The world watches closely, awaiting Iran’s response to the persistent violations of its sovereignty as the leading force behind the so-called ‘axis of resistance,’ a network of influence that extends in a crescent across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
Iran has experienced a series of sovereignty violations, including the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’s political bureau, during his visit to Iran for President Masoud Pezekshian’s inauguration. The incident occurred within a building affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These violations also extend to the broader Israeli and US offensives that targeted IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani and numerous Iranian nuclear scientists, culminating in the assassination of President Ebrahim Raisi. Raisi, poised to succeed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, was killed when the presidential plane was shot down, alongside Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. While all signs and circumstances strongly suggest that this was an assassination rather than a mere random incident, the official investigation insists on calling it an accident in an effort to maintain the dwindling prestige of the Persian state and its institutions.
These attacks, along with other clashes and strikes on facilities and camps and the assassinations of leaders within Iran’s regional networks, have cornered the clerical regime with no choice but to respond, leaving no room for silence or evasion, despite the severe threats and the unprecedented military deterrence on the ground and in the surrounding waters of the Arabian Gulf, the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. Tehran now confronts two daunting options, each carrying a heavy price that risks eroding its prestige and its regional standing and potentially the collapse of a project it has nurtured for decades.
The first option is for Iran to retaliate decisively against all Israeli violations to maintain its prestige and status among supporters of the “axis of resistance” and its proxies, while restoring the deterrence it has lost against future violations that are unlikely to cease. The second option is to yield to the threats, sacrificing its project by remaining silent and avoiding direct confrontation, which would lead to isolation, ridicule, increased pressure, the loss of negotiating leverage, blackmail, and diminished deterrence. The stakes could escalate further if Donald Trump wins the upcoming November 5 elections in three months, bringing with him his challenging legacy with Iran and his hardline policies.
Such silence and retreat might lead to Tehran’s loss of control over its proxies, eager for retaliation against the overt Israeli aggression: the Houthis in reaction to the al-Hudaydah port bombing, and Hezbollah following the assassination of Fouad Shukr, Hezbollah’s deputy leader and top military commander. Any of these proxies—stretching across the region—may rise up and break away from the Persian sphere of influence, particularly given that they are rooted in a different cultural and environmental context with Arab origins and are under significant internal strain.
A wounded Iran, stripped of its deterrence, now faces threats to obliterate its nuclear facilities and dismantle the infrastructure of its nuclear program. Additionally, its oil export ports and facilities have been marked as targets, putting Iran on the brink of a severe economic crisis that could destabilize the country from within, risking the collapse of the regime and severing its influence over regional proxies, which are likely to come under military attack. Leaks have even hinted that Tehran has been warned of a possible assassination attempt on the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, signaling a reminder that those responsible for previous high-profile killings are capable of reaching any target or facility within Iran, regardless of the protection offered by the IRGC.
Guided by its deep-rooted pragmatism and functional approach, Tehran deems this cost too high—compromising its project, credibility, influence, and allies. It may ultimately do only what’s needed to preserve its image. Perhaps this explains its delayed response, as it may be quietly seeking a measured retaliation akin to the events of April 13, one that would not provoke a counterstrike from Israel and its allies, carefully orchestrated with the help of Western and Arab mediators.
Tehran might find a way to preserve its image by coordinating retaliatory actions through its proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. This maneuver would exploit the resources, governments, and people of these countries to safeguard Tehran’s interests, projects, and sovereignty, leaving them to bear the brunt of the Israeli-Iranian confrontations and the region’s escalating tensions. Some perceive this scenario as a way to maintain the Supreme Leader’s image and keep turmoil away from his doorstep, even though he called on the IRGC to strike back after the assassination of Haniyeh, the “presidential guest” slain on Iranian territory. Overall, this scenario fits within President Pezeshkian’s efforts to avoid catastrophic strikes that could derail his administration before it even gets off the ground, especially as his grip on power remains tenuous.
We can interpret Hezbollah’s recent bombing of Israeli military bases, as reported last Sunday morning, within this context. The party’s statement, along with remarks from its leader Hassan Nasrallah, emphasized that the attacks were in retaliation for the assassination of leader Fouad Shukr, carefully distancing it from the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh or any of Iran’s stated goals of a direct Iranian strike on Israel.
