In a historic shift reflecting a bold recalibration of Russia’s stance on Afghanistan, the Supreme Court of Russia, on April 17, ruled to remove the Taliban from its list of banned terrorist organizations. This decision, is grounded in legislative amendments under Federal Law No. 513-FZ, passed on December 28, 2024. Taking immediate effect, the ruling marks a legal and diplomatic turning point, effectively ending the official criminalization of any contact or cooperation with the group within Russian territory—a policy that had been in place since the Taliban’s designation in 2003.
This legal development serves as a symbolic step paving the way for deeper political and diplomatic ties between Moscow and Kabul. Just six days after the ruling, on April 23, Russia’s Foreign Ministry announced an upgrade in diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, allowing the Taliban to appoint an ambassador to Moscow. Relatedly, Russia’s envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, met with the Taliban’s Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani, in Kabul, affirming Russia’s desire to expand ties with Afghanistan. Kabulov emphasized that Russia is keen to broaden its relationship with Afghanistan and has already begun taking serious, practical steps in this direction. Plans are also underway to activate a joint commission between the two countries during the XVI International Economic Forum “Russia — Islamic World: KazanForum”, held in Moscow this month. These developments clearly indicate Russia’s intent to redefine its relationship with Afghanistan’s de facto government, moving beyond previous pragmatic dealings with the Taliban toward a more institutionalized and open partnership across critical issues. The Taliban has controlled Afghanistan since August 2021.
The Taliban, for its part, welcomed Russia’s shift with enthusiasm, viewing it as a strategic milestone in bilateral relations. During a meeting with Russia’s ambassador in Kabul, the Taliban’s Foreign Minister, Muttaqi, described the move as a “significant development” in fostering cooperation, reflecting a mutual desire to deepen political, economic, and security coordination.
This article explores the backdrop of Russia’s decision to delist the Taliban, analyzing its multifaceted motivations—particularly its security dimensions—and assessing its potential implications. It also examines how the Taliban might leverage this decision to bolster its efforts to gain the regional and international legitimacy that its government has so far lacked.
A Gradual Transformation
The shift in Russia’s stance toward the Taliban—from labeling it a terrorist organization to removing it from the blacklist and engaging it as a strategic partner—was not a fleeting decision or a mere reaction to momentary circumstances. Rather, it is the culmination of a gradual process that began years ago, evolving alongside changes in Russia’s perception of the Taliban’s role in Afghanistan and the broader region, as well as Moscow’s assessment of the security and geopolitical interests that could be advanced through closer ties. Put simply, Russia’s decision to delist the Taliban is a legal step that encapsulates a gradual evolution in its policy toward the Taliban, signaling a growing alignment that began well before the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021.
As early as 2015, the Kremlin began reshaping its approach to the Taliban, establishing informal channels of communication. Sources indicate that Moscow provided moral and political support, with some allegations even suggesting the supply of weapons to the Taliban during its fight against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan. By 2017, cooperation had expanded to include intelligence-sharing and Russian military assistance in the Taliban’s campaign against Daesh.
While Russia has not formally recognized the Taliban as Afghanistan’s government since its 2021 takeover, it has pursued what can be described as “implicit recognition” of the group as the de facto authority. This informal acknowledgment has manifested in several ways, most notably the continued operation of Russia’s embassy in Kabul after the Taliban’s seizure of the capital. Russian Ambassador Dmitry Zhirnov was the first foreign diplomat to meet with Taliban representatives on Afghan soil following their takeover. Additionally, Russia has hosted official Taliban delegations in subsequent years, including at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2022 and 2024.
A qualitative shift also emerged in Russia’s official rhetoric. Russian officials began reframing the Taliban as a local movement that could be engaged, rather than a transnational threat. In September 2023, Zamir Kabulov, Russian presidential envoy to Afghanistan, stated that ‘Moscow does not view the Taliban as fundamentally terrorist,’ describing it as a ‘national movement’ with no ambition to export its ideology or engage in global jihad.
