Over the last few years, several logistics projects have been proposed, aiming to capitalize on the geographical location of one or more countries to establish logistics corridors that facilitate regional and global trade routes traversing specific regions or span continents, particularly linking East Asia, Western Europe, and the United States. The proposed projects encompass a range of initiatives, including waterways that utilize oceans, open seas, and artificial canals for ship transportation, as well as land-based corridors that incorporate railways, highways, and pipelines for transporting goods and petroleum products, as well as multi-modal corridors combining overland and sea routes.
These emerging projects are viewed as potential competitors to the Suez Canal, as they could diminish the volume of trade currently passing through this critical Egyptian waterway, recognized as the world’s leading industrial shipping lane, which could adversely affect the canal’s revenues and, by extension, Egypt’s overall economy. While these plans often provoke skepticism and, at times, exaggeration, a thorough and unbiased evaluation of the progress achieved in implementing and operating these projects remains essential to accurately gauge the potential risk of the Suez Canal losing part of its traffic in the future.
This second article in the series titled “The Suez Canal amidst Global Competition” delves into overland and multimodal corridors that could emerge as innovative solutions for transporting goods between Asia and Europe, positioning them as emerging competitors to the Suez Canal, particularly with advancements in technology enabling the transport of larger volumes of goods via railways and roads at lower costs, while also addressing environmental issues by lowering greenhouse gas emissions from trains and trucks, which in 2019 alone amounted to 1.89 billion metric tons—roughly 23% of global transportation-related pollution. Currently, there are nine potential overland and multimodal corridors competing with the Suez Canal, five of which span continents, while the remaining four traverse the Middle East.
I. Overland Corridors
1. Chinese Belt Initiative: Since the late 20th century, China has pursued a strategy to bolster its global economic influence. Central to this effort was the Go Out policy, which aimed to expand trade ties with Central and Western Asia as well as Europe. Building on this foundation, China unveiled the ambitious New Silk Road project in 2013, envisioning two logistical corridors—one focused on overland transportation and the other dedicated to maritime routes—as key components of its strategy to strengthen international trade and connectivity.
Over the past decade, numerous countries worldwide have expressed interest in partnering with China on this promising initiative. In response, the Chinese government broadened the scope of the project to encompass over 150 countries across four continents. As part of this effort, China has collaborated with these countries to construct infrastructure that facilitates trade and bolsters local and regional economies. Additionally, it has leveraged this growing momentum to expand the number of logistics corridors under what later became known as the Belt and Road Initiative, increasing them to nine corridors—six overland routes and three maritime pathways. Key details about these corridors is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Overland and maritime logistics networks of the Belt and Road Initiative
| Corridor | Type | Countries Served by This Corridor | |
| 1 | China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor | Land | Mongolia and Russia |
| 2 | The New Eurasia Land Bridge | Land | Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany |
| 3 | China Central-Asia-West-Asia Economic Corridor | Land | Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey |
| 4 | China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor | Land | Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore |
| 5 | China–Pakistan Economic Corridor | Land | Pakistan |
| 6 | China-Bangladesh-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor | Land | Bangladesh, India, Myanmar |
| 7 | Silk Route across the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean | Maritime | Countries Along the Suez Canal Maritime Route from the Yellow Sea to the Mediterranean |
| 8 | Silk Road across the Pacific Ocean | Maritime | Countries and Islands of Southeast Asia |
| 9 | Polar Silk Road | Maritime | Northern European Countries |
Source: A study conducted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK
Among these Chinese overland corridors, three hold the potential to rival the Suez Canal, the foremost being the New Eurasian Bridge, which began operation in July 2011, connecting Chongqing in central China with Duisburg in western Germany—predating the official launch of the Belt and Road Initiative. Over the subsequent years, this corridor expanded in tandem with China’s ambitions to deepen trade ties with European countries. By 2017, it had successfully linked 35 Chinese cities with 34 European cities, facilitating 3,270 freight train journeys between Asia and Europe that same year.