The Consulate Assault and the April 13 Retaliation—An Exception
For Iran’s leaders, the Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate near their embassy in Damascus on April 1 was seen as a severe breach, far beyond the bounds of the unspoken, yet mutually understood, game. It was no April Fool’s joke but a harsh new reality thrust upon the clerical regime and their allies beyond Iran’s borders. Failing to respond would be perceived as a sign of weakness, compromising the deterrence that underpins Tehran’s forward defense strategy. Nonetheless, even as Iran launched unprecedented strikes against Israel, it did so with extreme caution, focused on containing the situation rather than exacerbating it. The attack’s specifics were communicated to neighbouring countries before the strikes, with the expectation that this information would likely reach the United States and Israel, allowing ample time to minimize casualties or damage in Israel. The operation was completed in no more than 12 days.
Tehran swiftly moved to publicly call for an end to the cycle of escalation, even tweeting this intent from its UN mission in New York while drones were en route to Israel. Iran has consistently conveyed that it does not seek war with Israel or the United States. Instead, Iranian leaders assert that their primary objective is to reaffirm the previous rules of engagement with Israel—rules based on mutual deterrence, where confrontations remain confined to the “grey zone” without direct attacks. Similarly, despite Hezbollah’s escalating responses to Israeli strikes, the underlying aim appears to be the establishment of new rules of mutual deterrence rather than triggering a full-scale war.
This approach reflects a clear Iranian desire to avoid being drawn into a broader conflict, a point that both Khamenei and Nasrallah have emphasized publicly. They understand that a direct conflict would severely cripple Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, thereby significantly undermining the deterrence that both Hezbollah and Iran rely on against Israel—a priority Tehran holds far above the fate of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Tehran is reportedly deeply concerned about the scenario of a direct conflict with Israel or the United States and is seeking, with its allies in Lebanon, ways to avoid it.
Information Overload Strategy
Following Haniyeh’s assassination, a wave of “information flooding” ensued, with divergent accounts about the operation’s details and execution surfacing. Israel, the orchestrator of the operation, presented one narrative while leaking an alternate account. Iran, the target, released an official statement pointing fingers at nearby countries, while the IRGC, which had hosted Haniyeh, offered a differing narrative. The United States and its intelligence agencies, privy to the details, further muddied the waters by leaking several narratives to the press. Numerous intelligence agencies in the region, aware of the operation either beforehand or shortly after, each released their own narratives, creating a flood of conflicting stories that left the public in a state of uncertainty. These narratives, tailored to fit the agendas of their creators, left recipients of the information—who were themselves targets of the political and media messaging—confused. As is typical in managing crises of this nature, each party crafted a story that aligned with their desired scenario, aiming to overshadow competing narratives and take control of the discourse.
In this vein, Tehran’s narrative surrounding Haniyeh’s assassination at the IRGC’s guesthouse has been continuously shifting, reflecting its strategy to select a form of retaliation that would inflict serious damage on Israel while avoiding a broader regional conflict that could threaten Iran’s borders, territory, and resources. These shifting accounts also reflect the internal struggle among Iranian security agencies to deflect accusations of negligence and avoid blame for the apparent security lapses that enabled the assassination. Meanwhile, Iranian officials and media were formulating a new strategy for deterring Israel, especially after Operation True Promise failed to achieve that goal. At the time, this operation, involving missile and drone attacks, was heralded as a shift in Iran’s approach—from relying on proxies to launching direct assaults. Senior Iranian leaders have then asserted that, moving forward, Iran will retaliate against Israeli strikes with direct attacks on Israel.