By early 2024, legal steps began to crystallize this political shift. In May 2024, Russia’s Foreign and Justice Ministries jointly recommended to President Vladimir Putin that the Taliban be removed from the list of banned terrorist organizations. In July 2024, Putin himself described the Taliban as an ‘ally in the fight against terrorism.’ This trajectory culminated late last year with the passage of a new law authorizing Russian authorities to delist entities from the terrorist list, paving the way for further action. In December 2024, the Duma approved the first reading of a bill facilitating this process. Finally, in March 2025, the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation submitted a formal petition to the Supreme Court to delist the Taliban, with a hearing scheduled for April 17, 2025. This marked the conclusion of a legal process reflecting a long-term political and strategic transformation in Russia’s approach to the Taliban.
Multiple Motivations
Russia’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations cannot be understood in isolation from a web of pragmatic calculations and strategic objectives. These range from security concerns tied to securing its southern borders and safeguarding interests in former Soviet republics, to economic goals centered on reviving trade links through Afghanistan, to geopolitical ambitions aimed at reshaping regional influence amid growing competition with the West and China. The key drivers can be outlined as follows:
1. Security Considerations: While Russia’s delisting of the Taliban caps a gradual rapprochement that began years ago and solidified after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021, the accelerated pace of this convergence in recent months reveals a pressing security dimension shaping Russian decision-making. This is particularly evident in the rising threat posed by Daesh-Khorasan, which has emerged as a shared adversary for both Moscow and Kabul. Daesh-Khorasan has become the most dangerous Daesh affiliate in Asia, carrying out high-profile attacks both within and beyond Afghanistan’s borders, including on Russian soil. The most notable was the March 2024 attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, which claimed nearly 150 lives. Additional attacks targeting Russian interests in Kabul, coupled with Daesh-Khorasan’s propaganda efforts to incite its fighters against Russia, reflect a desire for vengeance rooted in Russia’s role in combating Daesh in the Middle East and Africa, as well as its efforts to curb the group’s activities in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia’s close ties with Daesh-Khorasan’s key adversaries, such as Iran and the Taliban, further fuel these retaliatory motives, compounded by historical animosities stemming from the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s among fighters from Central Asian states.
Consequently, Moscow views Afghanistan as a critical arena in countering transnational terrorism, given its strategic proximity to Central Asia—a region Russia considers an extension of its national security under its security doctrine. Moscow fears the spillover effects of Daesh-Khorasan’s expansion, especially amid intelligence reports highlighting the group’s growing recruitment of fighters from the region and its exploitation of Tajik communities within Russia for terrorist operations. Against this backdrop, security concerns have been the decisive factor in Russia’s shift toward the Taliban—not as a traditional strategic ally, but as a necessary tool to manage the escalating terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan. With Daesh-Khorasan’s activities escalating, it has become a shared worry for Russia and Central Asian states alike, cementing the Taliban’s role in regional security dynamics.
This reality underscores the Taliban’s success in leveraging its fight against terrorism to bolster its government’s legitimacy and break its international isolation. By forging cooperative security arrangements with regional and international actors to contain terrorist threats, the Taliban has positioned itself strategically. Its approach to combating Daesh-Khorasan exemplifies this. The Taliban has adopted a hardline strategy against the group, which includes a pragmatic dimension evident in the rhetoric of its leaders, which falls into two categories:
1. Statements that downplay the Daesh-Khorasan threat in Afghanistan, showcasing the Taliban’s ability to maintain domestic stability. This narrative is used to instill confidence in its rule and portray Afghanistan as a secure destination for foreign investment and tourism.
2. Messaging that warns global instability in Afghanistan serves no one’s interests, arguing that pressuring the Taliban could harm other countries and that cooperation with the group is essential to containing Daesh-Khorasan. The Taliban believes that the greater the perceived threat from Daesh-Khorasan, the more regional states will rely on its cooperation in security matters.
