The recent tripartite summit in Asmara, where the leaders of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia convened during Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s visit to Eritrea on October 10, has garnered significant attention from analysts focused on the evolving dynamics in the Horn of Africa, particularly since this year has marked a pivotal shift in the dynamics of existing and governing interactions and alliances within the broader regional interactions in the Horn of Africa. The summit follows Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s visit to Egypt on February 24 and two visits by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to Egypt earlier this year. Together, these meetings signal a renewed effort to redefine bilateral and regional cooperation among the three countries.
This summit can be viewed through specific parameters and contexts, which we outline below.
I. The Egyptian-Somali Rapprochement
The memorandum of understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland heightened tensions in the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia, with Mogadishu viewing this development as a breach of its sovereignty, as it strives for the unification of its territories and the restoration of its state following decades of instability. In response, the Somali government took a firm stance against Ethiopia’s actions, a position clearly articulated by the Somali president in a parliamentary address the day after the agreement was signed. He condemned the memorandum as illegal and a blatant infringement of international law. On January 6, 2024, Sheikh Mohamud enacted legislation to annul the memorandum, and on April 4, the Council of Ministers of Somalia announced the closure of two Ethiopian consulates, one in Garowe in Puntland State and the other in Hargeisa in Somaliland.
Amid these rising tensions with Ethiopia, Somalia swiftly moved towards closer ties with Egypt, bolstered by Egypt’s strong support for Somalia’s security and stability. This backing was clear in Egypt’s public stance endorsing Somalia’s unity and sovereignty, which was followed by the Somali president’s two visits to Egypt this year, which reflected this alignment, with the first visit occurring on January 20, 2024, shortly after the onset of these tensions. During a joint press conference, the Egyptian president affirmed that Egypt would not permit any threat to Somalia or its people, and he expressed readiness to intervene if called upon, underscoring Somalia’s right to collective defense as an Arab League member.
Egyptian airlines expands its reach with new routes to Mogadishu and Djibouti
The Joint Defense Agreement, signed by both countries and ratified by the Somali Council of Ministers on July 19, 2024, followed the Egyptian Foreign Minister’s visit to Somalia and Djibouti on April 12, which also marked EgyptAir’s first flights to these countries. This visit laid the groundwork for political consultations on shared political and security concerns. This was later followed by Sheikh Mohamud’s second visit to Egypt on August 20, followed by Egypt’s delivery of military equipment to Somalia, with the first shipment arriving on August 27 and a second on September 23 as part of the defense agreement, under which Egypt also contributes to the support and training of Somali forces and participates in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Meanwhile, Somalia declared its opposition to the inclusion of Ethiopian forces in the mission, viewing Ethiopia’s past military involvement as a means to exert pressure on Somalia.
The tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia extended beyond the disagreement over the memorandum with Somaliland, as Ethiopia sought to escalate matters by strengthening ties with Somali federal states, in line with its traditional policy of leveraging political polarization within Somalia and fueling internal divisions within the country. In this context, a delegation from Puntland met with Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in Addis Ababa, and arms shipments were sent to the region, simultaneously with the arrival of Egyptian soldiers and military aid in Somalia. Additionally, voices opposing the Egyptian presence grew louder, especially in southwestern Somalia, in parallel with Somalia’s declared rejection of Ethiopian involvement in newly formed mission where Egyptian forces are taking the lead.
These developments marked the beginning of a new chapter in relations between the two countries, initiated by Sheikh Mohamud’s rise to power and his implementation of a balanced foreign policy that aims at leveraging support from all parties to assist Somalia while distancing Mogadishu from a policy of alliances and alignments adopted by his predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, which had an impact on straining relations between Egypt and Somalia. During Farmaajo’s administration, several policies emerged that were perceived as hostile towards Egypt, including the cancellation of the educational cooperation protocol between Somalia and Egypt in April 2020, as well as Somalia’s reservations in June 2020 regarding an Arab League decision urging Ethiopia not to initiate the filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) without an agreement with the two downstream countries.
Egyptian mission headquarters in Somalia
II. Prospects for Regional Cooperation
In response to the evolving developments, the three countries took steps to reshape their bilateral relations, necessitating a reassessment of the framework for regional cooperation. This shift was prompted by their shared perspectives on the regional crises, particularly in response to the Ethiopian memorandum of understanding signed on January 1 with the Somaliland region, through which Ethiopia sought to secure a Red Sea outlet in exchange for recognizing Somaliland as an independent state. This development provided Egypt with a chance to reestablish its presence in the region after an era characterized by a deterioration in regional relations.
