On March 6 and 7, Syria witnessed its deadliest escalation since the collapse of former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, as sectarian clashes erupted in the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartous—home to the Alawite minority that had ruled the country for over half a century. While the new Syrian administration led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) blamed so-called “remnants of the former regime,” allegedly backed by Iran and Iraqi Hezbollah, for attempting to destabilize Damascus, video footage revealed that government-affiliated factions engaged in disproportionate violence and systematic sectarian killings, leaving over 1,000 people dead, most of whom were Alawites. In response, transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa formed a fact-finding committee to investigate human rights violations committed during the unrest. These clashes reveal broader dysfunctions in managing Syria’s transitional phase and highlight the challenges facing the political process.
This paper seeks to explore the underlying causes of ongoing sectarian violence, with a focus on the escalation in the coastal region and Iran’s role in fueling the conflict.
A Conducive Environment for Violence
The drivers of violence in Syria’s coastal region are deeply connected to the broader dynamics of the country’s ongoing transition. While some factors are related to battlefield dynamics and the balance of power among the actors on the ground, others stem from the intrinsic nature of the Syrian conflict itself. A third set of factors is linked to the background of the new ruling regime. The following is a detailed examination of these elements.
1. Interwoven Factors Shaping the Syrian Conflict (distrust, historical memory, sectarian violence, and social polarization): The complex and prolonged nature of the Syrian conflict, with its ethnic and sectarian entanglements and politically and sectarian-motivated atrocities, has created deep societal rifts and widespread mutual distrust among all segments of Syrian society. The war has ingrained a collective memory of conflict within various Syrian communities, shaped by their political, ethnic, and sectarian affiliations. Each community’s collective perception has become laden with negative and distorted stereotypes of the others, fostering a culture of revenge and retribution and a desire to inflict severe losses on opposing factions.
The fighters of the new Syrian army and security forces primarily come from various Sunni armed groups, some with jihadist backgrounds, that were active across Syria for over a decade as opposition forces. These groups engaged in violent actions against those they perceived as supporters of the Assad regime.
Their perception of the Alawite community, to which the Assad family belonged, is shaped by the belief that it was the popular base of the regime, an elite minority that oppressed the Sunni majority for decades, and a group that is collectively responsible for the crimes committed by the former government, particularly during the civil war. On the other hand, despite the absence of large-scale sectarian massacres following HTS’s takeover of Alawite-majority provinces, many Alawites remain convinced that the Sunni-led government will inevitably enact retaliatory violence against them. This fear is deeply rooted in their historical experiences of massacres and genocide, as well as a profound distrust of Islamist forces. The deployment of government forces to pursue what it called “remnants of the former regime” further escalated tensions. These forces are ideologically driven, have fought a sectarian war for over a decade, and lack discipline, leading Alawites to perceive their actions as acts of sectarian revenge.
The deep societal polarization in Syria is reflected in stereotyping and labeling, as each faction defines the other in highly negative terms. The jihadist-linked factions that now form Syria’s ruling administration frame Alawites as “remnants of the former regime” and “Shabiha” (pro-Assad militias), while Alawites view members of the new government as “terrorists.” Certain actions by al-Sharaa’s administration have further fueled Alawite fears regarding the government’s intentions. In Alawite-majority areas, the authorities carried out mass dismissals of civil servants, including 12,000 employees in Latakia from the Ministries of Health, Education, and the Latakia Port. Additionally, salaries and pensions were reduced, and sporadic targeted attacks on Alawite individuals by government-affiliated fighters heightened concerns about collective punishment and sectarian retaliation.
