The Syrian-Lebanese border has recently witnessed an alarming escalation, following clashes between Syrian security forces and armed Lebanese tribes residing in border villages on the Syrian side. This confrontation erupted after the Syrian government launched a military operation on February 6, 2025, in western Homs countryside—particularly in the villages of Hawik, Jarmash, and al-Heet—with the stated aim of combating drug trafficking and dismantling captagon production facilities. The operation resulted in casualties on both sides, as well as a series of retaliatory kidnappings.
What began as localized skirmishes quickly spiraled beyond the Syrian border, reaching Lebanese territory and prompting the Lebanese army to intervene in order to secure the country’s northeastern frontier. This escalation raises pressing questions about the underlying motives behind these border clashes and the broader implications they entail.
Building on this context, this article explores how the situation evolved from tribal negotiations over border control to intermittent clashes, eventually leading to a full-scale Syrian military operation against tribal militants stationed along the Syrian border. It also examines the connection between these events and the Lebanese ceasefire agreement, as well as Israel’s complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Additionally, the article delves into the underlying drivers of the conflict—both the officially stated motives and the unspoken agendas tied to Syria’s new leadership and its regional alliances.
I. Between Diplomacy and Armed Conflict: The Syrian-Lebanese Border Clashes
The 370-kilometer Syrian-Lebanese border has long been plagued by security challenges, exacerbated by the ongoing political and military turbulence in both countries. The latest flashpoint emerged from a Syrian military operation targeting so-called “wanted individuals involved in arms and drug smuggling” in villages predominantly inhabited by Lebanese tribes, including the Jaafar, Zeaiter, and Madlej clans. The offensive also led to the rescue of two Syrian security officers who had been abducted during the fighting. Heavy and medium weaponry, including artillery shells and drones, were used in the clashes, with some projectiles landing inside Lebanese territory. The violence resulted in multiple casualties and injuries on both sides of the conflict, as well as among Lebanese civilians. Additionally, the clashes saw a series of mutual kidnappings between armed Lebanese tribal groups in Syria and Syrian security forces.
As violence escalated, reports emerged of the Lebanese army stepping in as a mediator between Syrian forces and the armed tribes in an effort to secure the release of hostages. However, the situation deteriorated further on February 8, when Lebanese border villages in Hermel came under fire from the Syrian side, resulting in additional casualties among Lebanese civilians. In response, the Lebanese army deployed reinforcements to the Al-Qaa border region, issued orders to return fire at sources of attack from Syrian territory, and expanded its presence along the border. The escalation also prompted armed Lebanese tribal fighters to retreat behind Lebanese army lines after calling on the military to intervene to protect border towns.
Against this backdrop, Beirut opened diplomatic channels with Damascus to contain the crisis. On February 7, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun held a phone call with Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, during which both sides agreed to coordinate efforts to prevent further civilian casualties and restore stability to the region.
These clashes came in the wake of a failed tribal initiative aimed at regulating border security and curbing cross-border criminal activities. Syrian Aliwi tribal leaders had invited representatives of Lebanese tribes to a meeting in the Syrian town of Al-Samaqiyat to discuss measures to stem illegal smuggling through unregulated border crossings. However, the meeting never took place, and tensions quickly escalated into violent confrontations between Syrian security forces and Lebanese tribal militants. This ultimately led Damascus to launch a full-scale military operation to reassert control over its border regions.
By the time the operation concluded, Syrian security forces had taken control of 17 villages and farms, including Hawik, al-Samaqiyat, Zita, and Saqarja. The repercussions of these developments—both on Syrian-Lebanese relations and broader regional dynamics—remain to be seen.
On February 11, Syria’s Border Security Administration announced its complete control over the Lebanese-Syrian border in the areas affected by recent clashes, deploying forces at key junctions in villages swept by the Syrian military. This development followed the retreat of remnants of former president Bashar al-Assad’s regime and allied militants into Lebanese territory. The withdrawal was reportedly coordinated between Syria’s military operations command and the Lebanese army.