Progress on this logistics corridor continued unabated in subsequent years, despite escalating political tensions between Russia and the West, which culminated in the Russian-Ukrainian war. The six countries involved in operating the corridor agreed to launch the first cargo line between Asia and Europe with a fixed schedule, successfully completing its inaugural journeys in November 2022. The first train covered nearly 10,000 kilometers in 11 days of uninterrupted travel. Additionally, the corridor gained unexpected momentum following the November 2023 crisis involving attacks on ships transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which contributed to a 37% increase in demand for the corridor’s services during the first months of 2024. With ongoing development projects by the participating countries, reliance on the Eurasian Bridge is projected to grow in the years ahead.
Another Chinese corridor with the potential to compete with the Suez Canal is the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor. This route, the shortest land connection between China and Russia, spans 1,100 km of railways and less than 1,000 km of highways, offering the possibility of integration with European logistics networks. However, its utilization remains limited, and its infrastructure is underdeveloped, despite a 2016 agreement among the three countries to enhance and optimize the corridor. Progress has been hindered by rising tensions on the Ukrainian front and Russia’s focus on issues tied to its ongoing military operations along its western borders.
China’s final corridor with the potential to rival Egypt’s Suez Canal is the China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor, tracing the path of the historic Silk Road. Through collaboration with countries in Central and West Asia, as well as Turkey, China seeks to establish a new trade route to Europe, offering an alternative to corridors passing through Eastern Europe, where political challenges have intensified over the past decade. However, the corridor is hampered by several issues, including inadequate infrastructure, political instability among the countries involved, limited logistical coordination, and severe climate variability in certain regions. These factors lead to elevated transportation costs, reducing its viability as a preferred route for global trade.
2. The Trans-Siberian Railway: The Russian-Siberian Railway, stretching 9,288 km between Moscow and the port city of Vladivostok in Primorsky Krai in southeastern Russia, is recognized as the longest railway in the world (see figure 1). Construction of this historic railway began in 1891, making it one of Russia’s oldest railways. In recent years, Russian authorities have sought to leverage the strategic potential of this railway to establish it as an international trade corridor connecting East Asia with Europe, particularly South Korea and Japan, whose trade with the European Union in 2021 reached €107.3 billion and €62.4 billion, respectively, to bolster Russia’s regional and global political and economic standing.
Figure 1: Path of the Trans-Siberian Railway
Source: The Trans-Siberian Travel Company website
Since 2021, Russia has embarked on an ambitious modernization project to boost the volume of goods transported along this railway to 200 million tons by 2025. The Russian government allocated over ₽520 billion for this initiative. However, the project has encountered numerous obstacles and delays, partly due to the economic pressures stemming from Western sanctions imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions, which have intensified significantly following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, have forced the Russian government to seek substantial investment to fund the project. Yet, achieving this goal in the near future appears unlikely given the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine.
3. The Eilat-Ashdod Highway: In early 2012, Israel revealed plans to negotiate with China to fund a railway project designed to rival the Suez Canal. The proposal envisioned a rail link connecting the port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba with the city of Dimona in the Negev Desert, which would then integrate with the existing railway network, connecting Dimona to western Israeli ports such as Ashdod and Haifa. The project, valued at an estimated $7.9 billion, was planned to span 240 km. According to planners, the high cost was attributed to its dependence on state-of-the-art technologies and infrastructure designed to serve passenger and freight transport. Furthermore, the route encompasses numerous industrial structures, including 68 tunnels and bridges. Despite these ambitious plans, the project failed to move forward, as the substantial expenses involved were deemed disproportionate to its anticipated financial returns.
In mid-2023, Israel proposed a new, broader initiative to construct a high-speed railway linking Kiryat Shmona in the northernmost part of the country to the city and port of Eilat in the far south. The project’s estimated cost was approximately $27 billion, with plans to connect various commercial and logistical hubs across the country. However, Israel’s plans has yet to materialize. There is speculation that Israeli authorities might incorporate parts of this plan into the Indian Economic Corridor project, which was unveiled by the United States in September 2023, as a means of securing adequate financial backing.