Initially, the regime maintained that Haniyeh’s assassination was carried out by a missile launched from beyond Iran’s borders, specifically from a nearby country, followed by another missile fired in close proximity to the site of the assassination. In this way, the regime implied that Israel would be bombarded from all sides by missiles and explosive drones, presenting a full-scale threat from every conceivable angle. However, such an approach was anticipated to provoke a severe retaliatory strike from Israel against Iran. Consequently, the regime later stated that the assassination was executed using an explosive device smuggled into Haniyeh’s guesthouse suite, evading detection by the IRGC with alleged assistance from its own members. This heightened the likelihood of a retaliatory response, potentially involving coordinated Iranian strikes on Israeli targets, including high-ranking officials both within Israel and abroad, whom Iran holds accountable for the assassination. By adopting this approach, Tehran would be able to enlist non-Iranian allies for support and showcase a precise, strategic attack, all while deflecting any Israeli military retaliation against Iran or its regional assets.
To this end, President Pezeshkian is working to ‘convince’ the Supreme Leader to target only specific sites, ideally those agreed upon with a mediator, to prevent a regional conflict and safeguard Iran’s security and strategic interests. This approach contrasts with the calls from senior IRGC officials for an immediate missile response to Israel, regardless of the fallout. Some even suggest that Pezeshkian is keen to avoid any military escalation that might disrupt diplomatic channels with Washington.
Amidst the media frenzy and information overload, leaked reports reveal that the Iranian security leadership has been exploring a range of potential options for responding. These include targeting Israeli and Jewish interests worldwide, delegating the retaliatory strikes to the axis of resistance—particularly Hezbollah and the Houthis—and leveraging the threat of a direct Iranian assault on Israel to negotiate with the United States. The aim is to extract significant concessions such as reinstating Iran’s nuclear progress, lifting economic sanctions, withdrawing US troops from the region, and addressing other demands that Pezeshkian and his team are bringing to the negotiating table.
According to a report by the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Jarida on August 9, a source within Iran’s Supreme National Security Council stated that the question of responding to Israel was still under deliberation in Tehran, with officials waiting for specific directives from Supreme Leader Khamenei to decide on any retaliatory action. The source further revealed that the United States had offered to ease a significant number of the sanctions against Iran and re-join the nuclear agreement if Iran would forgo its intention to strike Israel.
In response, Iranian President Pezeshkian indicated that his country was willing to delay any retaliatory action indefinitely, contingent upon the US proposal also encompassing a comprehensive ceasefire in Gaza and US assurances to halt any Israeli aggression against Iran and its allies. During a meeting of the Supreme National Security Council, Pezeshkian stated that he had coordinated this stance with Khamenei and that if the United States agreed to these terms, he would persuade Khamenei to defer the military response in favor of selective retaliatory actions, such as assassinating Israeli officials in reprisal for Israel’s assassination of elements affiliated with Iran.
Seemingly, Tehran, known for leveraging military threats to maximize political gains, continues to emphasize its right to “respond appropriately” to Israel, carefully weighing the costs to extract political and economic benefits while bolstering its standing with the Biden administration and Europe to further its influence in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the likelihood of targeted terrorist strikes cannot be dismissed.
Any close observer of Israeli actions during this and other crises can consistently identify a hallmark strategy: the strategic use of media flooding. Israel frequently employs this strategy to exert pressure and escalate tensions towards pushing the Israeli narrative, ensuring its version of events, statements, and background details eclipses all others. This tactic pressures other parties into reactive roles, either refuting or clarifying within the narrative framework Israel has established. Concurrently, Israel has successfully infiltrated its narratives into Arab satellite channels and websites, which, by translating and rebroadcasting content from Israel’s Channels 12, 13, and 14, have secured significant airtime and attention, thereby shaping the perspectives of the Arab audience.
Iran’s Forward Defence Strategy
Strategically, Iran’s “forward defense” strategy aligns with its ideological foundation by transforming its ambitions into concrete actions. Through the expansion of its influence and the establishment of proxy forces throughout the Middle East, Iran’s leadership seeks to preempt threats before they reach its borders. This forward defense strategy, referred to as “offensive defense” within Iranian military circles, blends offensive tactics with a broader deterrence framework. Iranian military strategists perceive this regional strategy as a means to bolster Iran’s “strategic depth,” viewing it not merely as an expansionist endeavor but as a way to enhance Iran’s capacity to withstand enemy strikes, execute counterstrikes, and safeguard its domestic security and territorial integrity.
