On 5 January 2024, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani declared that his government was in the process of establishing a bilateral committee to devise a timetable for the ultimate withdrawal of forces of the Global Coalition against Daesh (GCAD) from Iraq, emphasizing that no aspect necessary to establish national sovereignty over Iraqi territories would be compromised. This transpired a day following an American airstrike that targeted a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) headquarters in Baghdad, killing Abu Taqwa, also known as Mushtaq Talib Al-Saeedi, a leader of the Al-Nujaba Movement, an Iraqi militia affiliated with the PMF. The United States justified the strike as an act of self-defense in response to attacks on its forces in Iraq and Syria by Iranian-backed factions. Iraq, however, viewed these strikes as hostile actions that would negatively affect national interests, undermine sovereignty, security, and stability, and deviate from the agreed objectives of the GCAD.
This article examines Iraq’s reasons for requesting the termination of the GCAD forces’ operations and explores the United States’ potential willingness to comply with these demands, particularly given the turbulent regional situation, including the ongoing war in Gaza. Further, the article delves into the possible consequences and difficulties that may arise from ending the GCAD’s involvement in Iraq, including the impact on Daesh’s activities and Baghdad’s capacity to counter it.
Multiple Motives
The Iraqi demand for the withdrawal of US forces coincided with a critical regional juncture in which the Middle East is experiencing a tumultuous period characterized by the Israeli assault on Gaza and the subsequent escalation of the regional crisis amidst efforts to maintain the pre-existing levels of engagement between state and non-state international and regional actors prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The primary motivations behind these calls can be delineated as follows:
Mutual Military Escalation between the Iraqi Militias and Washington: The call made by Iraq for the GCAD to withdraw is not unprecedented. Following the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Qassem Soleimani by the US army in Baghdad in January 2020, the Iraqi parliament voted to end the US military presence in the country, and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani confirmed in mid-August 2023 that Iraq no longer required foreign forces on its soil. Nevertheless, the current demands for American troop withdrawals originate from a distinct regional milieu in contrast to the preceding ones. It takes place against the backdrop of the Gaza War and the growing military confrontations between pro-Iranian militias, armed groups, and US forces in the area.
Ten days after the commencement of the current war, US military installations in Iraq and Syria that operate under the auspices of the GCAD were targeted in dozens of drone and missile assaults. In total, Washington tallied over 115 such attacks against its forces in the two countries. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an Iranian-backed network of armed Iraqi militias, claimed responsibility for the majority of these attacks as retaliation for US assistance to Israel in its Gaza conflict. In retaliation, the United States bombed militia-controlled sites in Iraq and Iranian-linked sites in Syria. It also named several leaders of the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades and Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada to its terrorist list. Alongside the field escalation came increasing calls from Iraqi political forces and armed factions to attack the interests of countries backing Israel in the Gaza war, led by the United States.
Thus, the announcement by Iraq of the establishment of a bilateral committee to coordinate and expedite the conclusion of the missions of the GCAD forces can be interpreted in the context of the internal pressures exerted on the Al-Sudani government to drive out foreign forces, its failure to defuse the current state of escalation following a period of relative calm that lasted for approximately a year, and its incapacity to forge a mutually agreeable agreement between the United States and Iraqi militias and armed groups, particularly those that are loyal to Tehran. One the one hand, the Iraqi government is powerless to stop these groups from targeting US interests and their growing demands to attack US military bases in Syria and Iraq, as well as the US embassy in Baghdad, in retaliation for Washington’s ongoing backing of Israel in the Gaza conflict. On the other hand, Washington’s response to these assaults cannot be thwarted on the grounds that it is exercising its “right to self-defense” and safeguarding its regional interests.
Critiques of the United States’ Presence in Iraq: Iraq’s desire to terminate the GCAD forces’ missions on its territory is inextricably linked to the growing controversy surrounding the US military’s presence in the country since 2017. Political parties and Iranian-backed Shiite militias are opposing the presence of US forces, and they have been calling for their withdrawal on several occasions, particularly in the wake of US forces’ killings of IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani and PMF leader Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis. The controversy in Iraq escalated when the Coordination Framework (CF) gained control over the country’s security and political landscape. The CF, which has close ties to Iran, is primarily focused on opposing the presence of the United States in Iraq.
