On May 10, US President Donald Trump announced that India and Pakistan had agreed to an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, facilitated by US-mediated talks. Pakistan later confirmed the agreement, with India adding that both sides would halt all military actions—on land, air, and sea—starting at 5:00 PM IST, with further discussions scheduled for May 12.
This announcement quelled fears of the recent escalation spiraling into an all-out war between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, a conflict that could have plunged not only South Asia but the entire world into deeper uncertainty and instability.
The Escalation’s Roots
This flare-up is the latest chapter in the decades-long India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, where the Indian-administered region periodically faces terrorist attacks. India attributes these to Pakistan-based militant groups, accusing Islamabad of tacitly supporting them—a charge Pakistan consistently denies.
The current escalation traces back to the April 22 Pahalgam terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, which killed at least 26 tourists (25 Indian nationals and one Nepali). New Delhi blamed the Pakistan-based group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) for the attack and accused Islamabad of supporting cross-border terrorism.
In response, India’s Ministry of External Affairs swiftly announced escalatory measures within hours of the attack. These included barring Pakistani citizens from traveling to India under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Visa Exemption Scheme, reducing Pakistan’s diplomatic presence, declaring Pakistani defense, naval, and air advisors at the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi persona non grata, and withdrawing India’s own defense, naval, and air advisors from its High Commission in Islamabad, effectively abolishing these roles in both missions.
Pakistan condemned these measures as unilateral, unjust, and legally baseless, particularly in the absence of credible investigations or evidence linking it to the attack. In retaliation, Pakistan mirrored India’s actions, closed its airspace to all Indian-owned or operated airlines, and suspended all trade with India, including transactions involving third countries via Pakistan.
The most alarming step came when India suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, stating it would remain on hold “until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.” This treaty, brokered by the World Bank and resilient through three wars (1965, 1971, and 1999), is critical to regional stability. India’s suspension introduces a dangerous new variable, threatening to fuel the enduring conflict.
Pakistan vehemently rejected the move, warning that any attempt to halt or divert water flows allocated to it under the Treaty would be considered an act of war, to which it would respond with full force. Pakistan also suspended all bilateral agreements with India, including the 1972 Simla Agreement, which aimed to end hostilities and normalize relations, until India ceases its “evident instigation of terrorism inside Pakistan, cross-border killings, and disregard for international law and UN resolutions on Kashmir.”
In response to India’s accusations of supporting terrorist groups, Pakistan repeatedly asserted it possesses concrete evidence of India-sponsored terrorism within Pakistani borders. On April 30, Pakistan’s military spokesperson, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, held a press conference, detailing what he described as “India’s execution of terrorism inside Pakistan.” He cited intelligence indicating that India has activated its terrorist networks to carry out attacks within Pakistan.
By the dawn of May 7, India announced the launch of Operation Sindoor, targeting nine sites in Pakistan, which New Delhi described as “terrorist infrastructure.” India emphasized that the operation was “focused, deliberate, and non-escalatory in nature,” aimed exclusively at terrorist facilities. In contrast, Pakistan’s Defense Minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, asserted that all targeted sites were civilian, including two mosques, and not militant camps. The Pakistani military claimed it downed five Indian fighter jets in India’s Punjab state and Indian-administered Kashmir, while India acknowledged losing at least two warplanes within its borders but did not specify the cause of their crashes.
Since then, heavy artillery bombardment has persisted across the Line of Control (LoC) separating Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir, resulting in dozens of civilian deaths and injuries on both sides. This continued until the morning of May 10 when Pakistan’s military announced the start of Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos, targeting an Indian missile storage facility and airbases in Pathankot and Udhampur. This followed India’s launch of missile strikes on three Pakistani airbases. According to Pakistani military sources, their forces struck 36 different targets in India.
Toward a Ceasefire
Since the late 1990s, whenever India and Pakistan have teetered on the brink of all-out war, intensive mediation and diplomatic efforts—often led by the United States—have succeeded in de-escalating tensions. This pattern is evident in several key moments of their conflict.
