Since the end of the first decade of the 2000s, Europe has faced an unrelenting series of crises—spanning political, economic, financial, demographic, and security spheres—that have laid bare its vulnerabilities. These crises are largely rooted in the frail economic and monetary foundations of the European Union (EU), as well as the limited democratic representation within its institutions. Such crises compel the continent to refine its existing strategies and craft new ones to confront volatility. Yet, each crisis reignites familiar discourse about Europe’s (referring to the European Union or the broader European project) awakening, decisive shifts, and rediscovery of its path after periods of inertia, coupled with claims that Europe moves forward and evolves only in response to crises. Yet, these crises continue to grow more severe; their effects may briefly recede, but they remain unresolved, often returning with even greater force.
As 2024 drew to a close, the outlook appeared even bleaker, with mounting challenges and an increasingly evident inability to address them. The two most influential countries in the EU are grappling with alarming economic crises that exposed the shortcomings of their adopted model, coupled with political paralysis expected to persist for at least six months. Rifts among EU member states became more pronounced, particularly as Germany either refused or was unable to take on the mantle of continental leadership. A tone of confusion and despair dominates the rhetoric of officials, lawmakers, and experts. Ambitious plans—especially in the areas of economy, security, defense, military manufacturing, and environmental transformation—had been proposed but ultimately faltered and lost traction.
The current impasse may prove temporary, with its causes varying across different issues. Resistance from certain groups, such as farmers opposing environmental policies, plays a role, as does the sheer breadth of objectives requiring substantial funding. For instance, how can the war effort in Ukraine be financed, military equipment provided, gaps in national armies addressed, and future weapons designed and manufactured simultaneously? Disagreements among member states further complicate matters, with some countries, particularly Hungary, adept at blocking decisions widely deemed necessary by the rest of the continent.
Of even greater significance, the long-simmering tension in Franco-German relations has now become more apparent. While cultural disparities between the two countries in political structures, economic policies (notably industrial), priorities, and stances on key players like the United States, Russia, China, and nuclear energy are well established, the growing difficulty in finding common ground is a newer development. This deadlock is particularly visible in areas such as joint European defense, Ukraine’s support, energy policy (including nuclear energy), free trade agreements with Latin America, military production, and the design of advanced weaponry. In general, both countries are focused on addressing their own significant internal challenges. Moreover, Germany no longer views its relationship with France as a priority worth compromising its own interests for, and is willing to harm French interests if it deems this to be necessary or beneficial. Meanwhile, France seems to fail to acknowledge that the vast economic disparity—an annual GDP gap of a trillion euros—has shifted the balance of power between them. It also overlooks the fact that most other European countries do not share its anti-US stance and do not regard French nuclear deterrence as a reliable safeguard for security.
The primary challenge at present is the overall Russian threat, with the Russian-Ukrainian war taking center stage. Over the past year, Russia made tangible gains on the battlefield, though these were not decisive. However, the toll in terms of lives, equipment, and economic strain has been exorbitant. Additionally, both Iran and North Korea became involved, providing Russia with both equipment and personnel.
On the other hand, Ukraine seemed drained. While its soldiers’ heroism and the inventive strategies of its leaders remain commendable, they cannot offset the critical shortfall in personnel and equipment. The country’s casualties are substantial, and it remains incapable of securing its airspace from the relentless barrage of Russian missiles and bombs. Over six million Ukrainians have fled abroad. The country’s energy grid has been destroyed, leaving power outages a constant, while its economy lies paralyzed. American aid is at times stagnant or delayed, and European assistance is not much better—particularly with noticeable hesitation and unease from the United States and Germany, though the latter’s position may change with the upcoming elections. The past months have seen a war of words between Kyiv and its allies. Critics argue that Ukraine has not enlisted enough personnel, while Ukraine contends that the support it receives is both insufficient and delayed, compounded by restrictions on the use of Western weaponry. Regardless of the rationale behind the West’s caution—fears of nuclear escalation—it is clear that their actions fall far short of the strong declarations they make.
Moreover, Russia is waging a hybrid war against European countries, employing a range of tactics including media disinformation campaigns—whose effectiveness has been proven—cyber attacks, sabotage operations targeting submarine cables and weapons depots, assassination attempts, and more. Moscow has significantly intensified these hostile actions over the past year. Notably, the existence of Russian media disinformation campaigns does not automatically mean that those who align with Russian positions are being deceived. A significant number of people in various European societies feel emotionally, culturally, and politically closer to Moscow, rejecting both the current liberal system, German hegemony over the continent, and the moralizing narratives of Brussels and the liberal media.
