Reflecting the Gulf’s pivotal role in his foreign policy, especially toward the Middle East, and mirroring the approach of his first term, US President Donald Trump kicked off his second term’s first overseas trip with a Middle East tour. The tour—preceded by an unplanned stop in Rome to attend Pope Francis’s funeral—covered three Gulf countries: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, and included participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Riyadh. While the regional landscape has fundamentally shifted since Trump’s first visit to the region in 2017, his perspective on the Gulf’s economic and geopolitical significance appears to have remained steadfast across both terms.
Against this backdrop, this article examines the preliminary steps taken by the United States and Gulf states ahead of the tour and seeks to analyze its outcomes, reflecting the priorities of the involved parties.
Preliminary Measures
The United States and Gulf countries laid the groundwork for the visit with steps designed to create a constructive atmosphere, conveying messages of reassurance, alignment, and consideration for shared interests. These measures are detailed as follows:
OPEC+ Decision to Boost Oil Production: Trump has consistently linked US inflation to rising global oil prices, having previously pledged to press Saudi Arabia and OPEC to lower oil costs. In a preemptive move, on May 3, OPEC+ announced an increase in oil production for June by 411,000 barrels per day, following a similar hike in May. This decision drove oil prices to their lowest in over four years, at $1 per barrel. The move starkly contrasts with OPEC+’s earlier insistence on production cuts, which ignored former US President Joe Biden’s demands, keeping energy prices high and bolstering Russian oil revenues amid US sanctions on Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine. Despite the pressure this places on ambitious economic plans, particularly for Saudi Arabia, the decision bolsters Trump’s domestic popularity and credibility in fulfilling campaign promises.
Resumption of US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Trump preceded his Gulf tour with the fourth round of indirect nuclear negotiations with Iran, aiming to reassure Gulf allies of Washington’s commitment to diplomacy as the primary approach to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While Gulf states seek to weaken Iran, terminate its nuclear program, and neutralize its regional proxies, they view weakening Tehran as a gradual, long-term process driven by internal exhaustion rather than direct military intervention. Consequently, Gulf capitals, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, exhibit clear reservations about military actions, such as unilateral Israeli strikes, which could drag the region into a destabilizing war, threatening their economic stability and national security. These states have thus urged the Trump administration to leverage US influence to curb Israel’s impulsiveness and prioritize diplomatic solutions.
Trump’s assessment of the regional situation, aligned with his America First doctrine and US strategic and economic interests, appears to favor diplomacy, though he repeatedly emphasizes keeping all options open. However, stalled nuclear talks could revive the prospect of military escalation, prompting Gulf partners to demand explicit US assurances, including commitments to collective defense and necessary military support, such as arms deals. A notable shift is evident in the Gulf, particularly Saudi, stance compared to its support for a confrontational US approach toward Iran during Trump’s first term. The 2019 attacks by Iran’s proxies on Saudi and Emirati oil and civilian facilities, without a US military response, led Gulf leaders to realize their countries would be the primary targets in a regional war, likely standing alone without American military backing.
Ceasefire Agreement with the Houthis: Despite domestic considerations, including the high political and material costs and the dent to US prestige from failing to neutralize or weaken Houthi capabilities due to a lack of clear targets, as well as the depletion of US military resources earmarked for confronting China in a potential Taiwan invasion, Trump’s decision to reach a secret ceasefire deal with the Houthis, mediated by Oman, reflects regional priorities tied to his Gulf tour. Trump sought to demonstrate a degree of independence from Israel’s calculations, which favor military solutions to serve self-interested goals, thereby signaling to Gulf allies that the US understands and prioritizes their security concerns. Saudi pressure appears to have played a significant role in pushing Trump to end the military campaign against Yemen before his visit. According to the British outlet Middle East Eye on May 6, citing unnamed US officials, Riyadh urged Washington to halt all US attacks on Yemen ahead of Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, warning that continued strikes would create an embarrassing situation for both Saudi Arabia and the United States. The officials noted that Saudi Arabia has opposed the US air campaign in Yemen since its inception under the Biden administration in 2024, but its insistence on stopping the attacks has intensified recently due to growing concerns about the scope of the strikes.
Dismissal of the US National Security Advisor: Trump’s decision to fire National Security Advisor Michael Waltz on May 1, less than two weeks before the Gulf tour, carries symbolic weight, reflecting the US approach to Middle East issues. Waltz closely coordinated with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu on military plans against Iran and adopted a hardline stance toward the Houthis. Trump’s unpredictable and volatile political style complicates interpreting this decision: Does it signal a broader US policy to avoid war in the Middle East, reflect Trump’s mercurial personal approach, or indicate internal conflicts within US decision-making circles? Nevertheless, the move cannot be divorced from the broader regional context. The Trump administration appears inclined to reduce reliance on military options while maintaining strategic support for Israel and avoiding entanglement in wide-ranging regional conflicts that could jeopardize US interests. The decision also signals a growing focus on strengthening economic partnerships with the Gulf, prioritizing economic interests over traditional military policies.
