The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) released the eleventh edition of the Global Terrorism Index for 2024, an annual report produced by the institute in English since 2012. Utilizing the Dragonfly’s Terrorism Tracker database and other sources, the report provides a comprehensive summary of the main global trends and patterns of terrorism. It analyzes important dimensions associated with the phenomenon, such as the social and economic conditions in which it occurs, and its dynamic nature that changes over time.
The first part of this series offered an overview of the toll of terrorist operations and the deadliest terrorist groups in 2023. The second part reviewed the ten countries most affected by terrorism according to the index. The third part examined trends in terrorist activity across different regions of the world in 2023. This installment discusses the characteristics that distinguish terrorist activity from other forms of violence, and the intersection between terrorism and organized crime in Africa’s Sahel region.
Characteristics of Terrorism
Looking at the total number of deaths resulting from terrorist activity, the absolute level of terrorism is much lower than other forms of violence. According to the index, the total deaths from 2008 to 2021 resulted from four different acts of violence: terrorism, armed conflict, homicide, and suicide. While terrorist activity caused 120,000 deaths, armed conflicts resulted in over 1.1 million deaths, homicides caused 5.5 million deaths, and 8.7 million people committed suicide. Despite the potential overlap between the different forms of violence, there is a clear difference in the absolute threat level each poses.
The relative threat of terrorism varies significantly from one country to another. For example, the average ratio of homicides to deaths resulting from terrorism during the period 2008-2021 at the country level is 148:1, meaning there are 148 homicides for every death due to terrorism. However, there are ten countries where this ratio is less than 10:1. In Burkina Faso, this ratio is 0.88, meaning the number of deaths resulting from terrorism is greater than the number of recorded homicides during this period, although this may occur due to underreporting of some homicides.
According to the index, although terrorism is not considered the most destructive form of violence in terms of total deaths resulting from it, it has many characteristics that make it “particularly” impactful compared to other forms of violence, as explained in the following points:
The skewed distribution of terrorism deaths: The statistical distribution of deaths resulting from terrorism takes a skewed direction, meaning that a large-scale terrorist attack can lead to a large number of deaths, reaching hundreds or thousands of people, compared to one or two deaths in a single homicide incident. According to the index, about half of terrorist attacks do not lead to deaths, while 22% of them result in the death of only one person, and nearly 96% of total attacks kill less than 10 people. Therefore, the rarity of large-scale terrorist attacks means that the deaths resulting from them have a Pareto distribution; that is, 80% of the total deaths resulting from terrorism are caused by approximately 20% of the attacks. In other words, despite the rarity of large-scale terrorist attacks, their impact can be much higher than that of moderate terrorist attacks.
The distribution of deaths resulting from terrorism across terrorist groups takes an even more extreme distribution than it does at the event level; between 2007 and 2023, only 11 terrorist groups were responsible for more than 80% of total terrorism deaths. One reason for this is that most terrorist groups do not tend to last for a long period. According to the index, 139 terrorist groups recorded at least one terrorist attack in 2007, and by the following year, only 73 of these groups recorded an attack, while only 25 groups remained active in 2023, representing an 82% decrease in the total number of active groups. Overall, the average active lifespan of a terrorist group from 2007 to 2023 was three years, with 44% of groups lasting two years or less.
The index enumerates a set of underlying reasons behind the short life cycle of terrorist groups: The first of them, is the inability of many groups to grow sufficiently to continue their operations in the long term, thus easily being disrupted by strikes by military and police forces. The second is the tendency of terrorist groups to continually change their skin through alliances with other groups, changing their loyalties, or disbanding under different names. The third is the inclination of small groups to become part of larger organizations to enhance their access to more resources.
The deep psychological impact of terrorism: Armed conflicts, homicides, and suicides usually occur amid high levels of violence, while terrorist attacks can occur when levels of other forms of violence are low. Terrorist attacks targeting public objectives aim to create chaos and provoke fear, thus receiving wide media coverage, which in turn amplifies their psychological effects.
The likelihood of terrorism contagion: Successful terrorist attacks in a certain area can stimulate retaliatory attacks in other parts of the world. For example, the index claims that the church and hotel bombings in Sri Lanka that killed 321 people were a direct response to the shooting at the Christchurch mosque in New Zealand, which resulted in 51 deaths.
Terrorism and Organized Crime in the Sahel
There is a clear relationship between the impact of terrorism and levels of organized criminal activity, which is somewhat one-sided; many countries with high rates of organized crime do not suffer from any effects related to terrorist activity, or their impact is minimal. In contrast, countries with a significant impact of terrorism have high levels of organized crime.
The relationship between organized crime and illegal economies and violent extremist groups varies by region and context, divided by the index into three patterns: coexistence, cooperation, and convergence. The first pattern refers to groups operating in roughly the same geographical scope, which may benefit from each other’s presence but do not necessarily work together. The cooperative pattern refers to a certain level of joint operation between specific groups to achieve mutual benefits. The convergent pattern means terrorist and criminal groups take control of each other’s key elements of operations. In general, armed groups directly manage organized criminal institutions, and sometimes some groups integrate criminal operations into their strategy in various ways, including directly choosing illegal economies to pool resources or imposing taxes on criminal or illegal institutions operating in the territories they control. The index cites the Afghan Taliban as an example; it funded its operations in Afghanistan through opium poppy cultivation and heroin production. ISIS managed to generate annual revenues of $2.9 billion through various illegal means, including ransom, forced taxes, and oil smuggling from territories they controlled in Iraq and Syria.