There is a growing belief among European elites and in broader segments of public opinion that the fighting must come to an end, with the understanding that this would require Ukraine to make concessions that cannot be dressed up as victories. The challenge, however, lies in the uncertainty of whether Europe will even have a seat at the negotiating table, and whether President Putin’s terms will be palatable. It remains unclear whether Russia’s significant setbacks in Syria will push Moscow to demand harsher terms in order to cover up its losses in the Middle East, or whether the severe state of the Russian economy will compel it to settle for a ceasefire without securing all of its demands. Similarly, no one can predict President Trump’s stance—whether he would be willing to accept all of Putin’s terms, or whether North Korea’s involvement and Russia’s increasing demands will prompt him to take a more hardline approach toward Moscow. Even if a deal is reached, it is widely acknowledged that both Moscow and, to a much lesser extent, Kiev have a longstanding history of failing to honor agreements.
The consensus on the necessity to end the war does not conceal the substantial disagreements over the conditions that can be accepted, nor does it obscure the negative signals emanating from Europe’s division, with the German Chancellor and the Prime Ministers of Hungary and Slovakia engaging with Moscow without consulting their European counterparts. (It is possible that President Trump had prior knowledge of Hungary and Slovakia’s intentions.)
Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has voiced significant European concerns, warning that the American and Russian presidents might reach a ceasefire agreement that effectively grants Russia a victory in exchange for Moscow distancing itself from Tehran. Another possibility is an agreement that fails to include provisions to end Russia’s hybrid war against Europe, or one that does not offer adequate security guarantees for Ukraine, instead shifting the burden of these guarantees onto Europe. European countries also fear that President Trump may declare his intention to disregard Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, justifying this move with Europe’s failure to meet its defense spending commitments.
In Europe, perceptions of ties with Turkey range across a wide spectrum. Many European countries welcome Turkey’s triumph over Russia in the Middle East, anticipating that this will, in time, strain relations between Ankara and Moscow, which would diminish Turkey’s leverage in using the threat of a Russian-Turkish rapprochement to pressure Europe. Such tensions may arise sooner than later, particularly if a ceasefire is reached in Ukraine and Turkey is compelled to permit the Russian fleet’s access to the Black Sea. However, there are considerable concerns regarding the fate of European terrorists in Syria and the growing ambitions of President Erdogan.
Overall, European positions on Turkey are highly diverse. Germany, Austria, and Belgium are wary of Ankara’s potential to destabilize their internal security and influence their Turkish or Muslim communities. Spain, Italy, and Portugal prioritize strong ties with Turkey for economic and geopolitical reasons. Greece views Turkey as an immediate threat, while Russia’s neighboring countries see Turkey as a vital member of the Western camp, placing more trust in Ankara than in Germany. Some countries, like France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, are deeply frustrated by Turkey’s behavior, which strains their interactions. Others, like the United Kingdom, disapprove of Turkey’s actions yet maintain and even foster ties. Hungary, on the other hand, admires Turkey’s model of strong leadership and resonates with President Erdogan’s critiques of the current Western paradigm.
Other setbacks are evident on various geopolitical fronts. France has significantly scaled back its military presence in several African countries, including Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Senegal. Its relations with Algeria and Tunisia have soured, while those with Morocco and Egypt have grown stronger. This decline is compounded by a widespread opposition to the French presence in key segments of African public opinion, particularly among the youth, coupled with a diminishing understanding of these countries and a weakened ability to navigate diplomatic relations effectively. While this decline may be temporary, as France possesses a variety of strategic assets, it is currently glaringly apparent.
In the Caucasus, European countries were unable to support the pro-European movements in Georgia, and to be fair, they had limited leverage to do so.
With regard to defense matters and military manufacturing, it can be argued that while Europe has made significant strides, progress has been slow. The continent has trained 70,000 Ukrainian soldiers, and military aid to Ukraine has exceeded €47 billion. There have been advancements in European cooperation in areas such as air defense, missile defense, electronic warfare, and mobile ammunition, with defense budgets rising across the continent. However, these initiatives have been delayed and are unlikely to provide immediate significant support to Ukraine.
One crucial fact still stands: building strong armies is important, yet developing a robust military manufacturing sector is a separate matter. The latter requires trained personnel and an increase in production capacity that cannot be achieved rapidly, while the former demands an expanded and well-trained military force, as well as enhanced operational capabilities. Many observers remain skeptical about Europe’s ability to succeed in this endeavor, particularly given the potential economic downturn that could be exacerbated if the United States initiates a trade war.
The outlook is not entirely grim. Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership has significantly boosted Europe’s capabilities, effectively turning the Baltic Sea into a NATO-controlled area. Ukraine has managed to break Russia’s grip on the Black Sea, exhausting the Russian bear. Poland’s ground forces are still advancing. Europe has finally shaken off its strategic slumber, though it may be too late.
