Over the past ten days, following the Syrian armed factions’ declaration of the Deterrence of Aggression operation, the field situation and the balance of power in Syria have undergone swift and profound shifts. These developments culminated in recent hours with the factions’ entry into the Syrian capital, Damascus, and their subsequent announcement of Bashar al-Assad’s ouster.
As a result, Syria has transitioned into a new era characterized by uncertainty and obscurity regarding its future trajectory, a situation that is further complicated by the current state of flux and the complex interplay of numerous local and global actors shaping the emerging dynamics. What remains certain, however, is that the transformations unfolding in Syria will not be confined to its domestic sphere but are poised to reverberate across the entire regional system.
A Marked Downfall
Several critical scenes and indicators collectively reflected a general decline in the Syrian army’s capacity to manage the current escalation and, conversely, the rising power of the armed factions, which ultimately succeeded in toppling the head of the political regime. The most prominent of these indicators include:
1- Factions’ Overwhelming Dominance Over Syrian Territories: On November 27, the Syrian armed factions launched a military campaign dubbed Deterrence of Aggression, spearheaded by key groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra), the Free Idlib Army, the Ahrar al-Sham Movement, the National Liberation Front, the Syrian National Army (SNA), and the Jaysh al-Izza [Army of Glory]. These factions share two defining characteristics, namely an adherence to extremist Islamist ideologies and a reliance on Turkish support and sponsorship. While the factions initially framed their operations as retaliation against the joint Russian-Syrian offensives throughout October 2024, the unfolding realities on the ground reveal broader, long-term strategic goals aimed at overhauling Syria’s territorial dynamics and reshaping its political order. This was demonstrated by the factions’ progression toward central Damascus, leading to the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad with minimal resistance.
In just over ten days, these factions have secured almost complete control of Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama. Moreover, they recently declared their total dominance over Homs, a strategically significant province that connects Syria’s interior with the capital and the coastal regions (which have traditionally been strongholds of the regime and Russian forces). They also confirmed their takeover of Daraa, a city of deep symbolic value as the epicenter of the 2011 uprising.
In southwestern Syria, the factions also declared their capture of the strategic al-Tha’lah military square in as-Suwayda, positioning themselves just 20 kilometers from Damascus. They subsequently announced advances in the western countryside of the capital and launched a special military operation to penetrate Damascus from multiple directions, effectively encircling the SNA forces and besieging the regime’s key strongholds within the capital. What stood out was the remarkable speed with which the factions entered Damascus, seized the city, and established control over it.
2. The Withdrawal of Syrian Army Units: Amid the ongoing field developments in Syria, Reuters reported that approximately 2.000 Syrian soldiers crossed into Iraq, seeking asylum, according to Khalaf Jadaan Al-Mahlawi, the mayor of Iraq’s al-Qa’im city. Concurrently, reports indicated that 300 Iraqi fighters withdrew from Syrian territories back to Iraq. This withdrawal seems driven by a perception of the SNA’s waning resilience, as well as an official alert cautioning Iraqi factions that they could be targeted by the United States or Israel if they participate in the ongoing battles in Syria.
3. Uncontested Surrenders of Key Cities: In light of the armed factions’ swift progress and their takeover of Daraa Governorate without notable resistance, some reports indicate that the Syrian army agreed to withdraw from the area under an arrangement guaranteeing a safe route for military officials to Damascus, located approximately 100 kilometers to the north, as reported by Reuters. This development may be attributed, on one hand, to political calculations aimed at redirecting security efforts towards defending the capital, and on the other, to the morale and psychological state prevailing the SNA units.
Yet, the most striking development in this context was the fall of Damascus itself. Contrary to expectations and predictions that the major decline of Syrian forces in handling the escalation was linked to preparations for a decisive battle for the capital—given Damascus’ immense symbolic value as the heart of Syrian state institutions and the embodiment of Bashar al-Assad’s regime (maintaining control over which will provide leverage for future negotiations)—what unfolded was the unopposed entry of armed factions into the city, signaling several important implications. On the one hand, it suggests the possibility of arrangements with certain allies, where an agreement was made to avoid resistance and accept the new reality. On the other hand, neither Iran nor Russia demonstrated a willingness to provide military support to the Syrian regime. Third, the Syrian army’s low morale, characterized by defeatism among soldiers and officers, played a significant role in this outcome.
Varied Interpretations
While acknowledging the Syrian army’s declining resistance and effectiveness in the face of the armed factions’ escalating tactics, the central question still revolves around the underlying factors that have driven this shift and the subsequent changes it has brought to the field situation in Syria. Several important considerations and factors can be highlighted in this context:
1. Low Morale within the Official Forces: The recent escalation, highlighted by instances of army units fleeing battlefields and abandoning strategic positions, has revealed a significant drop in morale among many segments of the official Syrian front. This decline can be attributed to several key factors. Some of these factors may partly arise from a perception that certain battles are futile, given the substantial mobilization of armed factions. Others may be attributed to the psychological toll of the factions’ considerable advances, compounded by the exhaustion and attrition resulting from the prolonged conflict that has raged since 2011.