During its military campaigns, Syrian border security forces seized weapons stockpiles, drug production facilities, and a counterfeit currency press, signaling a broader effort to dismantle illicit networks operating along the border. Additionally, reports indicate that security operations in western Homs countryside are continuing eastward toward the Jousieh border crossing, following the successful clearance of multiple Shiite-majority border villages of Lebanese nationals. Among the villages affected were Hawik, Akkum, Zita, its surrounding hills, and Jarmash, —all part of an extensive crackdown on drug traffickers and smuggling rings. These moves suggest a long-term Syrian strategy to assert full control over the Lebanese-Syrian border.
In a parallel and highly notable development, Israeli warplanes carried out airstrikes on February 9, targeting the Qalad al-Sabe’–Jarmash border crossing in Lebanon’s Jroud Hermel region. The strikes coincided with ongoing clashes between Syrian security forces and armed Lebanese tribes along the border, raising questions about the alignment of interests between Syria’s new administration and the Israeli government.
This coordination is not entirely surprising—it reflects the underlying convergence of objectives between the two sides since the fall of the previous Syrian regime on December 8, 2024, when opposition factions, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), launched a military campaign that ultimately toppled Assad’s government.
Furthermore, the timing of the Syrian administration’s latest military offensive against tribal militants on the border is closely tied to Israel’s commitment to withdrawing its forces from southern Lebanon under the ceasefire agreement—particularly the revised deadline of February 18. A closer look at the broader implications of these border clashes reveals underlying objectives that go beyond Syrian territory, implicating both the Syrian administration and, behind the scenes, Tel Aviv. The aim appears to be to divert Lebanese army forces, weaken their ability to withstand mounting security and military pressures, and ultimately fuel the perception that Lebanon is incapable of fulfilling its ceasefire commitments. These include disarming Hezbollah, pushing its forces beyond the Litani River, deploying the Lebanese army along the southern border, and asserting its authority there—all of which provide Tel Aviv with a convenient justification for refusing a full withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
Indeed, on February 18, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that the army would maintain a presence at five monitoring posts inside Lebanese territory to “protect northern Israeli border towns”. He warned of retaliatory action against any Hezbollah violations, stressing that Israel’s presence at these positions was temporary and strictly for security reasons. He further stated that once Lebanon fully adheres to its ceasefire obligations, Israeli forces would no longer need to remain in these positions.
II. Motivations behind the Syrian-Lebanese Border Clashes
By closely monitoring developments in the security landscape along the Lebanese-Syrian border—where tensions have escalated from diplomatic discussions to full-fledged armed clashes between Syrian security forces and Lebanese tribal militants within Syrian border villages, even spilling over into Lebanese territory—it is possible to identify several underlying reasons and motives behind the ignition of this border conflict. These factors not only shed light on the driving forces behind the escalation but also reveal both the stated and unstated objectives of these clashes, which can be outlined as follows:
1. Targeting Hezbollah and Dismantling Its Popular Support Base: Since the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime—and even before its collapse—the new Syrian administration has actively pursued remnants of the old regime and its allied forces, chief among them Hezbollah. This has been a primary objective of Syria’s new leadership and its regional backers, who see the neutralization of Hezbollah’s military and logistical presence as a top priority. This naturally translates into the continued effort to destroy Hezbollah’s strongholds, dismantle its weapon depots, sever its supply routes on both sides of the Syrian-Lebanese border, and cleanse Syrian territory of all Hezbollah elements and dismantle their support base along the border to prevent any possibility of regrouping or reestablishing influence in the region.
The 370-kilometer Syrian-Lebanese border has long been a flashpoint for conflict between the two countries, particularly in the northeastern regions near Homs, where a significant Shiite Lebanese population resides. Over time, these areas evolved into a logistical hub for Hezbollah, hosting weapons depots and serving as a key transit point for various smuggling operations, including arms, drugs, and fuel trafficking. Additionally, the Syrian-Lebanese border regions became a stronghold for Hezbollah, supported by deep-rooted tribal and demographic ties between Hermel in Lebanon and Qusayr in Syria. The situation is further complicated by the fact that large sections of the border remain undefined, making them easily penetrable and difficult to monitor, as they fall outside the scope of official security oversight and instead remain under tribal control. This combination of security gaps and illicit activities has transformed the Syrian-Lebanese border into one of the most volatile and sensitive frontier zones in the region.
