Another assault was launched on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targeting prominent leader Sayyed Razi Mousavi on 25 December 2023. The attack followed the assassination of another leader within the IRGC, Qassem Soleimani, in January 2020. Assassinating leaders of Iranian or pro-Tehran military groups, both within Iran and abroad, appears to be a strategy to diminish Iranian influence. This approach was employed again on 28 December, when Israel conducted an airstrike on Damascus International Airport, targeting 11 additional leaders of the IRGC.
If the targeting of Qassem Soleimani in Iraq occurred during a period of rising tension between Tehran, the West, and Israel—which was experiencing Iranian attacks or attacks by Tehran’s proxies against Western targets in the Arabian Gulf—then the circumstances surrounding Razi Mousavi’s death are no different. His assassination occurred during a period of increased tensions between Iran and Israel in Syria, which was influenced by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Additionally, there was a rise in tensions between Tehran, Tel Aviv, Washington, and Western countries following the initiation of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood in October. It is worth noting that pro-Iranian groups in the region, like the Houthis, continue to target foreign ships in the Red Sea.
This means that the circumstances surrounding the killing of Mousavi are essentially similar to those surrounding the killing of Soleimani.
What Does Mousavi’s Assassination Mean for the IRGC?
Arguably, the assassination of Razi Mousavi deals a significant setback to the Quds Force of the IRGC that is active overseas, particularly in Lebanon and Syria. Mousavi held a significant role as an influential Iranian military leader in Syria over the past few years. He played a crucial role in providing logistical support to Iranian agents and groups operating in Syria. Thus, in general, he served as the IRGC’s representative in Syria and was in charge of the Syrian dossier ever since the Iran-Iraq War ended in the 1990s.
While Iranian media outlets refrained from extensively covering his life, as is customary when discussing field military commanders who hold significant military and security importance in Iran, they did characterize him as “one of the close companions of the former Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani.” An expert on Iranian television referred to him as one of the unrecognized soldiers of Iran in the region.
Senior IRGC commanders have stated that Razi Mousavi was well-known in Israel and that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and others were cognizant of his activities, given that he had twice evaded assassination attempts. Iranian media sources approximate that Mousavi served for the IRGC overseas for twenty-five years, during which time he oversaw the operations of Iranian advisory forces in Syria and Lebanon.
Mousavi had a close relationship with the Lebanese Hezbollah and was even Israel’s next target when Mustafa Badr al-Din, Hezbollah’s former leader and cousin to Imad Mughniyeh, the other military leader, was killed in 2016.
The official Iranian news agency IRNA and the reformist newspaper Ham-Mihan characterised him as a highly significant and prominent commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, ranking second to Soleimani. In this regard, Mousavi was a key player in supplying Lebanon with Fateh missiles. Mousavi emerged as the preeminent figure representing Iran and the IRGC in Syria subsequent to the demise of former commander Mostafa Javad Ghaffari in December 2021. This came after escalating military conflicts between Ghaffari and the Russians in Syria until his assassination.
The chairman of the City Council of Tehran, Mehdi Chamran, describes Mousavi as one of the Quds Force’s founders. Ali Salehi, a senior officer in the Quds Force who went by the alias Abu Turab, described him as possessing “many work-related characteristics similar to Soleimani.” Mousavi was not only an old friend but also a trusted companion and confidant of Soleimani.
Thus, Mousavi’s significance was predicated on his adept management of the Iranian proxies stationed in Syria and his critical role in facilitating the transfer of diverse military supplies from Iran to proxies.
In light of this, the assassination of Razi Mousavi will undoubtedly disrupt coordination among various pro-Iranian military agents in Syria, as well as cause a major rift, albeit temporary, in the transfer of supplies from Iran to Syria and Lebanon. Furthermore, the manner in which he was assassinated would also have an impact on the Iranian approach to the Syrian conflict, which seeks to capitalize on the void left by Moscow in the region due to its preoccupation with the Ukraine conflict since February 2022 and extend its military and political presence there.
