Amidst an intricate security environment and a tumultuous regional climate, on March 6, the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS), comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, declared the formation of a joint military force aimed at countering terrorism as a novel strategy for addressing unparalleled security threats and challenges and bolstering shared defense and security policies. This comes amid the rising tide of terrorism and worsening transnational insecurity in the Sahel and West Africa.
I. Contextual Motivators
The ASS, under the leadership of Colonel Assimi Goita in Mali, President Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso, and Abdourahamane Tchiani in Niger, reached a consensus to form a unified military force with the aim of bolstering the member states’ capacities in the fight against terrorist threats and safeguarding the region’s security. The circumstances and motivations behind this decision can be elucidated as follows:
1. Escalation of Terrorist Activities and Attacks: al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Daesh in West Africa Province (DWAP), and Daesh in the Sahel Province (DSP), previously known as Daesh in the Greater Sahara (DGS), carried out numerous indiscriminate assaults on both government forces and civilians in the Sahel region. These organizations managed to capitalize on the security vacuum that ensued following the withdrawal of anti-terrorism forces, as well as the governments’ preoccupation with transitional phases and other internal challenges and successfully attained qualitative gains in order to solidify their influence and acquire new species for recruitment and infiltration of societies in marginalized communities. This was possible because these countries have extensive ungoverned territories that serve as secure bases for terrorist groups.
The 2024 Global Terrorism Index report reveals that the Sahel region accounts for over 50% of all global terrorism-related deaths. Additionally, five out of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism are situated in this region, with the Central Sahel countries (Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso) experiencing a particularly high frequency of violent attacks. In 2023, Burkina Faso recorded a 68% rise in fatalities and held the top spot on the terrorism index for the second consecutive year. The northwestern region of Burkina Faso, which is bordered by Niger and Mali, was the focal point of terrorist activity in 2023, which resulted in 1,907 fatalities. The JNIM remains the primary perpetrator of terrorist acts within the country, as evidenced by the nearly fivefold increase in fatalities associated with terrorist attacks attributed to the group in 2022 and 2023, averaging nearly twenty deaths per attack.
2. Withdrawal of Counter-Terrorism Forces: The recent period has been marked by the reorganization and formation of alliances and priorities pertaining to the military and security landscape in the Sahel region. November 2022 marked the end of French and European influence in the ASS, with the French Barkhane force and the European Takuba force withdrawing from Mali. In January and August of 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger terminated their military cooperation agreements with France. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) concluded its activities in March 2022, following years of government restrictions and tensions in the region that impeded their air and ground operations since Wagner’s forces became involved in the region in 2021. Add to this MINUSMA’s performance deficiencies and the consequences of the investigation into the Moura massacre. As such, the UN Security Council resolved to terminate the mandate of MINUSMA on June 30, 2023, cease its activities, and withdraw its personnel by December 31, 2023, with the ultimate withdrawal process coming to an end in January 2024.
Furthermore, on December 2, 2023, both Niger and Burkina Faso decided to withdraw from the G5 Sahel (G5S) and all its associated entities, including the G5S-Joint Force (G5S-JF). Earlier, Mali had withdrawn from this G5S on May 15, 2022. Moreover, the military junta in Niger terminated its alliance and ceased its collaboration in terms of security and military affairs with the European Union. The European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) and the European Union Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM) withdrew from Niger in December 2023. Furthermore, Niger terminated its security and military partnership with the United States by abruptly cancelling the agreement on military cooperation on March 16, 2024.
3. The ASS’ Withdrawal from ECOWAS: The ASS opted to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on January 28, 2024, amidst unprecedented challenges and rapid developments pertaining to political instability, insecurity, and the escalating threat of terrorism in member states, following the resurgence of military coups in the Sahel region, most notably the coup in Niger, that resulted in a number of alterations to the geopolitical alliance map, the equation of strategic balances, and the establishment of new regional axis policies and alignments.
The departure of the three countries from ECOWAS will have adverse effects on ongoing collaborative endeavors aimed at tackling security concerns, particularly in terms of exchanging intelligence and participating in regional counter-terrorism initiatives like the Accra Initiative involving Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, as well as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) formed by neighbouring countries within the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin).
4. Promoting the Joint Defence Alliance Trajectory: The establishment of a joint military force among the three countries is intended to pool resources and collective efforts in order to counter terrorism and address other security challenges in the region, amid recognition by the new military elites of the importance of relying on domestic capabilities and minimizing external assistance and a desire to eliminate Western hegemony. This arises in the context of France’s paternalistic policies and the adverse consequences of its France-Afrique policies. Over the past decades, France has exerted economic influence, engaged in political and military interventions, and compelled these countries to align with them rather than with other partners. What reinforces this trend is the volume of joint military operations, security coordination, information development and the operational framework that has recently been agreed upon between these countries in order to achieve the ASS’s security and defense goals, known as the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which was signed on September 16, 2023.
