After years of deadlock, Turkey took significant strides towards mending ties with Damascus. The thaw began on June 11, when military officials from Turkey and Syria convened at Russia’s Hmeimim Air Base in Syria under Moscow’s mediation. This was followed by a diplomatic push to ease tensions and speed up the normalization of relations, including consultations with Russian President Vladimir Putin during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kazakhstan. Adding to the momentum, reports emerged of an imminent Syrian-Turkish meeting in Iraq, alongside plans to reopen the Abu al-Zandin crossing near Aleppo, a critical point dividing regime-controlled areas from those held by the opposition.
Yet, the most striking development came with President Erdogan’s bold move to send his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan, to Damascus for a direct meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This decision, coupled with hints of a possible invitation for Assad to visit Turkey during Putin’s anticipated trip to the region, marks a dramatic departure from Turkey’s staunch opposition to Assad just a few months ago.
Against this backdrop, this paper explores the motivations behind Turkey’s shift towards normalization with Syria and the potential impact on the Syrian and broader regional landscape.
Motivations behind the Thaw
In diplomacy, normalization signifies the restoration of relations after a period of tension. Turkey has long set conditions for renewing relations with Damascus, insisting on a comprehensive political settlement that includes the opposition but excludes Assad. However, with no political resolution in sight, Ankara has shifted its focus to more immediate, practical concerns rather than waiting for a grand solution to the Syrian conflict. As a result, normalization has taken on a new meaning, now centered around issues like countering the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), curbing Kurdish aspirations, and facilitating the return of refugees. This shift sheds light on Turkey’s current motives for rekindling the normalization process, which is reshaping regional dynamics. Key motivations include:
• Securing the Southern Borders: Ankara has recognized that addressing its security concerns and stabilizing its southern borders—particularly through pursuing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and dismantling their semi-autonomous structures in areas of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), poised to hold municipal elections in August—requires cooperation with the Syrian government, given the ongoing American support for the Kurds. Turkey is also seeking security agreements with Baghdad, given the PKK’s leadership presence in Iraq’s Qandil region. Such cooperation is essential for severing supply lines between the PKK and Kurdish units across the Syrian-Iraqi border. Damascus shares these security concerns and understands the risks of national fragmentation if the Syrian Democratic Forces proceed with their planned elections. Consequently, Syria views Turkey as a crucial security ally in countering this threat, which may explain Assad’s apparent softening of the demand for Turkish troop withdrawal as a precondition for normalization.
• Easing the Refugee Burden: The Syrian refugee crisis has become a major challenge for the Turkish government, with the issue evolving into a focal point of political rivalry. Various political parties have weaponized it to criticize Erdogan, exacerbating the situation alongside rising xenophobia and violent incidents targeting refugees. This has been evidenced by recent attacks on Syrians, their property, and businesses across provinces like Kayseri, Hatay, Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Konya, Kilis, and Istanbul, which have only intensified the pressure. Additionally, growing public sentiment blames refugees for much of the country’s economic woes. In response, Ankara is keen to negotiate with the Syrian regime to secure assurances that returning refugees will be safe from persecution, especially since many Syrians in Turkey hail from diverse cities and the northern regions of Syria are not fully equipped to accommodate their return due to suboptimal living conditions.
• Leveraging Regional Dynamics: Several current regional dynamics are driving Turkish-Syrian normalization efforts. On the one hand, Ankara is capitalizing on Damascus’s search for regional allies, driven by concerns over a potential conflict brewing in southern Lebanon that could spill over into southern Syria. This anxiety is heightened by Russia’s reluctance to engage in a confrontation with Israel and the Syrian government’s dissatisfaction with the limited Russian presence near the Golan Heights. On the other hand, Turkey views the strained Syrian-Iranian relations—stemming from Israeli airstrikes on Iranian assets in Syria, Tehran’s focus on its early elections, the rise of a reformist president, and the loss of Iranian advisors on Syria—as a window of opportunity to ensure Tehran does not impede rapprochement efforts. Lastly, the normalization trend between Turkey and Syria is further encouraged by Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as a means of incentivizing the Syrian regime, which has remained detached from the ongoing Iranian-Israeli tensions.
• US Election Indicators: Recent polls suggest the potential return of Republican candidate Donald Trump to the White House in the upcoming November elections. Ankara is closely monitoring the implications of this scenario for the Syrian conflict, as it presents both opportunities and challenges. Erdogan has previous experience dealing with Trump’s decision to scale down US forces in northeastern Syria, which gave Turkey the green light to launch Operation Peace Spring in late 2019. Should Trump return to office, Turkey might find new opportunities for deeper involvement in Syria, particularly if the US reduces its military footprint, creating a vacuum that regional rivals like Iran may attempt to fill. This shift could also provide greater latitude for the SDF and renew prospects for Kurdish-Syrian dialogue, especially given the indirect connections between the Kurds, Iran, and Russia, with the latter advocating for negotiations between the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Damascus. Such developments could compel Turkey to cooperate or at least coordinate with Damascus, to navigate these changes. Therefore, Ankara is eager to anticipate and shape any shifts in the Syrian political and security landscape by establishing understandings with the Syrian government.