Unlike Javad Ghaffari, Mousavi seems to have gained a lot of traction in this area thanks to the fact that he has the support of both the proxy groups, Russia, and Syria.
Why Did Israel Assassinate Razi Mousavi?
Considering the regional circumstances and the course of the recent indirect conflict between Iran and Israel, whether in Syria, Lebanon, or the Red Sea, it becomes evident why Israel chose to target Razi Mousavi. The motives behind killing Mousavi can be detailed as follows:
1. The Comprehensive Iranian-Israeli Escalation in Syria amid Card Reshuffle: Iran appeared to have been rearranging its cards in Syria in the months that followed the outbreak of war in Ukraine, as Moscow shifted the majority of its international attention to the Ukrainian crisis. Iran endeavors to increase its military and political sway within Syria; in pursuit of this objective, it has consistently undertaken significant actions in the past and continues to do so at present.
For instance, pro-Iranian groups have expanded their deployment in eastern Syria, and the governorate of Deir ez-Zor has developed into a “military barracks” for Iranian proxies. Reliable international sources have reported that Iran has acquired more land and real estate in Syria and has greatly increased its cultural influence there. Therefore, Iran’s influence in Damascus’ political sphere has intensified. In tandem with reports suggesting that proxies are attempting to expand their deployment bases in northern Syria, Iran demands the withdrawal of American forces from the region so that it may accomplish its goals and maximize its influence within the country.
As such, Israel keeps a close eye on Iran’s activities in Syria, which it views with significant apprehension. This apprehension has prompted Tel Aviv to carry out numerous air strikes on targets affiliated with Iranian proxy groups in Syria. Israel considers that the growing Iranian influence in Syria, coupled with the growing number of IRGC members and affiliated groups, poses a serious threat to its security, especially since this extends beyond Syria to include Lebanon.
Consequently, targeting senior leaders within the IRGC, such as Razi Mousavi, who assumes the crucial role of orchestrating proxy group collaborations and providing logistical support, will inevitably have an impact on the strength of Iranian influence on Syrian territory and thus have a positive effect on Israeli security.
Israel’s targeting of Mousavi wasn’t unanticipated; in recent months, Tel Aviv has eliminated a number of leaders of the IRGC and pro-Iranian groups in Syria. Israel is therefore not only targeting Iranian military leaders in Syria but also tracking them inside Iran. One such instance is the May 2022 assassination of Hassan Sayyad Khodaei, a former senior officer in the IRGC in Syria, inside Tehran.
One possible indication that suggests the premeditation of Mousavi’s assassination is a report released on 19 July 2023, by the Israel-related Countering the Financing of Terrorism center, which described Mousavi as the commander of the 2250th Battalion of the 2000th Unit of the Quds Force in Syria and highlighted his responsibility for overseeing the logistical operations of the IRGC in Syria. According to this report, Razi Mousavi oversaw several Iranian military installations in Syria, including outposts in Damascus, Deir ez-Zor, Latakia, Hama, and Aleppo.
Furthermore, as stated previously, at least two failed assassination attempts were directed at Mousavi in recent years.
2. Targeting Israeli Interests by the Houthis and Iranian Proxies: In light of the recent uptick in proxy attacks orchestrated by Iranian entities against Israeli interests in the region and the partial involvement of Hezbollah in the conflict, Israel has frequently threatened to retaliate against Iran. Multiple Houthi assaults have been staged against vessels en route to Israel through the waters of the Red Sea from Yemen, while the Hezbollah has been involved in several clashes and military actions against Israel from southern Lebanon.
Nonetheless, Israel continues to face a genuine threat from Iranian proxies in water lanes, which has provoked significant internal unrest, prompting many Israelis to call for retaliation against Iran. As a result, Israel’s decision to target Razi Mousavi may be seen as a reaction to the water assaults orchestrated by Iranian proxies.