The Iraqi Forces’ Success in Encircling Daesh’s Activities: The Iraqi Prime Minister’s recurring demands for the withdrawal of GCAD forces are in response to the country’s recent successes in the fight against Daesh. Following the successful liberation of all Iraqi territories from Daesh’s control in 2017 by Iraqi security forces in collaboration with the GCAD, ongoing pursuits were initiated to apprehend Daesh remnants and its cells across the country. Iraqi forces conducted security and military operations against Daesh’s hideouts and cells in numerous provinces, resulting in a substantial reduction in Daesh’s activities within Iraqi territory and a decline in its military capabilities and its ability to recruit new elements. This resulted in Iraq becoming one of the most successful countries in the fight against terrorism in 2023, as many Iraqi analysts and officials have stated.
For instance, in September 2023, Al-Sudani told CNN that “Iraq no longer required the presence of foreign forces on its territories to combat Daesh,” citing the group’s status as merely a desert-chasing group that posed no threat to the country. In the same vein, on 21 August 2023, Qasim Al-Araji, the Iraqi national security advisor, affirmed that his country had successfully vanquished Daesh. However, it maintains activities pertaining to intelligence operations in order to safeguard the security progress that has been made. Ibrahim Al-Marsoumi, the commander of the PMF in the southern regions of Mosul, additionally declared on 26 August 2023, that Daesh operations have concluded, their existence is irretrievable, and the group can no longer move or breathe easily.
Potential Consequences
Amid the mounting pressure on Al-Sudani government to cease the operations of GCAD forces in Iraq, apprehensions are being expressed regarding the possible security implications of this course of action in the fight against Daesh. Below is a summary of the most significant expected consequences:
Resurgence of Daesh’s Operations: The withdrawal of GCAD forces from Iraq carries the potential danger of increased Daesh activity. This withdrawal, particularly if it occurs abruptly and without forethought, could result in a security vacuum that Daesh’s dormant cells could exploit to increase their activity within Iraq. While the security operations conducted in collaboration between the Iraqi and GCAD forces over the last two years have effectively encircled Daesh and deprived it of a substantial amount of financial and leadership assets, this does not provide sufficient evidence to assert or validate the cessation of the Daesh menace in Iraq. Although Daesh maintains a few dormant cells within the country, it continues to launch attacks against Iraqi army forces in numerous cities. Recent estimates by the United Nations experts indicate that the number of Daesh members in Iraq and Syria is between 5,000 and 7,000, the vast majority of whom are combatants. Daesh may have recently scaled back its operations in an effort to reorganize itself and facilitate the recruitment of new members so that it can resume its activities. This is particularly noteworthy given Daesh’s track record of adapting well to security strikes that target its strongholds and various detachments and its ability to flexibly respond to such developments.
Loss of Intelligence Support from the United States against Daesh: The withdrawal of GCAD forces from Iraq may result in the loss of intelligence efforts and advanced information that these forces provide to support the Iraqi army’s operations against Daesh, particularly the air strikes conducted by the Air Force against Daesh’s strongholds in rugged mountainous terrain. It is important to note that following its spatial defeat in Iraq in 2017, Daesh dispersed into small cells across various regions and began conducting attrition operations against the GCAD and Iraqi forces in an effort to establish its presence. The group adopted a strategy centred on launching attacks with a limited scope and degree of complexity in their tactics. As a result, the security forces tasked with combating Daesh were compelled to revise their military and security strategies and plans in order to concentrate on preemptive strikes against Daesh’s strongholds and substitute defensive patterns for offensive ones in order to impede its ability to launch attacks. Thus, Iraq declared in late 2021 that the GCAD would no longer be involved in combat operations but would instead serve as advisors to the Iraqi security forces, providing guidance, training, and intelligence cooperation. Over the course of the previous two years, the Iraqi security forces have predominantly endeavored to engage in an information war with small Daesh groups and cells in order to detect and monitor their activities prior to launching bombings. By doing so, they have suffered significant material and human casualties, which impede their ability to execute operations that specifically target civilians in critical regions.
