Following reciprocal military strikes targeting the locations of armed groups designated as terrorist organizations in mid-January 2024, Pakistan and Iran opted for pacification instead of escalation. In the wake of the Iranian assaults on strategic locations near the shared border on 16 January, the Pakistani cabinet convened under the leadership of acting prime minister Anwarul Haq Kakar and in the presence of heads of the Pakistani security and intelligence agencies, and it was formally declared that efforts would resume to restore diplomatic ties with Iran and reestablish the bilateral relationship in its entirety.
Before the meeting, the spokesman for the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs described Iran as a “cordial country” and emphasized the imperative of resolving the prevailing hostilities between the two countries. The foreign ministers of Pakistan and Iran engaged in a telephone consultation, emphasizing the profound nature of their countries’ relations and the significance of de-escalating tensions. They also agreed on the importance of improving collaboration in terms of precise coordination pertaining to the fight against terrorism.
Overall, Iran pursued talks with Islamabad rather than escalating the situation by adding fuel to the fire.
Pacification between the two countries in the aftermath of the attacks was essentially a foreseen consequence. However, it seemed that the Iranian airstrikes against Army of Justice positions on Pakistani soil were intended to test the waters of Islamabad. Had Pakistan not repelled these attacks, Iran would have likely retaliated in kind, firstly, for the organization’s actions and secondly, to initiate the removal of its roots that extend into Pakistani territory.
Regarding Islamabad, it was compelled to react and had no alternative but to do so for a variety of reasons, including the pressure from the Sunni populace and the need to discourage Iran from carrying out similar assaults in the future. The escalation of Pakistan’s regional conflicts and foreign relations, specifically its tense relations with India, further influenced the country’s decision to launch the attacks; thus, the Pakistani response can be interpreted as “a message of deterrence” directed towards New Delhi.
With regard to the recent crisis, the following factors primarily served as the triggers for the cessation of hostilities between Iran and Pakistan:
I. Pakistan’s Motives
Tehran initiated this recent escalation by targeting Army of Justice sites in Pakistan, but several factors deterred Islamabad from escalating with Iran. Indeed, the motivations of Pakistanis are considerably more varied in nature when compared to those of Iran, and Islamabad’s motives are even more delicate than the factors that prompted Iran to defuse the tensions. These motives can be detailed as follows:
1. Concerns Regarding Sectarian Unrest within Pakistan: According to prevailing estimates, the Shiite population in Pakistan constitutes approximately 10% to 15% of the total population of 247,653,000 million, which is roughly equivalent to around 37 million people. The majority of the remaining population are Sunnis.
Pakistan has long endured recurring episodes of sectarian extremism between Sunnis and Shiites, particularly with the Deobandi school’s authority over a multitude of Islamic movements. The Deobandis have openly displayed hostility towards Shiites. Since 1947, Pakistan has experienced extensive violence between the two the Deobandis and Shiites, with notable incidents including the Therhi massacre on June 3, 1963, and the Lahore incident in February 1978.
Within Pakistan, numerous Sunni armed factions operate, with Shiite scholars and gatherings of Shiite citizens as their primary targets. Two of these most notable groups are the Sipah-e-Sahaba [Army of Prophet’s Companions] and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi [Lashkar-e-Jhangvi].
In this sense, the Pakistani government is concerned about the potential impact of the conflict with Iran on its national security. The intensification of that conflict will initially incite the Shiites within Pakistan to oppose the government in Islamabad and may cause terrorist organizations to involve in the conflict between the two parties, ultimately resulting in a significant and unequivocal menace to Pakistani national security.
2. Avoiding Raising Ethnic Tensions between Tehran and Islamabad: Pakistan and Iran share concerns about the ongoing attacks in Balochistan, as they fear that these incidents may reignite separatist sentiments and conflicts associated with nationalism in both countries. It is noteworthy that the recent attacks by both parties have resulted in casualties among Baloch civilians, not just terrorist organizations. This implies that if these attacks persist, it will likely incite Baloch separatist armed factions in Pakistan and Iran to oppose the governments of these countries. This is particularly significant considering the impoverished conditions, limited access to resources, and political marginalization experienced by the Baloch communities in both Pakistan and Iran.