II. Perilous Consequences
Establishing a novel counter-terrorism force in the Sahel entails several consequences, one of which is the potential deployment of the new African Legion forces (a new paramilitary group replacing Wagner). In effect, Moscow capitalized on the power vacuum that emerged following the departure of French and European forces and bolstered its ties with military elites through providing military assistance and intensifying reciprocal diplomatic visits. It also initiated a call for a collaborative strategic partnership and global endeavors to tackle the consequences stemming from the significant escalation of insecurity and the deployment of multilateral military forces to combat terrorism in Africa, with a particular focus on the Central Sahel countries. Relatedly, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement urging collaborative efforts to reach joint solutions, stressing that international endeavors are crucial for achieving peace in the Sahel region, especially after the ruling military junta in Niger decided to abruptly terminate a military agreement that permits the presence of US military personnel and civilian staff on its territory.
In this vein, Moscow could propose selling weaponry and equipment to these countries without imposing the same requirements for upholding human rights and complying with international law as required by the United States. In return, Moscow stands to gain from Niger’s valuable natural resources, such as its gold mines. This strategy aligns with Russia’s declaration to restructure the Wagner forces, replacing them with the African Legion forces, which are anticipated to be stationed in various African countries, such as Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Central Africa.
Given the precarious security situation in the active terrorist hotspots in the Liptako-Gourma region along the borders of the Central Sahel countries and the Lake Chad Basin (Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon), the deterioration of regional initiatives and the withdrawal of international assistance will allow terrorist groups to gain more influence. The Sahel region, particularly Niger, continues to serve as a significant transit point for migrants originating from sub-Saharan Africa en route to North African countries and, subsequently, to Europe. Consequently, the escalating terrorist activities carried out by these organizations foreshadow a surge in the rates of migration and displacement. Furthermore, concerns and perils exist for the Gulf of Guinea coastal countries (Togo, Benin, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire) due to the spread of the contagion of terrorism and political unrest risks emanating from the Sahel region, where terrorist organizations continue to operate along the borders of these countries. Terrorist organizations view the Sahel region as a chance to make up for what they have lost in the Middle East.
III. Intertwined Challenges
In spite of the aspirations and objectives associated with the new counter-terrorism force, its dimensions, mechanisms, and constraints on mobility, training requirements, and funding sources remain undetermined. Discussions regarding this force are common during ASS meetings, and its future prospects resemble those of the joint force of the G5S, which failed to accomplish its objectives, leading to its dissolution when the three countries decided to withdraw.
A significant challenge for the Sahel countries is the absence of internal or external intelligence services and limited counter-espionage capabilities, which hinders their ability to predict and prevent terrorist attacks within their borders or against their people. Given the crucial role of intelligence information in effectively countering terrorism, relying solely on military operations is insufficient. Notably, the Malian army ranks third among the armies in West Africa, with military expenditure amounting to approximately $591 million, whereas the Burkina Faso army holds the fifth position, with military spending reaching around $440 million. The Global Firepower website ranks the Niger army as the least powerful army in West Africa with respect to armament. In pursuit of procuring weapons, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have collaborated more closely with Russia and Turkey to strengthen military cooperation.
While internal dynamics vary from country to country, the region is currently experiencing a surge in the operations of terrorist organizations, as well as mixed non-state actors comprising criminal gangs, armed factions, and rebel organizations. These actors actively subvert the safety and security of national states, exacerbating conflicts among diverse ethnic groups, sects, and ethnicities. Add to this the perplexity and scattering of the military forces of the three countries when addressing internal security issues, which caused the border region shared by these countries to become one of the most alarming regions globally. It has also become a sanctuary for terrorist groups and various well-organized criminal networks involved in activities such as human trafficking, illicit immigration, and the illicit trade of weapons and drugs. This situation is exacerbated by the interconnections between terrorist organizations and other criminal networks that operate in this region.
In short, the Sahel region is currently experiencing intricate interactions and a rise in security threats due to the formation of alliances between terrorist organizations, criminal gangs, and insurgent groups. This intricate security environment intensifies the dangers of both regional and international insecurity, considering the changes in the geopolitical dynamics of regional and international balances of power as well as regional alliances between Sahel states to achieve a cohesive perspective on combating terrorism and strengthening regional security.
