Negotiations between Iran and the West that took place between April 2021 and September 2022 have neither resulted in a significant breakthrough nor plunged into a serious crisis. While each party is still determined to uphold its fundamental principles and strategy for the potential agreement, it is also true that neither party has declared the diplomatic route a complete failure.
Arguably, the dispute between Iran and the West over the nuclear deal has currently entered a gray area. The crisis has not been alleviated by an agreement, nor has it been exacerbated by the news of its failure. This gray phase has been demonstrated by four major indicators:
1- On 21 February 2023, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that “it was up to Iran to engage to resolve a deadlock over its nuclear programme”, adding, “We continue to believe that, with regard to the nuclear program, the most effective, sustainable way to deal with the challenges it poses is through diplomacy. But in the – in this moment, those efforts are on the back burner because Iran is simply not engaged in a meaningful way.”
This implies that the United States is still dependent on the possibility of reaching a new agreement with Iran, despite the growing number of disagreements between Tehran and Washington on a variety of issues and files, most recently the former’s military assistance to Russia during the Ukrainian war.
2- The European Union’s reluctance to add the Quds Force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and a few other Iranian organizations and individuals to its list of terrorist organizations during its meeting on 23 January 2023.
According to Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the need to take proactive steps prior to the implementation of this agreement on the ground, such as the issuance of a judgment by a court of European countries condemning the Revolutionary Guard, was the reason why a draft agreement on Iran and Western countries failed to materialize in August.
3. Washington’s hasty denial of its involvement in the attack by three quadcopters on a military facility in Isfahan on 28 January 2023, and its suggestion that the Israeli Mossad might have been behind it.
4- The failure of Western countries to respond to reports surfaced on 19 February 2023 indicating discovering 84 percent enriched uranium particles in Iran’s enrichment facilities.
Limited Options
Although there are many and growing differences between Iran and Western countries, they did agree on one thing: to keep the nuclear agreement crisis in the gray phase as long as no agreement is reached during the negotiations in order to prevent an escalation to an irreversible phase.
This may indicate how few options both sides have at this point, which drives them to insist on staying within the “red lines”, at least for the time being. The following factors contribute to the scarcity of options available for Iran:
Iran’s Intertwining Crises: Iran has likely never experienced the number and severity of internal and external crises that it does now.
The Iranian government has failed to resolve the crisis caused by the domestic uprising that began on 15 September 2022. Additionally, there are the pressures brought on by the security breaches it experienced in the past, the conflict between the Iranian security and intelligence services, and the effects of the economic sanctions, which continue to have a serious negative impact on the country’s economy despite the efforts of successive governments to contain them. The impact of the sanctions was reflected in the great depreciation of the Iranian currency, with the dollar reaching more than IRR 500,000 at the end of February 2023.
As such, Iran may not believe that the time is ripe to respond to the stalled nuclear negotiations in the absence of a way, at least so far, to lift US sanctions, which would enable it to reach a point where it has the technological wherewithal to produce a nuclear bomb, particularly in terms of achieving 90 percent uranium enrichment
Avoiding the Risk of Involvement in War: Despite all the escalatory measures taken by Iran and the repeated assurances by Iranian officials that they are prepared to face any military action they may be subjected to, Iran appears eager to avoid this option. Although it never resorts to open hostilities, it does engage in what it calls “proxy war” by controlling escalation operations with its opponents through loyal militias in crisis countries far from its lands.
The brief conflict that broke out with the United States of America from 3-8 January 2020, after the Americans launched a military operation in Baghdad, which ultimately resulted in the death of Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, was perhaps the only exception to this trend since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Iran retaliated with missile attacks on two Iraqi bases occupied by American troops. Remarkably, after each strike, both countries were eager to send messages through a third party saying they had no desire to escalate the conflict.
Consequently, Iran is well aware that if it chooses the most difficult option—enriching uranium by 90 percent—it may increase the likelihood of a military confrontation. While uranium enrichment alone won’t be enough to make a bomb—Iran still needs other components, some of which may take more time to acquire—this step means that Iran is one step closer to being able to produce a bomb and that it’s only a matter of time before they get there.
Notably, avoiding military involvement, at least temporarily, may be a Western option. Considering the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, it’s unlikely that any European country would be interested in such a confrontation at the present time or in the foreseeable future. Similarly, the United States has no incentive to replicate its failed and counterproductive past efforts in the region unless it is compelled to do so by circumstances beyond its control, a necessity dependent on a confluence of circumstances that, according to its vision, may not yet have crystallized, notwithstanding its current keenness to hint at the military option in the face of Iran.
Perhaps this helps shed light on why the US government has been so quick to dismiss claims that the United States Air Force and another air force attacked a military facility in Isfahan on 28 January 2023. If taken, this action would have altered all calculations, keeping the nuclear agreement’s escalation in the gray area.
The Difficulty of Reaching a Nuclear Agreement at Present: Even though Western countries do not want to reach a deal right away, they also do not want the situation with Iran to escalate to the point of “no return” in case they publicly declare the “death” of the nuclear deal. For many considerations, these countries see time as the worst possible factor for this next step.
The most significant of these factors is Iran’s continued military assistance to Russia in support of its military operations in Ukraine. Iran also pursues a repressive approach to internal unrest and executed Reza Akbari, a former deputy defense minister with British citizenship.
Therefore, keeping things as they are until circumstances crystallize later and be more conducive to reaching an agreement or making a final announcement regarding an agreement may be the option that best aligns with Western interests and calculations at this time.
From Gray to Black?
This gray period is unlikely to last indefinitely. Iran and Western countries’ involvement in regional and international developments, such as the Ukrainian war, the escalation in some crisis countries like Iraq and Syria, and the continued development of the missile program, as reflected in Iran’s declaration on 25 February 2023 and the development of a cruise missile with a range of 1,650 km, are all examples of the rapid developments that are still imposing themselves on these arenas.
The Israeli factor cannot be disregarded either, as Israel appears motivated to pursue more aggressive measures in its dealings with Iran. This has been evidenced by recent maneuvers and ongoing attacks on Iranian targets in Syria, the most recent of which occurred in Damascus on February 20, 2023. This is especially true given that the current gray phase is incompatible with Israel’s current accounts.
Perhaps this explains why Tel Aviv insists on continuing to attack military and nuclear targets inside Iran, similar to the recent attack in Isfahan. Given all of these potential outcomes, it is not impossible that the current phase will change from “gray” to another shade.
