The Gulf states hold strategic significance for the United States, reflected in the substantial US military presence aimed at ensuring a steady flow of oil to meet the interests of its allies. This significance has become even more pronounced following the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as European countries reduced their reliance on Russia and the United States pushed for increased oil production. Beyond this, the United States seeks to maintain its regional dominance, ensuring no rival power threatens its influence or competes with it in a way that undermines the interests of its allies.
Against this backdrop, this analysis explores the anticipated US policy towards the Gulf states under a second Trump administration, examining the future of US-Gulf relations amidst shifting regional dynamics and the evolving policies of the Gulf states.
A Pivotal Shift
The Gulf states underwent a significant policy shift, increasingly prioritizing self-reliance in securing their own safety, addressing their concerns, and diversifying their alliances. This shift was largely driven by the unreliability of their relationship with the United States, particularly after the Houthi missile attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in 2019, a strike that Trump chose not to retaliate against, which prompted the Gulf states to reassess the trustworthiness of their alliance with the United States.
As a result, the foreign policies of the Gulf states evolved in response to regional and global dynamics, diverging from their previous approaches. They shifted toward diversifying their partnerships and forging alliances to better safeguard their interests, all while focusing on strengthening their capabilities and implementing national development strategies. This shift was particularly evident in their growing relations with China and Russia, their balanced stance during the Russian-Ukrainian war, where they refrained from taking sides, and their mediation roles, as seen in the prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in addition to Saudi Arabia’s call for the establishment of an global coalition to advance a two-state solution in response to the Gaza war, with the involvement of Arab and European countries in September 2024 during the United Nations General Assembly sessions.
Furthermore, Gulf states have embraced a policy of strategic hedging to safeguard their interests through cautious rapprochement with Iran, exemplified by the signing of the Iranian-Saudi agreement brokered by China on March 10, 2023, and fostering economic ties through trade agreements between Iran and the UAE, despite enduring political disputes, including the dispute over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb. Concurrently, Abu Dhabi pursued normalization with Israel in August 2020, while also diversifying its economic partnerships by joining the I2U2 group alongside India, Israel, and the United States, focusing on sectors like water, energy, transportation, space, health, food security, and technology in July 2022. Moreover, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined the BRICS group in January 2024, further diversifying their alliances.
Key Factors Influencing Policy Decisions in Trump’s Second Term
During Trump’s first term, the United States fostered close ties with Gulf states, evident in his participation at the Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh in May 2017, as well as shared concerns over the Iranian nuclear program, missile threats, and destabilizing regional activities, including Iran’s use of proxy forces. Several key factors are likely to shape US-Gulf relations in the second Trump administration, including the following:
• The Military Factor: The United States serves as a strategic partner to the Gulf states, maintaining a significant military presence in the region. Key US installations in the region include the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, based in Kuwait and Bahrain, overseeing navigation and maritime communication lines across the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea. There is also the US presence at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which was designated as a major non-NATO ally in January 2022, along with Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE and the US Central Command headquarters in Kuwait. As such, the military relationship plays a pivotal role in shaping US-Gulf ties, irrespective of whether the administration is Democratic or Republican. Under a second Trump administration, military cooperation is, therefore, expected to deepen, potentially through the negotiation of arms deals with Gulf states, particularly with the UAE’s ambition to secure F-35 aircraft, a deal that was put on hold during the Biden administration.
• Iran: While the United States has consistently portrayed Iran as the primary threat to regional security in its dealings with the Gulf states, Iran’s geopolitical significance is vital to American interests. Iran’s coastline encompasses nearly half of the Arabian Gulf and extends along one side of the critical Strait of Hormuz, a vital chokepoint for Gulf oil exports, trade, and transportation.
Despite implementing a policy of stringent sanctions against Iran during his first administration, Trump’s measures failed to guarantee the Gulf’s security, including his 2018 pullout from the Iran nuclear deal, the failure to deter Houthi strikes on Saudi oil facilities in 2019, and the heightened tensions following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, in 2020.
The policy of maximum pressure on Tehran is expected to persist under Trump’s second administration, albeit calibrated to avoid regional escalation, especially in light of the Gaza war’s impact and Gulf states’ desire to reduce tensions with Iran. Trump’s second administration is likely to focus on pressuring Iran without triggering a broader regional war. This approach would involve urging Israel to avoid escalatory actions against Tehran, imposing sanctions to regulate Iran’s behavior and its proxies in the Gulf, and potentially pursuing a strategy of restraint to contain Israeli-Iranian tensions, all while advancing Saudi-Iranian normalization, negotiating an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, and leveraging the appointments of Senator Marco Rubio as Foreign Affairs lead and Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor—both known for their hardline stance on Iran—to shape future policy directions.
