Tensions have flared along the Lebanese-Israeli border since the onset of the Gaza conflict on October 7, 2023, driving diplomatic endeavors to manage the crisis, foster calm, and establish a clear land border between the two countries. This analysis explores the nature of the border dispute between Lebanon and Israel, the international initiatives undertaken to address it, and the potential benefits a successful border demarcation deal could yield.

The Lebanon-Israel Border Conflict: Nature and Background

The land border dispute between Lebanon and Israel involves 13 contested points, aside from the Shebaa Farms, Ghajar and Kafr Shuba hills. A key point is B1 at Ras al-Naqoura coastal area, central to disagreements over maritime boundaries. The challenge of demarcating the land border stems from the French-British colonial era, when the Palestinian-Lebanese border was assigned to British and French forces at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference Versailles. Britain’s Deauville proposal granted Palestine a smaller area, encompassing the southern bank of the Litani River. An alternative plan outlined a border from Akka on the Mediterranean to the Litani River, then east to Mount Hermon, doubling Lebanese land and keeping the Litani as a buffer zone.

In June 1920, France proposed extending Palestine’s northern border from Ras al-Naqoura to a point near the Jordan River, just north of the Metula Jewish settlement and adjacent villages. By December 1920, a joint French-British mandate committee agreed on a border, formalized in reports signed by both governments in March 1923. The 120-km international border was split into four sectors:

• Sector A: Ras al-Naqoura to Sarit, spanning 15 km.
• Sector B: A meandering line from Sarit to al-Malikiyah.
• Sector C: Along the al-Malikiyah heights to Metula.
• Sector D: From Metula to the Syrian border.

Though drawn on paper, the border was never enforced on the ground. Local communities—Jews and Arabs in Galilee, and Lebanese Christians and Muslims across the border—disregarded it, continuing trade and movement. After the 1982 war, Lebanon’s army withdrew from the south in May 2000 under UN Resolution 425, followed by Israel’s withdrawal before peacekeepers arrived. The 120-km Blue Line was then drawn but diverged from the joint defense line in areas like southern Rmaish, Odaisseh, Kibbutz, and the Jisr al-Shughur in the east. The Blue Line shifted 200 meters west, aligning with the Kibbutz’s western edge, descending to the Odaisseh road, and tracing the southern side of Kfarkela and Metula.

Lebanon expressed reservations about 13 points along the Blue Line, covering approximately 485,000 square meters, excluding the border triangle with Syria. Lebanon argues these points deviate from the 1949 Armistice Agreement borders. The two countries also dispute Ghajar village, 4 km east of Metula along the Hasbani River. According to 1940 British military maps, the village was placed in Lebanon under the French mandate, but after Israel occupied the Golan Heights in 1967, its army entered the village, inhabited by the Alawite community. Additionally, the Shebaa Farms dispute persists, as UN Resolution 425 did not apply to the area, stating it falls under Israeli sovereignty within Syrian territory occupied by Israel.

Diplomatic Initiatives

The US mediation successfully culminated in a maritime agreement between Lebanon and Israel, signed in October 2022, representing a political triumph for the Joe Biden administration. Subsequent diplomatic efforts focused on progressing toward land border demarcation, fostering normalization between Israel and regional states, ensuring security along the Lebanese-Israeli border, and promoting the development of eastern Mediterranean gas fields.

US initiatives to demarcate the land border began before the Al-Aqsa Flood operation. In August 2023, US envoy to Lebanon Amos Hochstein stated that Washington was exploring possibilities to resolve a decades-long border dispute between Lebanon and Israel, engaging with Lebanese perspectives, visiting the border region, and consulting Israeli viewpoints. Following the outbreak of the Gaza war, Hochstein noted that a land border demarcation agreement could reduce hostilities between Lebanon and Israel, proposing a phased approach achievable through a gradual three-phase process. The first phase involves allowing residents of northern Israeli communities and southern Lebanese communities to return to their homes, which requires bolstering the Lebanese Armed Forces. The second phase entails providing an economic aid package to support Lebanon. The third phase focuses on finalizing a land border agreement between Lebanon and Israel.

