Structural transformations in Europe have historically been shaped by the degree of alignment or divergence with US policies, particularly regarding transatlantic cooperation and security partnerships in response to existing, emerging, or potential threats. To a large extent, US pressure has driven European countries to develop credible military capabilities, enabling them to shoulder more of their own defense responsibilities—a trend that gained momentum following the end of the Balkan Wars.
This push for greater European defense autonomy materialized in the San Malo Summit in December 1998, held between French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The summit laid the groundwork for a European security and defense policy, marking an Anglo-French-led effort to address the fallout from shifting US strategic priorities away from guaranteeing European interests.
This step emerged within the context of closer Franco-British bilateral ties, aimed at enhancing cooperation across multiple domains, particularly in security and defense. This growing partnership culminated in the Lancaster House Treaties of 2010, which formalized and deepened defense collaboration between the two countries. Over time, the scope of this partnership expanded to include nuclear cooperation, marking a significant strategic milestone as the treaties reached their 10th anniversary.
Despite European efforts to build on these steps, internal divisions within the bloc have undermined the effectiveness of its security role—particularly following the UK’s departure from the EU and the escalating transatlantic tensions during Donald Trump’s second term. These factors have propelled renewed Franco-British cooperation to the forefront of European security discussions, reaffirming the need to support Ukraine while maintaining reliance on US protection. This renewed coordination has sparked critical questions: Is Europe moving toward strategic autonomy without severing ties with Washington? Could this signal a new “Saint-Malo moment” within a dramatically different geostrategic context?
Multiple Trends
The US plan to end the war reflects a pragmatic stance toward Russia, emphasizing peace through strength. This has been evident in renewed dialogue with Moscow, paving the way for restored relations and a gradual easing of sanctions, all while negotiating a peace agreement that offers no legal or security guarantees to Ukraine against future Russian expansion. At the same time, Washington has increased pressure on the Ukrainian president to accept the “fait accompli” policy and approve the minerals deal with Washington, while simultaneously sidelining Europe.
These shifts have thus driven France and the United Kingdom, alongside the President of the European Commission, to rethink security guarantees aimed at strengthening European security and defense in support of Ukraine in the post-war phase, as follows:
Holding Emergency Summits: In an effort to coordinate a unified response to Trump’s handling of European and Ukrainian interests—particularly following the al-Diriyah meeting in Saudi Arabia—several high-level summits were convened. Alongside these discussions, economic sanctions against Russia were escalated, with the 16th sanctions package approved on February 19, 2025. In response to a heated exchange between the US and Ukrainian presidents, the UK hosted an emergency peace summit at Lancaster House on March 2, 2025. The summit sought to establish mechanisms to safeguard Ukraine and European security. During the event, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer emphasized that the continent was “at a crossroads in history.” He reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to military support for Kyiv, economic pressure on Moscow, and the formation of a coalition of willing countries—in partnership with France and with backing from Washington, which he described as a “trusted partner for Britain and Europe.” Shortly after, on March 6, 2025, an extraordinary summit in Brussels was held to further discussions on strengthening European defense and security.
Rearming Europe: On March 4, the European Commission announced a plan to encourage increased defense spending among EU member states in exchange for financial incentives. The initiative, valued at €800 billion, aims to strengthen European military capabilities amid escalating security concerns. Under this plan, €150 billion will be allocated as loans for defense investments, while €650 billion will be available to countries willing to raise their defense budgets by 1.5% over four years. To facilitate this, the EU will allow participating countries to exceed the standard budget deficit limit of 3% of GDP. The funding will specifically target key defense sectors, including artillery systems, air and missile defense, drones, cybersecurity, military mobility, artificial intelligence, and electronic warfare.
To circumvent potential objections from certain EU member states, particularly Hungary, the European Commission invoked Article 122 of the EU Treaty, allowing the plan to bypass parliamentary approval—a strategy previously used during the Covid-19 crisis. This move aligns with broader European efforts to increase defense spending. The United Kingdom has announced plans to raise its defense budget from 2.3% to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, funding this increase by reducing foreign aid from 0.5% to 0.3% of GDP. Meanwhile, France has pledged to double its current defense expenditure of approximately 2.1% by 2030. In a more aggressive stance, Poland aims to allocate 5% of its GDP to defense, reflecting a significant escalation in military investment.
