The past few months have seen the resurgence of piracy along the coast of Somalia, following over a decade of relative pacification and stability thanks to the combined international and Somali efforts that managed to crack down on piracy operations. This resurgence is seemingly on the rise in light of the major developments in the Middle East, including primarily the Israeli war on Gaza, which galvanized Iran-affiliated regional resistance movements to respond to the massacres perpetrated by Tel Aviv against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip. In this vein, the Houthi movement initiated attacks on vessels transiting from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.
In many respects, maritime instability in the Red Sea, one of the world’s most important maritime routes, has created an ideal environment for the resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and at Bab el-Mandeb, posing additional challenges and security risks to the international community and East African countries. This raises the question of the security implications of the resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb.
Hence, we aim to examine the indications of piracy resurgence, investigate the diverse triggers that have contributed to this resurgence, and discuss the security hazards that have arisen as a consequence of this phenomenon.
I. Indicators and Triggers of Piracy Resurgence in the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb
Several indicators point towards a resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb, a trend that coincides with the emergence of several indications and triggers contributing to renewed piracy activity. These factors include the following:
1. Indications of the Resurgence of Piracy
According to data released by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) on April 12, 2024, there were approximately 33 incidents of theft and piracy along the Somali coast in the first quarter of 2024, primarily concentrated in Mogadishu and the southern Horn of Africa, marking an increase of 18.2% in maritime crimes when compared to the same period in 2023, with only 27 incidents reported back then.
The report also showed that, out of 33 incidents, 24 of them involved armed pirates successfully boarding a ship. In March 2024, the cargo ship MV Abdullah, flying the flag of Bangladesh, was taken over more than 1,100 kilometers off the coast of Mogadishu while transporting coal from Mozambique to the UAE. The ship’s crew of 23 people was taken hostage, bringing the total number of sailors captured by the pirates to 35. A ransom of $5 million was paid to secure the release of the MV Abdullah ship on April 14. Notably, the MV Abdullah is the second ship to be hijacked since December 2023.
Furthermore, in the first quarter of 2024, Somalia reported five attacks on commercial ships off its coast. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) documented six incidents off Somalia’s coast since mid-December 2023, including successful kidnapping operations and attacks by armed men with automatic rifles and rocket launchers.
The European Union’s counter-piracy naval operation, Operation Atalanta, off the coast of Somalia, issued a warning on June 10 about a noticeable increase in events that might result in an escalation of piracy operations. Atalanta noted that pirates’ attack tactics include stealing sailboats, which they then use to launch attacks up to 600 miles away. According to Operation Atalanta, pirates blend in with the shipping traffic, with the boats serving as effective cover. From November 2023 to June 2024, there has been a significant increase in piracy incidents, resulting in the hijacking of 18 boats. Some of these boats have been released, but it is estimated that 6 or 7 boats are still being held by pirate groups.
Furthermore, the Atlanta Operation clarified that the pirates are utilizing previously seized ships that are armed and equipped with sophisticated navigation systems to execute new acts of piracy. These ships are later sent out to blend in with regular maritime traffic before smaller vessels are deployed to launch their attacks. It has also pinpointed numerous possible pirate bases along the Somali coastline, specifically between the cities of Hafun and Garad, with a particularly dangerous area north of Eyl in Puntland State—a notoriously pirate-heavy region of Somalia—in the north. In general, there are two primary types of pirate attacks: 1) small-scale attacks used to conduct offensive operations on illegal fishing boats near the Somali coast, and 2) larger hijackings of commercial ships by organized and experienced pirate groups.
2. Triggers for Piracy Resurgence in the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb
The resurgence of pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden and at Bab el-Mandeb, particularly off the coast of Somalia, was largely motivated by a number of triggers, some of which are associated with the regional arena in relation to the Israeli war on Gaza while others are associated with the internal environment of Somalia, which serves as a primary focal point for pirates.
Regarding the regional drivers, there are two elements that are interconnected and play a significant role in the resurgence of piracy activity.
First, there are the Houthi attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea. Notably, the commencement of these attacks on November 16 coincided with the resurgence of piracy in November 2023. Following the Houthi announcement on November 19, 2023, of their intention to target Israeli-affiliated vessels traversing the Red Sea in response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the situation steadily escalated. By March 15, 2024, the Houthis expanded their scope to include ships in the Indian Ocean, particularly those travelling via the Cape of Good Hope route. Finally, on May 3, they announced the targeting of vessels in the Mediterranean Sea. This series of pronouncements has coincided with a resurgence of piracy activity in the maritime region encompassing the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Bab el-Mandeb strait. A January 2024 Bloomberg report, reported a rise in piracy off the Somali coast since the disruption of maritime security caused by the Houthi actions. Notably, December 2023 saw the first successful hijacking of a vessel, the MV Ruen, by Somali pirates since 2017.
While both Houthi operations and piracy activity pose a threat to the maritime security of the Red Sea, a strategically important maritime route with significant implications for the global economy, it is important to note that the motives, tools, and capabilities behind Houthi attacks differ from those of piracy attacks. For instance, while the Houthis use unmanned aircraft and missiles to launch attacks, pirates use fishing boats and light weapons.
The second regional driver is the deterioration of security arrangements, which has resulted in a gradual decrease in the number of international naval forces patrolling off the Somali coast in recent years, observed following a decrease in the number of piracy operations. One example of such a decline was Operation Atalanta, whose readiness decreased along with a notable drop in piracy incidents between 2023 and 2026, with its focus shifting to anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.