2. Tightening Control Over Unofficial Crossings Along the Syrian-Lebanese Border: One of the primary reasons behind the Syrian security forces’ military operation in western Homs against Lebanese tribal militants residing in Syria—closely linked to the previously mentioned objective—is to undermine the influence of cross-border tribal groups by gradually asserting the new Syrian administration’s control over the unofficial border crossings. These crossings, numbering around 17, have long been under tribal control, with many even bearing the names of the clans that dominate them. Beyond this, the six official border crossings between Syria and Lebanon (figure 1) also pose a significant challenge due to their involvement in cross-border smuggling networks tied to various forms of organized crime.
Figure 1: Official Border Crossings between Syria and Lebanon
Source: Syria, Lebanon agree new crossing to control border chaos
Moreover, the new Syrian administration’s control over unofficial border crossings provides it with significant leverage over cross-border movement, allowing it to facilitate the passage of its loyalists while simultaneously blocking Hezbollah-affiliated elements from entering Syria. This move effectively thwarts any Iranian or Hezbollah-led efforts to regroup inside Syria and reestablish influence, preventing them from forming a critical mass capable of pressuring the new administration or becoming the nucleus of an armed opposition coalition. This strategic objective likely explains why, on February 17, the Lebanese army announced the closure of several illegal crossings, including those in Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, Qaa, the Qusayr–Hermel route, and the Dora–Al-Qaa road—a step that appears to have been coordinated with the new Syrian administration.
3. Forced Displacement and Severing the Syrian-Lebanese Connection: One of the underlying reasons behind the clashes between Syrian security forces and Lebanese tribal militants along the border is the deliberate effort to sever ties between the Syrian and Lebanese arenas. This involves dismantling the deep-rooted tribal connections that span both sides of the border by creating an inhospitable environment for Lebanese residents in Syrian border areas, effectively pressuring them into forced return to Lebanon. This move reflects an implicit implementation of a “forced displacement” policy seemingly adopted by the new Syrian administration toward Lebanese nationals residing in Syria. This strategy is evident in the Syrian forces’ evacuation of Lebanese nationals from border villages affected by the clashes. It also aligns with the administration’s earlier decision to shut its borders to Lebanese citizens, except for a limited number of individuals holding Syrian residency permits. Meanwhile, Lebanese nationals have been allowed to cross into Lebanon from Syria—an unofficial but de facto policy implemented without an official or publicly announced decision.
This implicit measure, which the ongoing border clashes appear to be enforcing through armed conflict and deteriorating security conditions, stems from multiple factors. First, it follows a recent influx of Lebanese individuals into Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Although no official figures have been released, reports indicate that many Lebanese individuals sought to reclaim properties they had abruptly abandoned during the regime’s collapse, allegedly striking financial deals with Syrians in Lebanon to repurchase their homes and businesses. This raised suspicions within the new Syrian administration that these transactions were in fact cover operations for Hezbollah elements attempting to regroup within Syria, using Lebanese border tribes as protection. In response, the Syrian administration moved to restrict Lebanese entry into Syria, tightening control over cross-border movement.
A second factor driving this policy appears to be retaliation for Lebanon’s restrictive measures against Syrian refugees. According to official Lebanese estimates from February 2025, over two million Syrians currently reside in Lebanon, with 80% lacking legal residency, making them vulnerable to forced deportations and evictions. Lebanese authorities have escalated anti-refugee policies, including mass deportations (see Figure 2, which illustrates the distribution of Syrian returnees across Syria.), the introduction of strict visa requirements demanding a Lebanese sponsor and a $2,000 fee, and widespread discrimination, fueled by rising anti-Syrian rhetoric from Lebanese officials. This hostile climate has led to violent attacks and social exclusion, alongside mounting public pressure for the mass expulsion of Syrian refugees from Beirut.