Expanded Nuclear Deterrence: The US-Russia understandings, established within the framework of a conditional partnership with Washington and under NATO’s umbrella, have prompted European countries to seek defensive mechanisms to enhance their deterrence capabilities. This was reflected in President Macron’s initiative to discuss the potential expansion of France’s nuclear umbrella to include European partners. Simultaneously, Friedrich Merz, leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the frontrunner for the German chancellorship, called for possible cooperation with the United Kingdom and France to extend their nuclear protection to Germany as a complementary pillar to US nuclear deterrence. In his address to the nation on March 5, he stated, “in response to the historic call sounded by the future Chancellor of Germany, I decided to launch a strategic debate on using our deterrence to protect our allies on the European continent. Whatever happens, that decision has always been, and will always be, up to the President and Commander in Chief of France.”
Meanwhile, Polish President Andrzej Duda proposed that the United States transfer nuclear weapons to Poland. In an interview with the Financial Times on March 13, 2025, he stated, “The borders of NATO moved east in 1999, so twenty-six years later there should also be a shift of the NATO infrastructure east.” This statement followed an earlier remark by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk before Parliament on March 7, in which he revealed that Poland was engaged in what he described as “serious” discussions with Paris regarding the expansion of France’s nuclear umbrella to protect Warsaw. He further asserted, “Poland must pursue the most advanced capabilities, including nuclear and modern unconventional weapons. This is a serious race — a race for security, not for war.”
Forming a “Coalition of the Willing”: The deployment of European forces on Ukrainian soil is no longer just a proposal but a serious consideration for certain European powers, particularly the United Kingdom and France. However, this initiative remains contingent on the outcome of intra-European discussions, which currently emphasize the necessity of ending the war before any potential troop deployment in Ukraine. In this context, France hosted military leaders from 34 European countries, along with NATO officials and representatives from Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, as part of the Paris Defense Forum, held at the École-Militaire from March 11 to 13, 2025. The forum focused on assessing Europe’s readiness to deploy forces in Ukraine should a peace agreement be reached to end the ongoing war, while also outlining key strategies to strengthen European defense.
In this context, statements from the defense ministers of Europe’s five major powers—France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, and Italy—following their meeting in Paris, held on the sidelines of the Paris Defense Forum, shed light on key aspects of European security guarantees for Ukraine. Britain and France are working to establish a coalition of European and non-European nations willing to enhance response capabilities and readiness to support peace efforts linked to the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war, according to UK Defense Secretary John Healey. Meanwhile, French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu stressed that the Ukrainian armed forces must remain the cornerstone of the country’s security, requiring long-term capacity-building and modernization.
Following the forum, defense ministers from France, Britain, Germany, Poland, and Italy outlined the core elements of European security guarantees for Ukraine. Britain and France are working to establish a coalition of European and non-European nations willing to enhance response capabilities and readiness to support peace efforts linked to the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war, according to UK Defense Secretary John Healey. Meanwhile, French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu stressed that the Ukrainian armed forces must remain the cornerstone of the country’s security, requiring long-term capacity-building and modernization. He also hinted that initial European troop deployments—if considered—might focus on protecting the Polish-Ukrainian border, a concern previously highlighted by Tusk, who reiterated that Poland’s mission is to defend its eastern border, which also serves as NATO’s and the EU’s frontier.
Mounting Pressures
European powers welcomed Ukraine’s acceptance of the US proposal for a one-month ceasefire, the restoration of US-Ukrainian alignment on the minerals deal, Washington’s reversal of its decision to halt military aid, and the resumption of intelligence sharing with Kyiv. However, despite these developments, European countries continue to face mounting pressures, requiring swift action and preparedness for post-war arrangements. In this context, some of these key challenges can be outlined as follows:
The Challenge of Strategic Independence: Despite the Franco-British push to develop mechanisms for ensuring European security and reassuring Ukraine, as well as NATO’s eastern and northern flanks, this does not imply abandoning US deterrence or fully “decoupling” from Washington. Instead, it may serve as a political maneuver aimed at preventing the Trump administration from disengaging from its allies while allowing Europe to recalibrate the deterrence equation and balance of power on the continent. The difficulty lies in the fact that Washington remains an indispensable strategic ally for Europe—one that is not easily replaceable, nor can European interests be fully safeguarded without US support. This reality is underscored by the following:
- Discussions on expanded nuclear deterrence in Europe coincided with US sidelining of Europe in efforts to settle the war in Ukraine, rather than with Russia’s revisions to its nuclear strategy in November 2024. At that time, Moscow expanded its list of strategic targets, declaring that it would resort to its nuclear arsenal if attacked by a non-nuclear state backed by a nuclear power, which Russia would interpret as a joint assault warranting a nuclear response. It also justified nuclear retaliation in response to the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies, as well as in cases of conventional aggression against Russia or Belarus that threaten their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity. At the time, these changes signaled a heightened risk of confrontation with the West. However, European countries refrained from taking concrete steps to counter Russia’s move, which was largely a reaction to the Biden administration’s decision to provide Ukraine with long-range weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory.
