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Reading: Facts about the Philadelphi Corridor, Rafah Crossing, and Peace Treaty
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Opinion

Facts about the Philadelphi Corridor, Rafah Crossing, and Peace Treaty

Gen. Mohamed Eldewery
Last updated: 2024/06/02 at 4:40 PM
Gen. Mohamed Eldewery
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Egypt vehemently opposes Israel’s recent actions in Rafah city, particularly the occupation of the Rafah Crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor on Palestinian territory, a situation that prompted Cairo to close the Rafah Crossing and halt the entry of aid through it. This reflected Egypt’s refusal to engage with the de facto situation imposed by Israel’s occupation of the crossing. While these developments are unrelated to the peace treaty between the two countries, they exacerbate the prospects of resolving the Gaza crisis and intensify the tension in bilateral relations.

There are several aspects that warrant attention, which are not associated with military operations but rather with the prevalent jargon used during the war. Consequently, it is critical to elucidate certain terms and rectify others in accordance with texts of the signed agreements, in order to prevent confusion and unfounded accusations against certain parties.

The Camp David Accords comprise two framework agreements signed on September 17, 1978, involving President Sadat, President Carter, and Menachem Begin. The first framework agreement, known as the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, focuses on finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian cause in line with Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The second agreement is the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, which comprises a collection of fundamental principles that were intended to be incorporated into the peace treaty that was signed later.

Half a year following the signing of these two agreements, the three presidents convened in Washington on March 26, 1979, to sign the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. This treaty comprehensively governs all facets of the bilateral relationship between Egypt and Israel. Here, we highlight four crucial points:

  1. Gaza Strip was mentioned in Article 2 of the Treaty, which stipulated, “The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip.” In other words, Gaza is not a part of any accord between Israel and Egypt.
  1. Security arrangements were stipulated for in Paragraph 4 of Article 4, which stipulates that “The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs I and 2 of this article may, at the request of either Party, be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.”
  1. Annex I of the treaty –i.e. the protocol on Israeli withdrawal and security arrangements– states in its second article that there are four zones wherein the nature of armament and the presence of international forces must be regulated. Three of these zones, namely A, B, and C, are located within Sinai and one, D, within Israel. Within these zones, the presence of tanks, artillery, and missiles is prohibited (the geographic depth of the two countries has been taken into consideration).
  1. Zone D is situated within Israeli territory along its border with Egypt, commencing east of Rafah. It starts from a point outside the borders of the Gaza Strip and extends to Eilat. Consequently, Gaza is not included in Area D. This is corroborated by the fact that when Israel disengaged from Gaza in 2005, it completely removed all of its military personnel from the Strip.

In connection with the security arrangements in Sinai, Egypt and Israel entered into a security agreement in September 2005 regarding Sinai. This agreement designated the establishment of a border guard regiment in Zone C of Sinai in lieu of the police forces specified in the Treaty. The primary objective of the border guard regiment was to combat terrorism and smuggling, with a particular focus on the Gaza border region. Additionally, Egypt effectively amended Article 4 of the Treaty when, in early November 2021, the two countries reached a consensus within a joint [Egyptian and Israeli] military committee to augment the border patrol forces and their capabilities for the purpose of safeguarding and controlling the borders in the northeastern strategic direction.

Regarding the Philadelphi Corridor, it is a slender passageway situated entirely within the Gaza Strip, 14 kilometers along the Egypt-Gaza border, extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Karm Abu Salem crossing while facing the Egyptian border. Israel named it the “Philadelphi Corridor” after taking control of the Strip and deployed its military forces there. It is important to note that Israel withdrew from the Corridor after withdrawing from Gaza in September 2005. This confirms that the Corridor is not considered part of its territory and doesn’t fall within Zone D. Following Israel’s withdrawal, the Palestinian Authority forces controlled the Corridor, which was later controlled by Hamas following its takeover of Gaza in mid-2007. In summary, there were no agreements between Egypt, Israel, or the Palestine that govern the Palestinian Corridor.

With respect to the Rafah Crossing, the following should be emphasized: 

  • Israel has maintained control over the Crossing since it took control of Gaza following the 1967 war, and it operated normally without issues during the 38-year period of occupation.
  • After Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the Palestinian Authority and Israel signed the Agreement on Movement and Access on November 15, 2005. This agreement mandated the involvement of a third party to manage operations at the Crossing from the Palestinian side. Egypt had no involvement in this agreement.
  • Three main entities have been involved in the Crossing’s operation since November 25, 2005, and it has been associated with the presence of three fundamental entities: the Palestinian Presidential Guard, the Crossing Authority of the Palestinian Authority, and the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah).
  • Following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in July 2007, EUBAM left the Crossing, and the Presidential Guard and the Crossing Authority were ejected. As a result, the three parties who had been agreed upon became unavailable, and the Crossing was shut down on both sides. Egypt was, nevertheless, opening the Crossing sporadically in front of Gaza’s population.
  • As a security measure, the Crossing was closed in the aftermath of the January 2011 events. Nevertheless, subsequent to the eradication of terrorism, it was permanently reopened. Egypt has kept its border with Gaza open throughout the current conflict, with the exception of when Israel temporarily took control of the area in recent weeks. The Palestinian Crossing will only be opened if Israel withdraws.

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TAGGED: Egypt, Gaza, Gaza war, Hamas, Israel, Palestine, Rafah
Gen. Mohamed Eldewery June 2, 2024
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Gen. Mohamed Eldewery
By Gen. Mohamed Eldewery
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