In response to the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, certain international forces have implemented measures to deter the Houthi and prevent further attacks in the Red Sea. However, the situation is further complicated by the fact that Somali security forces in Puntland—the main hub for pirate activity—have been preoccupied lately with either thwarting the activities of terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab and Daesh or ending the violent clashes between state forces and opposition-aligned armed groups in Garowe, Puntland’s capital. These tensions stem from proposed changes to the electoral system, including a potential shift to a direct election model and an extension of President Said Abdullahi Deni’s term until June 2023.
Turning to the Somali-specific factors that fueled piracy, we find that inadequate security supervision and regulations governing illicit fishing by foreign ships—including those from Iran, Europe, and Asia—stand out. While many foreign fishing vessels have a tendency to fish off the coast of Somalia illegally, there is still an additional problem: the government of Puntland and the Federal Government of Somalia have issued more licenses to foreign vessels while neglecting to tighten regulations to guarantee adherence to government restrictions, including prohibiting foreign vessels from fishing within 24 nautical miles of the coastline in order to reserve this area for local fishing, a commitment to which foreign vessels have not made. This fueled local fishermen’s frustration and anger, as they were unable to meet their needs due to low income, making them a prime target for pirate recruitment as a means of securing a source of income for themselves and their families.
The United Nations has stated that illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing off the Somali coast costs the country up to $300 million per year. As such, the inadequacy of the security and regulatory frameworks overseeing fishing in the waters off the Somali coast will contribute to the proliferation of piracy, even if the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea cease.
In addition, the lack of a strong Somali government allowed the pirates to establish a broad sphere of influence, providing them with safe havens for holding hostages and providing refuge for their members. Furthermore, there is a widespread belief among Somalis that “piracy is not a crime” but rather a means of rebellion against foreign vessels that infringe upon the sovereignty of Somalia and the rights of Somalis. This demonstrates the existence of an environment conducive to piracy, allowing it to flourish independently from the Houthi conflict in the Red Sea.
II. Security Implications of Piracy Resurgence in the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb
The resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb poses numerous security risks, many of which will likely worsen if international and Somali measures are not taken simultaneously to thwart any attempts by the pirates to resume their activities, which peaked in 2011. First, as piracy has returned and the Houthi group has persisted in attacking ships in the Red Sea, there has been a surge in demand for private maritime security firms. This has also resulted in higher insurance premiums as shipping companies have been forced to employ private security personnel to guard their vessels.
For example, the London-based security firm Subrosa Group established a new maritime security department in April 2024 in response to the worsening security conditions in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden. Subrosa Group CEO Niall Burns commented on this, saying “the establishment of our Maritime Security division is a direct response to the critical need for elite armed protection for large vessels navigating increasingly perilous waters worldwide. Incidents of maritime attacks are alarmingly on the rise, endangering the security, safety, and welfare of mariners on a daily basis as they traverse the oceans.” Indeed, the rise in demand for private maritime security companies has once again sparked calls for regulation of this industry, following the disbandment of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry in 2016. In 2011, the number of private security companies reached its zenith, as hackers recorded the highest number of attacks in the same year. As the demand for maritime security forces has grown, the costs of insurance coverage and the cost of covering potential ransom payments have also increased.
The second security concern, as highlighted by Operation Atalanta, is the potential for ransom payments to incentivize further piracy. The successful liberation of the Bangladeshi vessel MV Abdullah through a $5 million ransom exemplifies this risk. Such payments may embolden pirates to target additional vessels, leading to a cycle of escalating attacks and ransom demands. Thirdly, the proliferation of international naval forces stationed to defend their ships from potential pirate or Houthi attacks is leading to a militarization of the maritime region that stretches from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, which poses a threat to international stability. Such militarization is manifested in the US Operation Prosperity Guardian, Operation ASPIDES, and Operation Atlanta, as well as the autonomous deployments of US and European forces and military assets to safeguard their ships.
Importantly, the militarization of the region may exacerbate tensions between China and India, who have stationed several warships to secure ship traffic, which heightens the danger of the situation. Both countries might be tempted to exploit incidents of piracy or Houthi attacks to bolster their own military positions under the guise of protecting their vessels. India, for instance, has already increased its military presence in the region since December 2023. This move is widely seen as an attempt to secure a military base in the Seychelles, strategically located near the Somali coast. Conversely, China may leverage its existing military base in Djibouti as a launchpad for anti-piracy operations. These developments heighten the risk of limited confrontations between the two Asian powers in the vital region. Furthermore, Turkey’s recent conclusion of a bilateral defense agreement with Somalia on February 8, 2024, suggests a probable expansion of its naval presence off the Somali coast. This adds another layer of complexity to the already volatile regional security landscape.
The fourth security risk associated with the resurgence of piracy activity is the possibility that pirates will enter into covert cooperation agreements with terrorist organizations that would arm them or give them new strategies for carrying out their attacks. This will likely enhance the pirates’ qualitative and armament capabilities, while also providing them with a security protection umbrella that allows them to carry out their attacks safely, which ultimately strengthens the sources of funding for pirates and gives terrorist organizations new allies.
In this context, The National, an Emirati newspaper, reported that certain observers believe that an agreement has been reached between al-Shabaab fighters in Sanaag, northern Somalia, and the pirates to safeguard the latter in exchange for a 30% share of any ransom proceeds and a portion of any spoils they seize. This development coincides with the Somali government’s stringent measures to cut off the funding sources of al-Shabaab.
In short, the resurgence of pirate activity in this strategically vital maritime region, coupled with the deterioration in maritime security as a result of the Houthis repeated attacks on ships traversing the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and ultimately, the Mediterranean Sea, puts the international community in the inevitable position of having to reevaluate all the drivers that gave the pirates the perfect setting in which to resume their activities. This also calls on Somalia to reevaluate its policies that have helped turn its territorial waters into pirate strongholds, and to see the Somali coast as an asset for growth and stability rather than as a major source of danger to both Somali security and international community.