- Another critical factor is Europe’s reliance on American weaponry. Between 2020 and 2024, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway were among the top 10 destinations for US arms exports. During this period, Ukraine alone accounted for approximately 9.3% of total US arms exports and around 26% of US arms shipments to Europe. Moreover, US arms exports to Europe saw a significant surge, rising from 13% in 2015-2019 to 35% in 2020-2024—the highest level in two decades. These figures were highlighted in a March 2025 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) titled “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2024.”
- In addition, the issue of rising defense expenditures remains a pressing challenge, as many European countries continue to fall short of NATO’s target of allocating 2% of their GDP to defense spending. This shortfall persists despite mounting US pressure and the European Commission’s efforts to bolster European security and provide military support to Ukraine.
- Relatedly, the debate over the potential deployment of European forces to Ukraine raises numerous questions about the nature of such a force. Would it receive US backing or include NATO troops? Would it require a United Nations Security Council resolution to lend it legitimacy, or would it be a voluntary coalition of European countries? These uncertainties are particularly significant given the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, which underscored the critical role of American support in safeguarding European interests.
Internal Divisions in France: Expanding France’s nuclear umbrella to include other European countries would likely require domestic consensus, which remains difficult to achieve given the country’s ongoing political and economic challenges, which have intensified since President Macron dissolved the French Parliament in June 2024, following the European Parliament elections, which strengthened the rise of both the far-right and the far-left in France. This move also led to a decline in Macron’s popularity, the loss of his coalition’s parliamentary majority, and the looming threat of yet another dissolution of the legislature.
This initiative could also face significant risks if President Macron insists on pushing it forward in an attempt to regain domestic popularity. His political future may be at stake, especially if far-right and far-left forces rally public opinion against him by arguing for de-escalation with Russia—whether by opposing the deployment of French troops to Ukraine or rejecting the expansion of France’s nuclear deterrence. They may frame these actions as potential sources of intra-European and European-Russian conflict.
Additionally, France’s nuclear force—known domestically as “la force de frappe”—is deeply tied to the country’s strategic independence, a principle that would be difficult to abandon. As a result, domestic political challenges could hinder President Macron’s ambitions to secure European partners under France’s nuclear umbrella. If France were to extend its deterrence to include European allies, it would still struggle to match the scale, reach, and capabilities of US nuclear deterrence, which remains primarily focused on safeguarding France’s own vital interests—even if they align, to some extent, with broader European interests.
British Left’s Pragmatism: The Starmer government is recalibrating Britain’s relationship with Europe, five years after Brexit, while simultaneously working to strengthen economic and technological cooperation with the Trump administration. This approach aims to avoid direct confrontation with Washington and preserve both the AUKUS partnership and the broader NATO alliance, reinforcing Britain’s pragmatic role in European security. This pragmatism is reflected in Starmer’s decision to increase defense spending ahead of his visit to Washington, where he discussed key issues such as US tariff exemptions and a potential trade deal. Simultaneously, efforts were made to ease tensions between Washington and Kyiv following disputes over the US settlement proposal. The UK also coordinated readiness and strategic movements with France to ensure the continent’s security. Additionally, London expressed its willingness to deploy troops to Ukraine, with expectations that Britain would demand to lead the mission or share command with France. Furthermore, the UK might insist on retaining decision-making authority over the scale and scope of deployment, similar to its leadership role in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF).
Moreover, the United Kingdom refrained from following the EU’s retaliatory measures against the US tariffs on European steel and aluminum imports, which have now come into effect. This stance underscores Britain’s continued commitment to a policy of “selective engagement”, prioritizing a “Britain First” approach over full alignment with EU policies. It also highlights the UK’s strategic approach to European security matters, reflecting a practical application of the “Progressive Realism” doctrine outlined by Foreign Secretary David Lammy.
Finally, Washington’s plans to resolve conflicts in Europe and the Middle East—while pivoting toward the Indo-Pacific—signal the beginning of a new era of uncertainty in transatlantic relations. The trajectory of this shift will largely depend on Europe’s willingness, led by France, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission, to assume an unconventional role—one that strengthens European security and defense integration while mitigating the impact of internal divisions on the continent’s strategic effectiveness. However, this must be achieved without provoking a direct confrontation with the Trump administration, all while navigating the deepening rapprochement between Washington and Moscow.