Repeal of AI Diffusion Rule: The Trump administration announced plans to abolish the Biden-era AI deployment rule, which imposed strict export controls on advanced semiconductor chips critical for AI development, even for countries allied with the United States. This move opens the door for Gulf countries, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, to access chips from American companies like Nvidia and others. Notably, these countries had previously expressed frustration with the restrictions, forcing some of their companies, such as the UAE’s AI firm G42, to align with US regulations by divesting from Chinese firms and partnering with Microsoft, which invested $1.5 billion in G42 in 2024. The timing of this policy shift, coinciding with Trump’s Gulf tour, suggests US openness to Saudi and Emirati purchases of semiconductors to build AI infrastructure, possibly in exchange for substantial investments in American tech companies and a pivot away from Chinese suppliers. This move supports the Gulf countries’ goals of becoming regional AI hubs, in line with their strategies to diversify their economies away from reliance on hydrocarbons.
Significant Developments
Trump’s Gulf tour brought no surprises and adhered to the main thrust of his Middle East policy. However, its developments reflected the priorities of the US administration while highlighting the success of certain regional actors in achieving breakthroughs on key regional issues. Below is an analysis of the visit’s outcomes:
Engaging with Syria’s New Leadership: Saudi Arabia secured a significant breakthrough in Syrian-US relations, with Trump announcing from Riyadh the lifting of all sanctions imposed on Syria. This paved the way for a direct meeting in Riyadh between Trump and Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who ensured the meeting’s success by offering substantial geopolitical and economic concessions. These included granting the Unites States access to Syrian oil and gas, permitting the construction of a Trump Tower in Damascus, allowing Israel to maintain a security presence near the Golan Heights, and establishing a demilitarized zone in southern Syria. This breakthrough bolsters Saudi and Turkish diplomacy for successfully legitimizing al-Sharaa’s regime internationally, capping efforts to convince the US administration to engage more actively with Syria’s new leadership. The sanctions relief creates space for foreign investment and financial aid, jumpstarting Syria’s reconstruction. It also paves the way for deeper regional collaboration between Riyadh and Ankara.
Additionally, the Trump-al-Sharaa meeting crowns al-Sharaa’s series of outreach efforts to Arab and European countries to end Syria’s global isolation and restore its international standing. The encounter can be viewed as tacit US recognition of the new Syrian leadership’s legitimacy, potentially a first step toward recognizing Syria’s interim authorities as the country’s legitimate government. The end of sanctions opens avenues for investments from Syria’s regional allies, particularly Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, reducing Damascus’s dependence on China and Russia. It facilitates Syria’s gradual reintegration into the global financial system by enabling banks to resume international transactions and leverages Saudi Arabia’s pledge to settle Syria’s international debts. This also creates opportunities for Turkish firms to undertake economic projects, positioning Syria as a regional trade hub linking Europe and the Gulf through Turkey, which had been cautious due to fears of US sanctions.
The US opening to Syria’s new leadership is part of a broader effort to redraw the Middle East’s geopolitical map, driven by several strategic considerations. First, the United States seeks to encourage the Syrian regime to engage in security arrangements with Israel, potentially including demilitarized zones in southern Syria or direct security cooperation mechanisms, alongside guarantees that Syrian territory will not be used as a launchpad for threats against Israel. Second, it aims to redefine spheres of influence and establish new lines of contact among key players in Syria, allowing Israel to maintain a long-term military presence in the south while Turkey strengthens its security and military role in the north and center under US-backed security agreements. This aligns with the Trump administration’s push to reduce direct US military presence while empowering regional allies to take on larger roles, as evidenced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s participation in the Trump-al-Sharaa meeting via video. Third, it enables US access to strategic Syrian economic sectors, particularly energy, enhancing American influence in areas traditionally dominated by Russia or Iran. Fourth, it paves the way for Syria’s gradual reintegration into its Arab and regional environment within a framework that balances new realities and US interests.
However, it would be inaccurate to view the Trump-al-Sharaa meeting as a sign of full normalization between the United States and the Syrian regime. Washington is still assessing the Syrian government’s seriousness and ability to meet its security demands, particularly refraining from threatening Israeli interests and engaging in a gradual normalization process that could lead to joining the Abraham Accords. This includes expelling foreign fighters from Syrian government and security apparatuses, removing them from Syrian territory due to the direct threat they pose to regional allies, especially Israel, and ending the presence of armed Palestinian factions, notably Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to prevent Syria from serving as their safe haven. Additionally, the Syrian government must take responsibility for managing Daesh detention centers in the north and east, destroy all chemical weapons, and support US efforts to combat Daesh.