The deteriorating security situation in Lebanon, particularly as the country transitioned from a support base for Gaza’s resistance to an active battleground with Israel, has further displaced thousands of Lebanese citizens internally. This has placed additional economic and security pressures on Syrian refugees, many of whom now face exclusion from aid programs and emergency shelters, with priority given to Lebanese citizens for access and assistance.
Figure 2: Distribution of Syrian Returnees across Syrian Cities (December 8, 2024 – February 13, 2025)
Source: UNHCR estimates as of 13 February 2025
A third key motivation behind the Syrian-Lebanese border clashes lies in the dismantling of Hezbollah’s local support base, which extends across the Syrian-Lebanese border and reflects deep-rooted cross-border tribal ties. By asserting full control over border regions, including unofficial crossings, the new Syrian administration seeks to cut off Hezbollah’s financial and logistical networks, ensuring that border traffic and trade flows remain under state control, thereby channeling additional revenue into Syria’s economy, strengthening the new government’s financial position.
The timing of the Syrian military operation in western Homs aligns with a notable influx of returning Syrian refugees, particularly from Lebanon, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. UNHCR estimates indicate that between December 8, 2024, and February 13, 2025, approximately 279,620 Syrians returned to their homeland. Of these, 54% traveled from Lebanon, with the city of Homs emerging as one of the primary destinations for returnees, receiving 63,005 Syrians within this period.
In short, the Syrian government’s security campaign is part of a broader strategy to reassert control nationwide, eliminate remnants of the Assad regime, and neutralize its proxies, particularly Hezbollah. This includes dismantling Hezbollah’s support base within Syria to prevent any attempts at regrouping, while also working to sever the ties between the Syrian and Lebanese arenas—a key condition for dismantling Tehran’s regional resistance axis and ensuring the failure of any attempts by Iran and its proxies to regain their influence.
Moreover, the border clashes have exposed Israel’s covert role in supporting the new Syrian administration’s security agenda. The alignment between Damascus and Tel Aviv is evident in their shared strategic goals in Syria, which extend beyond Syrian borders to influence the Lebanese theater as well. This suggests that developments within Syria are being leveraged to justify the continued presence of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, revealing a deeper level of geopolitical maneuvering at play.The Syrian-Lebanese border has recently witnessed an alarming escalation, following clashes between Syrian security forces and armed Lebanese tribes residing in border villages on the Syrian side. This confrontation erupted after the Syrian government launched a military operation on February 6, 2025, in western Homs countryside—particularly in the villages of Hawik, Jarmash, and al-Heet—with the stated aim of combating drug trafficking and dismantling captagon production facilities. The operation resulted in casualties on both sides, as well as a series of retaliatory kidnappings.
What began as localized skirmishes quickly spiraled beyond the Syrian border, reaching Lebanese territory and prompting the Lebanese army to intervene in order to secure the country’s northeastern frontier. This escalation raises pressing questions about the underlying motives behind these border clashes and the broader implications they entail.
Building on this context, this article explores how the situation evolved from tribal negotiations over border control to intermittent clashes, eventually leading to a full-scale Syrian military operation against tribal militants stationed along the Syrian border. It also examines the connection between these events and the Lebanese ceasefire agreement, as well as Israel’s complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Additionally, the article delves into the underlying drivers of the conflict—both the officially stated motives and the unspoken agendas tied to Syria’s new leadership and its regional alliances.
I. Between Diplomacy and Armed Conflict: The Syrian-Lebanese Border Clashes
The 370-kilometer Syrian-Lebanese border has long been plagued by security challenges, exacerbated by the ongoing political and military turbulence in both countries. The latest flashpoint emerged from a Syrian military operation targeting so-called “wanted individuals involved in arms and drug smuggling” in villages predominantly inhabited by Lebanese tribes, including the Jaafar, Zeaiter, and Madlej clans. The offensive also led to the rescue of two Syrian security officers who had been abducted during the fighting. Heavy and medium weaponry, including artillery shells and drones, were used in the clashes, with some projectiles landing inside Lebanese territory. The violence resulted in multiple casualties and injuries on both sides of the conflict, as well as among Lebanese civilians. Additionally, the clashes saw a series of mutual kidnappings between armed Lebanese tribal groups in Syria and Syrian security forces.
