By using ECSS site, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.
Accept
ECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic StudiesECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies
  • Home
  • International Relations
    International Relations
    Show More
    Top News
    Another obstacle on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam?
    June 5, 2020
    Varied paths of reform in Africa
    March 22, 2019
    G20 Membership Justified: Africa and the Road to the G20
    June 14, 2020
    Latest News
    Power Play: Why Is Azerbaijan Setting Its Sights on the Horn of Africa?
    May 22, 2025
    Trump’s Gulf Tour: US Economic Gains and Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape
    May 21, 2025
    The Future of the India-Pakistan Ceasefire
    May 19, 2025
    Trump’s Deal-Driven Approach: Priority Issues in His Middle East Visit
    May 14, 2025
  • Defense & Security
    Defense & Security
    Show More
    Top News
    A Multi-dimensional Affair: Women and Terrorism in Africa
    June 14, 2020
    On deradicalisation: Marc Sageman and the psychology of jihadists
    June 22, 2020
    Assessing Deterrent Measures and the Prospects of War: US Military Movement in the Gulf to Confront Iran
    June 22, 2020
    Latest News
    Navigating Security and Diplomacy: What Russia’s Delisting of the Taliban Means for Bilateral Ties
    May 17, 2025
    Lakurawa: Armed Bandit Violence in Nigeria
    May 12, 2025
    Europe amid US–Iran Escalation: Can It Play the Diplomat or Become Entangled in the Crisis?
    April 13, 2025
    Exploring Alternatives: What’s Next for Russia’s Military Influence in Syria?
    March 27, 2025
  • Public Policy
    Public Policy
    Show More
    Top News
    Sinai: A Strategy for Development amid Fighting Terrorism
    June 17, 2020
    Egypt’s Comprehensive Vision for Human Rights
    June 22, 2020
    The Right to Health in Egypt
    June 22, 2020
    Latest News
    Weaponization of Resources: The Role of Rare Earth Metals in the US-China Trade War
    May 25, 2025
    The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: A Catalyst or a Challenge for Egypt’s Export Ambitions?
    May 15, 2025
    The Suez Canal amidst Global Competition (3): National Strides Outpacing Time
    April 29, 2025
    Gaza’s Changing Demographics: The Toll of War and Blockade
    March 9, 2025
  • Analysis
    • Opinion
    • Analysis
    • Situation Assessment
    • Readings
  • Activities
    • Conferences
    • ECSS Agenda
    • Panel Discussion
    • Seminar
    • Workshops
  • ECSS Shop
  • العربية
  • Defense & Security
  • International Relations
  • Public Policy
All Rights Reserved to ECSS © 2022,
Reading: Washington and Tehran: Prospects of De-escalation or Confrontation
Share
Notification Show More
Latest News
Weaponization of Resources: The Role of Rare Earth Metals in the US-China Trade War
Economic & Energy Studies
Power Play: Why Is Azerbaijan Setting Its Sights on the Horn of Africa?
Asian Studies Others
Trump’s Gulf Tour: US Economic Gains and Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape
Arab & Regional Studies
The Future of the India-Pakistan Ceasefire
Asian Studies
Navigating Security and Diplomacy: What Russia’s Delisting of the Taliban Means for Bilateral Ties
Terrorism & Armed Conflict
Aa
ECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic StudiesECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies
Aa
  • اللغة العربية
  • International Relations
  • Defense & Security
  • Special Edition
  • Public Policy
  • Analysis
  • Activities & Events
  • Home
  • اللغة العربية
  • Categories
    • International Relations
    • Defense & Security
    • Public Policy
    • Analysis
    • Special Edition
    • Activities & Events
    • Opinions Articles
  • Bookmarks
Follow US
  • Advertise
All Rights Reserved to ECSS © 2022, Powered by EgyptYo Business Services.
American Studies

Washington and Tehran: Prospects of De-escalation or Confrontation

Dr.Maha Allam
Last updated: 2025/05/06 at 1:09 PM
Dr.Maha Allam
Share
16 Min Read
SHARE