2. Absence of Transitional Justice Measures: The previously mentioned factors have complicated efforts to resolve the conflict and achieve a comprehensive national reconciliation that addresses the root causes of the war. Without effective mechanisms for justice and reconciliation, there is a higher risk of peace settlements collapsing and the country relapsing into conflict in later stages. Addressing these challenges requires targeted measures to end social injustices and ensure selective accountability for those responsible for human rights violations under the Assad regime. This means identifying and prosecuting individuals involved in past atrocities while avoiding collective punishment or political retaliation against entire communities. Additionally, there is a need for societal exoneration of the Alawite community from collective blame for the crimes of the former regime. Strengthening reconciliation among Syria’s political, ethnic, and religious groups is also essential for bridging divides, fostering a unified national identity, and ensuring mutual respect for each group’s sub-identity—all of which remain long-overdue initiatives.
3. The Dominance of a Militant Mindset in the New Syrian Administration: Despite the conciliatory and unifying tone of Syria’s official political discourse, and al-Sharaa’s administration’s efforts to alleviate sectarian fears by presenting itself as non-sectarian and emphasizing a transition from warfare to state-building and governance, its practices remain far from the principles of a national state. Instead, its governance continues to be shaped by a militant organizational mindset, evident in exclusionary and marginalizing policies against minorities. This was particularly reflected in the National Dialogue Conference, held in late February, where Kurdish, Alawite, and Druze minorities were not represented. Furthermore, the new political and military structures fail to reflect Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity, as they remain dominated by Sunni factions aligned with al-Sharaa. Extremist rhetoric within government forces has also escalated, with fighters openly calling for punitive measures against Alawites and using sectarian slogans such as “revenge against the Nusayris (Alawis).”
Additionally, the Syrian National Army has incorporated foreign fighters from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Chechnya, many of whom have radical ideological backgrounds and operate as mercenaries driven by ideological and financial incentives, without regard for national unity. Some of these fighters operate semi-independently from the General Security Service, yet the government bears responsibility for their undisciplined actions. Their presence has intensified anti-Alawite sentiment, with some militias vowing to retake Alawite strongholds along the coast, reinforcing a sense of existential threat among Syria’s minorities—particularly the Alawites, who have remained on high alert since the abrupt fall of the Assad regime.
4. Sectarian Practices of Government Forces: Building on the previous point, one of the greatest obstacles to curbing sectarian violence in the coastal region was the government’s reliance on a loosely controlled mix of factions—including armed civilians—to confront former regime loyalists directly engaged in the clashes. However, some members of these groups carried out vicious retaliatory attacks against Alawite civilians. These attacks extended beyond summary executions; perpetrators subjected survivors to degrading abuse, forcing them to crawl over the bodies of their neighbors, bark like dogs, and endure severe beatings. In addition, they looted homes and stole hundreds of vehicles. Fueled by sectarian identity, these acts of collective vengeance unleashed extreme, indiscriminate violence, reigniting deep-seated sectarian tensions and historical grievances.
5. The Intersection of Coastal Geography and Demographics with Political Shifts: The geographical and demographic characteristics of Syria’s coastal provinces have contributed to their transformation into a safe haven for fleeing Assad loyalists, many of whom remain armed. Kinship ties and sectarian affiliations have made the region a natural refuge for former regime figures, particularly military personnel, while the mountainous areas near Latakia have provided them with effective hiding spots. Driven by the loss of political, economic, and social privileges once enjoyed by their sect as the ruling elite, and by deep fears of collective punishment and exclusion under the new political order, these fighters have resorted to attacks against government forces. Their familiarity with the terrain has given them an advantage, allowing them to set ambushes, launch hit-and-run operations, and evade capture, in an attempt to reshape the balance of power and establish a new reality on the ground.
Iranian Motivations
Despite Iran’s denial of involvement in supporting former regime loyalists during the coastal clashes, several indicators suggest possible Iranian complicity. One key sign is the role of Ghiath Dala, a close ally of Iran and a former commander in Maher al-Assad’s Fourth Division, who announced the formation of a military council, calling for armed resistance against the new government. Notably, the coastal offensive by former regime elements took place just one day after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) declared the formation of a new Islamic Resistance in Syria , named Uli al-Baas [Possessors of Might], and the establishment of Force 313 for Jihad in Syria.