Repetitive Israeli attacks against IRGC leaders in Syria may be one indication of this. In addition to Mousavi, eleven other leaders of the IRGC were killed in another Israeli strike that targeted Damascus International Airport on 28 December 2023, three days after Razi Mousavi’s death. This attack was regarded as the most massive since the Gaza Strip conflict began on 7 October.
Potential Iranian Responses to the Recent Israeli Attacks
In response to the assaults that targeted Razi Mousavi and eleven other IRGC commanders, Iran’s military and security chiefs threatened to target Israel. In a statement, the IRGC stated that “Israel will pay the price,” echoing the words of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.
Given the ongoing conflict and confrontations between Iran and Israel, it is possible that the Iranian response to the assassination of Mousavi and the other eleven IRGC leaders would involve some or all of the following:
1. Increasing the Range of Proxies’ Attacks on Israeli Interests in the Area: In recent months, it appeared that one of the most common ways that Iran and Israel have clashed, either directly or indirectly, has been through Tehran’s operatives targeting Israeli interests across the Middle East, particularly in the Red Sea waters near Bab al-Mandab. Recently, the pro-Iranian Houthis targeted multiple ships en route to Israel and attacked the Israeli port of Eilat on the Red Sea.
It appeared that these types of assaults had an impact on Israeli interests and the Israeli interior, regardless of whether they took place in the Red Sea or within Israel. Given Iran’s recent expansion of its presence in international waters, one possible response to the targeting of Mousavi and other IRGC leaders could be to escalate these assaults against Israeli interests by increasing the frequency and geographical scope of attacks against Israeli vessels in international waters, whether in the Mediterranean or the Red Seas.
Furthermore, it is plausible that the frequency of Houthi assaults targeting Israeli territory could rise, analogous to the assault that occurred on Eilat.
2. Escalation of Iranian-Israeli Confrontations in Syria: In light of the assassination of Mousavi and a significant number of IRGC leaders, further military confrontations between Israel and Iran may resume in Syria in the coming days. It is anticipated that pro-Iranian proxies in Syria will escalate their tensions with Israel, launching attacks and targeting Israel from southern Syria. Israel will not remain silent in this regard. Therefore, if tensions escalate and Iran reacts in any way, from within or without Syria, to Mousavi’s assassination, Tel Aviv may escalate its assaults against additional Iranian sites in Syria over the next few days.
3. Escalation of Tensions between Hezbollah and Israel: Considering the historical context of the Iranian-Israeli confrontations in the last twenty years, it is highly probable that Iran will employ Hezbollah as a means of retaliating against Israel. Hence, Hezbollah may escalate the frequency and extent of its assaults against Israel in the coming days.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the assassination of Mousavi and other IRGC commanders will prompt Hezbollah to engage in a real war with Israel at this moment. Iran is evidently not inclined towards this option due to the conflict in the ongoing conflict in Gaza, and amid the presence of US and British forces in the eastern Mediterranean and the Western stance that any direct or indirect involvement of Iran in a war with Israel will result in punitive actions against Iran.
Consequently, it is possible that the Houthis will broaden the scope of their conflicts with Israel in the near future, but they will not engage in a war comparable to the one that occurred in July 2006.
4. Targeting Israelis Abroad: Targeting Israelis abroad is a highly probable scenario, considering Iran’s repeated use of this strategy in recent years to broaden its involvement with Israel. Recent attempts by pro-Iranian elements in Turkey and Cyprus to carry out assassinations of Israelis have been successfully prevented, as confirmed by the authorities of these countries. However, it is not certain that Iran will use this strategy as its sole response to the assassination of IRGC leaders; rather, it is more likely that it will use it in conjunction with one or more of the aforementioned scenarios.
ConclusionIn short, the killing of Razi Mousavi and other IRGC leaders may provoke a response from Iran. Nevertheless, this response is expected to be well-calculated in terms of its potential ramifications or implications. This particularly true given that Iran does not currently wish to broaden the scope of its conflicts with Israel to avoid military escalation with the West, spearheaded by the United States, since Western countries are extremely concerned about Iranian nuclear progress and the halt of the related negotiations in Vienna.