Contents
Talks amid War of Words and Maximum PressurePotential ScenariosScenario One: Pressure for a DealScenario 2: A Military Strike to Secure an AgreementScenario 3: All-Out War against Iran

The initial round of talks between the United States and Iran wrapped up on Saturday, April 12, in an atmosphere both sides described as “very positive and constructive,” with an agreement to resume discussions on April 19. The negotiations were conducted indirectly, as Tehran insisted, rather than face-to-face, as US President Donald Trump had hoped. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Ismail Baghaei, clarified that each delegation met in separate rooms, exchanging messages through Oman’s Foreign Minister, except for a brief direct encounter between the delegations after the indirect talks concluded. Media reports suggest Trump is eager to move swiftly toward an agreement, despite repeated threats to resort to military measures if the talks falter. This comes amid Iran’s efforts to ease sanctions and US demands to curb Iran’s nuclear program, against a backdrop of escalating regional tensions fueled by Israel’s unrestrained actions. The unfolding scene raises questions about the likelihood of either escalation or détente between Washington and Tehran as these talks progress.

Talks amid War of Words and Maximum Pressure

On February 4, 2025, Trump announced his intent to reinstate the “maximum pressure” policy in response to Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons. Tammy Bruce, the US State Department spokesperson, underscored that Washington “will use all tools at our disposal to hold the regime accountable for its destabilizing activities and pursuit of nuclear weapons that threaten the civilized world.” In line with this, Washington imposed sanctions on a fleet of ships and an international network responsible for funneling illicit revenues to Iran’s military. The Treasury Department clarified that the sanctions targeted individuals and companies in countries including China, India, and the UAE, while simultaneously imposing new sanctions on six entities based in Hong Kong and China for their involvement in a network procuring Iranian drones.

In contrast, in a post on his Truth Social account, Trump dismissed reports claiming that the United States, working in conjunction with Israel, is going to blow Iran into smithereens” as “greatly exaggerated.” He emphasized his desire to see Iran “great and successful, but one that cannot have nuclear weapons.” Going further, Trump expressed his eagerness to work toward a “peaceful nuclear agreement that will allow Iran to develop and prosper peacefully.” He called for immediate action to begin crafting this deal and even proposed hosting a “grand celebration” in the Middle East upon its signing and completion. Iran, however, rebuffed Trump’s proposal, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei rejecting the idea of negotiating a new agreement.

Breaking from his rhetoric of isolationism and reluctance to engage militarily overseas, the Trump administration carried out intense airstrikes on March 15 targeting the Iran-supported Houthi group, Tehran’s sole proxy still actively operating. In a post on Truth Social, Trump made it clear he would not tolerate Houthi assaults on US vessels, promising to deploy crushing force to meet his goals and warning that Iran would “bear responsibility for any further Houthi attacks.” National Security Advisor Mike Waltz also stated that the United States could hit Iranian targets in Yemen as part of its offensive against the Houthis.

In an unexpected revelation during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office on April 8, Trump told reporters that “direct talks with Tehran have begun,” referencing a meeting that was planned for Saturday, April 12. He added that he believes “everyone agrees reaching an agreement would be the best outcome.” Reinforcing this, White House spokesperson Caroline Leavitt stated during a press briefing that Trump has said the United States would hold “direct” talks with Iran on Saturday to discuss a new nuclear deal. She emphasized that the president had made it clear to the Iranians and they need to make a choice—they can reach a deal and negotiate, or they’ll have to pay a price. In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran prefers “indirect talks” with Washington “to avoid pressure and threats.” Iran’s IRNA news agency quoted Araghchi as saying, “Talks with the US are indirect; we do not accept any other method.”

The US delegation, under envoy Steve Witkoff, and the Iranian delegation, led by Abbas Araghchi, landed in Muscat, Oman, on April 12. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson reaffirmed that the Iranian team was there “for indirect talks.” On the other hand, Trump threatened military action should the negotiations fail. Tehran, in turn, issued a stern warning to neighboring countries with US bases, stating they would face “severe consequences” if they supported any American military strike on Iran.