Many sources argue that the Taliban at times inflates the Daesh-Khorasan threat as a bargaining chip to pressure the international community for aid, concessions, and financial support, capitalizing on Asian and Western fears of the group’s growing influence and its capacity to orchestrate cross-border attacks. The Taliban’s strikes against Daesh-Khorasan also serve as a showcase of its ability to neutralize terrorist threats, lending it a veneer of legitimacy as a de facto government. This allows the Taliban greater freedom on the international stage while diverting attention from its continued hosting of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups operating under its protection.
This model reflects the Taliban’s pragmatic use of counterterrorism to secure recognition for its government. Moscow appears to have recognized this approach and is betting on leveraging it to secure its immediate regional environment.
3. Countering Western Sway and Cementing Regional Clout: Russia’s decision to delist the Taliban from its roster of terrorist organizations aligns with a broader strategic vision aimed at reshaping the balance of power in its regional sphere, particularly in Central Asia. This move counters Western efforts to regain a foothold in Afghanistan’s geopolitically charged landscape, a region long regarded as a critical arena for testing regional and global power dynamics over past decades. Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Russia has sought to fill the resulting geopolitical void, driven by a desire to prevent the Taliban from becoming a pawn in Washington’s hands and to thwart any Western intelligence efforts to forge direct or indirect understandings with the movement.
This approach gains heightened significance amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, which has pushed Moscow to deepen alliances with anti-Western forces and leverage its ties with the Taliban as a card for political and strategic leverage against the United States. The move also aligns with Russia’s anti-Western rhetoric, which portrays the Taliban as a nationalist movement that successfully resisted American influence. This framing allows Moscow to highlight the failures of US policies in Afghanistan while positioning itself as a guarantor of regional stability and a reliable partner for the Taliban. In doing so, Russia strengthens its influence at the heart of Central Asia, while curbing prospects for any anticipated Western inroads.
4. Securing Economic Gains: The economic dimension is a key driver behind Russia’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations. Moscow aims to capitalize on its growing engagement with the movement to advance its economic interests, particularly under the strain of Western sanctions imposed on the Russian economy since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict. Russia recognizes that strengthening ties with the Taliban opens the door to promising economic opportunities and secures a long-term economic foothold in Afghanistan. This enables Moscow to offset losses from sanctions while establishing itself as a pivotal economic player in the heart of Asia. Afghanistan’s wealth of strategic natural resources—such as lithium, copper, and gold—holds significant appeal for Russian companies in mining and energy. Additionally, Afghanistan’s geographic position as a potential gateway to the Indian Ocean offers Russia a new avenue to expand trade and boost natural gas exports to South and East Asia.
Russia’s intent to deepen economic cooperation with the Taliban government became evident following Moscow’s recent announcement to delist the movement. This move paved the way for a new economic pathway with Afghanistan. On April 22, the Taliban’s Minister of Energy and Water, Mullah Abdul Latif Mansour, met with Russia’s Ambassador to Kabul, Dmitry Zhirnov, to discuss Russian investment opportunities in water and energy sectors, including major infrastructure projects like dams and renewable energy sources. Similarly, on April 28, Mawlavi Noor-ul-Hadi Abu Idris, deputy governor of Balkh province, met with Russian investors and representatives of Antico Afghani, where the Russian side proposed establishing a specialized oil and gas extraction plant, leveraging the region’s strategic location.
The mining sector saw parallel developments. On May 5, Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum officials met with Russian investors to explore cooperation in exploiting gold and emerald mines. Russian companies expressed readiness to provide technical support and industrial expertise, adhering to the legal frameworks set by the Taliban government. This momentum culminated in a coordination meeting on May 8, involving representatives from various Afghan ministries, dedicated to crafting a comprehensive plan to expand economic cooperation with Russia. The plan included proposals to boost trade volumes and channel Russian investments into strategic sectors serving both parties’ interests.
