Labyrinths of the French Political Landscape

A French government has been formed, yet it lacks a parliamentary majority, with only 210 National Assembly deputies out of 577 backing it. The New Popular Front alliance firmly opposes granting it any support, making its survival heavily reliant on the stance of the far-right National Rally party. Should the party choose to vote for a no-confidence motion, the government will likely collapse.

The challenges facing the government extend beyond this immediate reality, as its lifespan is uncertain—whether it will last a mere week or stretch to a decade. It also has no mandate to implement even minor internal reforms and has to navigate complex negotiations with a wide array of parties to pass any legislation.

In this piece, we highlight certain facts or factors that, alongside others, further complicate the situation.

General Scene Dynamics and Leftist Conduct

• The left-wing Popular Front alliance (made up of La France Insoumise, the Socialist Party, The Greens, the French Communist Party, and the New Anticapitalist Party) secured the highest number of seats in parliament.
• Marine Le Pen’s party, the National Rally, garnered the largest share of the vote.
• A significant portion of the French population backed two political forces, both advocating for unrealistic economic policies—mildly put—centered around increasing public spending without any substantial plans for raising revenue.
• The crux of the problem is this: any pragmatic policy will be seen as a betrayal of the voters’ mandate and a disregard for their views, whereas policies that align with their vote could trigger a severe financial and economic crisis.
• The situation worsened with La France Insoumise’s outright refusal to make any concessions or display any readiness to negotiate its economic program. It demanded what amounted to submission and support for impractical measures from the other political forces. This strategy worked as most of the members of the other left-wing factions were elected with the backing of La France Insoumise voters, allowing the party to impose its vision.
• While this stance might be seen as ideological political extremism, most observers—and I share this view—believe that the left has no true desire to govern. Instead, it has concealed this desire through its adamant refusal to engage with others. La France Insoumise aims to unseat the President and push for early presidential elections, banking on the idea that the center will fail to make it to the second round.
• A further layer of complexity arises from the fact that all political forces owe their victories to voters who supported other parties, yet cast their ballots for the candidate they believed could defeat someone they strongly opposed—usually the National Rally’s candidate, and sometimes those of the Greens or La France Insoumise.
• This stance of the Popular Front has led the centrist parties (affiliated with the president, although the situation has become more complicated) to seek an alliance with the Republican Right. They have been forced to accept the fact that the government’s survival now rests in the hands of the National Rally. If the far-right party decides to align with the left to topple the government, it will fall, and the challenges will continue to escalate.