With arms embargoes spanning decades hindering Iran’s development of conventional military strength, while Middle Eastern rivals like Saudi Arabia have significantly advanced in this realm, Iran has strategically pivoted towards asymmetric warfare tools, particularly through its alliances within the Axis of Resistance. These tools also include deploying domestically produced drones, medium- to long-range missiles, and asymmetric naval assets such as fast boats, drones, and sea mines, similar to those Iran has strategically deployed in the Strait of Hormuz in recent years. This strategy reveals Iran’s awareness of the constraints on its conventional military strength when confronted by more formidable opponents.
Over the past decade, Tehran has increasingly relied on this strategy in response to growing tensions with the United States and Israel. The deterioration in relations with the two countries has brought about harsh economic sanctions intended to stymie Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions, coupled with targeted assassinations and cyberattacks against its nuclear infrastructure. These developments have heightened the threat perceptions among Iranian leaders, further solidifying their conviction in the strategic necessity of bolstering the country’s deterrent capabilities.
Central to this strategy are Lebanon and Syria. Tehran has, over the past decades, entrenched its political and military influence within both countries, with senior Iranian leaders now proclaiming that Iran’s “natural strategic depth” reaches as far as the Mediterranean. This geographic focus underpins Iran’s strategic priorities. Its presence in southern Lebanon positions Hezbollah as a formidable threat to Israel in the event of a multi-front conflict with the Axis of Resistance. Likewise, the Syrian Golan Heights, adjacent to Israel, hold immense strategic importance as a potential additional layer of deterrence.
Eastern Syria, meanwhile, plays a distinct yet complementary role for Tehran, acting as a vital land corridor linking Iran with Syria and Lebanon through Iraq. Control over this region allows for the seamless movement of Iranian and allied forces, supplies, and weaponry across borders, ensuring the swift deployment and resupply of proxy groups.
Additionally, Iran’s presence in eastern Syria enables it to closely monitor and exert pressure on US operations. The United States, as part of its Global Coalition against Daesh, maintains a limited military presence in the region, supporting its allied Syrian Democratic Forces to secure control in the northeast. The United States also maintains a presence in the at-Tanf garrison in eastern Syria, which, though primarily aimed at combating Daesh, also serves as a counterbalance to Iran’s regional influence. However, despite this, US bases in eastern Syria (and Iraq) have increasingly come under attack from Tehran-backed militias as Iran seeks to drive the United States out of the region.
From Iran’s perspective, the war in Gaza has highlighted the strategic importance of Syria and Lebanon in the minds of its political and military leaders. As the likelihood of conflict with Israel and the United States grows, these two countries have become critical to Iran’s strategic calculus. Tehran now regards its alliances in Syria and Lebanon as the bedrock of its security, forming a cohesive deterrent front against Israel. This front, cultivated through years of Iranian support and deep local ties, should be factored into Europe’s considerations as it crafts an effective response to the intensifying regional dynamics.
Next in strategic importance is the Houthi front, which, in coordination with Tehran, is forging an unusual relationship with al-Qaeda in Yemen and the Somali al-Shabaab organization across the sea, serving as a calculated investment to advance Houthi-Iranian aims of regional deterrence and threat projection. This front holds equal weight with the Shiite militias in Iraq, which secure the regime’s hinterland and consistently challenge US forces in Mesopotamia. Meanwhile, Hamas and Islamic Jihad rank lower in Tehran’s hierarchy of priorities, although the ongoing events in Gaza since October 7 have brought them to the forefront, capturing significant attention on the global stage.
In summary, Iran and the United States are navigating a landscape of complex calculations and caution, each wary of risking their strategic interests in the region. Iran will not jeopardize Hezbollah, its most significant proxy, just as the United States will not abandon Israel or leave it vulnerable in a region where it faces widespread popular hostility. Regardless of whether a direct response occurs, the ongoing skirmishes and conflicts will persist, guided by the established rules of engagement that ensure that both Israel and Iran continue to play their functional roles. This dynamic will continue to fuel regional polarization and exhaustion, irrespective of conspiracy theory calculations—since reality has outstripped all theoretical and fruitless debates about the existence of a conspiracy.
