The complex dynamics surrounding the nature of the evolving relationship between the Syrian regime and the Kurdish autonomous administration represented by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), controlling roughly a quarter of Syrian territory—most notably al-Hasakah, Deir ez-Zur, ar-Raqqah, and other areas—have once again taken center stage. This renewed attention follows the fierce confrontations that broke out recently between SDF units and the Syrian regime’s forces, along with loyalist militias, in various eastern Syrian regions, especially Deir ez-Zur.
While clashes of this nature have been a frequent occurrence throughout the Syrian civil war since 2011, their significance has been amplified by several key factors. Firstly, these are among the most intense and large-scale clashes between the two sides in recent months, with some analysts suggesting they may redefine the “ambiguous” relationship between the SDF and the Syrian regime. Secondly, the timing coincides with escalating discussions around the re-emergence of Daesh in Syria. Thirdly, the current regional context, coupled with the external dynamics at play—particularly the roles of the United States and Russia—adds further weight to these recent events.
I. Dimensions of the Recent Escalation between the SDF and the Syrian Regime
The clashes between the SDF and the Syrian regime erupted on Wednesday, August 7, sparked by the announcement that “tribal forces” had crossed from the western to the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, an area controlled by the SDF. After hours of intense fighting with Kurdish forces in multiple villages and towns, the “tribal forces” withdrew to their original positions. Subsequently, on Friday, August 9, the SDF faced a fierce barrage of mortar shells and heavy artillery, launched from areas in the Deir ez-Zur countryside where pro-Iranian local groups are stationed. The shelling resulted in the deaths of 11 civilians, according to reports from the SDF and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. In retaliation, the SDF laid siege to several regime-held areas in the cities of al-Hasakah and Qamishli, located in the far northeast of Syria.
Against this backdrop, several key observations can be made regarding these recent confrontations:
1. The Syrian Regime’s Propagation of the ‘Civil Protests’ Narrative: The regime has described the events in Deir ez-Zur as “civil protests against the autonomous administration’s separatist aspirations.” According to the regime, residents in the Deir ez-Zur countryside, where the separatist SDF militia operates, are engaging in widespread protests against this militia. The regime claims that the SDF militia, which is linked to American occupation forces, is pushing forward an agenda of abuses and attacks against local residents in order to force them into supporting its separatist agenda and to conscript their sons into its ranks.
To grasp this narrative, several key factors should be considered. Firstly, the Syrian regime highlights its refusal to recognize the SDF as part of the Syrian military forces or to acknowledge the autonomous administration as a legitimate authority in Syria. Secondly, the regime is pushing the narrative that the autonomous administration and its policies are to blame for the crises in these areas. Thirdly, this escalation jeopardizes both current and potential negotiations and creates obstacles for forming alliances that serve the interests of both parties.
2. The US Involvement in the Recent Escalation: The United States was actively involved in the recent escalation between the SDF and the Syrian regime. Reports highlighted the arrival of a military delegation, including leaders and officials from both the Global Coalition against Daesh and US forces, who inspected the bombed sites and extended their condolences to the victims’ families. Additionally, a combined patrol from the Coalition and the SDF toured the towns of Diban, al-Busayrah, and Abu Hamam, where the fighting had been intense.
This US rush to manage and potentially contain the recent situation, even if only temporarily, is rooted in Washington’s dedication to backing its Kurdish allies. This is driven by several important considerations, including maintaining the current military dynamics in Syria, countering Iranian influence, and ensuring continued support for the SDF in its efforts against Daesh. Notably, the Kurdish autonomous administration regions in Syria have recently been major battlegrounds for Daesh activities, with the SDF being the key operational force in Washington’s strategy to combat it.
3. Apprehension about Disrupting Field Dynamics: What stood out in the SDF’s response to the recent attacks, whether by tribal groups or by government forces and the Iran-aligned National Defence Forces (NDF), was framing the attacks as an attempt by the Syrian regime to infringe upon the sovereignty of the autonomous administration areas and disrupt the established stability in these regions. It is worth noting that Deir ez-Zor Governorate is militarily divided between the US-backed SDF and the Coalition on the one hand and government forces and Iran-aligned factions on the other. The SDF, supported by the United States and the Global Coalition, controls the eastern and northern banks of the Euphrates River, including the major oil and gas fields like Al-Omar Oil and Conoco Gas. Conversely, government forces and local factions loyal to Iran, primarily the NDF militia, control the western bank of the Euphrates river, encompassing central Deir ez-Zur city and the towns of al-Mayadin and al-Bukamal near the Iraqi border.
The SDF is increasingly concerned about several significant factors that could alter the balance of power in its areas of control. The first is the gradual expansion of Russian military influence and deployment, particularly in parts of ar-Raqqah and Aleppo where the SDF maintains relative control. The second factor is the growing presence of the Syrian regime’s border guard forces, al-Hajana, along the Turkish-Syrian border, which expands the regime’s geographical reach, allowing it to strengthen its forces and utilize military transport routes within SDF-controlled areas. This development puts geopolitical pressure on the SDF. The third factor is the mounting signs of an imminent normalization of relations between the Syrian and Turkish regimes, a move that could negatively impact the influence of the autonomous administration. Collectively, these variables represent a serious concern for the SDF, which describes them as efforts to alter the strategic landscape and disrupt stability in its areas of control.
