The previous version of the NSS was released in 2022 under the Biden administration. It placed strong emphasis on strategic competition with China and Russia, renewed investment in domestic industrial policy, and climate change as a central national security challenge.
The new National Security Strategy, issued in early December 2025, spans 33 pages and lays out the contours of U.S. foreign and security policy for the next three years. The document clearly reflects President Donald Trump’s vision for his second term and marks a notable departure from post–Cold War American strategic thinking.
Substantively, the strategy represents a significant shift away from the foreign policy framework that has dominated U.S. thinking since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It explicitly criticizes earlier American strategies as overly expansive and places “core U.S. interests” at the center of decision-making, rather than pursuing global dominance as an end in itself. This approach aligns closely with the “America First” doctrine that defines Trump’s worldview. The document also places strong emphasis on what it describes as the administration’s “early and successive achievements,” most notably the claim that Trump has achieved peace in eight international crises.
From a formal perspective, the presentation of the 2025 NSS differs from previous versions. Unlike earlier strategies, which were unveiled through major presidential speeches, the new document was released via a written statement published on the White House website. More importantly, it departs sharply from Trump’s own 2017 NSS, which framed U.S. foreign policy almost entirely around great-power competition, particularly with China and Russia. In contrast, the 2025 strategy makes no reference to “great-power competition,” signaling a conceptual shift of considerable importance.
China: From Strategic Threat to Economic Competitor
The treatment of China in the 2025 NSS differs markedly from previous U.S. strategic documents. China is no longer described as the “primary threat” or the “most significant challenge” to U.S. national security—phrases that were central to earlier strategies. Instead, it is characterized as an “economic competitor,” a “potential threat to global supply chains,” and a power that must be prevented from achieving regional hegemony.
Most notably, the document includes an unprecedented acknowledgment of the possibility that China could achieve military superiority over the United States. It states that deterring any potential aggression against Taiwan should “ideally” be achieved through U.S. military superiority. The use of the term ideally implies that American military dominance is no longer assumed. Moreover, describing deterrence as a “priority,” rather than a core strategic interest, suggests a downgrading of Taiwan’s centrality in U.S. grand strategy.
Equally significant is the absence of ideological language regarding democracy and human rights in the China section. Whereas previous strategies framed U.S.–China rivalry in normative terms, the 2025 NSS approaches China almost exclusively through economic and strategic considerations.
The document nevertheless emphasizes that maintaining a conventional military balance in the Indo-Pacific remains “necessary,” given the region’s economic and strategic importance. Preventing war—particularly in the Taiwan Strait—is identified as a key U.S. objective. However, the strategy avoids explicit discussion of the growing threat posed by China’s conventional, nuclear, space, and cyber capabilities.
Notably, the NSS distinguishes between security challenges in the Western Hemisphere and broader confrontation with China, suggesting that Chinese activities in the Americas—while important—are secondary to more immediate threats to U.S. homeland security.
The strategy reaffirms Taiwan’s importance but calls on Japan and South Korea to shoulder a greater share of responsibility for its defense. This aligns with recent increases in military spending and defense manufacturing in both countries and reflects Washington’s broader emphasis on burden-sharing.
Russia: From Adversary to Potential Partner
Russia’s portrayal in the 2025 NSS is significantly less confrontational than in recent U.S. strategies. The document suggests that the Trump administration does not view Russia as a direct threat, but rather as a potential economic partner with whom strategic stability could be pursued.
The strategy sharply criticizes European states for deteriorating relations with Moscow and for treating Russia as an existential threat. It goes further by implicitly blaming European countries for the failure to reach a peace settlement in Ukraine. Remarkably, the document contains no criticism of Russia’s actions in Ukraine and makes no mention of China’s support for Russian military operations.
Within NATO, the strategy departs from the alliance’s traditional open-door policy. It calls for eliminating the perception that NATO is an ever-expanding alliance and preventing this perception from becoming reality. This aligns with Trump’s longstanding opposition to Ukrainian NATO membership, a position also held by former President Joe Biden. As a result, U.S.–European relations are likely to experience increased strain.
Strategic Priorities Reordered
The document repeatedly criticizes previous U.S. administrations while emphasizing the current president’s ideas and achievements. Its geographic prioritization signals Washington’s future focus: first the Western Hemisphere, then Asia and the Indo-Pacific, followed by Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The overwhelming emphasis lies on the first two regions.