2. Decline in Support and Assistance from Allies: A notable shift has been observed in the level of support from Syria’s allies, including Russia, Iran, and certain regional factions. Reuters, in a December 2, report, cited sources stating that Hezbollah “does not intend to send fighters to support the Syrian army.” According to the cited sources, “Hezbollah had not yet been asked to intervene” and “it was not ready to send forces to Syria at this stage following the ceasefire with Israel.” Additionally, numerous reports suggest that Iran also does not intend to engage militarily in the ongoing conflict. In a December 6 report, Bloomberg cited sources close to the Kremlin stating that “Moscow has no intention of rescuing the situation in Syria as long as the Syrian army continues to relinquish its positions.” This indicates a shift in Russia’s stance, signaling a departure from its policy of unwavering support. Instead, Moscow appears to be prioritizing the protection of its strategic interests in Syria, particularly along the coastal region.
Several key factors underpin these positions, which can be outlined as follows:
- For now, Hezbollah seems unlikely to extend its support for the Syrian army beyond political and media backing. This position is rooted in several primary factors. First, there is the severe toll taken by the recent war, leaving Hezbollah in a state of fatigue, and its immediate focus on the internal reorganization and strengthening of its ranks, which reflects an unwillingness to participate in new military engagements in the short term. Second, the party has already withdrawn dozens of its senior leaders from Syria over recent months due to persistent Israeli strikes and targeted operations, while also redirecting its military focus to southern Lebanon. Third, its current priority in Syria centers on safeguarding its vital facilities and infrastructure, a stance corroborated by a December 2 report from the Israeli Broadcasting Authority.
- Russia’s position was striking on two key fronts. First, the criticism directed at the Syrian side for what it termed as “abandoning positions,” and second, the statements by Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, who suggested that Moscow will act slowly regarding a decisive intervention alongside Syrian government forces, preferring instead to continue assessing the situation.” This information underscores that Russia hasn’t made a clear decision about offering support to the Syrian army, due to concerns over the high cost of such an option and the significant exhaustion Russia faces as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine.
- It appears that Iran is currently relying on two main avenues of support for the Syrian army: the first being official diplomatic solidarity and backing, and the second involving indirect support through its affiliated militias, such as the Baqir Brigade, a military militia established in 2012 that initially operated in Aleppo before expanding to Deir Ezzor. Iran seems to be navigating several key considerations, balancing its support for Damascus with the need to avoid provoking international forces like Israel and the United States. Furthermore, overt Iranian intervention in Syria may come with a significant cost, including mounting pressure and the risk of increased American escalation against Iran.
- Recent days have seen growing discussions about the controversial possibility of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) engaging in the ongoing escalation in Syria. Factors fueling this speculation include the PMF’s close ties to Iran, statements by its leaders signaling a willingness to support Syria, and its active role in border security operations alongside the Iraqi army. Notably, the Iraqi army has deployed three military brigades, complemented by two brigades with PMF participation, to bolster border defenses. However, the PMF’s potential support for the SNA is likely to encounter significant logistical challenges. One key obstacle is the difficulty of moving Iranian weapons by land to Syria, particularly toward Aleppo, as the HTS factions have gained control of major routes, including the Aleppo-Damascus road, following their capture of Saraqib in Idlib Governorate. Even if air transport is considered as an alternative, similar complications are anticipated. Smuggling weapons through the al-Bukamal region is likely to encounter new challenges, as the SDF have obstructed the al-Raqqah road toward the northwest for security purposes, further complicated by the deployment of US forces in the northeast within SDF-controlled zones.
3. The Syrian Army’s Deep-Rooted Structural Crises: Over the past several years, the Syrian army has faced profound structural challenges that have significantly shaped the current reality. Among these challenges is the deterioration of its armament and military capabilities, driven by economic hardships and international sanctions imposed on Syria. Consequently, the reliance on aid and backing from Russia, Iran, and allied armed factions proved to be a miscalculation, exacerbating the army’s combat deficiencies. Additionally, the unrelenting strain on Syrian forces due to the war, ongoing since the escalation to armed violence in 2012, remains a critical factor that cannot be overlooked.
4. The Stalemate in Syria’s Political Process: Over the years, Syria’s ruling institutions have adopted a strategy heavily centered on security measures and reliance on external support and assistance. This approach has entrenched the securitization of the Syrian crisis while fostering the proliferation of armed and terrorist groups. As a result, it has effectively blocked any pathways for political dialogue or the implementation of critical reforms needed to address Syria’s challenges. As a result, the field dynamics and balance of power have dictated outcomes, leaving the ruling institutions in a disadvantageous position.
5. The Significant Mobilization of Armed Factions in Syria: Field observations during the operation highlighted the remarkable armament levels of advanced armed groups operating across various Syrian fronts. These factions possess a wide range of light, medium, and heavy weaponry, including drones. Videos circulating on social media revealed their use of diverse arms, such as assault rifles like the AK-47 and M16, alongside heavier machine guns such as the PK machine gun, known for integrating features of the Kalashnikov, Degtyarev, and Goryunov. Additionally, some sniper rifles from the Soviet era were also noted among their arsenal, let alone local weaponry, most notably advancements made by the Shaheen Brigades focused on drone operations. This significant armament of armed factions can be traced back to two primary factors. The first is the prolonged external support and strategic preparation for this conflict. The second is the capture of significant weaponry during battles with the Syrian army, particularly following the seizure of numerous arms depots, factories, and military facilities. This stands in stark contrast to the Syrian army’s ongoing decline in terms of armament and overall military capacity.
In short, toppling al-Assad introduces a host of scenarios for Syria, largely marked by uncertainty and pessimism. This outlook is driven by several considerations, including the likelihood of instability and chaos within the country, efforts by regional and international powers to leverage the situation to secure greater influence, and the resurgence of terrorist and violent groups seeking to reclaim their foothold. For these organizations, Syria remains a strategic base and an environment ripe for proliferation and expansion.
