In 2024, the regional landscape witnessed critical developments that are set to impact the future of terrorism in 2025. Key among these were Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) taking control of the Syrian government, the ripple effects of Israeli aggression on Gaza, and the pragmatic collaboration between violent non-state actors across the Middle East. These dynamics underscore the ongoing influence of geopolitical shifts in the region on the evolution of terrorism in the short and medium term. This paper aims to analyze the major shifts in the terrorist landscape during 2024, providing insights into its operational dynamics and regional hotspots for 2025.
Various Shifts
The terrorist phenomenon underwent multiple transformations in 2024, with potential ripple effects extending into 2025. These shifts can be outlined as follows:
1. Expanding Strategic Options: A look at the history of terrorist organizations reveals four primary strategic approaches. The first focuses on confronting the “near enemy,” targeting local ruling regimes. The second centers on “defensive jihad,” aimed at resisting non-Muslim countries that have invaded Muslim lands. The third is directed at the “far enemy,” primarily the United States, based on the belief that its support for local regimes hinders their overthrow. The fourth revolves around “offensive jihad,” seeking to establish a caliphate through expanding Muslim-controlled territories.
However, HTS has managed to expand these strategic options by accomplishing what all terrorist organizations ultimately seek—seizing power and gaining a degree of international recognition, at least in practice if not in official statements. This is a feat that even the Taliban has struggled to achieve, making HTS a compelling model for other organizations aiming to follow a similar path.
2. Addressing the Israeli Aggression on Gaza: Since the onset of Israeli aggression in late 2023, most terrorist organizations have actively engaged with the situation in Gaza. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates issued a series of statements praising Operation al-Aqsa Flood and calling for attacks on all targets deemed Crusader, Zionist, or Israeli as part of an open war. Meanwhile, Daesh encouraged attacks against Jewish communities worldwide and, in 2024, attempted assaults on Jewish temples in Russia and France.
However, in the first half of 2024, al-Qaeda introduced a long-term strategy aimed at capitalizing on the widespread anger within Arab and Islamic societies triggered by the Israeli aggression on Gaza. This strategy was articulated through a series of articles titled “This is Gaza: A War of Existence, Not a War of Borders,” which called on individuals to travel to Afghanistan, receive training, learn from the Taliban’s experience, and then return to their home countries to implement those lessons. This strategic approach holds the potential for significant repercussions on regional security in the future.
3. Forging Pragmatic Alliances: Since 2023, several pragmatic alliances have emerged between terrorist organizations and violent non-state actors, with these ties strengthening further in 2024. The Houthi movement has deepened its relationship with al-Qaeda in Yemen—despite their ideological differences—establishing communication channels with the Somali al-Shabaab movement. Both al-Qaeda in Yemen and al-Shabaab now act as intermediaries and, to some extent, partners, facilitating the smuggling of materials in and out of Yemen to support the Houthis’ weapons supply chains. In return, the Houthi movement provides these groups with drones, enhancing their operational capabilities and regional influence. This mutually beneficial relationship exacerbates instability across the region.
4. Employing Generative Artificial Intelligence: Terrorist organizations have leveraged artificial intelligence (AI) applications to advance their objectives, with one of the most notable examples being the use of AI in drones for surveillance, reconnaissance, and executing attacks. Since 2023, these groups have also begun exploiting advanced AI models, including generative AI systems like ChatGPT, to spread their ideologies and amplify propaganda efforts. This trend continued and intensified in 2024 when the Islamic Media Cooperation Council (IMCC), a media group affiliated with al-Qaeda announced on February 9, 2024, the launch of an AI workshop aimed at enhancing its followers’ proficiency in using AI tools for media-related activities.
Daesh further advanced its use of AI in 2024 by launching several videos created with AI technologies and leveraging generative AI to translate its messages into more than 12 languages. This growing reliance on AI-driven tools is likely to continue and intensify, as these applications provide extensive opportunities for enhancing the reach and impact of their propaganda.
