the stick (punitive economic measures or military threats), coaxing them away from China). An element of uncertainty will continue to hover over China’s international partnerships, to varying degrees.
The spike in tensions between Beijing and Tokyo since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi came to power is an example of the stress under which some of China’s bilateral ties can be placed, despite the principle of mutual benefit. China and Japan have deep economic interdependence in trade, investment, and supply chains, but the Taiwan question coupled with the pull of Japan’s heavy dependency on the US exerts a strong negative impact on Chinese-Japanese relations.
China’s discourse and actions express an awareness of its limitations as a global actor. Some of these are self-imposed – it does not seek to supplant the US as a hegemon, for practical and ideological reasons, as explained above. Some are externally imposed by geopolitical and economic realities. However, China remains determined to shore up its strength as a major power within the multipolar global order it is trying to shape, where the US nonetheless retains its position of leadership.
Accordingly, China will continue to develop the means to reform the international system from within. It will strengthen its presence in international institutions at a time when Washington is turning its back on them. It will assert its influence in global issues that Washington no longer prioritises, such as climate change, clean energy, and green infrastructural development. At the same time, Beijing will continue to rally opposition against hegemonic and unilateral practices while building consensus behind global development, peace, and “a community with a shared future for humanity.”
Published in cooperation between the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Weekly, and the English-language portal Ahram Online.
