The frequency of Daesh’s terrorist attacks has increased in Syria since 2023, but the most brutal assault ever seen there this year was the group’s final operation, which took place on 10 August and targeted a military bus of the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) on the Deir Ezzor-Homs road, killing 33 soldiers and injuring others. This new level of Daesh’s activity within Syrian territory elicits a number of fundamental observations, described in greater detail below.
1- Despite a decrease in the number of Daesh’s operations in Syria, some of the group’s hallmarks can still be seen there. In 2022, Daesh claimed responsibility for approximately 277 operations, compared to 366 in 2021 and 581 in 2020. However, this obvious drop in activity does not at all suggest that the threat is lessening. According to several reports released by the Security Council, Daesh maintains bunkers west of the Euphrates River and has cells operating in several regions of Syria, including southern Syria, particularly in Daraa. Currently, Daesh operates in Syria along two parallel lines: the first is rebuilding and recruiting from the camps in northeastern Syria, and the second is employing the so-called “influential selection” strategy, which refers to launching attacks that have the greatest impact while sustaining the fewest casualties among its ranks.
2. Syria is strategically significant to Daesh, and this becomes clear when considering a number of different factors. First, prior to its geographical defeat, Daesh’s headquarters was in Syria; therefore, the group’s ability to conduct extensive terrorist operations within Syria indicates that it continues to possess power and control. Second, Syria’s location near Iraq’s border and its proximity to it allow it to receive financial and logistical support. Third, Syria may once again be used as a recruiting ground for Daesh. In the past, Syria acted as a venue for recruitment, as is demonstrated by the thousands of its members who are currently incarcerated in Syrian jails and who have previous battlefield and combat experience, not to mention the group’s members’ children in the Syrian refugee camps, especially those in the Al-Hol camp. In this context, Michael Corella, the commander of the US Central Command, sounded the alarm in December 2022 about what he termed the “upcoming generation of Daesh”, in reference to the 25,000 children of Daesh members living in the Al-Hol camp, who are at risk of becoming ideological extremists.
3-Daesh is carrying out this operation with two main objectives in mind. It first aims to highlight its capacity to reposition, step up its operations, and increase the credibility of its new leader, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. Notably, on August 3, in a speech that was recorded under the title “So rejoice in your transaction, which you have bargained”, Daesh declared the passing of its former leader Abu Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi and the selection of al-Qurashi as its new leader. Second, it seeks retribution for the murder of its leaders in Syria. Notewirthy, three of the group’s leaders were assassinated in Syria between 2022 and 2023, namely Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (October 2022), Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (November 2022), and Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi (April 2023), and many of the group’s prominent leaders were assassinated in Syria as well, including Maher al-Agal (July 2022), Hamza al-Homsi (February 2023), Jasim al-Jaburi (February 2023), Khalid al-Jabouri (April 2023), and Usama-al-Muhajir (July 2023).
4- The recent operation demonstrates Daesh’s tenacity because it was able to survive, adapt, and carry on despite the level of attrition it experienced at various levels. It lost the first and second ranks’ leaders, either through murder or imprisonment and experienced a decline in private financial reserves, which are now estimated to be between $25 and $50 million, down from about $100 million in February 2021. Add to this its geographical defeat and the contraction of its influence in its traditional strongholds. Despite this, Daesh continues to work to prove that its purported caliphate is still in place, even if it is unable to grow.
5- Countering terrorism no longer ranks first among state security priorities. The international community is now less eager to combat terrorist organizations in favor of concentrating on other conventional and unconventional security threats, such as the Russian-Ukrainian War, the ensuing food and energy crises, and the emergence of new threats like climate change and epidemics. This resulted in a decrease in international efforts to combat terrorism, which was evidently reflected in an uptick in terrorist group activity.
The August 2022 withdrawal of France and its allies (such as Operation Barkhane and the Takuba Task Force) from Mali is a case in point. This withdrawal coincides with the national armies’ failure to stop terrorist group activity there, which created a security vacuum that gave terrorist groups the chance to expand their influence and intensify their operations.In short, Daesh’s continued activity in Syria and other diverse arenas despite repeated security strikes indicates that it was defeated as an alleged caliphate state, but it remains a terrorist organization capable of endangering international and regional peace and security. This necessitates a reevaluation of the international community’s security priorities, as there is a real danger that these groups will reemerge if the counterterrorism pressure is eased, especially given the persistence of a large number of factors that encourage their resurgence.
