The policies of the new US administration have created an entirely new landscape, one in which the very foundations of European and transatlantic defense and security are crumbling. The “American nuclear guarantee” can no longer be taken for granted—nor can the assumption that the United States will offer any form of support should Europe face a major crisis. In fact, the possibility that the United States might align itself with Europe’s adversaries, particularly Russia, cannot be ruled out. Moreover, Washington’s new approach—marked by utter disregard for international law and treaty obligations—could embolden certain states to escalate tensions, potentially even resorting to military aggression against European countries or their neighbors.
In short, Europe is stepping into the unknown. No one can predict how the Trump administration will act. The best-case scenario might be limited to brazen extortion. No one knows how Russia will respond—whether it will opt for a temporary de-escalation to present itself as a peacemaker or continue to raise the stakes. It is unclear whether Ukraine’s domestic front can hold, now that the United States has embraced Moscow’s rhetoric that President Zelensky must be removed, portraying his presence as the main obstacle. Nor is it certain that President Trump can be persuaded to alter his stance—either by accepting new European commitments and burden-sharing arrangements or by granting a temporary reprieve. In any case, the possibility of a complete transatlantic rupture cannot be dismissed. NATO’s fate is uncertain. Ukraine’s future hangs in the balance. And Europe’s ability to bear sacrifices, or to effectively navigate the vast array of political, defense, environmental, and economic challenges it faces, remains an open question. Finally, a crucial unknown remains: will European countries act together, or will each seek separate understandings with the major powers? On every major issue at hand, there is no shortage of competing interpretations and divergent positions.
The first pressing question: Can Europe shoulder the burden of supporting Ukraine alone? The second: Can Europe defend itself without US support, and how quickly can it build an independent defense system? The third: Is it even possible to achieve both goals at once?
Several related questions follow. Are we witnessing an irreversible break with the United States, or can the damage still be repaired? Will European countries accept a “Finnish option”—a form of neutral, conciliatory stance toward Russia? Can a European nuclear deterrent be established, whether collectively or by the states bordering Russia? Is rapprochement with China a viable alternative, trading improved relations with Beijing for a counterbalance to the emerging US-Russia dynamic?
We do not claim to have answers to all these questions. But what is new in this evolving landscape is that these are no longer mere idle speculations—they are possibilities that must be seriously considered.
Let’s start with what is clear. Financially, European countries—despite the current crisis—could, if they wished, replace Washington’s role. The real problem, however, lies in military support. Money can be found to purchase weapons, but are the weapons available? The answer is that European arms manufacturers cannot fill the gap. Building new factories does not happen overnight, and investors will not take such a risk unless they are assured of sustained demand for decades. In several key sectors, there is also a shortage of skilled labor and essential raw materials.
The question, then, is whether the weapons Ukraine needs can be purchased. Buying from the United States would, in effect, be rewarding Washington’s brazen behavior—and that’s assuming the United States is even willing to sell. Other sources exist—South Korea, for instance—but there is no easy answer, especially given Ukraine’s existing challenges with the diversity of its weapon systems. Its forces are already struggling to train on multiple platforms simultaneously.
Beyond that, Europe simply cannot replace Washington’s role in certain military domains—particularly intelligence gathering and satellite surveillance. There is also the looming threat that the United States could deprive Ukraine of access to the vital Starlink system. In theory, the European Union could retaliate by phasing out Starlink across the continent and imposing sanctions on major US tech companies, but it is unclear whether Europe would be willing to escalate in this way.
It is essential to recognize that building an independent European defense system and designing the weapons of the future require a very different approach than simply sustaining Ukraine’s war effort. Establishing a self-sufficient European military force would require an immense, long-term commitment. Such a force would not be operational before 2035—unless a miracle occurs. Producing weapons is one thing; training soldiers and developing operational expertise is another—and arguably the greater challenge. Russia, a master of hybrid warfare, will undoubtedly work to disrupt any European military buildup. Europe, meanwhile, lags in key technological fields and lacks critical raw materials.
The key question is whether Europe can achieve military self-reliance while continuing to support Ukraine, or whether abandoning Kyiv—despite the negative signals such a move would send—might be a necessary evil to avoid spreading resources too thin. Would the risks of withdrawal outweigh the costs of staying the course?
Recent developments have brought the issue of nuclear deterrence back to the forefront. In terms of capability, France alone can deter Russia. What is new, however, is that Germany has now accepted that relying on the United States is no longer an option. The new German chancellor has formally raised the question of the United Kingdom and France providing a nuclear security guarantee for Europe.
In this regard, it is worth noting that the United Kingdom does not have the same freedom of action as France, since its nuclear deterrent is not independent of the US arsenal. This raises another question: What price will France demand in return? Paris has long sought to shift part of its financial burden onto others, and this could be its opportunity. Another issue is trust: Will Russia’s neighbors prefer to develop their own nuclear capabilities, despite the enormous challenges? It is also worth noting that most European countries have purchased American weapons in recent years, further complicating any real effort to break free from US military dependence.
At present, the “Finnish option” (a neutral, conciliatory stance toward Russia and the United States) is off the table, given the political balance in major European capitals. However, it can no longer be ruled out that, by the end of this decade or beyond, far-right parties sympathetic to Russia—or aligned with Trump’s worldview—could come to power in Europe. If that happens, the idea of a friendly neutrality toward Moscow will be taken far more seriously, especially given the lack of public appetite for sacrifice among European populations. Of course, attitudes could shift over time—no one knows, for instance, whether the humiliation of Zelensky will leave a lasting impact on European public sentiment.
As for the Chinese option—an idea floated by some analysts—it could indeed provide a boost to European economies. But the cost of such a shift would be steep, and it is unlikely that Europe would pursue it unless relations with Washington deteriorate to the point of near-total rupture.
For Europe, the optimal course of action is to divide roles among its leaders. The heads of states with strong ties to Washington—namely the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland—should take the lead in mending relations with the United States. Their mission would be to persuade Washington of the necessity of sustaining support for Ukraine and granting Europe additional time, or at the very least, to renegotiate transatlantic relations without resorting to a complete break. Meanwhile, Paris and Berlin could enter the equation either from the outset or at a later stage.
European leaders will likely attempt to craft a joint European-Ukrainian—and possibly even US-backed—initiative to end the war in Ukraine. They will also seek swift agreements on streamlining bureaucratic hurdles, coordinating arms policies, and making large-scale investments in technology and defense industries.
That said, the possibility remains that some European countries will pursue unilateral agreements—either with Washington or even Moscow. What is certain, however, is that Russia—along with, perhaps, the United States and China—will actively work to deepen divisions among European countries, fueling internal polarization and exploiting the fact that Europe’s liberal elites lack a strong popular base of support. We won’t dwell here on our negative assessment of most European leaders—both liberal and populist—nor on our doubts about their ability to rise to the challenge.
There is little reason for optimism. Most scenarios appear bleak. Personally, I believe that the US president has already made up his mind and will not back down from his choices. He might delay their implementation if the price is tempting enough, but he won’t abandon them. The only developments that could reshape the landscape would be a critical misstep by President Putin that forces Trump to shift his policies—or a Republican loss in the upcoming midterm elections.