The nature of forthcoming regional deals, whether aimed at easing tensions or maintaining a state of escalation, will shape the direction of Trump’s approach. This could involve continuing a maximum pressure strategy, likely provoking retaliatory actions by Iranian proxies against US and Gulf interests, thereby perpetuating Iraq and Syria as theaters of conflict, or alternatively, Trump might pursue a course of diplomatic agreements with Iran, the Gulf states, and Israel to avoid further escalation. This approach aligns with the statements of his potential vice president, J.D. Vance, who underscored the need for restraint by stating: “Israel has the right to defend itself, but America’s interest is sometimes going to be distinct — like sometimes we’re going to have overlapping interests…And our interest, I think very much, is in not going to war with Iran.”
• The Yemen Crisis: If Houthi assaults jeopardizing maritime security in the Red Sea persist, a second Trump administration may continue Biden’s strategy of forming an alliance against the Houthis and reinstate their designation as a terrorist group—a step initially taken by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in January 2021 at the end of Trump’s first term. Conversely, if the détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia proves successful, Houthi threats to Gulf security could diminish. This shift might encourage Gulf states, after years of unresolved engagement in the Yemen conflict, to prioritize resolving the crisis and avoiding escalation against the Houthis in collaboration with the United States. The focus would then shift to restoring stability in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, while also working towards brokering a ceasefire in Gaza.
• Gulf Concerns: The Gulf states harbor deep security concerns over Iranian threats and a growing distrust in the United States as a reliable partner and security guarantor. As a result, they are likely to maintain a cautious stance through strategic hedging. This could involve Saudi Arabia signing a normalization deal tied to a defense agreement with the United States, reinforcing their security partnership. However, progress on this front could be hampered by Israeli intransigence on the Palestinian cause or escalation by targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities. In response, the Gulf states might pivot toward strengthening ties with China, capitalizing on its regional engagement via the Belt and Road Initiative and prioritizing Chinese investments in critical sectors such as infrastructure, energy, and technology.
On the other hand, the Gulf states may lean toward a policy of strategic hedging with the United States, reflecting their apprehensions over its steadfast support for Israel, which risks escalating tensions between Iran and Israel, with potential spillover into the Gulf. This strategy would see the Gulf states pragmatically balancing relations with both sides to secure their interests and address security concerns and taking steps to ease tensions with Iran, as evidenced by the recent official visit of the Chief of Staff of the Saudi Armed Forces, Fayyadh al-Ruwaili, to Tehran and his meeting with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Bagheri, under Chinese mediation on November 10 to advance Saudi-Iranian normalization. This move aligns with broader Gulf developmental visions, such as Saudi Vision 2030 and UAE Centennial 2071, which prioritize stability over conflict. Alternatively, the Gulf states might revert to a more conventional approach, maintaining tensions with Iran while pursuing normalization with Israel and demanding robust security assurances from the United States to counter Iranian threats.
• The Israeli-Saudi Normalization Agreement: Building on the Abraham Accords signed during Trump’s first term with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, it is anticipated that this path may culminate in an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement, accompanied by a defense pact with Saudi Arabia and backing for its ambitions to establish a peaceful nuclear program. However, advancing along this path is contingent on potential regional agreements tied to ending the Gaza conflict and post-war arrangements. Saudi Arabia has conditioned such normalization on ending the Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state, presenting a significant challenge for the Trump administration. This is further complicated by Israel’s right-wing government’s rejection of a Palestinian state and Trump’s unwavering support for Israel, highlighted by his recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, relocation of the US embassy, and legitimizing Israeli control over the occupied Syrian Golan during his first term.
• The Economic Factor: US-Gulf relations are expected to see an increase in trade agreements during Trump’s second term, building on significant investments during his first administration, such as Jared Kushner’s oversight of a $2 billion investment fund led by Saudi Arabia and the $400 billion in investment agreements sealed with Saudi Arabia during Trump’s 2017 visit to Riyadh. This trend is further emphasized by the September 2024 visits of key Gulf leaders to the United States, including those of Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, aimed at bolstering economic ties with the United States.
• Technology and Energy: US-Gulf relations are expected to expand in technology, driven by Gulf countries’ focus on artificial intelligence, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. On the energy front, Trump’s probable emphasis on boosting fossil fuel production and exports during his second term may drive oil prices down, creating economic pressure on Gulf states heavily reliant on oil exports as a cornerstone of their economies.
In conclusion, Trump is expected to balance relations with Gulf states by promoting normalization in return for easing tensions in Gaza, ensuring stability in Yemen to address Gulf priorities, and reinforcing security in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Concurrently, he is likely to prioritize Israeli security and facilitate its integration into the region, while countering Russian and Chinese advances in the Gulf by securing economic and technological agreements, capitalizing on the Gulf’s growing focus on AI and technology. Besides, the Trump administration may resort to applying pressure on Gulf states regarding their domestic policies or defense transactions to further its strategic goals in the region.