The Government and Its Advocates

• The centrist coalition aligned with the president is made up of three main parties: the Renaissance party, the Horizons party, and the Democratic Movement party, along with a fourth, The Republicans.
• Long-standing and deep-rooted grudges exist between the Democratic Movement party and The Republicans, dating back to the 2012 elections. Last week, reports surfaced suggesting that the Democratic Movement was contemplating not joining the government due to objections over the inclusion of certain Republican Right figures. This move appears to have been a form of blackmailing to pressure for a bigger share of ministries.
• The Renaissance Party brings together both the center-right and center-left, but the center-left strongly opposes the Republican Right’s stance on immigration. The left wing has warned that it will withhold support for the government if it aligns with the policies of certain right-wing ministers.
• Within each of the four parties, there is at least one politician viewed as a “potential presidential candidate,” all of whom are likely keeping an eye on the upcoming presidential election and the possibility of early elections. Gabriel Attal (former Prime Minister), Edouard Philippe (former Prime Minister), François Bayrou (former presidential candidate), Laurent Wauquiez (former Minister), Gerald Darmanin (former Minister of the Interior), and perhaps Bruno Le Maire (former Minister of Finance) are all in the mix. If elections occur ahead of schedule, the current Prime Minister could very well consider running. The prospect of others considering a run cannot be ruled out either. The critical factor here is that the ambitions of these leaders are influencing—and will continue to influence— their political decisions and calculations. The possibility remains that one of them, along with their party, may decide to break away from the current government.
• President Macron and Prime Minister Barnier agreed to exclude potential presidential candidates from the ministerial cabinet, fearing they might use their positions to maneuver politically or adopt stances that would appeal to the public or their party’s voters. Ironically, I believe this exclusion inadvertently benefits these candidates, as the government—if it endures—will inevitably have to implement unpopular policies. Notably, one of these candidates, Laurent Wauquiez, sought the role of Minister of the Interior, hoping to champion the ‘firmness’ policies he advocates and possibly gain access to confidential documents and intelligence on other political forces. The president rejected his request and instead offered him the Ministry of Economics and Finance, a post that would require him to introduce unpopular measures. Wauquiez wisely declined to fall into that trap.
• I believe that the involvement of both Wauquiez and Attal in bargaining and what amounts to blackmail has damaged their standing in public opinion, especially since both allowed information to leak to the media. Meanwhile, others maneuvered quietly behind the scenes, keeping their similar actions hidden from the public eye. In contrast, the Prime Minister’s popularity has risen, as he appears to be the only one who has taken responsibility and is genuinely focused on the public interest.
• President Macron is no longer able to secure the loyalty of his inner circle. This issue predates his decision to dissolve parliament and stems primarily from the fact that he cannot run for a third term, as the constitution prohibits it. However, the dissolution has worsened the situation, as it was sudden and unilateral, made without consulting any party leaders. This has triggered a major political crisis that cost many seats in both parliament and government. While tactical or strategic alliances with the president are still possible, and some may seek his endorsement, the bond of loyalty has been severely weakened.
• The tensions in negotiating government formation and seat distribution arise from competing logics. The numerical strength argument favors the centrist parties that hold the lion’s share, with their representatives outnumbering the Republican Right by more than threefold. However, the Republican Right could have countered that public opinion demanded change and that keeping the ministry aligned with a Macronist stance—where most members are loyal to the president—contradicts its rejection of his policies. In the end, the formation of the government implies that the logic of numerical strength has triumphed over other considerations.
• It remains unclear how the government’s overall policies and the statement that will be presented to the National Assembly in early October will be shaped. We will address the budget issue in more detail below. Some reports suggest that the Prime Minister will consult with the leaders of the four main parties, but the specifics remain unknown—will the Prime Minister draft a declaration and then present it to the leaders, or will consultations occur before any drafting begins? While this question may appear minor, it indirectly touches on the evolving balance of power between the legislative and executive branches.
• It is evident that the President’s influence has waned, but he is likely to intensify his efforts to intervene, whether through mediation, stirring controversy, or proposing initiatives that could potentially succeed. However, many parties are apprehensive about the possibility of a poorly thought-out move or initiative, driven by the president’s desire to “remain at the forefront of the political stage.”
• The balance of power between the president and the prime minister currently leans somewhat in favor of the latter, largely because the president lacks viable alternatives as long as the left refuses to engage with him. This makes the threat of resignation—the Samson option—a powerful tool, and it appears that Barnier employed it at one stage of the negotiations on forming the government. Barnier has also worked to centralize a significant number of powers under his control; for instance, the Minister of Public Action and Accounts is no longer part of the Economics and Finance system but is now a minister delegated directly to the prime minister.
• A significant observation is that most ministers are categorized as “politicians”—parliamentarians with experience and knowledge of legislative processes—rather than being drawn from civil society or technocratic backgrounds. Additionally, the number of non-Parisians in the government is relatively high, suggesting they are expected to have a deeper understanding of public opinion trends across the country.
• Another key point is the clear reluctance to join the ministry, which has led several qualified individuals to decline the opportunity. This hesitation is likely driven by the uncertain lifespan of the government and the high probability that they would be compelled to implement unpopular measures.

The National Rally

• The National Rally party garnered the highest number of votes but was excluded from participating in any of the National Assembly’s committees.
• Does this suggest that the National Rally has an interest or desire to see the government fail or push the president toward resignation? The party’s calculations are shaped by several contradictory considerations. On the one hand, it undoubtedly benefits from the government’s failure, regardless of whether its policies tilt to the right or left. However, its greatest concern would be the success of a government that enacts right-wing policies in security and immigration, as this could bring the Republican Right back to the political forefront—a scenario that appears unlikely. On the other hand, the National Rally insists on acting with institutional respect and a sense of responsibility, in stark contrast to La France Insoumise, which aims to radically transform the system and actively fuels unrest.
• Additionally, the exclusion of the party’s representatives from all committees, combined with the hostile conduct of many other representatives, greatly benefits the party. This situation fuels its narrative of victimization, bolsters its complaint about the disrespect shown to its voters, and enables the party to abstain from governing—essentially absolving it of any responsibility for failure. Unlike the left, which has distanced itself while attempting to claim otherwise, the party makes no such effort.
• The party’s main issue is that the second round of legislative elections underscored the French people’s overwhelming rejection of its leadership. These elections also exposed several vulnerabilities in its platform—particularly those related to discriminating against dual nationals. Furthermore, the conduct of some of its candidates lent credibility to accusations that the party has not entirely abandoned its fascist or extremist roots, with claims that it still engages in dissimulation. In short, the party appears unprepared to contest new elections at this moment; it must either resolve these issues or convince the French to overlook them—an endeavor that will take time.
• Unless the left alters its strategy of outright rejecting any opportunity for the center, the government’s fate will remain firmly in the hands of the National Rally, which effectively holds the power to decide its survival or downfall. It is likely that, at some point, the party will withdraw confidence from the government. The real question remains: when will this happen?
• The situation calls for austerity measures at odds with the party’s policies. Will it stand against these measures or let the government implode under their weight? The party will most likely attempt to balance both options—voicing opposition to the measures while refraining from toppling the government, all the while using this stance as leverage to extract gains. However, mounting unrest on the streets may eventually force it to abandon this strategy and let the government fall.