Impact on Efforts to Combat Daesh in Syria: The GCAD forces’ total withdrawal from Iraq might have an impact on the fight against Daesh in Syria. The forces stationed on Iraqi soil offer logistical and informational assistance to those stationed on Syrian soil, in addition to serving as backup support in the event that the latter are placed in perilous situations. Hence, any disruption in the coordination among the GCAD forces spanning the Syrian-Iraqi arc would impede the efficacy of the endeavors focused on destroying the strongholds and leadership of Daesh that are geographically centred in Syria.
Exposure to Economic Pressure: The security consequences that may arise from the withdrawal of GCAD forces from Iraq are associated with potential adverse effects on the Iraqi economy, which in turn will inevitably affect counterterrorism endeavors. If Iraq continues to insist on the immediate withdrawal of US forces without reaching a mutually agreeable solution, it is possible that Washington will respond by ceasing security and financial assistance to Baghdad. Additionally, the United States may threaten to impose economic sanctions and withhold the billions of dollars in Iraqi oil revenues that are deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, comparable to the threat made by the previous Donald Trump administration to impose severe sanctions on Iraq in 2020 in response to the Iraqi parliament’s vote on the withdrawal of US forces. A recurrence of the same scenario would plunge the Iraqi government into a severe economic crisis that would impede its attempts to rebuild areas freed from Daesh and to fortify and restore the capabilities of the security forces involved in combating terrorism, given that these endeavors necessitate significant financial outlays.
Overall, the magnitude of the consequences linked to the potential withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq will largely depend on the manner in which this withdrawal is executed and whether it occurs entirely or partially. Additionally, the timeframe for this withdrawal will be significant, as will the Iraqi government’s preparedness level and its strategies to address the potential repercussions, particularly in light of the escalating risks posed by Daesh. Arguably, Iraq no longer requires the same level of assistance that was previously required to overcome the Daesh threat, a shift that can be attributed to several factors, including the following:
1) The extraordinary progress that the Iraqi security forces have made in the last two years, both in terms of their preparedness to conduct precise, qualitative operations that have targeted and continue to target Daesh’s strongholds across the entire territory of Iraq and in terms of their level of possession of a potent intelligence data bank that allows them to launch successful preemptive strikes against Daesh’s hideouts and surprise and pursue both individual members and small, dormant cells.
2) The Iraqi government taking a set of measures last year to strengthen its capacity to combat terrorism within the country. These measures involved reorganizing the Iraqi security forces to enhance the effectiveness of security institutions, authorizing the creation of preliminary anti-terrorism legislation, initiating joint security operations with intelligence agencies to target the hideouts of terrorist organizations within Iraqi territory, particularly Daesh, and progressing towards transferring the responsibility of security operations to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in the areas liberated from Daesh. This would enable the army forces to concentrate on addressing the deficiencies and security vulnerabilities, both within cities and between different regions, as well as along the border areas with Syria.
3) Iraq’s recent efforts to fortify security and intelligence cooperation with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and the security services in the Kurdistan region have filled a security void on the borders between the Iraqi governorates and the Kurdistan regions, as well as on the Iraqi-Syrian border, preventing Daesh elements from using these areas to infiltrate and plot attacks.
Notwithstanding the accomplishments of the Iraqi armed forces in their fight against Daesh, certain hazards and difficulties linked to the operations of the group persist. Iraq should formulate an all-encompassing strategy to address these challenges, or at the very least mitigate the potential repercussions they may have on the country’s stability and security. These challenges primarily encompass risks associated with correctional facilities and camps housing tens of thousands of Daesh members and their families in northeastern Syria, with some of these facilities situated on the Iraqi border. Growing concerns arise regarding the potential for Daesh to storm these facilities, free some of its members, and recommence operations in Iraq, particularly given the symbolic significance that Daesh attributes to Iraq as the group’s hub. This suggests that despite the current reduction in its financial and operational capacities, the threat Daesh poses will persist within Iraqi territories. This threat is likely to increase in the future due to the ongoing unstable geopolitical situation, especially in the aftermath of the recent Gaza war. There are also growing signs that Daesh is trying to take advantage of and invest in the complicated regional security situation it has created in order to demonstrate its presence and influence.