4. The SDF’s Strategy of Exploiting the Regime’s Vulnerable Flank: Analyzing the recent escalations between the Syrian regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces, a notable tactic employed by the SDF was the imposition of a siege and heightened security measures in al-Hasakah and Qamishli. This strategy aimed to pressure the Syrian regime and its loyalist groups to cease their attacks on parts of eastern Syria. This brings to light two important assumptions: first, that the security zones in al-Hasakah and Qamishli are weak spots of the regime, making them prime targets for SDF pressure; and second, that Russian mediation during this escalation hinged on the understanding that lifting the siege on these areas was contingent upon halting the military tensions and bombardments in eastern Syria.
II. Proposed Explanations for the Recent Escalation
The recent escalation between the Syrian regime and SDF forces can be understood from two primary perspectives. The first suggests that these confrontations signal a resurgence of armed conflict in Syria, pushing it back to the forefront of events. The second, more plausible perspective, views this escalation as a strategic maneuver to reshape the dynamics of influence in Syria, driven by the Syrian regime’s efforts to reassert itself as the dominant force in the conflict while also factoring in current regional developments. Within this framework, several critical contexts and factors should be considered when analyzing the recent escalation, including the following:
1. Domestic Dynamics Driving the Escalation: Approximately nine years have elapsed since the establishment of the SDF in October 2015. Despite the relative stability prevailing in the regions under its control, occasional confrontations and security disturbances continue to occur. These incidents can be attributed to several key factors. Firstly, the Syrian regime has consistently refused to acknowledge the autonomous administration’s authority and the fait accompli policy. Secondly, the SDF was largely intent on excluding the Arab component from any arrangements related to the management of the areas under its control, which amplifies nationalist and ethnic sentiments, fuelling tensions and potentially leading to confrontations or the use of this element as a pressure tactic by involved parties. Here, it is crucial to highlight the violent clashes in Deir ez-Zur in August 2023, sparked by widespread protests from Arab tribes against the SDF, resulting in temporary control of certain areas, which the SDF recaptured within a month. Thirdly, the autonomous administration faces numerous structural and organizational challenges. Some of these issues stem from its inability to effectively address the needs of the population, while others are linked to the escalating security vulnerabilities in these regions, which exacerbate internal discontent with it.
2. Involvement of Regional Powers in the Recent Escalation: The Turkish factor is crucial in understanding the dynamics in Syria’s Kurdish regions. The SDF, primarily composed of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), along with various local and military councils, is viewed by Turkey as the Syrian counterpart of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Ankara’s principal adversary. This perception could drive Turkey to conduct ongoing military operations against these Kurdish areas, which would also strain Ankara’s relations with the United States, a major ally of the SDF. In this vein, a pivotal factor is the significant rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus and the growing signs of imminent normalization between the two countries, which led the SDF to assert that both Turkey and Iran bear direct responsibility for the recent events.
Regarding Iran, a key strategic objective for Tehran is the establishment of a logistical corridor extending from Iraq through Syria to Lebanon, with the aim of building support and solidarity networks for Iranian-aligned factions as part of the so-called ‘Shia Crescent.’ Reports suggest that Iran supports seven military bases and approximately 70 military positions in Deir ez-Zur alone. There is a clear Iranian interest in diminishing the SDF’s influence in Deir ez-Zur to bolster its own allied factions, given that Deir ez-Zur serves as a crucial link between Syria and Iraq along the Euphrates River. Additionally, Iran views eastern Syria and SDF-controlled areas as a vital battleground for challenging and pressuring the United States.
3. Impact of Regional Dynamics on the Syrian Arena: A key factor in understanding the resurgence of security tensions in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria is the rapid shift in regional dynamics prompted by the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza. The impact of this regional turmoil on eastern Syria can be deciphered through several critical considerations. First, estimates suggest a direct US interest in redirecting the Iranian factions’ focus from their confrontations with Israel and attacks on American bases towards targeting the SDF forces. Second, eastern Syria has become a key target area for factions loyal to Iran. In October 2023, in the wake of the tragic strike on al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq declared responsibility for a significant attack involving guided missiles and drones on the Conoco gas field in eastern Syria and US military bases, including al-Tanf military base. Thirdly, a significant strategic consideration contributing to the escalation in eastern Syria is the pursuit of pressure campaigns against Washington to diminish its military presence in the region. The objective of these escalating actions, either directly against US military forces or through proxies, is to compel Washington to reduce its military footprint in Syria and Iraq or to refrain from expanding it in the near or medium term.
4. Russian Calculations in Mediating between the Two Sides: The primary factor that contributed to de-escalating the tension between the SDF and the Syrian regime was Russia’s mediation efforts, spearheaded by General Sergei Surovikin, the Russian forces’ commander in Syria. Surovikin’s meeting with SDF’s General Commander Mazloum Abdi led to a consensus on easing security measures in al-Hasakah and Qamishli as a “goodwill gesture” aimed at reducing tensions in northeastern Syria. Additionally, an agreement was reached for a prisoner exchange involving those detained during the recent unrest. This development is supported by several key factors. First, Russia has long been committed to acting as a mediator between the regime and the SDF. Second, the Russians aimed to maintain the status quo prior to the recent clashes, avoiding any new arrangements that could complicate the field situation, especially given their engagement on other fronts. Essentially, Russia seeks to preserve the Euphrates River as the dividing line between the regime and SDF territories, at least for now. Third, Russia believes that altering these long-established field lines could provoke unnecessary US-Russian confrontations, which it prefers to avoid at this time.
In conclusion, the recent confrontations between the Syrian regime and the SDF can be attributed to a confluence of factors. Some of them are rooted in the internal calculations and field strategies of each party, while others are influenced by the current regional context, including the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip and the evolving calculations of the key actors involved in the Syrian crisis.
