Egypt is currently engaged in herculean efforts with various stakeholders, including the Palestinians, Israelis, United States, and Arab countries, to achieve a mutual agreement on a proposed ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, which aims at addressing contentious matters and getting both parties to make reciprocal concessions. This agreement is regarded as the ultimate chance for the conflicting parties, regional countries, and international powers invested in the stability of the Middle East.
Objectives of the agreement include primarily preventing the Israeli military from launching a significant invasion in Palestinian Rafah, establishing a ceasefire as a starting point to halt the progression of the war, providing humanitarian assistance to all regions of the Gaza Strip, contemplating the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, and averting tension in Arab-regional relations.
The subsequent phase will entail an in-depth examination of intricate issues (technical components of the agreement) between Hamas and Israel. This will include ascertaining the precise quantity of Israeli detainees held by Hamas and other resistance factions, alongside the number of Palestinian prisoners and detainees according to mutually agreed-upon lists, the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip until their complete departure, the relocation of displaced civilians from the Gaza Strip to their places of residence, and the movement of people from densely populated areas to an area near the border throughout the entire Gaza Strip.
In this vein, president Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi urged all parties in a tweet published on the X platform on May 6 to increase their endeavors towards achieving a resolution that would put an end to the human tragedy afflicting the Palestinian people and finalize the exchange of prisoners and hostages, towards establishing a comprehensive ceasefire. This is consistent with the widespread belief among the security services and certain Israeli military officials (such as the Minister of Defence, the Chiefs of Staff, the Shin Bet, the Mossad, and negotiation officials) that the war has come to a stalemate and that a truce agreement that would result in the detainees’ release is necessary.
Key Determinants Influencing Egypt’s Stance
Arguably, Egypt’s position is driven by a number of factors that motivate it to speed up the process of negotiating a truce between the warring factions. These factors include the following:
1. Keeping the Israeli Military Presence in Palestinian Rafah from Turning into a Full-Fledged Invasion:The Israeli military operation in Rafah is still “confined” to the eastern peripheries and has not expanded further into Rafah’s interior. Egypt, however, objects to the actions of the Netanyahu government, which is using military escalation as a means of coercing Hamas into making concessions following its acceptance of the Egyptian cease-fire agreement. This prompted the Israeli army to seize control of the Rafah crossing from the Palestinian side and to threaten a full-scale incursion into Rafah, which is thought to be the last reasonably safe area in the Gaza Strip and the last safe haven for over a million Palestinians. Such an incursion could potentially lead to an unthinkable humanitarian disaster, which is something that should be avoided.
While the Israeli government claims that its control over the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt is a reaction to the targeting of areas near the Karem Abu Salem crossing, Cairo believes that escalating and counter-escalating actions hinder efforts towards pacification. In this vein, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on May 8, expressing concern about the Israeli operation in the city of Rafah, south of Gaza, stating that this operation jeopardizes the ongoing efforts to achieve a lasting ceasefire within Gaza and viewing it as a serious threat to the lives of over one million Palestinians. Cairo therefore fiercely opposes the operation, especially in light of the possibility that it will drive Palestinians closer to Egypt’s border, putting Egypt under political and humanitarian pressure.
2. Utilizing a Ceasefire as an Initial Measure to Halt the War: Despite Israel’s consistent opposition to the cessation of hostilities, which Hamas demanded in return for a truce agreement, the preliminary agreement designates a provisional ceasefire as a pathway to a final resolution of the dispute during the third phase of the agreement. This is a win-win for Hamas and Israel, considering that Tel Aviv has recently lost the backing of the US government and the solidarity of the Israeli street—albeit, this is just a minor roadblock to the mainstream in the Yemeni-Israeli government.
Netanyahu is not the sole advocate for prolonging the war. Benny Gantz, a member of the War Council, also shares this perspective. Gantz believes that ceasing military operations without capturing Rafah would essentially allow 80% of the threat to persist, giving Hamas the chance to rebuild its capabilities. Furthermore, Israeli cities experience daily demonstrations led by the families of deceased Israeli soldiers who support the continuation of the conflict and impede efforts towards achieving pacification. Likewise, right-wing groups are putting a lot of pressure on the government to carry out the Rafah operation. Conversely, families of Israeli prisoners are demonstrating and urging the Prime Minister to accept the truce agreement. Egypt is strategically leveraging the existing division to impede the mobilization of support for the Israeli political leadership that advocates for the continuation of the war and obstructs the establishment of a ceasefire.
3. Delivering Humanitarian Assistance to Every Area of the Gaza Strip: According to Egyptian logic, a ceasefire would allow more humanitarian aid to reach the northern, southern, and central parts of the Strip via the various crossings, allowing for the delivery of medical aid, relief, and other necessities to the Palestinian people. Thus, in a statement issued on May 8, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged Israel to exercise the utmost restraint and abstain from escalating the situation during this crucial phase of the ongoing ceasefire negotiations. It also emphasized the need to protect the lives of Palestinian civilians, who have been subjected to an unparalleled humanitarian crisis since the start of the aggression against the Gaza Strip.