• Bolstering Regional Diplomacy: Turkey is actively seeking to bolster its diplomatic standing both regionally and globally. The normalization of relations with Syria aligns with Ankara’s broader strategy of mending ties with other key regional powers, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Israel. This diplomatic initiative also underscores Ankara’s ability to navigate a balanced foreign policy between the United States and Russia, each with divergent interests and strategies in Syria, within the context of larger geopolitical maneuvers.
Potential Repercussions
The shift in Turkish-Syrian relations into a new phase could have significant consequences for the political and economic conditions in northern Syrian regions, as well as for both the Turkish and Syrian governments. These implications can be explored as follows:
• Diminished Popular Support for Turkey: In opposition-held areas, there is growing anxiety among militias about the potential consequences of Ankara’s rapprochement with Damascus. They fear this diplomatic shift could lead to a reduction in Turkish political and military backing or pressure them into negotiating with the Syrian government as part of a broader political deal. This unease has already manifested in unprecedented clashes between opposition factions and Turkish forces, which, although initially sparked by the attack on Syrian refugees in Kayseri, also reflect broader discontent with Turkey’s evolving stance on the Syrian conflict. This development could signal a significant erosion of Ankara’s popular support in northern Syria.
• Divergent Reactions among Opposition Factions: The reaction of opposition factions to the evolving Turkish-Syrian relationship may vary depending on their level of dependence on Ankara. Factions that were established by Turkey and are entirely reliant on its support—such as the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, the Sultan Murad Division, and the Hamza Division—are more likely to align with Turkey’s directives and may be more accepting of the political rapprochement, particularly given that they are ethnically and regionally diverse and have strong ties to Ankara, with many of their leaders of Turkish origin. On the other hand, factions with a more Islamic orientation, which are ethnically homogeneous, of Arab descent, and deeply rooted in regional, familial, and tribal networks—such as the Levant Front, the Liberation and Construction Movement, and the Mu’tasim Division, as well as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which controls Idlib—may resist Turkey’s new approach. These groups could oppose the Turkish initiative, engage in military actions against Turkish interests, or incite popular protests against Turkey’s policies.
• Redefining Relations with Opposition Factions: Ankara is known for not discarding its assets completely, often choosing instead to repurpose and strategically employ them. This approach is likely to shape Turkey’s policy towards its allied factions. Rather than abandoning these groups outright, Ankara may opt for a more strategic restructuring—dismantling some factions, merging others, redefining their roles, and recalibrating their armament levels. Such steps would be contingent on the success and progression of Turkish-Syrian agreements, potentially leading to a scenario where these factions might eventually acknowledge Damascus as the sole legitimate government in Syria. However, this outcome seems improbable at the current stage. Overall, the relationship between Turkey and these loyal factions remains fraught with uncertainty and skepticism. For instance, a recent July meeting between Turkish intelligence coordinator Bashqan Sami and 100 faction leaders in Azaz yielded only vague assurances from Turkey about not abandoning these groups and ensuring their safety, without offering concrete commitments or promising to include their representatives in future Syrian-Turkish negotiations.
• Uncertainty in Kurdish Territories: The future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), their armaments, and the territories they control is a central topic in Turkish-Syrian negotiations. The talks may result in an agreement that allows Turkey to continue military operations in the AANES areas, targeting SDF members and civilian infrastructure. Ankara might also seek assistance from the Syrian Arab Army or loyal factions like the Sultan Murad Brigades, the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, and the Hamza Division to gradually re-establish Syrian regime control over northeastern Syria. Discussions could also explore ways to dismantle the SDF or integrate them into official government forces, determining the level of armament allowed and defining the terms of Kurdish participation in the Syrian political system. This scenario might push the Kurds to engage in consultations with the Syrian government, with backing from Russia and Iran, especially if they perceive a withdrawal of the American security umbrella should Washington alter its policy towards Syria. In such a case, the SDF might only gain approval to operate as local security forces within the broader framework of the Syrian government’s military forces.
• Pursuing Economic Advantages: While the economic dimension may not be the primary driver behind the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, it certainly represents one of the potential benefits. The reopening of border crossings and international highways carries not only political implications, signaling recognition of the Syrian regime and the establishment of economic and trade relations, but it also revitalizes trade routes by resuming the flow of goods and people across borders and within Syria. This would open up economic opportunities for both countries and potentially improve living conditions in Syria. For instance, if efforts to expand the Hijaz al-Shat Road in Azaz—an area under Turkish control that links Aleppo to the Turkish border city of Gaziantep—prove successful, alongside the reopening of the M4 highway (a key trade artery linking western Syria to Iraq, partially under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), this, coupled with the reopening of the Abu al-Zandin crossing near al-Bab, which has already fostered trade between Turkish-controlled areas and Syrian government-held eastern Aleppo, would enable Turkish goods to reach Gulf markets via Syria, traversing Jordan through the Nasib border crossing in southwestern Syria. This route’s significance for Turkish trade is amplified by the closure of the Israeli port of Haifa, which Turkey had relied on for Gulf exports since 2011. The closure followed Turkey’s trade ban with Israel in response to the Gaza conflict.
