Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan extended his congratulations to Donald Trump after early indicators confirmed Trump’s election as the 47th president of the United States, marking his return for a nonconsecutive second term. Erdogan went beyond the X diplomacy often associated with Trump, opting for “telephone diplomacy” as well, joining the ranks of world leaders who wasted no time in establishing contact with the newly elected US president through early calls.
While Ankara maintained a neutral stance during the American election campaign, refraining from signaling any explicit support for either US presidential contender, it appears more at ease with an administration headed by Trump, coupled with a Republican-controlled Congress. Turkey is carefully observing the unfolding dynamics within the White House and the composition of the new administration, buoyed by optimistic remarks, as it anticipates that the Trump 2.0 presidency will pave the way for advancements in bilateral relations.
Against this backdrop, this paper examines the key issues and dossiers shaping ties between the two countries, along with Turkey’s expectations for Trump’s second term, while briefly reflecting on Ankara’s interactions with the United States during Trump’s first term in office.
A Legacy of Challenges
Ankara has traditionally favored Republican administrations, with a few notable exceptions during certain historical periods when it leaned towards the Democratic Party. This preference stems from the Democratic administrations’ propensity to emphasize human rights issues, such as the Armenian genocide, and to tie the advancement of economic relations to the state of democracy and human rights. This has put the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in a bind with its coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which staunchly opposes any political reforms.
Turkish-American relations were marked by significant tension during the Obama and Biden administrations. Biden, in particular, made antagonistic remarks about his Turkish counterpart during his campaign and did not host Erdogan at the White House during his presidency. His term saw little progress on key bilateral issues, such as Ankara’s reinstatement in the F-35 stealth fighter program, curbing US support for Kurdish forces in Syria, and fostering economic cooperation. Instead, his administration emphasized the need for internal political reforms, expanded military aid to Greece, and broke with longstanding US presidential precedent by officially recognizing the 1915 Armenian massacre as a “genocide.”
However, this does not imply that Turkish-American relations followed a harmonious course during Trump’s first term. On the contrary, his term was marked by significant tension, with deep-seated structural differences continuing to strain the bilateral relationship. Trump sanctioned Turkey five times in four years, further straining its already fragile economy. Twice, these sanctions were triggered twice by the detention of US pastor Andrew Brunson and twice by Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, compelling Trump to comply with the Democratic-controlled Congress’s demand to enforce the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which also resulted in Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 program.
Another round of sanctions followed Turkey’s military operations against the People’s Defense Units (YPG) in northern Syria, during which Trump sent Erdogan a sharply worded letter with offensive and undiplomatic remarks. Moreover, Trump’s trade protectionism, rooted in his “America First” policy, weakened trade relations between the two countries. The introduction of tariffs on Turkish products, including steel and aluminum, led to a roughly 20% decline in Turkey’s exports to the United States during 2018 and 2019. This economic strain was compounded by the lack of action on Turkey’s requests for the extradition of the Gulen Movement members based in the United States.
Nonetheless, Erdogan appears prepared to turn over a new chapter with Trump 2.0, grounded in pragmatism. This willingness is less about resolving entrenched issues between Ankara and successive US administrations and more about prioritizing dialogue, enhancing communication, and capitalizing on personal diplomacy. The relationship between the two presidents has been marked by a close personal connection, reinforced by Trump’s appreciation of Erdogan, whom he considers a strong and decisive figure.
Trump hosted Erdogan at the White House on two occasions, in 2017 and 2019, alongside numerous encounters during global events and consistent phone diplomacy. Turkish policy makers perceive a shared style between the two in managing diplomacy and addressing complex challenges. This alignment fosters open communication channels, enhancing mutual understanding of shared concerns. Additionally, the Republican majority in both chambers of Congress—the House of Representatives and the Senate—offers a cohesive approach to US policy toward Ankara, potentially avoiding scenarios like the 2019 impasse when Trump was compelled to yield to Congress and impose sanctions on Turkey.
That said, the enduring structural challenges in Turkish-American relations will continue to hinder efforts to clear the lingering tensions between the two countries. While direct communication and dialogue are crucial, they alone cannot resolve the contentious issues. Diverging stances on regional and global political and security matters—along with Trump’s potential policies on issues like the Gaza war, the Syrian crisis, and support for the Kurds—are likely to strain bilateral ties. This is particularly concerning given that his first term brought unfavorable outcomes for Ankara on these fronts.
Despite Trump’s rhetoric about withdrawing US forces from northern Syria, taking some steps to reduce support for the YPG, and giving Turkey the green light for a military operation in 2019, the decision to pull US troops back was eventually reversed, and US support for the Kurds persisted. Additionally, Trump’s hardline stance on Israel—marked by moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing it as Israel’s capital, and acknowledging Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan—clashed with Turkey’s policy of supporting Palestinian solidarity, further straining bilateral relations.
