Before diving into any country’s or institution’s efforts to revive Palestinian reconciliation or assessing their outcomes, it’s crucial to extend full appreciation and support for these initiatives. Palestinian reconciliation has always been and will continue to be an essential obligation for everyone who understands its critical significance for the Palestinian people and their cause.
From this standpoint, it’s crucial to acknowledge China’s efforts in bringing together fourteen Palestinian factions between July 21 and 23, with the Chinese Foreign Minister actively participating in discussions that resulted in the so-called “Beijing Declaration,” signed by representatives and leaders of the involving Palestinian factions and aimed primarily at ending divisions and bolstering Palestinian unity.
Equally, Russia and Algeria merit thanks for their previous efforts in hosting similar meetings. When it comes to Egypt, its dedicated role in striving for Palestinian unity goes beyond mere thanks; it requires recognition of the fact that the Palestinian issue has been a significant aspect of Egypt’s national security priorities.
While I will not delve into the specifics or analyze the recent progress of Palestinian reconciliation in Beijing, it’s crucial to highlight the key principles outlined in the Beijing Declaration. These are:
- Upholding the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital
- Confirming the Palestinian people’s right to resist occupation
- Forming a temporary national reconciliation government, formed by consensus among Palestinian factions and the president’s decision, to exercise authority over the Palestinian territories and ensure the unity of Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem
- The government’s duties will include reconstructing the Strip and preparing for general elections.
- Towards enhancing the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization, there was an agreement to activate the Temporary Leadership Framework (TLF) for political decision-making partnership, as outlined in the National Accord Agreement signed in Cairo on May 4, 2011.
Now, it is fitting to move straight to an essential group of necessary questions related to the broader issue of Palestinian reconciliation, which are as follows:
- Does the Beijing Declaration introduce any new provisions that differ from the principles outlined in previous statements and efforts over the years, starting with the National Accord Agreement signed in Cairo in May 2011, which laid the groundwork for achieving a just reconciliation to end the persistent division and serve the interests of the Palestinian people?
- Why have the Palestinian factions failed to achieve reconciliation for 17 years, despite numerous agreements addressing all contentious issues and the tireless efforts of Egypt over the past decade and a half?
- Which factions have been obstructing reconciliation? Have these factions made any genuine or strategic changes in their positions, or are the changes merely tactical responses to current circumstances?
- Will the national unity government proposed by the Declaration be the magic key to solving the issue? Will it be a technocratic government? Will it have the authority needed to carry out its responsibilities, especially in the Gaza Strip? Who will be allowed to wield these powers over a ravaged territory? What will be the fate of the recently formed government?
- What will be the consequences of the Gaza war for the future of the Palestinian cause as a whole? Will Israel permit the return of the Palestinian National Authority and its new, temporary government to the Gaza Strip? What will be the political, military, and security situation in Gaza the day after the war ends?
- What will be the position of the Hamas movement post-war? What will be its political and military status? Will Hamas accept being out of power in the Gaza Strip after ruling alone for 17 years, or will it have preconditions or comply with the Palestinian Authority’s decisions and policies?
- How can Palestinian factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad be included in the Palestine Liberation Organization when they have not yet accepted its obligations, including the recognition of Israel? To what extent will the TLF exist, and what will be its limitations?
- What mechanisms will the factions employ to implement the principles of Palestinian reconciliation, considering the current obstacles such as the Gaza war and its aftermath, as well as the extremist positions of the Israeli government?
- How can presidential, parliamentary, and National Council elections be conducted given the current situation that complicates these processes more than some might anticipate?
- Is the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip feasible, and if so, how can it be accomplished? How can we secure the billions of dollars required for this endeavor, which seems highly challenging at present? What are the prerequisites for donor countries to participate in the reconstruction effort?
- How can the aspiration for an independent Palestinian state be realized when one part of the state, the Gaza Strip, is in ruins, while the other part, the West Bank, faces severe challenges such as Israeli efforts at Judaization, settlement expansion, and widespread violence—conditions that have intensified to levels not seen since the occupation began in 1967?
- Are intentions now genuinely pure and sincere, and has the threat become more acute after the Israeli war in Gaza? Or is the Beijing meeting merely another routine friendly gathering, akin to all previous and potential future meetings?
- Will the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and the Fatah movement, as well as the Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and some factions based in Syria, see positive developments in the near future? Or will it remain entrenched in the longstanding tension and mistrust that has characterized it so far?
- Have the Palestinian factions anticipated the potential outcomes of the US presidential elections, particularly if former President Donald Trump were to win? What would a resurgence of momentum in US-Israeli relations mean for them, especially concerning the possibility of the return of the controversial “Deal of the Century” and its implications for the Palestinian people?
Although the questions I’ve raised might seem to cast a shadow of skepticism or suggest a dim outlook, they are posed with the intention of sparking genuine reflection and action. It’s imperative that the leaders of the factions that endorsed the Beijing Declaration tackle these issues with earnestness and respond with true sincerity if they are genuinely committed to transforming the current turbulent and complex scene. Should these meetings prove to be mere “friendly gatherings,” any slender hope left for achieving Palestinian reconciliation and ending the division will be lost for good.
In short, I extend my appreciation to those who signed the Beijing Declaration and referenced the Cairo reconciliation agreement of May 2011. At this critical juncture, I urge all Palestinian leaders to transcend their differences and come together on fundamental principles that will protect the Palestinian people and their cause from serious threats of elimination that are currently underway. Only by putting aside self-serving partisan interests—which have led us to this self-inflicted crisis—can we prevent Israel from continuing to exploit Palestinian divisions for its own gain.