4. Considering Gaza Strip Reconstruction: Gaza’s reconstruction, or the “day after”—the period following the silencing of guns—is a major factor driving Egypt’s actions in favor of a truce agreement that shifts interactions from one of militarization and war to one of truce, reconstruction, and restoration of life. Now, Gaza has transformed into a no-go zone, as evidenced by unparalleled human casualties and extensive infrastructure destruction, to the extent that international estimations suggest reconstruction could persist for the next century if the rate of reconstruction follows the same trajectory as reconstruction endeavors in the aftermath of prior conflicts and wars.
Over the past forty years, Gaza’s human development—encompassing healthcare, education, the economy, and infrastructure—has been steadily declining, and 72% of the city’s residential buildings have been either entirely or partially destroyed. According to a report released by the United Nations in May, the estimated cost of reconstructing the Gaza Strip is approximately $40 billion. However, this figure is subject to change as the losses continue to accumulate during the ongoing conflict. Forty million tonnes of debris were accumulated. Thousands of bodies lie entombed beneath the debris. The psychological repercussions of the conflict on the civilian populace and the precipitous escalation of poverty within a brief timeframe pose significant challenges, which will contribute to a perilous development crisis that jeopardizes the future of forthcoming generations. Some analysts argue that the international community has not confronted such a challenge since the era of World War II.
This situation necessitates the implementation of a three-year temporary early recovery programme following the conclusion of the war. Arab countries and the United Nations Development Programme have recently engaged in discussions regarding the expeditious housing of displaced Palestinians in decent conditions and the restoration of their normal economic, social, health, and educational lives; they cannot afford to wait decades for reconstruction. A new Marshall Plan, like the massive US-sponsored programme to rebuild Europe following WWII, will be necessary for Gaza’s recovery. Nevertheless, there are significant concerns regarding the Western world’s readiness to collaborate with Arab countries in the mission of reconstructing Gaza, particularly in light of the ongoing internal conflicts within Arab countries, which demand attention for settlement and reconstruction.
5. Mitigating Tensions in Arab and Regional Relations: Due to the exorbitant expenses associated with warfare and conflicts, the region was on the verge of pursuing a path of pacification as an alternative to the prevailing state of tension that characterized intra-Arab relations, as well as Arab relations with regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Ethiopia. This has been manifested in the evolution of diplomatic ties between the Arab Quartet countries and Qatar subsequent to the Al-Ula Agreement, Syria’s reestablishment of membership in the League of Arab States and its participation in the recent Arab summit in Riyadh, the gradual resumption of Egypt and Turkey’s relations after a decade of strained relations since the Muslim Brotherhood regime’s downfall, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates experiencing a relative upsurge in their relations with Turkey, the signing of the Beijing-sponsored deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran to reestablish diplomatic relations, and ongoing discussions regarding Iran’s willingness to explore ways to fortify its relationship with Egypt.
However, following the October 7 attacks, the focus shifted towards restricting the conflict and stopping its expansion within the boundaries of what some people call “the unity of the battlefields.” In light of the current situation in Gaza, Egyptian officials frequently state in regional and international forums that there is a connection between regional stability and the events taking place in Gaza, as evidenced by the increase in conflict in the West Bank, Lebanon, and the Red Sea, which subsequently impacts international trade and the socio-economic conditions in each country in the region.
Speaking at the oath of office for his third term, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi stressed this, noting, “The past few years have clearly proven that the path to nation-building is not paved with roses. Fate has tested our nation’s resolve with challenges on multiple fronts: the domestic menace of terrorism, sudden global crises, and fierce international and regional wars raging around us. Those imposed unprecedented challenges, unparalleled in their magnitude and severity throughout Egypt’s modern history.”
Diverse Lines of Action
In this specific context and in order to be ready for the various scenarios, Egypt is making progress on multiple levels, as described below:
I. Putting the Egyptian army on high alert to handle any scenario that may arise along the strategic border lines, from the east following the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip, from the west following the multifaceted instability in Libya, or from the south, where the Sudanese Army Forces (SAF) are engaged in combat with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to control power. That’s why President Al-Sisi underscored the need to protect Egypt’s national security in light of the unstable regional and international environment during his inauguration speech for his third term.
II. Enhancing diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States in order to exert pressure on Israel not to squander the chance to negotiate a ceasefire that would permit the exchange of detainees and prisoners, halt hostilities for several weeks until a full-scale cessation, and build upon ongoing mediation endeavors in order to resolve this tense situation.
III. Maintaining coordination with the Arab parties—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan in particular—will help stop the conflict from escalating further and turning the region into a larger battle between Israel and the Iranian-led resistance axis. This will also help send signals to Israel from other Arab countries that a new strategy towards the Palestinians is necessary for regional normalization.
IV. Working to push both Israel and Hamas to make reciprocal concessions on crucial matters during the negotiation, as they are engaging in the negotiation from a position of vulnerability rather than strength, following over 200 days of warfare. On the one hand, the Israeli leadership has failed to accomplish its objectives in conducting the war. On the other hand, Hamas’ leadership, both domestically and internationally, did not comprehend the extent of the human and material damages to the Strip prior to initiating the October 7 attacks.
V. Underscoring the critical nature of accelerating the recognition of the Palestinian state and advancing the two-state solution as a foundation for a comprehensive solution of the Palestinian cause and the sole means of restoring stability and security in the region, while placing significant emphasis on the necessity of reforming the Palestinian Authority in order to enable it to effectively address the obstacles that beset the Palestinian cause.
