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Reading: What Does Daesh’s Targeting of Qassem Soleimani’s Grave Signify?
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Terrorism & Armed Conflict

What Does Daesh’s Targeting of Qassem Soleimani’s Grave Signify?

Tokka Al-Naggar
Last updated: 2024/01/15 at 6:13 PM
Tokka Al-Naggar
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On Wednesday, January 3, Daesh claimed responsibility for the attack that targeted the Iranian city of Kerman. According to the group’s statement, two of its members departed towards a gathering of “polytheists” near the grave of their dead leader, Soleimani, and set off their explosive vests in the middle of the gathering.

This bombing coincides with the fourth anniversary of Soleimani’s assassination in Iraq in 2020. It also follows the release of an audio recording in January by Daesh’s official representative, Abu Hudhayfah Al-Ansari, titled “And Kill Them Wherever You Find Them,” in which he referred to the Gaza Strip war and urged Daesh members to target the United States, Israel, and Iran.

What Is Daesh’s Perspective on Iran?

With the United States acting as their common adversary, Iran and Al-Qaeda maintained a relationship characterized by the advancement of pragmatic interests in exchange for putting aside ideological differences. The existence of Al-Qaeda leaders within Iran facilitated the execution of several significant operations, posing a formidable challenge to the United States and its allies. Conversely, the Iranian sanctuary played a pivotal role in ensuring the continued existence of Al-Qaeda.

While Daesh originated from Al-Qaeda, the two groups approached Iran differently due to their divergent stances regarding the Shiites. 

Al-Qaeda, for its part, did not prioritize fighting Shiites, believing that the best way to deal with them was through preaching rather than sectarian conflict. This was formally expressed in a letter written in 2005 by Al-Qaeda’s second man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, to Al-Qaeda’s then-leader in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, in which Al-Zawahiri expressed his disapproval of the attack on ordinary Shiites in Iraq, telling Al-Zarqawi that it is incumbent on them to preach the call of Islam to the Shiite and explain and communicate to guide them to the truth. “Has any Islamic state in history ever tried that? And why kill ordinary Shia considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance?” Al-Zawahiri inquired in his letter.

Daesh, on the contrary, categorically excommunicates the Shiites, considering them a sect of polytheism and apostasy.

The connection between Iran and Daesh can be elucidated by examining the statements made by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in May 2014, who served as the official spokesperson for Daesh at that time. In his address titled “Sorry, emir of Al-Qaeda,” Al-Adnani refuted the notion that Daesh was an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, but emphasized that his group was adhering to Al-Qaeda’s instructions. One of these instructions was to refrain from launching attacks on Iranian soil in order to safeguard their interests and logistical routes within Iran.

Thus, Iran was capable of ad hoc neutralization of Daesh’s assaults on its territory for years. Nevertheless, with the disengagement between Al-Qaeda and Daesh, the latter initiated a series of terrorist attacks against Iran, the most notable of which was the attack that occurred in 2017, targeting the Iranian Shura Council and the shrine of Ayatollah Khomeini, let alone targeting the Shahcheragh Shrine in the city of Shiraz in 2022.

Similarly, we can’t overlook the significant contribution of Iranian-supported factions in exerting security pressure on Daesh in its conventional strongholds. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also actively participated in the liberation of territories previously under Daesh’s control in Iraq and also played a crucial role in coordinating military operations in Syria to reclaim areas under Daesh’s control. Hence, multiple factors have converged to shape the animosity between Daesh and Iran.

Multiple Motives

A multitude of factors contributed to Daesh’s assault on Iran, encompassing Iran-specific, regional, and Daesh-specific considerations. These can be succinctly outlined as follows:

Undermining the Iranian-Sunni Alliance: The attack on Soleimani’s grave took place in the context of increasing coordination between Iran and several Sunni actors in the region. Daesh seeks to diminish the influence of this alliance that poses a threat to its hegemony. In a recent audio message titled “And Kill Them Wherever You Find Them,” Daesh highlighted the collaboration between the Hamas movement and Iran. They condemned the alliance with Shiite groups, considering it a sinful act. Daesh also claimed that this collaboration has escalated in recent years, with resistance factions aligning themselves with Iran and forming the so-called resistance axis, as a result of which the Palestinian factions have allowed Iran to take a leading role in the Palestinian scene, presenting itself as a savior and defender of Palestine.

The recorded message further asserted that the recent assault on Gaza unveiled the truth behind this fictitious axis and that Iran established it to advance its own objectives; that the Palestinian factions are merely instruments for Iran to wage a proxy war; and that the Shiites perceive Jerusalem merely as a tool to exploit prevailing circumstances. As a result, this attack is seen as a direct threat to Iran on the one hand and a response to Tehran’s growing influence in Daesh-affiliated countries on the other.

Regaining Propaganda Momentum: The outbreak of war in Gaza resulted in a decline in the momentum of Salafist-jihadi terrorist organizations. Conversely, Iran-aligned Shiite groups experienced an upsurge in momentum due to their successful execution of several assaults against US bases in Iraq and Syria, as well as shipping traffic in the Red Sea. These groups emphasized in their statements that the strikes were a response to Israel’s invasion of Gaza and a further demonstration of opposition to the United States’ military presence in Iraq and the region.

As a consequence, there has been a notable increase in analyses positing that the trajectory of terrorism in the area might transition from being dominated by Salafi-jihadi organizations like Al-Qaeda and Daesh to being dominated by Shiite groups associated with Iran. Thus, Daesh is launching this attack in an effort to revive media momentum and propaganda for its activities.

Confirming IS-Khorasan’s Influence: Many reports have confirmed IS-Khorasan’s involvement in the two bombings in Iran. One could argue that Daesh conducted this operation to validate its presence and establish itself as a significant and indispensable actor in the region that can’t be overlooked. According to the 32nd United Nations report, which was released on July 25, 2023, IS-Khorasan is thought to be the most dangerous threat in Afghanistan and the wider region. The report also mentioned that the group has between 4,000 and 6,000 members and that its attacks against both the Taliban and foreign targets have become more sophisticated. Its attacks showcased a formidable operational capability encompassing communication, planning, reconnaissance, and execution. Relatedly, the Kerman operation serves as a validation of the impact of IS-Khorasan.

Mitigating the Intensity of Daesh’s Operational Decline: The assault executed by Daesh in Iran coincides with a significant operational downturn that the group experienced in 2023. Excluding December, Daesh claimed responsibility for 838 operations in 2023, a 53% decrease from the 1,811 operations it conducted during the same period in 2022. Due to its limited capacity for substantial operational expansion in its primary strongholds of Iraq and Syria, coupled with waning propaganda momentum, Daesh endeavors to accomplish one of two things with this assault: surmount its defeats and boost the morale of its members.

In short, the explosion carried out by Daesh in Kerman is anticipated to heighten the intricacy of the regional landscape. Numerous indicators suggest the potential convergence of future objectives between Daesh and forces hostile to Iran, particularly in light of the symbolic significance of Daesh’s assault on the grave of Qasem Soleimani, which the United States regarded as a fruitful hunt. Consequently, there is a possibility of a convergence of pragmatic interests among certain countries that are in conflict with Iran and Daesh.

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TAGGED: Daesh, Iran
Tokka Al-Naggar January 15, 2024
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