1. Strategic Alliances in the Horn of Africa in 2018
The alliance between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia exemplified the regional peace and development model championed by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed as part of his political project launched in 2018, according to which he reshaped regional alliances, beginning with the landmark peace agreement with Eritrea on July 9, 2018, which put an end to decades of historical animosity over border disputes and ultimately earned him the Nobel Peace Prize.
As part of Ethiopia’s efforts to resolve regional conflicts and reshape the political landscape, Abiy Ahmed, following the peace agreement with Eritrea, accompanied the Eritrean president on multiple regional tours with the aim of fostering Eritrea’s reconciliation with neighboring countries, paving the way for its reintegration into the regional community and promoting regional harmony.
Following a summit in Asmara on September 5, 2018, that brought together Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia with the goal of reshaping the regional map, the three leaders pledged to form a joint tripartite coordination committee, reopen Ethiopia’s embassy in Eritrea. Following the summit, Abiy Ahmed visited the ports of Assab and Massawa, where Ethiopian ships have resumed docking. Furthermore, the three countries’ foreign ministers launched diplomatic initiatives to mend relations between Eritrea and Djibouti, marked by a tripartite visit to Djibouti the day after the summit.
This atmosphere fostered a growing rapprochement between Somalia and Eritrea, despite Somalia’s longstanding accusations that Eritrea harbored elements of the Somali al-Shabaab movement. Backed and orchestrated by Ethiopia, this rapprochement culminated in the 2018 trilateral security agreement between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, under which Eritrea secretly joined Ethiopia in operations against Tigray, while regional collaboration was also expanded to address counterterrorism efforts in Somalia.
Mirroring Ethiopia and Eritrea’s efforts, Eritrea signed an agreement with Somalia on July 30, 2018, during a landmark visit to Asmara by then-Somali President Farmaajo—the first Somali presidential visit since Eritrea’s independence. This agreement marked the resumption of diplomatic and fraternal ties after a 15-year hiatus and laid the groundwork for regional cooperation and integration by strengthening trade, investment, and collaboration in security and defense.
One of Ethiopia’s key aspirations was to drive regional economic cooperation and integration, primarily by addressing border disputes to enable smoother transit, open trade pathways, and build logistical links among regional countries. This vision sparked optimism around the growth of regional investments and development projects.
Ethiopia viewed alliances and a zero-problems approach as foundational to advancing regional integration within the Horn of Africa. Central to this vision were land and logistical connectivity projects anchored by port access, as seen in initiatives like the Horn of Africa Initiative and the infrastructure connectivity projects, such as the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, linking Ethiopia with Kenya and South Sudan.
Ethiopia’s agreements with Eritrea and Somalia aligned with this regional integration approach, aimed at easing its landlocked constraints and boosting its economic strength. With Eritrea, Ethiopia secured agreements to utilize the ports of Assab and Massawa, while in June 2018, an agreement with Somalia opened Ethiopian investments in four Somali seaports. Similarly, an agreement with Djibouti granted Ethiopia a share in the Port of Djibouti in exchange for shares in Ethiopian companies.
Thus, the Horn of Africa Initiative, launched in 2019 with the involvement of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, and Somalia, focused on promoting economic and trade integration across the region. Its primary objectives included infrastructure projects and economic corridors for energy and electricity, investment in port facilities, and the establishment of a unified digital market. Backed by international and regional financing institutions, this initiative highlights the Horn of Africa’s strategic importance.
2. Regional Aspirations Fueling Tensions
Despite the aspirations for peace in the Horn of Africa and the drive to resolve regional issues as part of a movement toward establishing a regional development bloc, which would allow countries to leverage shared resources and comparative advantages within key African economic blocs, and thus play a crucial role in supporting the continental trade and the economic transformation of regional states, Ethiopia’s strategic assessments, despite prioritizing growth and economic development, have been driven by regional leadership ambitions, leading to a reversal in policies supporting regional stability and conflict resolution.
For instance, Ethiopian initiatives to partner with Somaliland in 2018 had a very different outcome than the planned outcomes; rather, its actions have instead sown instability across the region. In May 2018, Ethiopia engaged with Somaliland to develop its ports alongside Dubai Ports, agreeing on a deal that granted Ethiopia a 19% stake, Dubai Ports a 51% share, and the Somaliland government a 31% share in the port. Ethiopia also struck another deal with Dubai Ports in May 2021 to upgrade the 260-kilometer land route connecting Addis Ababa to Somaliland’s port of Berbera. However, by June 2022, the Somaliland government announced that Ethiopia had forfeited its stake in Berbera port due to non-compliance with the terms of the agreement. This project was part of a broader initiative to enhance regional connectivity. Ethiopia’s plans for investment in Somali ports included the development of road networks linking Kismayo in southern Somalia to Ethiopia, as well as a road connecting Ethiopia to Hobyo port in the western region of Somalia, as well as investments in the ports of Port Sudan and Lamu in Kenya. These initiatives were designed to diversify Ethiopia’s trade routes and strengthen its position within regional supply chains.