This means that the security disruption in the region on both sides will provide an ideal opportunity for citizens and armed groups to act against the two countries.
It is noteworthy to mention that Pakistani and Iranian concerns extend further, as both Islamabad and Tehran accuse foreign countries of providing support to the Baloch in both regions. Pakistan has consistently directed this accusation at New Delhi, which has on multiple occasions denied such allegations.
3. Reducing the Intensity of Anti-Government Terror At tacks: The governments of Islamabad and Tehran resorted to early pacification out of fear that sectarian tensions would worsen and that anti-government organizations would take advantage of the security chaos in both countries to launch attacks against the two central governments, should the attacks continue. Iran, like Pakistan, takes this issue into consideration. This is especially true given the presence of numerous other armed and non-armed groups fighting the regimes of the two countries, operating both domestically and internationally.
4. Anticipating India’s Utilization of Pakistan’s “Widespread Security Turmoil”: Pakistan consistently takes into account potential Indian response or opportunity exploitation in its regional and external endeavors, given the protracted and profound conflict that exists between the two countries. Thus, Islamabad’s recent decision to actively seek peace with Iran has been significantly influenced by these strategic factors. This is further compounded by Pakistani concerns regarding the potential impact of India-backed ethnic strife on the stability of governance and overall security.
5. Avoiding the Reopening of Further Disputed Issues between the Two Countries: Countless disputes have arisen between Iran and Pakistan during the last decades. Both countries, aside from their sectarian and ethnic inclinations, accuse each other of collaborating with foreign intelligence agencies. This collaboration is alleged to be aimed at bolstering certain factions or promoting the interests and influence of their respective nationalities. Furthermore, both countries face accusations of providing shelter to separatist or anti-government terrorist organizations. Islamabad alleges that Tehran is collaborating with Indian intelligence to bolster Baloch nationalism, whereas Iran contends that the Pakistani government is providing sanctuary to various terrorist groups that are hostile to the Iranian regime.
Furthermore, the foreign policies of the two countries are in direct opposition to each other, and there are also conflicting files pertaining to regional and international interests.
Hence, the two countries opted for pacification as a means to avoid exacerbating the numerous unresolved issues and problems.
6. Preparing for the Upcoming Pakistani Parliamentary Elections: Pakistan is presently making arrangements for the upcoming legislative elections, which are set to take place on February 8, 2024. These elections follow the conclusion of Parliament’s term in August and the establishment of a caretaker government, led by Anwar-ul-Haq Kakar, to oversee the electoral process.
These elections are taking place amidst a politically charged environment in Pakistan. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan has been disqualified from running in this cycle, and his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, is attempting to capitalize on the public’s sympathy towards him in order to take part in the elections. Shehbaz Sharif, the former prime minister of Pakistan, and Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the current head of the Pakistani People’s Party, are all eager to run in and win these elections.
Hence, the Pakistani government, security services, and military are actively working towards pacifying the domestic situation and ensuring stability to successfully conclude the electoral process without any further delays.
II. Iran’s Motives
While Pakistan had multiple and delicate reasons for seeking pacification, the factors that motivated Iran to calm down were, in certain respects, equally significant to the sensitivity of Pakistan’s motives. The Iranian motives can be summarized as follows:
1. Avoiding the Incitement of Internal Sectarianism and Nationalism within the Sunni Sistan and Baluchestan Province: In light of the complex issues involving various anti-government Baloch factions and the Iranian government, as well as the challenging circumstances endured by the Sunni populace in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran recognized that intensifying and focusing on the Baloch in Pakistan could incite more violent confrontations against Iranian security forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the province. This, in turn, raises the risk of the spread of violence to other regions within Iran.
Under these circumstances, it is highly probable that Baloch groups in Pakistan will collaborate with their counterparts in Iran to oppose the government in Tehran.
Simultaneously, the likelihood of inciting the Sunni populace in the Sistan and Baluchestan province to oppose the central government in Tehran is growing if the Iranian army or the IRGC persists in targeting Baloch Sunni civilians in neighboring Pakistan. Prospects exist for Islamabad to extend assistance to Baloch factions in Iran as well.