As violence escalated, reports emerged of the Lebanese army stepping in as a mediator between Syrian forces and the armed tribes in an effort to secure the release of hostages. However, the situation deteriorated further on February 8, when Lebanese border villages in Hermel came under fire from the Syrian side, resulting in additional casualties among Lebanese civilians. In response, the Lebanese army deployed reinforcements to the Al-Qaa border region, issued orders to return fire at sources of attack from Syrian territory, and expanded its presence along the border. The escalation also prompted armed Lebanese tribal fighters to retreat behind Lebanese army lines after calling on the military to intervene to protect border towns.
Against this backdrop, Beirut opened diplomatic channels with Damascus to contain the crisis. On February 7, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun held a phone call with Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, during which both sides agreed to coordinate efforts to prevent further civilian casualties and restore stability to the region.
These clashes came in the wake of a failed tribal initiative aimed at regulating border security and curbing cross-border criminal activities. Syrian Aliwi tribal leaders had invited representatives of Lebanese tribes to a meeting in the Syrian town of Al-Samaqiyat to discuss measures to stem illegal smuggling through unregulated border crossings. However, the meeting never took place, and tensions quickly escalated into violent confrontations between Syrian security forces and Lebanese tribal militants. This ultimately led Damascus to launch a full-scale military operation to reassert control over its border regions.
By the time the operation concluded, Syrian security forces had taken control of 17 villages and farms, including Hawik, al-Samaqiyat, Zita, and Saqarja. The repercussions of these developments—both on Syrian-Lebanese relations and broader regional dynamics—remain to be seen.
On February 11, Syria’s Border Security Administration announced its complete control over the Lebanese-Syrian border in the areas affected by recent clashes, deploying forces at key junctions in villages swept by the Syrian military. This development followed the retreat of remnants of former president Bashar al-Assad’s regime and allied militants into Lebanese territory. The withdrawal was reportedly coordinated between Syria’s military operations command and the Lebanese army.
During its military campaigns, Syrian border security forces seized weapons stockpiles, drug production facilities, and a counterfeit currency press, signaling a broader effort to dismantle illicit networks operating along the border. Additionally, reports indicate that security operations in western Homs countryside are continuing eastward toward the Jousieh border crossing, following the successful clearance of multiple Shiite-majority border villages of Lebanese nationals. Among the villages affected were Hawik, Akkum, Zita, its surrounding hills, and Jarmash, —all part of an extensive crackdown on drug traffickers and smuggling rings. These moves suggest a long-term Syrian strategy to assert full control over the Lebanese-Syrian border.
In a parallel and highly notable development, Israeli warplanes carried out airstrikes on February 9, targeting the Qalad al-Sabe’–Jarmash border crossing in Lebanon’s Jroud Hermel region. The strikes coincided with ongoing clashes between Syrian security forces and armed Lebanese tribes along the border, raising questions about the alignment of interests between Syria’s new administration and the Israeli government.
This coordination is not entirely surprising—it reflects the underlying convergence of objectives between the two sides since the fall of the previous Syrian regime on December 8, 2024, when opposition factions, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), launched a military campaign that ultimately toppled Assad’s government.
Furthermore, the timing of the Syrian administration’s latest military offensive against tribal militants on the border is closely tied to Israel’s commitment to withdrawing its forces from southern Lebanon under the ceasefire agreement—particularly the revised deadline of February 18. A closer look at the broader implications of these border clashes reveals underlying objectives that go beyond Syrian territory, implicating both the Syrian administration and, behind the scenes, Tel Aviv. The aim appears to be to divert Lebanese army forces, weaken their ability to withstand mounting security and military pressures, and ultimately fuel the perception that Lebanon is incapable of fulfilling its ceasefire commitments. These include disarming Hezbollah, pushing its forces beyond the Litani River, deploying the Lebanese army along the southern border, and asserting its authority there—all of which provide Tel Aviv with a convenient justification for refusing a full withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
Indeed, on February 18, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that the army would maintain a presence at five monitoring posts inside Lebanese territory to “protect northern Israeli border towns”. He warned of retaliatory action against any Hezbollah violations, stressing that Israel’s presence at these positions was temporary and strictly for security reasons. He further stated that once Lebanon fully adheres to its ceasefire obligations, Israeli forces would no longer need to remain in these positions.
