In response to the mobilization of clan militias against them, the Somali Al-Shabaab movement withdrew from its positions and announced the immediate evacuation of a large number of villages in central and south-central Somalia.
These shifts have raised a host of questions about the motivations behind the movement’s decision to abandon its positions. Is this a tactical withdrawal by Al-Shabaab to regroup its forces and return to the concentrations from which it retreated, or a strategic one given Al-Shabab’s multiple setbacks over the past two months as a result of the cooperation and coordination among some Somali clans, the Somali government, and the allied forces to carry out sporadic attacks on Al-Shabaab positions with the aim of eliminating it?
Clan Militias’ Role in Combating Al-Shabaab
Clan militia fighters cited a variety of reasons for joining the fight against Al-Shabaab, including the movement’s taking of their livestock (which is a significant source of savings for the tribes), kidnapping and forcing children to join the movement as fighters, killing family members, and imposing excessive taxes on the local population.
Many Al-Shabaab fighters deserted the movement, which served as a major factor in its defeat, especially after the allied forces (i.e. the African Union forces and the US forces) began supplying and deploying forces to fight alongside the clan militias. In the past five months, the allied forces supported by clan militias have been able to retake more than 40 villages in the Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions in the country’s center. This has forced Al-Shabaab to leave two key locations that served as the organization’s headquarters, while the Somali army managed to take control of bridges and major cities.
After Al-Shabaab ambushed convoys and humanitarian aid for the affected Somalis in their areas of control in September 2022, the clans revolted against the movement, sparking a real revolution and uprising of the clan militias that were already on edge due to mounting pressure from Al-Shabaab and forced recruitment. Clan militias perceived the attack as specifically targeting them and endangering their lives and stability.
Undoubtedly, clan militias contributed significantly to the fighting, which led Al-Shabaab to flee during the clashes between them. For instance, the Abgaal clan managed to take control of numerous areas (such as Middle Shabelle, Mudug in the south, and Galguduud) after declaring a general mobilization against Al-Shabaab in September 2022. The central region’s tribal clans rose up against Al-Shabaab, particularly the Xawaadle clan, in retaliation for Al-Shabaab’s assassination of one of its most prominent clerics on May 27. The Xawaadle clan is a sub-clan of the majority Hawiye clan in central Somalia.
In the Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions of central Somalia, militias and government forces took control of more than 20 settlements as the military campaign moved forward, driving Al-Shabaab out of two key areas. The Somali forces have regained control of the restored bridges and large cities. Al-Shabaab responded by launching counterattacks and engaging in street combat, exhausting both allied forces and clan militias.
Since the summer of 2022, some Somali clans have worked to free themselves from Al-Shabaab’s tax and tribute demands. In an attempt to push them out of those areas, Somali clans have provided 3,000 of their militias in the ongoing war. Additionally, in September of last year, the Somali army conducted joint military drills in Galmudug with clan militias and the local populace to practice fighting Al-Shabaab, putting the country’s central region in a state of open conflict. Previously, clan militias had joined the fight against Al-Shabaab, but this was the first time that these clans had received direct official military support, which encouraged local and affected people in Somalia to join the militias and fight.
Outcomes of the Military Campaign against Al-Shabaab’s Strongholds
A new approach to combating terrorism in Somalia was formed by the combined efforts of the allied forces (the African Union forces and the US forces), the Somali army, and clan militias. They relied on waging an all-out war against Al-Shabaab in various locations, with the assistance of some clan forces and militias (Makawisli) that have extensive military field experience in the country’s center and south.
In this vein, Al-Shabaab suffered a quality attack when drones from the African Union peacekeeping mission launched airstrikes on Al-Shabaab’s positions, weakening and crippling the group’s military prowess. It is also worth noting that international partners provided intelligence and security assistance to the Somali forces so that they could confront Al-Shabaab’s strongholds.
The government’s efforts helped tighten the screws on Al-Shabaab because the new Somali government laid out a clear plan for implementation that required close coordination between Somali clan leaders, local government officials, and outside forces in the regions where Al-Shabaab is active. These actions had the extraordinary pressure of tightening the screws on Al-Shabaab and its concentrations, forcing it to withdraw.
Alongside these military and ground operations, the Somali government began open communication with former Al-Shabaab dissidents in an effort to contain them and recruit them into its ranks. The Somali authorities were successful in luring these elements and separating them from the movement by appointing Mukhtar Robow, a former Al-Shabaab spokesperson, as Minister of Religious Affairs. This undermined the movement’s cohesion and unity and lowered morale among its members.
Relatedly, the current government’s efforts to reconcile with Sufi militias and Sunnis in order to enlist them in the fight against Al-Shabaab have increased the pressure on the group, forcing it to seek refuge elsewhere.
The Future of Counterterrorism in Somalia
Despite the fact that the Somali army and tribal militias have retaken many villages and cities in the country’s center and north, they still face numerous obstacles that make it difficult for the state to hold onto the territory from which Al-Shabaab withdrew, given the state’s inability to provide aid to civilians and protect them from retaliatory attacks of Al-Shabaab in case of their cooperation with the allied forces.
Worse, the current government is mired in an economic crisis, rendering it unable to implement development or humanitarian projects, as well as structures for local governments in affected areas that encourage citizens to stay. On December 14, 2022, the Somali army and clan militias reclaimed control of Ali Guduud Mosque and its environs, as well as the checkpoints used by Al-Shabab to blackmail tribes and mount attacks.
In short, the recent uprising by clan militias supported by allied forces to drive out Al-Shabaab, one of the most potent Al- Qaeda affiliates in East Africa, has conflicting ramifications. While it is hoped that this uprising will weaken Al-Shabaab, a protracted military campaign will only increase chaos and instability and endanger the social and economic system by highlighting the role of clan militias, who may later adopt specific political demands.