Some media reports have also indicated Iranian coordination with Iraqi factions to form armed groups, stage attacks in Syria, and orchestrate a military coup. A high-level meeting held last month in Najaf, Iraq, included Hossein Akbari (a former IRGC commander and ex-ambassador to Damascus), Amir Ali Hajizadeh (commander of the IRGC Air Force), head of special operations in Iranian intelligence, and Syrian military figures from the former regime, such as General Asaad al-Ali, General Mohammed Kholouf, and Brigadier General Adel Sarhan. The meeting reportedly resulted in an agreement to provide Iranian logistical support through border crossings, including Deir ez-Zor–al-Bukamal and Hasakah–Qa’im–Rabia–Malikiyah, while securing maritime supply routes via the ports of Tartous and Latakia. The plan also involved deploying fighters from SDF-controlled areas and coordinating Hezbollah’s military support.
Based on the above, several key motives explain Iran’s role—whether implicit or direct—in the coastal offensive, whether through intelligence sharing, financial support, or communication assistance. This involvement is largely driven by Tehran’s close ties with Ghiath Dala and Iran-backed militias in Syria. These motives can be outlined as follows:
1. Syria’s Strategic Significance in Iran’s Regional Project: The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, a long-standing Iranian ally, represented a major geopolitical setback for Tehran, given Syria’s central role in its regional strategy and Shiite expansion efforts. Syria serves as the heart of Iran’s regional project, strategically positioned between Iraq and Lebanon, forming a crucial link in Tehran’s regional network. For years, Syria has served as a linking hub within Iran’s regional project, reinforcing Tehran’s regional influence and enabling it to maintain its Shiite axis in the Middle East. Syria has also functioned as a logistical corridor for Iranian supply lines, facilitating the smuggling and manufacturing of weapons from Tehran to its allied militias in Syria and Lebanon.
Iran’s military presence in Syria is among the most extensive, with approximately 295 military sites under its control. Tehran has long mobilized Shiite militias—both Iranian and foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq—to support the Assad regime. The fall of Assad and the rise of a temporary government led by Ahmad al-Sharaa pose a direct threat pose a direct threat to Iran’s influence, potentially disrupting its operational coordination among its regional proxies. This concern has driven Iran to play a role in the offensive on Syria’s coastal region, leveraging certain militias in an attempt to reclaim its influence, counter international and regional efforts aimed at weakening its foothold, particularly in response to Turkish and Saudi attempts to establish a Sunni bloc in Syria—an initiative that threatens Iran’s broader Shiite project.
Tehran fears the growing Turkish influence in Syria and Ankara’s broader regional ambitions, particularly its efforts to expand its presence in Iraq and the South Caucasus. A key concern for Iran is Turkey’s push to establish the Zangezur Corridor, a route connecting Turkey to Azerbaijan via Armenia. This project threatens Iran’s access to Armenia, a crucial partner in maintaining Tehran’s regional foothold and trade routes in the Caucasus.
2. Hezbollah’s Defeat in Lebanon: Over the past few months, particularly since the outbreak of the Gaza war, the region has undergone a geopolitical reconfiguration that has dealt significant setbacks to Iran. The confrontations between Israel and Iranian-backed forces have weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon, disrupted its influence, and diminished its operational capabilities through targeted assassinations of key commanders and the destruction of its military assets. These conflicts have also had a negative impact on the leadership and fighters of Iran’s allied militias, reducing their ability to provide support and reinforcements. Additionally, with the fall of al-Assad’s regime, there has been a push to distance Syria from Iranian influence. Hezbollah’s weakening in Lebanon’s frontline has also eroded its role in securing Assad’s rule, which ultimately contributed to the collapse of his regime on December 8, 2024. Since the early days of the Syrian uprising, Iran had actively trained and armed militias to fight alongside Assad, ensuring his survival. However, with his fall, Tehran now faces the challenge of maintaining its foothold in Syria without its long-time ally in power.