Diverse Aspirations
In assessing its potential ties with the United States during the Trump administration, Turkey identifies a range of critical issues and goals it aims to address and accomplish, including:
• The Syrian Dossier and the Future of the US Presence East of the Euphrates: Since 2020, Ankara has been reactivating the Syrian front in anticipation of Trump’s potential return to the White House next January, aiming to assert its role in reshaping the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape and positioning itself within the emerging regional security framework. Ankara supported Syrian opposition factions in the northern regions to advance toward retaking liberated cities and ultimately reaching Damascus, culminating in the toppling of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime within 11 days.
Undoubtedly, the future of the Syrian political process will be a pivotal topic in Turkish-US relations moving forward. This issue is closely tied to discussions about the potential withdrawal of US military forces from east of the Euphrates and ongoing support for the YPG and their military wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Ankara is expected to stress the importance of preventing the formation of an independent Kurdish entity along its southern border, advocate for the establishment of a buffer zone in northern Syria, and seek expanded control over border areas. Erdogan may present his objectives against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the YPG as aligning with US efforts to curb regional militias and arms proliferation. Still, it remains unlikely that Washington will completely cease its military collaboration with Syrian Kurds, though Turkey might be offered an enhanced role in the region.
Turkish analyses indicate that the MHP leader Devlet Bahceli’s initiative concerning the potential release of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader who has been imprisoned for nearly 25 years, was an early move in anticipation of Trump’s return. This move is linked to Trump’s prior message to Erdogan about Syria, which included undiplomatic remarks, and another communication from Mazloum Abdi, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the YPG, whom Trump referred to as “the general,” expressing an interest in negotiating with Turkey. The US president at the time encouraged his Turkish counterpart to engage in dialogue with the PYD and the YPG. Despite his long imprisonment, Abdullah Ocalan retains significant influence over these Kurdish factions, where he is still regarded as “the leader.” His images continue to adorn the walls of administrative buildings belonging to the Democratic Union Party and the YPG in the east of the Euphrates.
Bahceli’s initiative can be seen as Turkey’s strategic move to manage relations with the Kurds in northern Syria, open communication channels with them, and leverage Ocalan’s influence to bring the party and its units under Turkish sway. This reflects a Turkish understanding that Washington is unlikely to disband the PYD or the SDF or halt its support for the Syrian Kurdish factions entirely, even if it reduces its military presence. Washington’s need to establish buffer zones along the Syrian-Iraqi border to sever Iranian militia supply lines makes a deal involving the eastern Euphrates and a larger role for Arab tribes more palatable to Ankara.
• The Turkish Role in the Middle East: Turkey perceives the anticipated US policies toward the Middle East—particularly efforts to curb Iran’s influence and halt the Israeli aggression against Gaza and Lebanon—as an opportunity to expand its regional influence. Ankara believes it may be entrusted with certain operational roles to weaken Iran’s presence in Syria and Iraq on behalf of the United States, as part of Washington’s strategy to delegate more responsibilities to regional allies in implementing American policies. This is further reinforced by the fact that the United States does not view Turkey as a threat to its interests in the Middle East, given their strategic alliance within NATO. This trend is reinforced by the Heritage Foundation, a neo-conservative think tank with close ties to Trump, under an initiative named Project 2025. Developed by former Trump administration officials, the project outlines a larger role for the United States’ regional partners in countering Iran and suggests that Washington should support Turkey as a counterbalance to Iranian influence, thereby safeguarding US and Israeli interests in the region. In response, the Turkish government has shown its willingness to take on this role by signing a security agreement with the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Region in August 2024, focusing on military and security cooperation and counterterrorism efforts.
• Strengthening Turkey’s Geopolitical Significance: Building on the previous point, the Trump administration may offer Turkey a larger role on the global stage, particularly concerning the Syrian crisis and confronting Iran’s regional ambitions. Turkey could position itself as a potential mediator in the Gaza conflict, leveraging its strategic partnership with Israel—despite periodic rhetorical escalation—and its strong ties with Hamas. Additionally, Trump might open the door for Turkey to participate in the peace process in Ukraine, given Erdogan’s ability to engage with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, aligning with the new US administration’s willingness to work with Russia to facilitate a political resolution to the war in Ukraine.
Furthermore, Trump’s comeback could reduce Turkish-European tensions, particularly in light of the EU’s concerns over US trade protectionism, Trump’s views on NATO funding, and the potential reduction of US military aid to Europe. With NATO’s largest army and a vital role on the NATO’s Southern Flank, Turkey is positioning itself as a key partner in the development of more autonomous European defense policies. These dynamics elevate Turkey’s geopolitical relevance on the global stage, particularly for both the United States and the European Union.