Based on the structure of the document, U.S. strategic priorities now center on homeland security, border control, the Western Hemisphere, economic security, and the Asia-Pacific region. The most prominent references to U.S. military presence are linked to the Americas, where the strategy calls for adjusting overseas military deployments to address urgent threats in the Western Hemisphere and withdrawing from theaters whose relevance has declined.
This suggests an expanded U.S. military footprint in Central America and the Caribbean, including locations such as Puerto Rico and Haiti. The revival of references to the Monroe Doctrine implies tighter constraints on redeploying U.S. forces away from the Caribbean basin.
Implicitly, the strategy seeks to secure key strategic nodes in the Western Hemisphere—such as the Panama Canal, Greenland, and much of the Caribbean—while allocating additional intelligence and military resources to the region. This approach echoes the 2017 NSS but also reflects evolving geopolitical realities in the Americas.
Economics as the Core of National Security
The 2025 NSS places unprecedented emphasis on economic power as the foundation of national security. Advanced technology exports and defense procurement are framed as instruments of U.S. economic statecraft. The document highlights basic and dual-use research in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, autonomous systems, space, maritime capabilities, and nuclear technology as essential pillars of American power.
The strategy also emphasizes restoring U.S. “energy dominance” across oil, gas, coal, and nuclear power. It argues that cheap and abundant energy will boost employment, reduce costs for consumers and businesses, and strengthen domestic manufacturing—developments likely to have global implications for energy markets.
The Middle East Downgraded, Europe Criticized
The Middle East is no longer presented as a top-tier U.S. priority. This does not reflect diminished regional importance, but rather Washington’s desire to reduce direct involvement and rely more heavily on regional partners. The section titled “Burden-Sharing and Peacebuilding” encapsulates this approach: lowering the costs of engagement without full disengagement.
This represents an extension of earlier Obama-era efforts to pivot away from the Middle East, though previous attempts were disrupted by recurring regional crises. The new strategy recalibrates U.S. involvement toward conflict containment and protection of maritime routes and supply chains, while explicitly downgrading the importance of energy security and great-power competition in the region.
The critique of Europe is particularly sharp. The strategy warns of demographic change in Europe, echoing narratives associated with the “Great Replacement” theory. It questions whether some European states will retain strong enough economies and militaries to remain reliable allies, citing immigration as a driver of cultural fragmentation.
The document criticizes the European Union directly and signals support for European actors opposing current EU policies. It even suggests that Europe faces prospects of civilizational decline within the next two decades—language likely to resonate with far-right political movements across the continent.
Notable Omissions and Contradictions
Several actors prominent in earlier strategies are largely absent. North Korea is not mentioned at all, despite its growing military capabilities. The Philippines, a key U.S. ally in the South China Sea, is also omitted. Iran appears only three times, compared to seven references in 2022 and seventeen in 2017.
While Iran is acknowledged as a past source of regional instability, the document suggests its influence has waned, citing weakened proxy capabilities. This assessment overlooks Iran’s intact missile arsenal and the continued operational strength of groups such as the Houthis in Yemen and, to a lesser extent, Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Africa receives minimal attention, consistent with the Trump administration’s broader disengagement, particularly following the closure of USAID earlier in the year. While the strategy frames U.S.–Africa relations as shifting from aid to trade and investment, it ignores mounting tensions with major African economies such as South Africa and Nigeria.
The document’s claim that peace has been achieved between Egypt and Ethiopia does not reflect the ongoing dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Similarly, it treats the Hamas–Israel ceasefire as a settled peace and assumes Israeli strategic dominance, reducing the Palestinian issue to a limited conflict—an interpretation detached from realities on the ground.
Defense Lessons and Strategic Contradictions
On defense, the strategy highlights lessons from the war in Ukraine, particularly the interaction between air defenses and drones. This signals accelerated U.S. investment in air defense manufacturing, including renewed emphasis on the “Golden Dome” project. The document points to an expansionary phase for U.S. defense industries, reinforced by claims of maintaining the world’s most credible nuclear deterrent.
Finally, the strategy contains clear contradictions: calls for building an economic coalition against China while waging trade wars against allies; pledges of non-interference alongside explicit political signaling toward European domestic politics; and advocacy of peaceful conflict resolution amid rising U.S. military pressure across parts of Latin America.
Taken together, the 2025 National Security Strategy reflects not merely a policy update, but a fundamental reordering of American strategic thinking—one that privileges geography, economics, and transactional power over ideology, alliances, and traditional global leadership.
Published in cooperation between the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Weekly, and the English-language portal Ahram Online.