Prospective Activity
Terrorist organizations are expected to expand their operations across multiple geographical regions in 2025. The anticipated areas of increased activity can be outlined as follows:
1. The Middle East and North Africa: The Middle East and North Africa region is expected to experience heightened terrorist activity due to escalating crises and ongoing instability. Daesh is likely to maintain and even intensify its operations in Syria in the short and medium term, while simultaneously working to strengthen its capabilities by exploiting the complex dynamics on the ground, let alone the ongoing conflict between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, which has weakened efforts to combat Daesh and compromised the security of detention facilities housing its members. Additionally, Daesh may attract disillusioned extremists from within HTS, who oppose the group’s recent pragmatic shifts.
There are growing concerns that the repercussions of the Syrian conflict will spill over into Iraq. The current situation in Syria is expected to influence the activities of terrorist organizations and facilitate the cross-border movement of their members between the two countries. This threat is further compounded by the presence of a large number of Daesh members in Iraqi prisons.
In Libya and Yemen, Daesh activity has declined in recent years. However, if the group experiences a resurgence in its traditional strongholds, it is likely to trigger an operational revival of its other branches. This could also lead to the reactivation of its administrative offices, such as the Anfal office, which oversees operations in Libya and parts of North Africa, and the Umm al-Qura office, responsible for Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula.
Considering al-Qaeda’s potential activity, its presence in Syria has notably declined. However, in light of recent developments, the Hurras al-Din [Guardians of Religion] organization, an al-Qaeda affiliate, is likely to capitalize on Syria’s ongoing instability to carve out space for its operations. Recent UN reports suggest that the group is actively restructuring and shifting its focus toward local dynamics.
Turning to al-Qaeda in Yemen, despite facing significant challenges—including security pressures that have led to the loss of key leaders and growing internal divisions—it remains the most influential terrorist organization in the Yemeni arena. The real threat of its future activities lies in its pragmatic coordination with the Houthi movement, a dynamic that is likely to fuel further instability in Yemen and potentially impact the security of the Red Sea region.
2. East Africa: The threat posed by terrorist organizations in East Africa is expected to grow in 2025. Daesh Somalia has successfully expanded its presence, benefiting from a significant influx of foreign fighters from Syria, Yemen, Ethiopia, Sudan, Morocco, and Tanzania. Additionally, it has strengthened its position within the global Daesh network by managing financial operations, collecting revenues, and distributing funds to various African branches. Furthermore, its capability to plan external operations has increased. This trend is likely to continue, especially given that at the beginning of this year, Daesh Somalia claimed responsibility for a high-profile attack on a major military base in the Bari region of Puntland, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 22 security personnel.
Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, has managed to withstand extensive security campaigns by Somali forces, regaining control over some previously liberated areas. The group continues to launch complex attacks targeting Somali security forces and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Additionally, it is advancing its operational capabilities, notably through the development of armed drones capable of conducting attacks. In light of HTS’s success, it is plausible that al-Shabaab may also aspire to seize power in Somalia. However, many analysts anticipate that the AMISOM will play a pivotal role in countering the terrorist threat within the country.
3. West and Central Africa: In 2025, Sub-Saharan Africa is set to remain a key battleground for the growing influence of terrorist organizations, largely due to the proliferation of failed states and ungoverned spaces that serve as refuges for these groups. Daesh in West Africa Province, operating across the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad), stands out for maintaining the highest operational tempo among Daesh’s external affiliates. This level of activity is likely to continue through 2025, with no intentions of expanding beyond its current strongholds. The group’s primary objective remains tightening control over its existing territories to reinforce its strategic positions.
Meanwhile, Daesh in the Sahel, active in southeastern Mali, western Niger, and northeastern Burkina Faso—an area known as Liptako Gourma region—is expected to expand its territorial control in 2025. This projection follows its significant gains in 2024, when it doubled the size of its controlled areas, extending its grip in Mali and pushing into new regions of Niger and northeastern Burkina Faso. Despite these territorial ambitions, its strategic priority remains strengthening its logistical corridor with northwestern Nigeria.
As for Daesh in Central Africa, composed of two distinct factions—Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’ah (ASWJ) in Mozambique and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—is expected to escalate its operations in 2025, especially since ASWJ ramped up its activities in 2024 following the withdrawal of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission from Mozambique, while the ADF managed to withstand the security pressure from Operation Shujaa, a joint offensive by Congo and Uganda, regaining momentum through intensified attacks. Looking ahead, the ADF is likely to pursue cross-border expansion, with neighboring countries like Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi remaining vulnerable to Daesh Central Africa’s expansionist ambitions.