Simultaneously, reopening the Abu al-Zandin crossing offers economic benefits to opposition-controlled areas by facilitating the sale of products from industrial hubs in Jarabulus, al-Bab, Kobani, Azaz, and Afrin to regime-held territories, products that had been limited to local markets due to the closure of crossings between different zones of control. However, the overall economic impact remains constrained, as the primary trade partner for opposition areas is Turkey, and the Syrian government’s expected benefits are modest as long as the crossing does not facilitate the transport of oil from the AANES regions, which seems unlikely. Nevertheless, Damascus might hope to secure economic gains by enlisting Turkey’s assistance to reclaim oil fields in Deir Ezzor, currently held by the SDF, or by negotiating an agreement on the operation of these fields and the distribution of their revenues.
• Bolstering the Syrian Regime’s Regional Standing: Erdogan’s initiative to engage with Assad marks a significant diplomatic win for the Syrian president, showcasing a notable shift in Erdogan’s previously unwavering stance. This move not only further diminishes Assad’s regional isolation—following last year’s restoration of ties with several Arab countries and the reinstatement of Syria’s Arab League membership—but also strengthens his position on the international stage. Assad is likely to leverage this newfound engagement to push for gradual foreign troop withdrawals, reassert full sovereignty over Syrian territory, and accelerate reconstruction efforts across the country.
Persistent Challenges
Despite the progress made thus far, the path to full normalization between Turkey and Syria is fraught with challenges that could derail or delay the process or lead to agreements that are partial and narrowly focused. Some of the most pressing challenges include:
• Unfavorable Conditions for Refugee Return: The timing, location, and manner of refugee repatriation remain uncertain, hampered by the harsh realities on the ground. The widespread destruction of infrastructure, coupled with the fact that many refugees lack homes to return to, underscores the challenges. Additionally, the absence of basic services, economic opportunitiesو and a functional economic system to support daily life, along with the slow pace of reconstruction due to US sanctions, further complicate the process. Beyond that, most refugees are reluctant to return to areas under Syrian government control.
• Weak Capabilities of the Syrian Army: While a theoretical agreement to counter Kurdish attempts at forming parallel governance structures might be possible, the Syrian government currently lacks the strength to fulfill its commitments independently. The Syrian Arab Army alone cannot fully secure northern Syria and requires external support to confront the PKK and the YPG, especially since these groups enjoy US backing. Consequently, a complete and immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces is unlikely; instead, we may see partial security arrangements aimed at controlling the situation in the north.
• Disagreements over the Political Settlement Formula: Ankara remains committed to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 as the framework for a final settlement of the Syrian crisis, which demands that the Syrian government engage with the opposition, initiate talks to draft a new constitution, and hold presidential elections excluding Assad. Assad, however, rejects this approach, viewing it as foreign interference in Syria’s internal affairs. Furthermore, the aforementioned UN resolution has lost traction within the international community, and the Geneva process has become irrelevant to speeding up the political process. This suggests that any progress will likely focus on specific issues, such as the Kurdish question and the refugee crisis, rather than restoring the full scope of bilateral relations as they were before the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011.
• Iran’s Possible Toughening Position: Iran’s current negative stance could play a significant role in the normalization process between Ankara and Damascus. Despite Turkey and Iran’s mutual opposition to the SDF, Iran is hesitant about increasing Turkish influence in northern Syria and aims to replace Turkish troops with those loyal to it. As such, the extent to which Iran accepts Turkey’s proposals depends on its broader regional strategy and its specific interests in Syria, as well as the terms of its agreements with Ankara. While Tehran may not yet have taken a definitive position on the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, it could eventually pressure Assad to enforce a rigid timeline for the withdrawal of Turkish forces, which could obstruct the path to normalization.
Conclusion
The current normalization process is unlikely to fully resolve all outstanding issues or restore Turkish-Syrian relations to the positive state they enjoyed in the early 2000s. The profound gap and loss of trust between the two countries, exacerbated by the Syrian crisis and divergent policies, make a complete return to former relations unrealistic. The primary objective is to reach partial agreements on critical security and political issues that are priorities for both countries and to reduce the costs associated with ongoing differences.
This current normalization endeavor is an extension of previous intelligence and diplomatic meetings with Syria and represents another phase in a long negotiation process. Success will depend on the ability of both countries to negotiate beneficial deals and avoid rigid stances that could derail progress. Additionally, Turkey’s efforts at reconciliation with Syria do not signify a withdrawal of support for the Syrian opposition. Ankara is adept at maintaining strategic leverage and reconfiguring its assets, with the opposition remaining central to its vision for a political settlement, including a new constitution, elections with opposition involvement, and a restructured security and military framework.