II. Motivations behind the Syrian-Lebanese Border Clashes
By closely monitoring developments in the security landscape along the Lebanese-Syrian border—where tensions have escalated from diplomatic discussions to full-fledged armed clashes between Syrian security forces and Lebanese tribal militants within Syrian border villages, even spilling over into Lebanese territory—it is possible to identify several underlying reasons and motives behind the ignition of this border conflict. These factors not only shed light on the driving forces behind the escalation but also reveal both the stated and unstated objectives of these clashes, which can be outlined as follows:
1. Targeting Hezbollah and Dismantling Its Popular Support Base: Since the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime—and even before its collapse—the new Syrian administration has actively pursued remnants of the old regime and its allied forces, chief among them Hezbollah. This has been a primary objective of Syria’s new leadership and its regional backers, who see the neutralization of Hezbollah’s military and logistical presence as a top priority. This naturally translates into the continued effort to destroy Hezbollah’s strongholds, dismantle its weapon depots, sever its supply routes on both sides of the Syrian-Lebanese border, and cleanse Syrian territory of all Hezbollah elements and dismantle their support base along the border to prevent any possibility of regrouping or reestablishing influence in the region.
The 370-kilometer Syrian-Lebanese border has long been a flashpoint for conflict between the two countries, particularly in the northeastern regions near Homs, where a significant Shiite Lebanese population resides. Over time, these areas evolved into a logistical hub for Hezbollah, hosting weapons depots and serving as a key transit point for various smuggling operations, including arms, drugs, and fuel trafficking. Additionally, the Syrian-Lebanese border regions became a stronghold for Hezbollah, supported by deep-rooted tribal and demographic ties between Hermel in Lebanon and Qusayr in Syria. The situation is further complicated by the fact that large sections of the border remain undefined, making them easily penetrable and difficult to monitor, as they fall outside the scope of official security oversight and instead remain under tribal control. This combination of security gaps and illicit activities has transformed the Syrian-Lebanese border into one of the most volatile and sensitive frontier zones in the region.
2. Tightening Control Over Unofficial Crossings Along the Syrian-Lebanese Border: One of the primary reasons behind the Syrian security forces’ military operation in western Homs against Lebanese tribal militants residing in Syria—closely linked to the previously mentioned objective—is to undermine the influence of cross-border tribal groups by gradually asserting the new Syrian administration’s control over the unofficial border crossings. These crossings, numbering around 17, have long been under tribal control, with many even bearing the names of the clans that dominate them. Beyond this, the six official border crossings between Syria and Lebanon (figure 1) also pose a significant challenge due to their involvement in cross-border smuggling networks tied to various forms of organized crime.
Figure 1: Official Border Crossings between Syria and Lebanon
Source: Syria, Lebanon agree new crossing to control border chaos
Moreover, the new Syrian administration’s control over unofficial border crossings provides it with significant leverage over cross-border movement, allowing it to facilitate the passage of its loyalists while simultaneously blocking Hezbollah-affiliated elements from entering Syria. This move effectively thwarts any Iranian or Hezbollah-led efforts to regroup inside Syria and reestablish influence, preventing them from forming a critical mass capable of pressuring the new administration or becoming the nucleus of an armed opposition coalition. This strategic objective likely explains why, on February 17, the Lebanese army announced the closure of several illegal crossings, including those in Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, Qaa, the Qusayr–Hermel route, and the Dora–Al-Qaa road—a step that appears to have been coordinated with the new Syrian administration.