It is anticipated that Daesh’s geographical and operational expansion in Africa will persist into 2025. This development carries serious implications, chief among them the group’s success in forging connections between its areas of influence and its provinces across the continent, paving the way for increased human and logistical support flows.
Regarding al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) aims to consolidate its control over Burkina Faso and establish a corridor to the countries along West Africa’s coast. This expansion aligns with its broader strategy to extend influence towards the Gulf of Guinea. After securing vast territories in the Sahel, countries like Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire are poised to become its next targets, especially with its operatives already present in their northern regions. The experience of HTS is likely to serve as an influential model for JNIM, given its proven ability to embed itself within local communities and exhaust the strength of national armies in the areas it operates.
4. Central and South Asia: Central and South Asia are expected to remain hotspots for terrorist activity in 2025. Daesh-Khorasan continues to pose the most significant threat in the region, having adapted to increased pressure from Taliban attacks, strengthened its financial and logistical networks, and ramped up recruitment efforts to sustain its cross-border operations. The attacks it carried out in Moscow and Iran in 2024 underscore its intent to assert its ability to destabilize regional security while signaling the launch of a new phase of operations in the near future.
When it comes to al-Qaeda’s activity in Afghanistan, international assessments vary significantly. United Nations reports suggest that the group is in the process of rebuilding its operational capabilities, viewing Afghanistan as a safe haven for recruitment and external planning. Conversely, US intelligence estimates indicate that al-Qaeda is at its lowest historical levels in Afghanistan and is unlikely to regain its former strength. Despite these differing perspectives, one thing remains clear: al-Qaeda’s real power lies in the strength of its branches, and it is unlikely that its central command in Afghanistan will revive significant operational activity in the short or medium term.
The Pakistani Taliban has escalated its operations in 2024, driven by a dual agenda, involving pressuring the Pakistani government to release its imprisoned members and responding to internal pressure from its extremist factions, which oppose negotiations with Islamabad and advocate for continued attacks. Given these motivations, the movement is expected to intensify its attacks in its active areas throughout 2025.
Notably, the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia has significantly declined, thanks to sustained security operations targeting terrorist organization branches, particularly those affiliated with al-Qaeda and Daesh in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. While these groups have weakened and fragmented, ongoing vigilance is necessary to prevent them from regrouping and rebuilding their networks.
Emerging Trends
Several emerging trends are anticipated to shape the landscape of terrorism in 2025. These developments can be reviewed as follows:
1. Local Insurgencies versus Global Terrorism: Since 2021, there has been growing anticipation regarding the potential rise of local terrorism over global terrorism. This shift is largely driven by the defeats suffered by transnational terrorist organizations—Daesh, for example, lost most of its territorial strongholds in the Middle East, while al-Qaeda has not executed a large-scale attack in the West for over two decades. As a result, several terrorist groups have begun reassessing their operational strategies, recognizing that direct affiliation with Al-Qaeda or Daesh undermines their chances of gaining the international political legitimacy needed to achieve their political objectives.
The case of HTS illustrates a strategic shift, as the group formally cut ties with al-Qaeda in July 2016 to concentrate on local dynamics, with its main objective being the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Its rise to power as the de facto authority in Syria demonstrates the potential effectiveness of this localized strategy. Consequently, it is plausible that other terrorist organizations will be inspired to follow the same path, especially considering the endorsements and congratulations the movement has received from various al-Qaeda branches.
Therefore, the shift of some terrorist organizations toward focusing on their local realities poses a significant threat to the countries in which they operate. This shift opens new horizons for these groups, enabling them to embed themselves more deeply within local contexts, which necessitates the development of adaptive counter-strategies to address future challenges. However, for these organizations to achieve sustainable success at the state and governance level, they would need to embrace forms of moderation that are inherently at odds with their radical ideologies.