Thus, the regional mobilization was not as much a result of cooperative and developmental ambitions as it was driven by pursuits to achieve strategic gains at the expense of regional stability. This was highlighted by the Two Waters Grand Strategy [In amharic: የሁለት ውኃዎች ዐቢይ ስትራቴጂ], published by the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs affiliated with the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2024, which underscored the significance of securing Ethiopian access to sea and river resources to break free from landlocked constraints—even if it meant confrontations with neighboring countries. A key aspect of these efforts involved Ethiopia’s move to recognize Somaliland’s independence, challenging Somalia’s efforts to restore national unity. Despite Ethiopia’s prior proposals for cooperation with Somaliland, its recent steps toward endorsing Somaliland’s sovereignty intensified the discord with Somalia, which perceives Ethiopia’s initiatives as more focused on regional dominance than on fostering stable relations in the region.
Ethiopia’s recent actions followed its unsuccessful attempts to achieve the rapprochement it had sought with Eritrea in 2018, as the celebratory moment of peace in the Horn of Africa quickly lost its luster, particularly as the Tigray conflict unfolded and concluded with the Pretoria Peace Agreement, contrary to the wishes of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki.
Border crossings between Ethiopia and Eritrea
The Tigray War wasn’t the sole obstacle to resolving the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, a historical bone of contention between the two countries. Since the signing of an agreement to reopen three border crossings—Zalambesa, Bure, and Rama—in September 2018, and the subsequent opening of the Humera-Om-Hajer crossing in January 2019, which granted Ethiopia access to the ports of Assab and Massawa, numerous hurdles have emerged, including the Tigray conflict, which hindered Abiy Ahmed’s ability to fulfill his promises, as the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) controlled the Badme area claimed by Eritrea. In response, Eritrea closed the crossings from its side. In December 2018, restrictions were imposed on the Zalambessa-Serha and Rama-Ksadika crossings. On January 16, 2019, both countries announced the establishment of commercial checkpoints at all four open border crossings. In February of the same year, the governments reaffirmed plans to reach a formal agreement to regulate trade and transport between the two countries.
The Humera-Om-Hajer crossing, opened in January 2019 to replace the previously closed crossings, became the primary route for most goods. However, it was closed in April of the same year. On April 22, the Bure-Debay crossing was also closed, indicating the fragility of the agreements reached.
It is no secret that all countries in the region have increasingly come to recognize the risks posed by Ethiopia’s current policies. Somali apprehensions extend well beyond Eritrea’s borders, and Djibouti was among the first to voice its concerns over Ethiopia’s actions and statements. As early as 2018, Abiy Ahmed’s regional initiatives sparked unease in Djibouti, a country whose economy heavily relies on its port facilities, amid Abiy’s agreements with Eritrea and Somalia to utilize their ports, as part of a strategy to diversify options, which heightened Djibouti’s concerns, leading it to offer its own ports as a means to ease regional tensions, despite the underlying strategic anxiety.
President Al-Sisi with his Eritrean counterpart (to his right) and Somali President (to his left)
3. Strategic Alliances in the Horn of Africa in 2024
Since mid-2022, President Sheikh Mohamud’s administration aimed to restore balance in foreign policy, signaling the potential for shifts in alliances within the Horn of Africa. A key aspect of President Mohamud’s strategy, marking a shift from Farmaajo’s policies, has been to mend relations with countries like Egypt and the UAE, whose ties with Somalia had soured in recent years.
Regarding Ethiopia, signs of a recalibrated Somali approach emerged when Sheikh Mohamud postponed his visit to Addis Ababa during his initial regional tour after taking office. Instead, he prioritized a visit to Egypt on July 25, 2022, signaling an intent to reshape existing regional dynamics. The warm reception of Sheikh Mohamud’s election by Tigray’s leadership, particularly Chairperson of the TPLF Debertsion Gebremichael, hinted at the emergence of new balances distinct from the previous years’ dynamics.