Is the Withdrawal of GCAD Forces from Iraq imminent?
The declaration by the Iraqi government of its intention to terminate the operations of GCAD forces in Iraq has generated considerable discord regarding the feasibility of its immediate implementation. According to prevailing conjecture, this declaration merely represents an effort to assuage the pressure from Shiite factions within Iran on the Al-Sudani government to withdraw US forces from Iraq. A few dynamics make this withdrawal improbable in the near and medium terms. Although the long-term occurrence of this withdrawal cannot be categorically ruled out, it is probable that it will involve a redeployment or reevaluation of the GCAD forces’ mission, based on the following:
Dissuading International and Regional Adversaries: Although the stated purpose of US forces in Iraq is to support Iraqi security forces in their fight against Daesh’s remnants and prevent their resurgence, it can be argued that the US’s motivation for having these forces there goes far beyond combating terrorism to include deterring its regional and global adversaries and protecting its interests in the Middle East. Iraq is a critical and significant arena for the United States to challenge Tehran’s influence and sever regional cooperation between its militias in the region. Additionally, Iraq is a crucial point in Washington’s geostrategic competition with Russia and China. Given this, the US Department of Defence refuted any intentions to withdraw its troops from Iraq. Therefore, in response to the Iraqi government’s declaration of establishing a bilateral committee to coordinate the conclusion of the GCAD forces’ missions, ministry spokesman Patrick Ryder stated that Washington remains firmly committed to its objective of annihilating Daesh and that its forces remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government.
Bringing the Middle East’s Significance Back into Focus: The recent escalation in regional tensions in the Middle East, which is associated with the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip, and the previous Middle Eastern reactions, particularly in the Gulf, to the consequences of the Ukrainian war that were contrary to the desires of the United States and Europe exposed the fallacy in American strategic calculations concerning the region’s diminishing significance in favor of turning eastward to contain the emerging threats from China and Russia. This prompted the United States to reassess the significance of the Middle East to its strategic interests and bolster its regional presence, particularly in light of the growing risks associated with leaving its forces and interests there vulnerable to frequent attacks by Iranian-aligned armed militias.
Absence of National Consensus in Iraq on US Withdrawal: The Iraqi government’s declaration regarding the cessation of GCAD operations is not embraced by every influential and active political actor on the Iraqi scene. The Sunni and Kurdish factions vehemently oppose this withdrawal and insist on the continued presence of US forces. The reception of General Joel Fowell, Commander-in-Chief of the GCAD forces in Iraq and Syria, by Masrour Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, on 9 January, made this abundantly clear. In their meeting, they emphasized the significance of safeguarding stability and security in Iraq and the surrounding area, as well as the necessity of continuing the GCAD forces’ missions to aid the Iraqi army and Peshmerga forces in their fight against terrorism. Some estimates suggest that if the United States is compelled to withdraw from Iraq, its forces and military bases could potentially be relocated to the Kurdistan region.
In conclusion, the Iraqi government’s request for the exit of the GCAD forces from Iraq is motivated by several factors, including the increasing military conflicts between US forces and Iranian-backed militias and armed factions, particularly in light of the ongoing war in Gaza, the growing resistance to the presence of American forces in Iraq by the Iranian-backed political parties and Shiite militias, and the Iraqi security forces’ triumph in encircling Daesh’s activities in Iraq and freeing all of its territory through collaboration with the GCAD forces. Nevertheless, the current predicament regarding the withdrawal will not be as straightforward as it once was due to intricate calculations associated with the geostrategic interests of the United States and its Middle Eastern allies, which extend beyond the objectives of counterterrorism.
