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Reading: The Golan: Between Israeli Violations and the Disengagement Agreement
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Arab & Regional Studies

The Golan: Between Israeli Violations and the Disengagement Agreement

Dr. Mohamed Harby
Last updated: 2025/02/11 at 9:32 PM
Dr. Mohamed Harby
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Throughout the period before the Disengagement Agreement of 1974, Syrian-Israeli relations in the Golan were marked by tensions that the agreement sought to ease, facilitating a ceasefire and reducing military forces along the disengagement line.

Following the fall of Assad’s regime and the Syrian army’s withdrawal,  Israeli forces advanced into the Golan Heights, crossing into the buffer zone with Syria and and deploying in key positions—Mount Hermon, nine or more sites within the Area of Separation (AoS), a chain of locations near it across Qunaitra and Rif Dimashq governorates, and a site east of the Bravo Line called tal al-dababat [Tank Hill].

This represents a further occupation of Syrian territory in breach of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Damascus and Tel Aviv, despite the presence of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). UNDOF reported that the Israeli army’s presence in their area of operations in the Syrian Golan has significantly hindered their freedom of movement and their ability to perform operational, logistical, and administrative tasks, adding that while they continue to fulfill their mandate of monitoring and reporting from positions across the AoS, their mobility remains severely restricted under current conditions.

The Israeli occupation army announced that its forces had seized territory on the Syrian side of the border in the Golan Heights, with Israel considering expanding its military incursion into the Syrian Golan under the pretext of preventing rebel forces from entering the area. The Israeli security cabinet unanimously approved the decision to occupy the buffer zone and key observation posts in the Golan Heights, just a few kilometers from the Israeli border. This prompted the Israeli government to cancel the Disengagement Aagreement with Damascus, allowing the Israeli army to take full control of the buffer zone, which spans 200 square kilometers out of the Golan Heights’ total area of 1,800 square kilometers. This zone holds significant military strategic value as it includes Mount Hermon’s summit, which rises 2,500 meters above sea level.

The Israeli occupation forces’ swift action to annex new areas of the Golan and effectively terminate the Israeli- Syrian Armistice and Disengagement Agreements is driven by Syria’s current state of exhaustion and the impact of international interventions—both from the East and the West— coupled with US backing for Israel’s efforts to annex the Golan. Together, these factors reinforce Israel’s belief that Syria is in no position to take military action to reclaim the Golan.

The current international landscape is marked by chaos in global relations, reflecting a disregard for the rules and norms of international law, except within certain limits. This stands in stark contrast to the legal perspective, which emphasizes the role of international institutions in regulating both peaceful and non-peaceful interactions among countries.

The Golan remains one of the most volatile areas, especially after President Trump, during his first term, issued a decision recognizing Israel’s annexation of the territory occupied since 1967. Trump’s return to power would likely signal the end of any prospects for genuine peace in the Middle East, given his previous decision affirming the Israeli occupation state’s sovereignty over the Golan.

This represents a blatant violation of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which obligates UN member states to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” A broader look at the international landscape, particularly in the Middle East, reveals a stark imbalance of power favoring the Israeli occupation state. The Golan, being an occupied territory, falls under the scope of Security Council Resolution 242, which explicitly forbids the acquisition of land by force. Additionally, the UN General Assembly has passed multiple resolutions rejecting Israeli sovereignty over the Golan, alongside Security Council Resolution 497 of 1981, which unequivocally states that acquiring territory through force is inadmissible and that Israel’s attempts to impose its laws and jurisdiction over the occupied Syrian Golan are null, void, and without any legal standing under international law.

Indeed, Israel’s annexation of additional territories in the Golan Heights and its breach of the Armistice Agreement stand as some of the most severe international crimes committed by the occupying forces. These actions are unilateral and hold no legal weight in international law, as they cannot alter the stable and recognized international status of the occupied territories. As an occupying power, Israel cannot claim sovereignty over the Golan. Occupation and sovereignty are incompatible. Sovereignty remains the exclusive right of the state under aggression, which alone holds the authority to enact legislation. The Golan Heights are an integral part of Syrian territory, and their strategic importance lies in their geographical position and control over key roads leading to Damascus.

All occupied territories in the Golan are governed by international resolutions, the Hague Convention of 1907, and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Among these, the most significant resolutions mandate that:

  • Occupation does not give the Occupying Power sovereignty, nor does it grant it any rights over the occupied territory, regardless of the duration of the occupation.
  • Annexing occupied territory, disposing of it, or assimilating its population into the occupying state is not permissible. Any actions taken in this regard are null and void, carrying no legal weight.

While the Israeli occupation forces have ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949, they argue that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply to the occupied Arab territories. However, international resolutions from both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, including Resolutions 242 and 338, recognize the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Syrian Golan Heights as occupied territories, to which the Geneva Conventions apply. This stance has been affirmed by both the International Court of Justice and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which have confirmed that the Fourth Geneva Convention is part of customary international law, obligating Israel to adhere to its provisions.

Moreover, the Disengagement Agreement continues to be in effect in accordance with Security Council Resolution 350 of 1974 and the principles of international law, meaning the political changes in Syria do not impact the agreement. This was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its ruling on July 19, 2024, regarding the legal consequences of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories since 1967.  In an unprecedented case with testimony from fifty-two countries, the Court’s findings were similar to those concerning Israeli actions in the Golan. The Court confirmed that the continuation of occupation does not alter its legal status under international humanitarian law. It defined occupation as the exercise of effective control by a state over foreign territory and reaffirmed the prohibition on acquiring territory through the threat or use of force. Additionally, the Court asserted that Israel’s practices, aimed at asserting sovereignty over the occupied territory, are inconsistent with the prohibition on the use of force in international relations and the fundamental rule against acquiring territory by force.

As such, Israel’s decision to impose its laws, administration, and jurisdiction over the occupied Syrian Golan is null and void, carrying no legal weight. This was affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly during its 70th session in 2015, which declared that any legislative or administrative measures Israel, as the occupying power, has enacted or may enact to alter the character or legal status of the occupied Syrian Golan are  null and void and represent a stark violation of international law and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War.

It is evident that  Israel’s grip on the Golan Heights and its attempts to annex new areas are driven by multiple objectives of the Israeli occupation forces. The Golan is viewed as a safeguard for Israel’s survival as a state that seeks to expand its borders through force and de facto control, amid countries that reject both its existence and its acquisition of land belonging to others through illegal means.

Given the significant imbalance of power and the Israeli occupying forces’ determination to proceed with the annexation of new Syrian territories, the potential outcomes of the developments unfolding in the Golan could include the following:

  • Syria could turn to the Security Council, but any resolution the major powers attempt to pass will likely face an American veto. This is because any decision rejecting Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan would contradict President Trump’s previous policy and his recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan.
  • One possible scenario is the division of Syria followed by a referendum among the Golan residents on their right to self-determination, with Israeli settlers included as part of the voting bloc. This process would take on an international legal framework, relying on the right to self-determination outlined in international conventions. The United States could then support this initiative and push for a Security Council resolution affirming the right to self-determination.
  • Another potential scenario is the stagnation of the current situation, marked by a firm rejection of the Golan’s annexation on one side and the continued presence of the occupying state with expanding settlements on the other. This deadlock would suggest the absence of any foreseeable resolution or agreement.
  • Reclaiming the Golan by force, which is an unlikely option due to Syria’s current circumstances and its incapacity to undertake any military action now or in the foreseeable future.

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