Although terrorist groups have always engaged in some form of criminal activity throughout history to fund their operations and activities, their need to engage in criminal activities has significantly increased after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The sponsorship of some states for terrorist groups decreased due to sanctions imposed on states that support terrorist activity, prompting these groups to seek new sources to enhance their resources through participation in criminal activity.
The index suggests that terrorist groups are likely to be involved in organized crime in weak states, where illegal economic activity is often a primary source of livelihood for people living in conflict zones or those lacking strong governance. Terrorist groups seek to sponsor this illegal activity, promote it, and maintain it to distribute its economic returns to the population, allowing non-governmental actors to build trust and influence among local populations, making it difficult to eradicate or reduce their capabilities.
According to the index, the strength of the link between the activity of terrorist groups and organized crime varies from one geographic region to another. This connection is very strong in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the Sahel region, which has now become the site of nearly half of the world’s terrorism-related deaths. While terrorist groups based in the region are involved in a wide range of illegal economic activities such as human trafficking, four main areas play the most significant role in the central Sahel region, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger: cattle theft, gold mining, drug smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom. This can be discussed as follows:
Gold mining: Many forms of conflict, including terrorism, are closely linked to artisanal gold mining and smuggling in the central Sahel region, where rapid expansion in gold mining operations has led to strong competition among active terrorist groups in the region for control of these operations. Given the strategic importance of this region, there has been a significant increase in attacks against gold mining operations in the past three years. In Burkina Faso, for example, up to 20 tons are produced annually, with an estimated annual value of $1.5 billion, and control—even to a small extent—of mining operations by extremist groups represents a significant opportunity to enhance their resources. Also, controlling the area where gold is mined allows these groups to have a much greater impact on local populations. Although the government in Burkina Faso announced the closure of artisanal gold sites in 2022 in an attempt to restrict jihadist groups’ access to gold mining revenues, it is unclear what impact this will have, as similar attempts in the past have backfired. Jihadist groups used the closures to gain popular support from local communities that rely on mining activity. It is also likely that most mining operations will remain active in areas that have fallen out of state control; the government in Burkina Faso controls only 60% of the country’s territory, meaning a significant part of the gold-rich area in the north of the country is outside the regime’s control.
While terrorist groups may sometimes engage in gold mining and smuggling, the more common practice in areas controlled by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims in Burkina Faso and Mali is to make money by providing security. For example, in the Didan gold mining area, the group took over in 2021, replacing government-aligned militias, and began providing security and protection for local miners, imposing lower fees than those charged by the pro-government militias for their services, providing them with a steady income. Not only that, but it also helped them build relationships and partnerships in the region to enhance their control.
Cattle theft: Cattle theft is a common illegal activity in the Sahel region, as is the case in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, often associated with long-standing conflicts between different ethnic components. According to the index, the significant increase in the number of terrorist groups and other non-governmental actors in the region has led to an increase in cattle theft operations, as well as an increase in the severity of violence associated with this activity. Between 2018 and 2020, an estimated 126,000 cattle were stolen in the Mopti region of Mali. By 2022, this number had increased by about 130,000 in a single year. Also, ISIS’s campaign in the Sahel in late 2022 to expand its territories in the Gao and Menaka regions in northern Mali came with a sharp increase in cattle theft, in addition to increased violence in those areas.
Drug smuggling: Drug trafficking is one of the most financially lucrative illegal activities in which active terrorist groups in the Sahel region participate. These groups often engage in this type of activity when operating in areas with historically active networks in drug production or transportation, or when they control territories where smuggling operations take place, presenting themselves as the most capable of providing a safe climate for drug traffickers. In general, drug trafficking operations are directed by criminal groups, not terrorist groups directly, where the latter collect revenues by taxing the criminal group in exchange for providing security and protection for smuggling operations.
Kidnapping and ransom: Active terrorist groups in the Sahel region have generated significant revenues from kidnapping and ransom operations over the past two decades. According to the index, this activity has now become a main part of the economic resources for the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims affiliated with al-Qaeda, where civilians who play a role in business or politics throughout Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are among the most common targets for the group; estimates indicate that kidnapping and ransom operations constituted 40% of its revenue in 2017.
In light of the above, the escalation of terrorist activity and organized crime in the Sahel has created a complex security landscape fraught with risks. Several governments in the region have lost control over vast areas of territory, and political instability remains in countries of the region. Some developments over the past two years have complicated this landscape, providing more opportunities for terrorist groups to enhance their activity and expand their control areas, including the end of Operation Barkhane, the French counter-terrorism mission in 2022, the end of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) at the end of 2023, the military coup in Niger in July of the same year, and the expansion of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims’ operations in neighboring Sahel countries in West Africa, particularly Benin and Togo, as part of its regional expansion strategy that began in 2022.