In 1999, US mediation ended the Kargil War, sparked by Pakistani forces crossing the LoC into Indian-administered Kashmir. Following the 2001 attack on the Parliament of India by terrorists allegedly linked to Pakistan-based LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed, US diplomacy averted war. Similarly, American intervention after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, carried out by LeT-linked terrorists and resulting in 166 deaths, helped prevent escalation. In 2019, US diplomatic pressure defused tensions following the Pulwama attack, which killed 40 Indian security personnel. As then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo noted, few realized how close the India-Pakistan rivalry came to nuclear conflict in February 2019.
During the latest escalation, the United States initially showed little interest in intervening. However, according to a Guardian report citing Pakistani security and intelligence officials, as both sides intensified the conflict, the US administration recognized the urgent need to act. The escalation, particularly after India’s strikes on three Pakistani airbases, posed a global threat, with the nuclear risk becoming “a very real possibility.”
Consequently, President Trump tasked Secretary of State Mark Rubio with engaging Pakistan and Vice President JD Vance with communicating with India. By 02:30 PM on May 10, the military operations chiefs of Pakistan and India spoke by phone for the first time since hostilities began, agreeing to initiate a ceasefire at 04:00 PM. However, reports of cross-border firing and drone activity along the LoC delayed implementation until 05:00 PM.
Since then, India and Pakistan have offered divergent accounts of the agreement, the role of international mediation, and the future of talks. India’s Director General of Military Operations claimed that on May 10, he received a message from his Pakistani counterpart seeking communications. Conversely, Pakistan’s military spokesperson, Lieutenant General Chaudhry, stated during a May 11 press conference that India requested the ceasefire after May 8 and 9, following Pakistan’s military operation. Pakistan responded only after executing its retaliation, Chaudhry added, noting that it engaged with international stakeholders post-operation and agreed to the ceasefire request.
A second point of divergence concerns the role of international mediation. India downplayed mediation, insisting the ceasefire resulted from direct bilateral talks with Pakistan. Pakistan, however, emphasized its centrality, with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif thanking President Trump for his “sincere” role, alongside Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, the United Kingdom, the UN Secretary-General, and others who contributed to the ceasefire.
A third difference lies in how each side characterizes the agreement. Pakistan describes it as a formal ceasefire agreement, while India’s Foreign Minister referred to it as an “understanding” on halting military actions, suggesting India views it as a non-binding arrangement. This aligns with India’s official rhetoric, which emphasizes continued monitoring of Pakistan’s behavior.
The fourth divergence pertains to the scope of future talks. India insists discussions will focus solely on securing the ceasefire, whereas Pakistan hopes they will address India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty.
Defining Factors of the Ceasefire
Several factors may ensure both India and Pakistan adhere to de-escalation and maintain the ceasefire:
Recognizing the Limits of Escalation: Despite mutual accusations of violating the ceasefire agreement or understanding, both sides have reaffirmed their commitment to halting hostilities and exercising restraint. This signals a shared desire to avoid reigniting the cycle of escalation, content with the warning messages and advanced military capabilities demonstrated through their reciprocal strikes. India, for instance, sought to reinforce its post-2016 doctrine of responding decisively to terrorist attacks on its soil. Operation Sindoor underscores the Indian military’s readiness to target any part of Pakistani territory as long as Islamabad’s alleged support for anti-India terrorist groups persists. Pakistan, in turn, targeted Indian military bases to showcase its retaliatory capacity.
As such, both nuclear powers inflicted measured damage on each other, avoiding escalation into a major war. They recognize that neither can achieve total victory without causing catastrophic regional destruction. For Pakistan, the economic toll of such a conflict would be unbearable amid its ongoing economic crisis, which it is addressing through cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Just a day before the ceasefire announcement, the IMF approved a $1.4 billion funding tranche for Islamabad.
A full-scale war would jeopardize Pakistan’s IMF partnership, undermining investor confidence and stalling major infrastructure projects, such as those under China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly, a major war would derail India’s ambition to become a global manufacturing hub. Moreover, India may prefer to avoid diverting military resources to a prolonged conflict with Pakistan while its border dispute with China remains unresolved. Although India and China reached an agreement in October 2024 on coordinated border patrols, improving bilateral ties somewhat, US-China competition could complicate this progress.