Russia aims to increase bilateral trade with Afghanistan to $3 billion in 2025, with a target of $10 billion by 2030, as stated by Rustam Khabibullin, head of the Russian Business Center in Afghanistan, in August 2024. This reflects an ambitious economic vision that transcends traditional trade, positioning Afghanistan as a cornerstone of Russia’s regional economic strategy.
A Milestone on the Path to Legitimacy
Russia’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations carries multiple dimensions, but its most significant implications lie in the political and diplomatic gains it affords the movement, particularly in breaking the international isolation it has faced since returning to power in August 2021. As a precedent set by a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia’s move enhances the Taliban’s prospects for formal engagement with other countries and opens doors to broader diplomatic involvement, whether through the acceptance of its envoys or enabling it to manage Afghanistan’s diplomatic missions abroad. Over recent years, the Taliban has made gradual strides in this regard, including being delisted from terrorist designations in Kazakhstan in December 2023 and Kyrgyzstan in September 2024, as well as securing permission for its diplomats to assume control of embassies in several neighboring countries. Notably, China and Kazakhstan have formally recognized Taliban representatives as legitimate envoys of the Afghan state. According to Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, in an interview with Al Jazeera on April 30, the Taliban currently maintains diplomatic representation in 41 countries worldwide.
This gradual openness toward the Taliban—despite no country yet officially recognizing its government—reflects a rising trend of pragmatic normalization with its rule. It signals a shift in the priorities of many capitals, which now prioritize strategic, security, and economic considerations over issues like human rights or democratic principles. The Taliban, keenly aware of this shift, seeks to leverage it to solidify its political standing. Russia’s delisting decision is not merely symbolic; it translates into tangible opportunities for economic and diplomatic cooperation, easing some of the international restrictions imposed on the Taliban.
This development fits into a broader Taliban strategy rooted in a “pragmatic-utilitarian” approach, which capitalizes on shifting regional dynamics and international interests to bolster its legitimacy. By positioning itself as a capable contributor to regional stability and a bulwark against transnational terrorist groups, the Taliban aims to reshape its global image as an indispensable player in the regional security equation. The movement recognizes that its rigid adherence to its domestic ideology has not deterred certain powers from engaging with it based on mutual interests, encouraging it to maintain its internal policies while wielding security and diplomatic leverage to expand its international presence without making significant concessions on its governance practices.
The UN’s engagement with the Taliban at the third Doha meeting of special envoys to Afghanistan in June 2024, sponsored by the United Nations, exemplifies how the movement has benefited from this “implicit recognition” as the de facto authority in Afghanistan, even without formal international recognition or the lifting of global sanctions. After protracted negotiations, the Taliban succeeded in shaping the meeting’s framework, sidelining representatives of civil society, women, and the opposition, and limiting the agenda to technical issues like counter-narcotics and banking facilitation. By asserting itself as Afghanistan’s sole representative, the Taliban secured UN acquiescence, viewing this as a diplomatic triumph that reflects growing international acceptance of its rule and paves the way, in its view, for further global recognition. This example underscores how international openness to the Taliban, even if driven by necessity, strengthens its negotiating position and opens channels for political influence, all while the movement offers little to no concessions on public freedoms, particularly women’s rights—issues central to the international conditions for recognizing its government.
In short, Russia’s decision to delist the Taliban marks a pivotal step that broadens the movement’s prospects for international gains. It also raises critical questions about how the global community will navigate its relationship with the Taliban amid ongoing transformations and the prioritization of security and economic interests by regional and global powers. The decision further exposes a core dilemma tied to the concept of terrorism: its increasingly political and fluid nature, shaped more by the interests and calculations of global powers than by fixed legal or moral standards. This risks entrenching a selective approach to dealing with violent non-state armed actors, potentially undermining the existing international framework for counterterrorism and eroding its effectiveness and credibility in the future.