Driven by shared concerns, Somalia and Eritrea have deepened their rapprochement, especially after Eritrea voiced its disapproval of what it deemed excessive Ethiopian rhetoric. This shift prompted steps toward a regional stance countering Ethiopian moves. In November 2023, Somalia appointed its first ambassador to Eritrea, and in January this year, President Sheikh Mohamud prioritized Eritrea as his first visit, declaring Somalia’s intent to gain ally support against Ethiopia’s destabilizing efforts. In line with this, the Eritrean president affirmed his country’s solidarity with Somalia’s position on Ethiopia’s contentious pursuit of sea access.
More than two years prior, despite the Eritrean president’s absence at his inauguration in June 2022, President Sheikh Mohamud embarked on a diplomatic tour starting with a visit to Eritrea on July 12, followed by his first trip to Egypt on July 25. This regional outreach included additional visits to Kenya on July 15, Djibouti on July 16, and Tanzania on July 21, aimed at initiating a new phase of regional cooperation and enhancing trade and economic partnerships.
During his inaugural four-day visit to Eritrea, President Sheikh Mohamud signed a seven-point agreement with President Afwerki, focusing on strengthening ties and expanding economic and cultural collaboration. The agreement covered key areas like trade, water security, agriculture, fisheries, health, and education, alongside arts, sports, and technology. It also emphasized bolstering security and defense cooperation to sustain peace and stability.
While in Eritrea, Sheikh Mohamud conducted a visit to the Somali units secretly training in Eritrea, sent by his predecessor Farmajo under the security agreements made during his administration for cooperation, within the framework of the regional alliances that emerged at that time. Notably, Eritrea had delayed their return to Somalia to utilize them as planned in the fight against Al-Shabaab, an issue Sheikh Mohamud pledged to resolve with Eritrean leaders.
Amid the backdrop of recent regional transformations, Egyptian-Eritrean relations underwent a notable shift, having previously been marked by a certain detachment during the period of rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. However, as tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea began to resurface—especially following the resolution of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and escalating fears of renewed direct confrontation between the two countries since November 2022 and throughout 2023—Eritrea has once again shown a willingness to align its viewpoints with Egypt, particularly at the highest levels of political leadership, reflecting a reinvigorated diplomatic partnership.
Isaias Afwerki’s most recent trip to Egypt occurred in February of this year, following his last visit in July 2020. This marked his fifth visit since 2013 and his twenty-fifth since Eritrea gained independence. His latest journey coincided with a series of unfolding developments in the region, particularly the crisis in Sudan, as both countries seek to align their strategies for addressing the situation.
On September 16, Major General Abbas Kamel, the former head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, along with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Badr Abdel-Aati, visited Eritrea to discuss recent developments in the Horn of Africa and the challenges facing the Red Sea region, a visit that coincided with a meeting of the foreign ministers from Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia, held on the sidelines of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Following this, President Al-Sisi visited Eritrea on October 10, joined by his Somali counterpart, Sheikh Mohamud. Their discussions led to bilateral and tripartite declarations, emphasizing the necessity for enhanced security coordination and regional cooperation among the three countries across various sectors.
This Egyptian-Eritrean rapprochement unfolded alongside a widening divide between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which led to the Eritrean Civil Aviation Authority suspending Ethiopian Airlines starting September 30, 2024, due to concerns about safety violations affecting Eritrean passengers, according to official statements. This action came after flights between the two countries were resumed in 2018, following a twenty-year hiatus.
The tripartite meeting of the three leaders highlighted their commitment to coordinating efforts concerning regional developments. The joint statement released following the summit underscored the three countries’ agreement to work together on the crisis in Sudan and the stability of Somalia. It also emphasized the need for collaboration among coastal countries along the Red Sea, along with a shared understanding of the importance of promoting regional development and economic cooperation while countering initiatives that could undermine regional stability.
In conclusion, the evolving dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the accompanying shifts in alliances reflect a pattern of increasing regional polarization, which directly influences efforts toward regional integration. There exists a direct relationship between political security and stability and economic cooperation and integration. Although economic cooperation and integration initiatives are intended to bolster political and security stability, it is primarily political polarization that hinders efforts for stability and development. At times, economic ambitions driven by aspirations for regional hegemony can lead to instability, as illustrated by Ethiopia’s attempts to invest in regional ports—not with the intent of promoting regional development or escaping its landlocked predicament, but rather to assert regional leadership backed by economic power.
This situation necessitates that all regional integration projects, at the political level, be coupled with initiatives that support regional economic development; otherwise, bilateral and tripartite relations may contribute to tension rather than serve as a robust basis for stability and integration. As such, it is crucial for the Egyptian-Eritrean-Somali consensus to develop strategies for regional economic integration, considering the alternative projects already underway, while ensuring these strategies encompass goals that include other regional countries, so that their rapprochement transcends a mere political alliance and is anchored in sustainable objectives.