The Appeal of Victory Narratives: During the escalation, both India and Pakistan emphasized the effectiveness of their strikes, enabling each to claim victory upon agreeing to the ceasefire. India promoted its success in damaging Pakistani bases and destroying a radar system in Lahore. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh declared that “the roar of Indian forces reached Rawalpindi, the very headquarters of the Pakistani Army.” Pakistan, meanwhile, highlighted its strikes on Indian military targets and the downing of five Indian fighter jets.
These victory narratives resonate with rising nationalism in both countries, bolstering their leaderships. In India, media outlets hailed Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a “hero” unafraid of external challenges. In Pakistan, the escalation and accompanying rhetoric unified the public behind the military, healing a prior rift between the Pakistani leadership and citizens. This disconnect, fueled by public protests demanding better economic conditions and an end to political polarization following the removal and arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan—Pakistan’s most influential political figure—had intensified. Khan faces over 100 charges in Pakistani courts.
Sustained International Pressure: Despite India’s denial, the US announcement of its mediation, after initial reluctance to intervene, reflects Washington’s recognition of the dangers of continued escalation and the risk of a major war. India is a key pillar of the US strategy to counter China, with Vice President JD Vance stating during a recent visit that the US-India relationship “will shape the 21st century.” Meanwhile, the escalation highlighted the battlefield effectiveness of Chinese weaponry, potentially boosting global demand for it and impacting US arms sales negatively.
While China might gain from heightened tensions, a broader India-Pakistan conflict would destabilize the region, harming Beijing’s interests, particularly in Pakistan. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a cornerstone of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has faced implementation delays but remains a priority for Beijing, which is unlikely to abandon its investment.
Potential Pathways Forward
Both India and Pakistan describe the follow-up talks after the ceasefire announcement as low-level and technical, aimed at ensuring continued compliance with the ceasefire. According to Lieutenant General Rajiv Ghai, India’s Director General of Military Operations, “reaching understandings on this may take time to bear fruit.”
The talks are unlikely to address resolving the Kashmir dispute. Despite Pakistani hopes, fueled by US President Donald Trump’s expressed willingness to work with both sides “to see if a solution on Kashmir can be reached,” India firmly rejects international mediation, insisting the issue remains a bilateral matter with Pakistan. This stance was evident in official and public Indian reactions, which categorically dismissed the US offer.
Three parallel pathways could shape India and Pakistan’s approaches in the coming period:
The first pathway involves both sides’ leadership continuing to embrace victory rhetoric, emphasizing their ability to deter and defeat the adversary. In a May 12 speech, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi underscored the importance of strength and deterrence, highlighting India’s dominance in modern warfare during the recent clash and warning Islamabad to dismantle its terrorist infrastructure if Pakistan wishes to survive. Conversely, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, in a post-ceasefire address, praised the “brave and bold” Pakistani forces for their professionalism, delivering a “highly effective response that will always be remembered as a chapter in modern warfare.” India is expected to maintain its stance of refusing dialogue with Pakistan as long as Islamabad’s alleged support for militant groups persists, while Pakistan will likely continue asserting that Kashmir is inseparable from its identity, calling for international intervention based on UN Security Council resolutions and the Kashmiri people’s will.
The second pathway involves the possibility of negotiations to stabilize border security, restore diplomatic, trade, and people-to-people ties, and potentially address India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty. While studies suggest that suspending the treaty would not immediately disrupt water flows to Pakistan—requiring years of infrastructure development and billions in investments for India to build dams capable of withholding Pakistan’s share—concerns persist about India’s ability to alter water delivery timings or withhold flood warnings. Such actions could severely impact Pakistani agriculture and farmers.
The third pathway focuses on domestic measures. In India, authorities may intensify efforts to strengthen state control in Jammu and Kashmir to counter separatist movements seeking independence or unification with Pakistan. In Pakistan, the government may escalate counterterrorism operations against Baloch separatists, particularly the Balochistan Liberation Army, which Pakistan’s military claims is an “Indian proxy.”
In short, the India-Pakistan dispute over Jammu and Kashmir is likely to remain protracted, with periodic risks of renewed escalation driven by factors like mutual distrust, miscalculations, and rising nationalism. The recent escalation, which saw both sides expand their targets deep into each other’s territory, heightens the danger of future confrontations escalating into broader conflicts.