II. Multimodal Corridors
4. The North-South Transport Corridor: The origins of this project trace back to Imperial Russia in the late 19th century, driven by the desire to access warm waters via a trade route stretching from Russian lands, through Afghanistan, to Persia and the Indian Ocean. However, the idea remained unrealized until 2000, when Russia, Iran, and India signed an agreement to establish a multimodal trade corridor linking their territories. Over the next two decades, an additional eleven countries from West and Central Asia and Far Eastern Europe joined the initiative. The proposed route spans 7,200 kilometers, with its endpoints planned to connect the city of Mumbai in the south to the city of St. Petersburg in the north, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Contrasting the North-South transport corridor with the Suez Canal maritime route
Source: Vajiram & Ravi Institute
Progress on the North-South transport corridor remained slow and limited for years, but recent political changes across Asia and the globe have sparked renewed calls for its activation. Iran, eager to bolster its struggling economy, seeks to establish itself as a key logistics hub in Central and West Asia. Meanwhile, Russia aims to bypass Western sanctions that hinder its trade, shortening delivery times between the Middle East and Russia by nearly half—down to 20 days compared to the 40-50% longer maritime journey via the Suez Canal. Central and West Asian countries are also looking to enhance their global connectivity, fostering local economic growth, while India views the corridor as a means to access new Asian markets without relying on Chinese overland routes or passing through Pakistan.
The construction of the North-South Transport Corridor encounters multiple challenges faced by the participating countries, including the decline in the quality of transportation infrastructure in certain countries such as Iran whose railway networks are incompatible with commercial transportation needs, as well as the subpar condition of highway networks and the outdated state of seaports. The participating countries encounter significant challenges in securing the necessary funding for development efforts, particularly as major financial institutions in the West and China hesitate to extend loans due to various political considerations. Moreover, the project struggles with inadequate customs regulations among its member countries and the absence of well-defined logistical entities to manage cross-border supply chains. Adding to these hurdles are political disputes and security tensions among certain Asian countries involved in constructing the corridor.
The countries involved in the corridor are working to address the challenges hindering its implementation using available resources. For instance, Iran is actively pursuing the construction of a railway line in the northern region to support transit trade towards the Caspian Sea. Additionally, Turkmenistan, Russia, and Iran are collaborating to upgrade infrastructure on the corridor’s eastern segment. Further, the founding countries of the corridor have also opened opportunities for private sector companies to invest in construction and operational activities, while promoting the North Corridor by launching experimental shipments to test the transport of various goods. There appears to be minimal resistance to proposed expansions that could reshape the project’s map in the future, aligning with the capabilities of all contributing countries and enhancing the corridor’s logistical significance.
It can be observed that the North-South Transport Corridor is unlikely to yield significant benefits in the short term. However, the commitment and enthusiasm demonstrated by the participating countries suggest that this project will experience gradual development over the medium and long term, eventually enhancing its service infrastructure and enabling it to handle tens of millions of tons of goods annually.
5. The Turkish-Arab Corridors: Turkey has sought to capitalize on the political stabilization efforts it has pursued in recent years to bolster its national economy, which has encountered numerous challenges over the past decade. This has led to the initiation of several economic partnership projects with Gulf countries, including logistical corridors designed to connect the ports of eastern Arabia with southern Turkey, particularly Mersin Port.
Turkey launched its first logistical corridor linking the Gulf in November 2021, dubbed the Sharjah-Bandar Abbas-Mersin Corridor. The route began at the Emirati port of Sharjah, traversed the Arabian Gulf to the Iranian port of Shahid Rajaee, and then continued overland to the Turkish port of Mersin. If further developed, the corridor was expected to cut transportation time by up to 60%, reducing it to a maximum of eight days compared to the over twenty days required via the traditional Suez Canal route.