Concurrently, on February 13, 2024, French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné proposed a plan to Lebanese authorities to reduce tensions. The proposal called for Hezbollah’s withdrawal 10-12 kilometers north of the border, dismantling buildings and facilities near the border, withdrawing combat units, including al-Radwan forces, deploying 15,000 Lebanese troops to southern Lebanon’s border zone, ending Israeli airspace violations, forming a quadripartite committee (France, United States, Israel, Lebanon) to oversee compliance, and negotiating land border delineation.

As clashes between Israel and Hezbollah escalated, US and French efforts to demarcate the land border paused but were revived following the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement on November 27, 2024. On March 11, 2025, US Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East Morgan Ortagus stated that the United States was facilitating talks between Lebanon and Israel to diplomatically address unresolved issues, such as the release of Lebanese prisoners, contested points along the Blue Line, and five areas still under Israeli control.

Moreover, two US officials affirmed that Lebanon and Israel agreed to initiate talks to resolve enduring land border disputes. Moreover, on April 3, 2025, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot voiced France’s commitment to negotiations acceptable to all parties for demarcating the Israel-Lebanon land border. In this framework, Israel confirmed its willingness to engage in talks for border demarcation with Lebanon and agreed to establish three joint working groups with Lebanon, France, and the United States to tackle issues concerning the Blue Line, the five Israeli-controlled sites, and the matter of Lebanese detainees.

Numerous Gains

The demarcation of the land border between Lebanon and Israel offers various benefits for different parties, detailed as follows:

• Lebanon: Lebanon is grappling with an economic crisis and a devalued currency. Reaching an agreement on land border demarcation with Israel serves the Lebanese people’s interests by potentially preventing renewed escalation on the southern border, fostering calm, achieving a diplomatic milestone for the Lebanese government, and easing economic strain through the return of foreign investments.
• Iran: When the maritime border agreement between Lebanon and Israel was signed, Iran did not object, recognizing its benefit to Lebanon and its potential to avert Lebanon’s economic collapse at a time when Tehran is unable to provide support. With deteriorating conditions, including the Israeli war in Gaza and heightened tensions on the Lebanese-Israeli border, Iran has an interest in advancing the demarcation of the Lebanese-Israeli land border. Renewed fighting on Lebanon’s southern border could jeopardize Iran’s key strategic ally in the region, undermining its regional clout. Tehran cannot sustain escalation on the Lebanese front, particularly amid challenges like the loss of its Syrian ally, discussions over the succession of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, economic woes, and nuclear talks with the second Trump administration. 
• Hezbollah: Lebanon’s successive crises are often attributed to Hezbollah’s actions. According to a poll by the Arab Barometer, only 30% of Lebanese express significant trust in Hezbollah, while 55% have no trust at all. Support for Hezbollah’s regional political role is limited, with only a third of Lebanese favoring its involvement, while 42% oppose it. Thus, it is in Hezbollah’s interest to pursue de-escalation with Israel to avoid further conflict and its negative repercussions in Lebanon, which would strain the group’s already weakened capabilities due to the war with Israel.
• Israel: Israel stands to gain from a land border demarcation agreement with Lebanon, akin to the maritime deal, by securing calm on the Lebanese-Israeli border and mitigating Hezbollah’s threat to northern Israel. An agreement serving both parties’ interests would stabilize the border and open pathways to normalizing ties with Lebanon.
• Italy: Italy is among the European countries particularly invested in Lebanese affairs. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has repeatedly affirmed Rome’s commitment to working with all relevant parties to ensure Lebanon’s stability. Italy is keen on pursuing oil and gas exploration and investment in Lebanon’s offshore blocks, with the Italian company Eni showing interest in exploring Lebanon’s exclusive economic zone. Recognizing the importance of Lebanese-Israeli land border demarcation, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani revealed, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington in July, Italy’s efforts to broker a land border agreement between Beirut and Tel Aviv.

In conclusion, the demarcation of the land border between Lebanon and Israel hinges on several factors, including the resilience of the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement, the success of diplomatic efforts to resolve outstanding disputes over prisoners and Hezbollah’s disarmament, and subsequent discussions on contested land points such as Ras al-Naqoura B1, Shebaa Farms, Ghajar, Kafr Shuba, the resolution of the Shebaa Farms dispute, and the delineation of the Lebanon-Syria border.