• Advancing Defense Collaboration: Turkey’s close defense ties with Russia, epitomized by Ankara’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system, continue to strain Turkish-American relations. While the recent US approval of F-16 fighter sales to Turkey has been hailed by officials on both sides as a crucial step towards rebuilding mutual trust, Turkey’s reintegration into advanced military production programs like the F-35 stealth fighter remains unresolved. Progress on this front is likely to hinge on Ankara taking measures such as shelving the S-400 system, enabling inspections, or selling the the S-400 system to another country, which would signal a commitment to addressing US security concerns.
• Broadening Economic Ties: Economic considerations are a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy, shaped by pressing domestic challenges that influence the country’s political future. While the Turkish economy stands to gain from increased US investments, efforts to resolve the Ukrainian war, and expanded technological cooperation—particularly in light of Elon Musk’s ties to Erdogan and Turkey, now reinforced by his appointment as head of a newly created Ministry of Government Efficiency under Trump’s administration. However, Ankara remains cautious about the potential imposition of economic sanctions should bilateral relations sour once more.
Trump-era sanctions left a lasting mark on Turkey’s economy, exacerbating Ankara’s concerns over the potential effects of Trump’s trade protectionism. Turkey seeks to boost its trade volumes with the United States, which currently amounts to approximately $30 billion. Amid these developments, discussions have arisen about the potential reappointment of Berat Albayrak, Erdogan’s son-in-law and ex-Minister of Treasury and Finance, to the cabinet in a ministerial or vice-presidential capacity. Albayrak’s established rapport with Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner is seen as a strategic asset for advancing economic cooperation. Notably, Albayrak’s 2019 Oval Office meeting marked a historic first for a Turkish minister.
• The Iranian Nuclear Program and the Reinstatement of Sanctions: Trump’s anticipated policy towards Iran presents a mix of opportunities and challenges for Ankara. On one hand, curbing Iran’s regional influence aligns with Turkey’s ambitions to expand its own influence. On the other hand, any US backing of Israeli actions against Iran that could escalate regional tensions poses a significant risk to Turkey’s security. Furthermore, the “maximum pressure 2.0” strategy against Tehran threatens to disrupt Turkey’s trade and economic ties with Iran. Despite their geopolitical rivalry, both countries remain committed to fostering trade growth.
During Trump’s first term, US sanctions on Iran emerged as a point of friction in Turkish-American relations, particularly after Mehmet Hakan Atilla, Former Deputy General Manager of Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank, was apprehended at John F. Kennedy airport in New York on March 27, 2017, and prosecuted for violating sanctions on Iran. Turkey is expected to publicly reject both the maximum pressure campaign and the failure to reinstate the nuclear deal, aiming to steer clear of a confrontational stance toward its regional geopolitical rival and prioritize a “cooperative competition” model to manage bilateral relations.
• Erdogan’s Political Aspirations and Trump’s Potential Support: Erdogan seeks Trump’s backing for his constitutional amendments aimed at enabling his re-election despite the constitutional term limits, capitalizing on Trump’s admiration for Erdogan as a strong leader.
This support would be reflected in policies such as fostering positive economic ties and pumping more investments to strengthen the Turkish economy, a critical factor that swayed voters towards the opposition in the March 2023 local elections. Erdogan also hopes for US support in addressing the Kurdish issue, bolstering Turkey’s operations against the PKK in Syria and Iraq, enhancing Ankara’s global geopolitical influence—key to shaping his legacy as the leader who restored Turkey’s prominence. Additionally, Trump’s avoidance of criticisms on democracy and human rights would shield Erdogan and the AKP from the political cost of adopting reforms opposed by their coalition partner, the MHP. This contrasts with the Biden administration’s stance, which tied economic investments to reforms the nationalist bloc resists.
• Ankara’s Pursuit of Gülen Movement Extraditions: Despite the passing of Fethullah Gulen, the exiled leader of the Gulen movement, in the United States, Ankara continues to press Washington for the extradition of individuals it identifies as movement members. Erdogan’s earlier attempts to extradite Gulen, accused of masterminding the failed July 2016 coup, were rebuffed by Trump’s administration, even after being raised seven times. Erdogan is likely to revisit these demands in upcoming negotiations between the two presidents, though Trump’s response is expected to mirror his previous refusal.
In conclusion, while Turkish politicians appear optimistic about Trump’s potential return to the White House, Turkish-American relations remain fraught with persistent challenges. Trump’s re-election could introduce both opportunities and risks to the bilateral dynamic. Turkey’s regional security priorities and strategic ambitions may occasionally clash with Trump’s America-first policies. Nevertheless, the personal rapport between Erdogan and Trump could act as a stabilizing force, even if tensions surface periodically. Overall, Turkish-American relations will continue to be shaped by a delicate equilibrium. Although frequently tested and occasionally hitting low points, the US-Turkish relations has consistently avoided a complete rupture, as both countries prioritize managing their differences constructively as NATO allies.
The Arabic version of this article was published on the ECSS website on November 21.