The momentum behind this corridor gradually waned in the months that followed, as political and technical hurdles hindered its progress, including the volatility of Iranian relations with Turkey and the Gulf countries, escalating Western sanctions on Iran, and the deteriorating state of logistics infrastructure within Iranian territory.
Turkey swiftly shifted focus to another project proposed by Iraq in early 2022, which involves constructing a railway corridor and a land route beginning at the Grand Faw Port on the Arabian Gulf, passing through several major Iraqi cities such as Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, before reaching the Iraqi-Turkish border north of Dohuk Governorate (as shown in figure 3). At the close of the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi, Turkish President Erdogan declared his country’s intention to collaborate with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq on this new corridor.
Figure 3: The route of the Iraqi development road project
Source: The Anadolu Agency website
The corridor’s construction, with a projected cost three times higher, is slated to progress alongside the development of the Grand Faw Port. The first phase is expected to conclude by 2028, with the completion of the railway line and land route to Turkey. The second and third phases are set to be finalized by 2038 and 2050, respectively, focusing on enhancing the corridor’s capacity in line with the expanding capabilities of the Grand Faw Port.
Some political speculations suggest a connection between Turkey’s exclusion from the US-backed Indian Economic Corridor project and its shift towards participating in the Iraqi Development Road project. Turkey aims to bolster its presence in the regional logistics landscape, despite being left out of the US initiative. However, there are concerns that the Iraqi Development Road could encounter financing and implementation challenges, particularly if Saudi Arabia and the UAE prioritize their involvement in the India-Middle East-Europe corridor project.
6. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor: On September 9, 2023, a memorandum of understanding was signed by the United States, India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, France, Germany, and the European Union to establish an economic corridor connecting India, the Middle East, and Europe. The primary aim of this corridor is to enhance economic connectivity and integration among US-aligned countries in Asia and Europe. However, it is widely believed that the main strategic objectives behind this initiative include countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative and fostering economic cooperation between the Gulf Arab states and Israel, which aligns with broader efforts to facilitate political normalization agreements with these countries.
The corridor’s route is set to commence at the commercial ports of Mundra and Mumbai on India’s western coastline, traversing the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea toward the Emirati port of Jebel Ali. From there, the trade movement will transition to railways passing through Saudi Arabia before culminating at Israel’s commercial port of Haifa. Subsequently, goods will be reloaded onto ships destined for various European ports, as shown in figure 4.
Figure 4: Path of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor
Source: The Lowy Institute
The countries involved in the project aim to boost inter-trade activity along this corridor by 40%, yet trade is not the sole focus, as these countries also seek to incorporate advanced technological initiatives that prioritize environmental sustainability, such as laying clean hydrogen pipelines, electricity transmission lines, and fiber optic networks for digital data and communications, which would ultimately foster economic and technological integration among these countries while promoting interaction and normalization between their people and communities.
Despite the ambitious vision surrounding the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, it faces several significant challenges. Foremost are the political obstacles, including the feasibility of resuming political normalization agreements between Israel and the Arab Gulf states at present. Furthermore, the Middle Eastern countries involved in the project are grappling with the strain of international tensions, primarily driven by the longstanding rivalry between China and the United States. Adding to these are financial and economic hurdles, particularly the challenge of distributing the financial responsibilities for infrastructure development and assessing the anticipated long-term returns. Lastly, security issues loom large, with recurring armed conflicts in the region, exemplified by the escalating tensions that began in October 2023 and continue to grow in scale and complexity.
In short, most of the overland corridors positioned as competitors to the Suez Canal remain in their developmental stages, with numerous challenges and obstacles impeding their progress as shown in Table 2. While some may falter, others are expected to resolve their challenges and build their capacities over time, eventually establishing themselves as influential regional or global logistics pathways. This poses a direct challenge to the Suez Canal and highlights the critical need for Egypt to innovate and execute initiatives that safeguard its competitive share of global transport and logistics revenue, leveraging its strategic geographical position.
Table 2: Assessment of overland and multimodal corridors competing with the Suez Canal
Source: Researcher’s Analysis
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