During a visit to Abu Dhabi, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright declared that the United States is ready to escalate pressure on Tehran by cutting off its oil exports, a move aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear activities. He noted his belief that US allies in the Gulf are “deeply concerned” about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and align with Washington’s stance. At the same time, the United States imposed sanctions on five entities involved in running and supervising Iran’s nuclear efforts, including the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and its subsidiary, the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). A State Department statement underscored that the United States “will continue to hold accountable those who seek to support Iran’s nuclear program.”

In a statement released on IsraelArabic, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid out Israel’s demands for any potential agreement with Iran before talks between Washington and Tehran started. “We are in full agreement that Iran must never possess nuclear weapons,” Netanyahu declared. “This can be done by agreement, but only if this agreement is Libyan style: They go in, blow up the installations, dismantle all of the equipment, under American supervision.” He added that if Iran dragged out the talks,” the alternative would be a “military” response.

Potential Scenarios

Throughout his campaign, Trump criticized Biden for weakening the “maximum pressure” approach of his first term through lax sanctions enforcement. He further blamed Biden’s “soft” stance on Tehran as the main driver behind the October 7, 2023, attack. While Trump’s initial presidency offers a blueprint for his Iran strategy in his second term, evolving regional dynamics could steer Washington’s new approach. These include Israel’s aggressive regional posture, Iran’s strategic fragility, and Tehran’s moves to reconcile with its neighbors, factors that cause the landscape to become far more convoluted, complicating efforts to analyze the current negotiations and their likely outcomes.  This complexity can be viewed through three potential scenarios:

Scenario One: Pressure for a Deal

This scenario hinges on the premise that Trump’s central aim is to clinch a new deal, fueled by his drive for quick wins and surprising diplomatic coups, coupled with a cautious approach to military tools and a business-minded reluctance to shoulder costs, particularly in security and defense, which has been evidenced by his call for a  nuclear peace deal” that lets Iran “develop and prosper” peacefully. The scenario also aligns with regional states’ desires to contain tensions and prevent further escalation, as seen in Iran’s open lines of communication with Gulf states, the reestablishment of Iran-Saudi diplomatic relations, Iran’s attendance at the Arab-Islamic Summit, and the Saudi Chief of Staff’s visit to Tehran, among other signs.

Although reaching an agreement is the goal, Trump wields “maximum pressure” for two key purposes: first, to prevent Iran from dragging its feet or buying time, and second, to force Tehran into a deal shaped by US demands. Concurrently, Trump offers reassurances to Iran’s leadership, signaling that Washington does not seek regime change, thus enticing Tehran to the negotiating table. This tactic exploits the Iranian regime’s priorities—securing its longevity while facing intensified economic chokeholds. Some observers argue that Trump’s seemingly inconsistent rhetoric is a deliberate part of his bargaining strategy, aimed at keeping opponents unsettled and under constant pressure.

Scenario 2: A Military Strike to Secure an Agreement

This scenario rests on the premise that the “maximum pressure” strategy, in its present form, may fall short, prompting Washington to escalate with a limited military campaign as the next step in its high-stakes pressure on Iran. The scenario is rooted in the notion that the increased US military buildup in the region and attacks on Yemen’s Houthis are a signal to Iran, pressing it to rejoin negotiations on US terms. It, thus, reflects Trump’s “peace through strength” doctrine, employed across multiple fronts. This could mean precise strikes on Iranian targets, not just the Houthis, to dismantle Tehran’s long-game tactics and insistence on indirect talks. The envisioned military action or limited war might mirror the strikes of April and October 2024, likely executed by Israel with US backing.

Although regional states would likely reject military escalation against Tehran, such a move would satisfy Israel to some extent. In February 2025, al-Hurra reported US intelligence assessments indicating Israel’s inclination to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities this year, capitalizing on Iran’s current vulnerabilities. The risk of this scenario lies in the challenge of predicting Iran’s tolerance limit. Instead of guaranteeing Iran’s return to the negotiating table, it could inadvertently drag the entire region into a quagmire of disorder.