2. Escalation of Conflicts between Terrorist Organizations: In 2025, conflicts between various terrorist organizations are expected to intensify across regions such as Syria, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Liptako Gourma region. In Syria, an internal rift could arise within the HTS-led alliance due to the presence of factions opposing its pragmatic approach. Extremist factions, such as those from the Turkistan Islamic Party, may seek to defect and continue their operations independently. While their cooperation in overthrowing the Assad regime was evident, this does not suggest they will work together in governance.
In Somalia, a renewed conflict between al-Shabaab and Daesh Somalia is likely as the latter seeks to bolster its financial and human resources. With these enhanced capabilities, Daesh Somalia is poised to challenge al-Shabaab’s influence in the region, which has already experienced multiple rounds of conflict since 2018 due to competition over human and logistical resources.
In the Lake Chad Basin region, the ongoing conflict between Daesh West Africa and the Boko Haram faction, led by Bakura Doro, is expected to persist. Boko Haram’s attempts to strengthen its logistical capabilities and Daesh West Africa’s efforts to expand into its territory are likely to fuel this ongoing struggle.
In the Liptako Gourma region, despite a temporary lull in hostilities between the al-Nusra Front and Daesh in Iraq and Syria, following a settlement of their conflict in 2024, tensions are likely to resurface. This anticipated escalation stems from Daesh’s expansionist ambitions, which directly clash with the Nusra Front’s established areas of influence.
3. Growing Threat of Foreign Fighters: In 2025, the threat of foreign fighters is likely to escalate. The phenomenon has surged since the Arab revolutions in 2011, fueled by the diversity of conflicts that have provided fertile ground for their recruitment and deployment. Terrorist organizations in both the Middle East and Africa have absorbed large numbers of foreign fighters, which has not only complicated but also prolonged ongoing conflicts. HTS’s decision to award military ranks to foreign fighters highlights the strategic value they bring to such groups. This development acts as a powerful motivator, signaling to foreign fighters across various regions that their contributions are both recognized and rewarded, thereby encouraging further cross-border mobilization.
Meanwhile, the threat posed by Daesh returnees remains a serious concern. In 2024, the US Central Command estimated that around 2,500 Daesh fighters are still operating in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, roughly 9,000 members are held in over 20 detention centers across northeastern and eastern Syria, guarded by the Syrian Democratic Forces. Adding to this, about 42,000 family members of Daesh fighters are living in various camps.
Should these individuals succeed in leaving Syria—whether returning to their countries of origin or settling elsewhere—they could pose significant security risks. These risks are linked to several key factors, including the potential for terrorist activities, including lone wolf attacks and suicide terrorism, the ability to recruit and spread extremist ideologies, and the capacity to build connections between terrorist groups both locally and globally.
4. The Rise of Lone-Wolf Terrorism: It’s challenging to claim that the New Orleans attack in the early hours of 2025—where a pickup truck, driven by an individual influenced by Daesh ideology, plowed into crowds on Bourbon Street in the heart of the French Quarter—signals a new wave of Daesh-inspired attacks in the West. However, there are clear signs pointing to the potential rise of lone-wolf terrorism, particularly with the growing threat of Daesh’s digital caliphate and its persistent calls to target the West. The shift from controlling physical territories to operating in digital spaces has made it harder to detect individuals acting alone yet driven by extremist ideologies.
In this context, the Homeland Threat Assessment 2025, conducted by the US Department of Homeland Security in October 2024, highlighted that the threat of domestic and foreign terrorism remains significantly high, with “lone criminals and small groups” expected to carry out various attacks. The assessment attributed the growth of lone-wolf terrorism to several factors, most notably the ongoing calls from al-Qaeda and Daesh to target the West, as well as the lasting effects of Israeli aggression on Gaza. What makes this type of terrorism particularly dangerous is not just its low operational cost but also the challenge it poses to security and intelligence agencies, as it often operates without the logistical trail typical of larger, coordinated attacks.
In conclusion, the threat posed by terrorist organizations is a persistent one, fluctuating in response to geopolitical developments and counter-terrorism strategies. As such, terrorist organizations are expected to maintain a considerable role in shaping geopolitical dynamics in the near and medium future. Crucially, societal contexts play a key role in either enabling or rejecting the presence of such organizations, highlighting the importance of adopting comprehensive policies that address the underlying drivers of extremism and terrorism.