Key Priorities: Navigating the Budget and Its Conflicts

France faces multiple critical challenges, and its government must swiftly address several pressing issues. These include the New Caledonia issue, immigration, and agriculture- and industry-related policies. The government is also grappling with significant opposition from various parties questioning its legitimacy, the absence of a majority in the National Assembly, and a media landscape that is largely hostile. While addressing some of these issues is an unavoidable responsibility, others represent a political necessity to ensure the government’s survival—balancing demands of the far right without alienating the center-left.

However, the most pressing issue is the budget, followed closely by the formulation of the government’s statement. France’s financial situation is dire, with a staggering €64 billion in debt interest payments due, and a chronic deficit that risks triggering punitive actions from the European Union. Worse still, the deficit has exceeded the projections of the previous government, further exacerbating the crisis.

Le Figaro reports that last year, the deficit had already reached 5.5% of GDP, a level not seen outside of crisis periods. The government had promised to reduce it to 5.1% this year. However, the latest estimates from the Ministry of Economics and Finance suggest that, without corrective action, the deficit would increase to 5.6% of GDP. Even more concerning, it could jump to 6.2% by 2025—far above the targeted 4.1% in the planned budget path—unless the government can secure €60 billion.

The situation has reached a point where it is too late to reverse course, largely due to the chaos triggered by the president’s decision to dissolve parliament. As a result, the government may be forced to rely on the studies and decisions made by the previous government. This situation risks fueling the narrative from the government’s opponents, who will claim that it is endorsing the policies and choices of the president and the political current that lost the elections.

Before the government formation was announced, the Ministry of Economics and Finance revealed that it had requested an extension from the European Commission to submit its plan for reducing the public deficit, which was originally due by September 20. France requested such an extension to ensure that the plan aligns with the 2025 Finance Bill. As a result, it is also possible that the submission of the Finance Bill, initially scheduled for October 1, will be delayed by about two weeks

Leaks reveal that the budgets allocated to defense and security are the only ones set to increase at a rate faster than inflation next year. In contrast, the policies most impacted by spending pressures include official development assistance (-18%, excluding inflation), sports (-11%), agriculture (-6%), overseas France (-4%), environment (-1%), and health (-0.8%).

However, it is evident that the clashes between administrations, ministries, and interest groups will be exceptionally intense.

Several experts argue that France is likely to make commitments to the European Commission and implement some reforms, but it will fall short of adhering to the roadmap it outlines. They note that this has been a recurring pattern in the past, though they caution that such optimism—believing radical reforms can be delayed—may be misplaced.

Conclusion

French observers have often ridiculed the German government for being a coalition of three parties with many internal differences. However, the current French government comprises representatives from four parties, each carrying a history of unresolved grudges, ruses, and conflicts, with its survival hinging on the tacit approval of a fifth party.

This government, already strained by deep divisions among its members, the president’s penchant for sudden measures and shocking interventions, and the personal ambitions of its supporters eyeing the next presidential elections, is navigating an unprecedented crisis, with escalating street protests, a severe financial crisis, and a host of urgent challenges, all while lacking a steadfast majority to offer unconditional support through thick and thin.

What further complicates the issue is that French politics has drifted away from its tradition of compromise and forging durable alliances, a culture that is essential in the absence of a governing majority. The current prime minister may be the only politician adept at navigating negotiations and balancing firm principles with strategic concessions, but his challenge lies in the declining popularity of his Gaullist, Catholic, and Conservative values, even though he retains the respect of significant segments of the public.