As a result, these circumstances contributed to Iran’s prompt de-escalation with Pakistan.
2. Incapability of Iran to Simultaneously Open Multiple Fronts of Engagement: During a period when Iran was targeting locations in Pakistan that support the Baloch Army of Justice, which it considers to be a terrorist organization, the IRGC attacked sites in the Iraqi city of Erbil that it claimed were Israeli Mossad-affiliated espionage and launched strikes against Daesh locations in the Syrian province of Idlib.
Presently, Iran is engaged in conflicts, either directly or indirectly, on a regional and international scale with various actors and countries, both in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The arena is also seeing, against the backdrop of the conflict in Gaza and its aftermath in the Red Sea, the involvement of Iranian proxies in an almost open conflict with the United States, Israel, and some other Western countries.
Iranian-Western relations are currently strained due to several factors, including the nuclear issue, Iranian-Russian collaboration in Ukraine, and the doubts of certain Western countries regarding Tehran’s backing of the Palestinian Hamas movement. Along its border with Afghanistan Border, security stability is a significant concern for Iran given the nature of its relations with the Taliban movement in Kabul.
As a result, Iran refrained from escalating the situation and opening a new front of conflict with a country of Pakistan’s size due to its ongoing conflict with various external organizations organizations, actors, and nations on the outside.
3. Sidestepping Pakistan’s Formidable Intelligence and Military Apparatus: Since the rise of Islamists in Iran in 1979, the political regime has refrained from actively pursuing a confrontational relationship with neighboring Pakistan. Pakistan possesses a potent army and significant intelligence in the surrounding region, giving it clear regional influence and weight. Should the conflict with Iran intensify, this could have a significant impact on the network of Iranian regional foreign strategic interests.
The Pakistani army, on the other hand, benefits from having access to modern military hardware thanks to its connections and purchases from Western countries, while the traditional Iranian army struggles with its outdated equipment, particularly in the air force.
4. Avoiding the Fury of Iranians: Several opinion polls conducted by external research centers in recent years, as well as protests and demonstrations that occurred in Iran during the same period, have revealed that a significant number of Iranians oppose policies that support particular foreign countries or organizations in Syria, Iraq, or Lebanon. Specifically, these policies are incongruent with the nature of Iranian policies in those countries, as they are perceived to impose financial burdens on the Iranian budget.
If Iran initiates hostilities in the eastern region of the country against Pakistan, it is anticipated that there will be an increase in domestic discontent, leading to protests that opposes the conflict with Pakistan to avert a potential security breakdown or the country descending into a state of widespread disorder and insecurity. Hence, opting to prevent escalation with Pakistan was the optimal choice for Iran.
5. Caution Regarding the Instigation of Further Domestic Nationalist Inclinations: By engaging in pacification efforts with Pakistan, Iran has successfully averted the risk of inciting other ethnic groups within its borders or reactivating the activities of armed factions from these groups against the state, taking advantage of the unstable security situation that is probably going to accompany a conflict with Pakistan, a neighbour. These concerns encompassed not only the Baloch group but also extended to other ethnic groups.
6. Additional Regional Calculations (Israel): Given the protracted open dispute between Iran and Israel across multiple domains (e.g., intelligence, information, and military), the Iranian decision-maker harbors apprehensions that Israel may capitalize on the security crisis and the Iranian conflict with Pakistan to its own benefit, particularly in light of the heightened tensions stemming from the Iranian nuclear program and Iranian backing of several proxies in the region that recently targeted Israel interests.
Iran does not completely rule out the likelihood of Israel collaborating with certain adversaries under such conditions; this, in turn, dissuades Tehran from intensifying tensions with major regional powers.
Conclusion
Following their respective recent attacks, pacification emerged as the most favorable course of action for both countries. Islamabad and Tehran have successfully mitigated potential threats to their interests and national as well as regional security by refraining from further escalation. The crux of the matter lies not in internal conflicts that can be suppressed or resolved over time, but rather in a multitude of intricate sectarian, national, ethnic, and regional issues between two countries that, through pacification, have deliberately chosen to keep them closed and prevent third parties from stepping into the conflict.