Iran’s motive in fueling the Syrian coastal conflict may be to maintain the pillars of its regional project following Hezbollah’s weakening in Lebanon and to escalate tensions in Syria as a means of restoring its influence. Tehran fears losing its strategic tools in the region and, more critically, losing Syria as a corridor for transporting fighters and weapons between Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran via Syrian territory. To counter this, Iran deployed its allied militias in the coastal conflict, particularly as some factions fled to Iraq after Assad’s fall, with most of them regrouping in the Iraqi border town of al-Qa’im. Just before the coastal clashes on March 6, the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria announced on March 5 the formation of a new militia named “Uli al-Baas”, whose emblem closely resembles those of Iran-backed Iraqi militias, Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as the Pakistani Zainebiyoun and Afghan Fatemiyoun brigades.
3. Restoring Militia Influence: Iran’s involvement in supporting former regime loyalists in the Syrian coastal conflict may be part of a broader effort to restore the influence of its allied militias, serving its strategic interests amid Syria’s transformation into a battleground for regional and international power struggles. By securing a land route from Iran to Lebanon, Tehran aims to strengthen its military and political foothold. Estimates suggest that Hezbollah played a role in the coastal clashes, coordinating with former regime elements, with coordination taking place in neighboring countries. The ongoing instability in Syria at this critical moment has provided Iran with an opportunity to reassert itself following the loss of its ally, Assad.
The current chaos in Syria plays into Iran’s hands, facilitating its return and reactivating its influence following the loss of its ally, Assad. Tehran’s goal is to create obstacles for Syria’s new administration, hinder efforts to restore security and stability, and challenge the rebuilding of a strong national state. A stable Syria would weaken Iran’s militia-driven influence, whereas prolonged political instability and continued chaos would allow Tehran to reassert itself. Iran reportedly commands around 100,000 fighters in Syria, spread across 70 militias, according to statements by IRGC Commander Hossein Salami. Among these are the Fatemiyoun Brigade, composed of Afghan fighters, the Zainabiyoun Brigade, made up of Pakistanis, as well as Lebanese and Iraqi Hezbollah forces. Other groups include the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba from Iraqis, and the Yemini Sa’da Brigaden.
4. Tehran’s Fear of Losing Its Foothold on the Mediterranean: Iran is deeply concerned about losing Syria as a strategic foothold on the Mediterranean. Under Assad, Tehran secured an agreement to develop a port on the shores of Tartus, while also seeking to acquire control over the Latakia port as an alternative. The Assad regime at the time was receptive to this, granting Iran a presence on the Mediterranean, given Syria’s crucial role as a coastal gateway.
This positioning would allow Tehran to hold a key bargaining chip in global trade dynamics and counter rival powers, as Syria’s coastal strip in the Eastern Mediterranean plays a pivotal role in regional conflicts and geopolitical agendas. Iran also fears losing Syria as a transit hub, particularly given its ambitions to establish the 2,000 km Persian Corridor, which would connect Iran to European markets via Syria and Iraq. If Iran is pushed out of Syria, alternative energy routes could emerge through Syrian territory, further weakening Tehran’s strategic leverage.
In conclusion, the events in Syria’s coastal region carry serious implications for the country’s future. If the escalation continues, the conflict could expand into broader efforts to dismantle Syria, with some states exploiting the minority card to hinder the political process. Israel, in particular, has shown support for a sectarian federal system based on minority groups such as the Druze and Alawites, offering them protection and assistance to ensure that Syria remains weak and unable to threaten Israeli security, whether by backing separatist movements or reinforcing a military presence in the south.
Additionally, shared Turkish-Israeli interests may lead to mutual understandings regarding dividing spheres of influence in Syria. Turkey’s primary concern lies in curbing Kurdish expansion, while Israel seeks to prevent Iran from reestablishing its foothold in Syria, which could drive both countries toward coordinated strategic efforts in the region.
