The high representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell’s visit to Russia raised a barrage of European criticisms after he was outplayed by Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, who described the bloc as an “unreliable partner”. Criticisms of Borrell went too far that members of the European Parliament demanded Borrell’s resignation after his controversial trip to Russia which came days after the arrest of Kremlin critic, Alexei Navalny, labeling the visit as a “complete disaster”. Adding insult to injury, as Borrell was meeting his Russian counterpart, Russia expelled diplomats from Germany, Sweden and Poland for allegedly attending pro-Navalny rallies.
Although criticisms of the visit focused primarily on Borrell’s disappointing performance, his inability to push back against his Russian counterpart, and the bad timing of the visit, they opened the door for questions on the existence of a coherent and credible EU democracy and human rights policy in the fabric of its external relations, given the current consistent prioritization of economic interests of a clear bloc of European states over democracy and human rights equally stipulated in the EU Treaty, European Convention on Human Rights, EU Action Plan for the Protection of Democracy and Human Rights, and the EU’s recently approved Magnitsky Act that imposes sanctions on egregious abusers of international human rights. In this regard, Carnegie Europe recently published two related articles on the topic: “Is the European Union Willing to Defend Human Rights Globally?” on 4 February, and “Why the European Union Cannot Do Foreign Policy” on 9 February , highlighting the perspective and policy of some of the world superpowers (including Russia and China) toward the EU and their assessment of the maximum limits of the collective European action in the absence of unanimity among EU member states on constructing a unified strategic EU foreign policy. Moscow’s strategy, for example, is based on dealing separately with each EU member state, and that is exactly the way it does its foreign and economic policy with Germany. Correspondingly, Angela Merkel never took the step to place the common European interests over purely national ones.
The ineffectiveness of the European sanctions is clearly reflected in the resumption of the $1 billion Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, under the supervision of former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, despite the European sanctions imposed on Russia following its annexation of Crimea and its conflict with Ukraine. Trump’s administration imposing sanctions on businesses involved in Nord Stream 2 will be among the pressing challenges facing the new Biden administration that seeks to strengthen the US relations with Europe. The inability of the EU to defend common interests and values precludes creating a genuinely European strategy and gives countries, like Russia and China, the opportunity to sustain their economic interests with individual European governments. The fact that the EU institutions weren’t able to face the 17+1 Forum in which Beijing meets regularly with a number of Central and Eastern European and Balkan countries to promote its economic and political interests clearly reflects Beijing’s ability to disregard the EU as a collective actor whenever the need arises.
Despite the deep concern expressed by the EU about the jailing of the Russian opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, the attempt to murder him with a chemical poisonous substance, the Russian cyber-attacks on the German Parliament, or China’s threats to impose embargo on European countries that openly criticize its crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, this haven’t been translated into real action. Similarly, the resolution issued by the European Parliament on the deteriorating situation of human rights in China didn’t stop the EU from signing an investment agreement with China, throwing the common European values and morals on human rights to the wind in the pursuit of achieving the economic interests of European countries that still recognize the necessity of availing themselves of the comparative and competitive advantages of the Chinese market as well as its large absorptive capacity notwithstanding all past year’s talk about adjusting globalization streams to prevent China’s dominance of global supply chains of high-tech products. Lacking their pressure, the declarations of the European Union bureaucracy in Brussels on the situation of human rights in a number of countries no longer represent a real concern for these countries given their ability to pursue their economic interests with individual European countries beyond criticism of their human rights situation.
While the EU is still far away to be considered a superpower capable of competing superpowers on the international scene such as China and Russia, it, however, has remarkable achievements as an economic grouping but lacks a unified foreign policy or a common foreign or defense policy and there isn’t enough evidence of its ability to play an active role in bolstering democracy and human rights internationally. For example, despite Borrell’s stating that the political dialogue with Moscow has come to a standstill, Russia’s declaration that it has no intention to enter in any negotiations about human rights, and despite all what has been said about the determination of the EU to impose sanctions on Russia during EU foreign minister meeting to be held on 22 February and the European Summit to be held next March, the current state of division in the EU over how to deal with Russia is likely to prevent these potential sanctions and these statements remain half-baked particularly with around 40-70% of Europe’s gas coming from Russia. And if we take into consideration Russia’s influence over a number of issues including Erdogan’s Turkey, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, fight in Syria and Libya, and the Mediterranean security, Nord Stream Project will remain unaffected by potential European sanctions although it may still be faced with the US sanctions if Biden’s administration choose not to lift sanctions imposed on the Project by Trump.
Apart from the fact that the EU’s interest in promoting democracy and human rights internationally is dependent on its relevant economic interests, the damage caused to its reputation following its 2016 agreement with Turkey on the refugee crisis which represented a clear violation of the International Humanitarian Law can’t be ignored. In fact, the EU’s failure to impose sanctions on Turkey despite the ongoing violations in the country since the attempted coup d’état in July 206, goes in hand with policies of some European countries that seek limiting arrivals of refugees to their lands, which is itself a clear breach of obligations under the United Nations Convention relating to Status of Refugees of 1951. Following a similarly dismal response, the European Commission kept silent and choose not to condemn the arbitrary detentions in Bulgaria in 2020, and didn’t object to Bulgaria’s deportation of Gulen supporters to Turkey. Finally, the EU position in dealing with China, Russia, Turkey, and naturally Israel is a perfect example of its double standards on human rights and democracy issues where economic interests and balancing of power are prioritized over common European values that promote democracy and respect for human rights internationally.