Scenario 3: All-Out War against Iran

Over the past two decades, US presidents have pursued deterrence against Iran through diplomacy and sanctions, steering clear of direct military attacks on Iranian soil. Yet, Israel’s effective strikes on Tehran’s proxies and disruption of Iran’s regional network have upended this strategy, proving that Iran’s regional threat can be further dismantled. This scenario is based on assessments that the United States is gearing up for a full-scale assault on Iran, evidenced by a ramped-up military presence in the region—including additional B-2 stealth bombers, the deployment of the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier, and the extended deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman. Recent spikes in US aerial surveillance off Iran’s coast add weight to this theory, as do US air operations in Yemen, viewed as a “rehearsal” or “field test” for targeting Iran itself.

This scenario is bolstered by Israel’s push to urge the United States to capitalize on Iran’s current strategic vulnerabilities to permanently eliminate the threat it poses. It also draws support from segments of the American Christian right, who frame the regional escalation as part of an “end-times battle,” with some evangelical figures claiming “we are on the brink of the Second Coming.” Meanwhile, Tehran’s rejection of U.S. conditions and its continued “time-buying” strategy could provoke a reckless response from Trump, particularly given his fixation on achieving swift victories. However, this scenario carries immense costs—not only in terms of financial expenditure but also the broader toll on the region, driven in part by Iran’s reaction. Should Tehran perceive an existential threat, it could retaliate by launching attacks from all its “missile cities” that survive initial strikes.

In short, an initial analysis points to the first scenario as the most probable, but shifting dynamics on the ground suggest that all outcomes are possible, especially in light of the charged regional interactions and the pervasive uncertainty and confusion shaping perspectives. Predicting the Trump administration’s position on the region with certainty is difficult, as a stark division within the administration over renewed Middle East involvement has emerged. Signal leaks regarding US attacks on Yemen’s Houthis exposed Vice President JD Vance as the figurehead of the isolationist camp, contrasted by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s leadership of the confrontational approach. This split was commented on by Matthew Petti, assistant editor at Reason magazine, who told Al Jazeera via text, “the newfound aversion to foreign wars, especially in the Middle East, has sat uncomfortably with the right-wing cultural affinity for Israel.” He added that the US far right is specifically riven with internal divisions, torn between advocating for isolationism and safeguarding Israel.

Related Posts

Trump’s Deal-Driven Approach: Priority Issues in His Middle East Visit

A Polarizing Administration: The Thorny Aspects of Trump’s Second Term

The Harris-Trump Debate: A War of Words Exposing Stark Contradictions

Attempted Assassination of Trump: The Impact of Polarization and Political Violence in the US

Dr.Maha Allam May 6, 2025
Share this Article
Facebook Twitter Whatsapp Whatsapp LinkedIn Telegram Email Copy Link Print
Dr.Maha Allam
By Dr.Maha Allam
Head of American Studies Unit

Stay Connected

Facebook Like
Twitter Follow
Instagram Follow
Youtube Subscribe

Latest Articles

The Inside Story of the Tigray Humanitarian Crisis
International Relations August 4, 2021
Gains with Strings Attached: Demarcating the Lebanon-Israel Land Border
Arab & Regional Studies May 6, 2025
Explaining the Rise of Daesh in Syria
Terrorism & Armed Conflict August 26, 2023
World shifts
Publications June 1, 2020

Latest Tweets

International Relations

  • African Studies
  • American Studies
  • Arab & Regional Studies
  • Asian Studies
  • European Studies
  • Palestinian & Israeli Studies

Defence & Security

  • Armament
  • Cyber Security
  • Extremism
  • Terrorism & Armed Conflict

Public Policies

  • Development & Society
  • Economic & Energy Studies
  • Egypt & World Stats
  • Media Studies
  • Public Opinion
  • Women & Family Studies

All Rights Reserved to Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies - ECSS © 2023

Removed from reading list

Undo
Welcome Back!

Sign in to your account

Lost your password?