3. Forced Displacement and Severing the Syrian-Lebanese Connection: One of the underlying reasons behind the clashes between Syrian security forces and Lebanese tribal militants along the border is the deliberate effort to sever ties between the Syrian and Lebanese arenas. This involves dismantling the deep-rooted tribal connections that span both sides of the border by creating an inhospitable environment for Lebanese residents in Syrian border areas, effectively pressuring them into forced return to Lebanon. This move reflects an implicit implementation of a “forced displacement” policy seemingly adopted by the new Syrian administration toward Lebanese nationals residing in Syria. This strategy is evident in the Syrian forces’ evacuation of Lebanese nationals from border villages affected by the clashes. It also aligns with the administration’s earlier decision to shut its borders to Lebanese citizens, except for a limited number of individuals holding Syrian residency permits. Meanwhile, Lebanese nationals have been allowed to cross into Lebanon from Syria—an unofficial but de facto policy implemented without an official or publicly announced decision.
This implicit measure, which the ongoing border clashes appear to be enforcing through armed conflict and deteriorating security conditions, stems from multiple factors. First, it follows a recent influx of Lebanese individuals into Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Although no official figures have been released, reports indicate that many Lebanese individuals sought to reclaim properties they had abruptly abandoned during the regime’s collapse, allegedly striking financial deals with Syrians in Lebanon to repurchase their homes and businesses. This raised suspicions within the new Syrian administration that these transactions were in fact cover operations for Hezbollah elements attempting to regroup within Syria, using Lebanese border tribes as protection. In response, the Syrian administration moved to restrict Lebanese entry into Syria, tightening control over cross-border movement.
A second factor driving this policy appears to be retaliation for Lebanon’s restrictive measures against Syrian refugees. According to official Lebanese estimates from February 2025, over two million Syrians currently reside in Lebanon, with 80% lacking legal residency, making them vulnerable to forced deportations and evictions. Lebanese authorities have escalated anti-refugee policies, including mass deportations (see Figure 2, which illustrates the distribution of Syrian returnees across Syria.), the introduction of strict visa requirements demanding a Lebanese sponsor and a $2,000 fee, and widespread discrimination, fueled by rising anti-Syrian rhetoric from Lebanese officials. This hostile climate has led to violent attacks and social exclusion, alongside mounting public pressure for the mass expulsion of Syrian refugees from Beirut.
The deteriorating security situation in Lebanon, particularly as the country transitioned from a support base for Gaza’s resistance to an active battleground with Israel, has further displaced thousands of Lebanese citizens internally. This has placed additional economic and security pressures on Syrian refugees, many of whom now face exclusion from aid programs and emergency shelters, with priority given to Lebanese citizens for access and assistance.
Figure 2: Distribution of Syrian Returnees across Syrian Cities (December 8, 2024 – February 13, 2025)
Source: UNHCR estimates as of 13 February 2025
A third key motivation behind the Syrian-Lebanese border clashes lies in the dismantling of Hezbollah’s local support base, which extends across the Syrian-Lebanese border and reflects deep-rooted cross-border tribal ties. By asserting full control over border regions, including unofficial crossings, the new Syrian administration seeks to cut off Hezbollah’s financial and logistical networks, ensuring that border traffic and trade flows remain under state control, thereby channeling additional revenue into Syria’s economy, strengthening the new government’s financial position.
The timing of the Syrian military operation in western Homs aligns with a notable influx of returning Syrian refugees, particularly from Lebanon, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. UNHCR estimates indicate that between December 8, 2024, and February 13, 2025, approximately 279,620 Syrians returned to their homeland. Of these, 54% traveled from Lebanon, with the city of Homs emerging as one of the primary destinations for returnees, receiving 63,005 Syrians within this period.
In short, the Syrian government’s security campaign is part of a broader strategy to reassert control nationwide, eliminate remnants of the Assad regime, and neutralize its proxies, particularly Hezbollah. This includes dismantling Hezbollah’s support base within Syria to prevent any attempts at regrouping, while also working to sever the ties between the Syrian and Lebanese arenas—a key condition for dismantling Tehran’s regional resistance axis and ensuring the failure of any attempts by Iran and its proxies to regain their influence.
Moreover, the border clashes have exposed Israel’s covert role in supporting the new Syrian administration’s security agenda. The alignment between Damascus and Tel Aviv is evident in their shared strategic goals in Syria, which extend beyond Syrian borders to influence the Lebanese theater as well. This suggests that developments within Syria are being leveraged to justify the continued presence of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, revealing a deeper level of geopolitical maneuvering at play.