While the Syrian government has shown willingness to engage with Israel and opened communication channels through intermediaries for security and intelligence agreements, supported by Turkey and some Gulf actors—without which Trump would not have agreed to meet al-Sharaa or lift sanctions—it currently cannot fully meet Trump’s demands. Given the widespread proliferation of weapons among armed factions, removing them from security apparatuses or expelling them from the country without triggering internal conflict is challenging. Daesh retains its geographic strongholds and operational activity in Syria, and it is premature to judge the new Syrian administration’s ability to contain or counter this threat, especially after the group’s aggressive propaganda and field campaigns against al-Sharaa’s government over the past five months. Moreover, the Syrian government lacks a comprehensive strategic vision for counterterrorism and the institutional and security capabilities needed to effectively address this threat, raising questions about its reliability as a strategic partner for the United States or the international community in global counterterrorism efforts.
Moreover, lifting US sanctions alone is not enough to attract the foreign investment needed for economic recovery due to several factors. First, persistent political instability, sectarian violence, security chaos, and the lack of a transparent legal framework—crucial for capital inflows—cannot be addressed solely by removing economic restrictions. Second, the Syrian economy faces structural challenges beyond sanctions, including severe macroeconomic decline and extensive damage to critical infrastructure from the prolonged war. Third, the slow recovery pace for long-term investments, such as in oil and gas, is hampered by ongoing security threats like terrorism and the risk of sanctions reinstatement if al-Sharaa fails to deliver on his promises to Trump. Fourth, the scale of external funding for reconstruction and economic and humanitarian aid remains insufficient relative to Syria’s needs. Fifth, certain European sanctions on individuals tied to the Assad regime, as well as on chemical weapons, illicit drug trafficking, arms trade, and dual-use goods, remain in effect. Sixth, Trump has not signaled any US intent to lift Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism—a status imposed in 1979 for supporting Palestinian factions—which continues to pose a significant barrier to foreign investment.
Endorsement of New Geopolitical Spheres of Influence: The political outcomes of Trump’s Gulf tour can be seen as a US endorsement of new geopolitical spheres of influence in the Middle East, particularly by recognizing Turkey’s leading role in managing the Syrian landscape on behalf of the United States. During his meeting with al-Sharaa, Trump announced that he would send Secretary of State Marco Rubio to Turkey the following week to meet with his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shaibani, to discuss US demands and next steps for expanding engagement with the new Syrian government. Additionally, the tour solidified Israel’s northward expansion beyond the Golan Heights, legitimizing it through Syria’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords based on the current on-the-ground reality, as Israel is unlikely to withdraw from its expanded territories given the absence of Syrian deterrence capabilities.
Spearheading Economic and Defense Agreements: The economic dimension topped the priorities of Trump’s Gulf tour, likely serving as the primary rationale for choosing the Gulf as his first international destination. Washington seeks to open new markets for its industrial and technological products amid intensifying global competition in energy and advanced technology sectors, while Gulf countries aim to attract more US investments. Over four days, Trump secured a massive package of investments and deals. Saudi Arabia announced a $300 billion investment package in the United States, spanning sectors such as mining, energy, and technology, alongside a record-breaking $142 billion arms deal—the largest ever between the two countries. This deal includes supplying Riyadh with advanced military equipment from over 12 US defense companies, covering air and space forces, missile defense, maritime and border security, ground force modernization, and communication system upgrades.
On the Qatari front, deals worth $1.2 trillion were signed, including a major agreement for Qatar Airways to purchase 210 aircraft from Boeing for $96 billion, alongside significant investments in drone technology. In the UAE, deals valued at $200 billion were finalized, encompassing investments in metals, technology, artificial intelligence, nuclear and conventional energy, and aviation.
The US deals with Saudi Arabia and the UAE highlight both countries’ ambitions to become regional AI hubs. A key agreement with Riyadh includes a commitment from the state-owned AI company Humain to build AI infrastructure in Saudi Arabia using hundreds of thousands of Nvidia’s most advanced chips over the next five years. Additionally, AMD, a leading Nvidia competitor, pledged up to $10 billion to deploy its infrastructure in Saudi Arabia alongside Humain, while Amazon committed $5 billion to support data center infrastructure. In the UAE, a preliminary agreement allows the import of 500,000 of Nvidia’s latest AI chips annually starting this year.
Deferral of Saudi Arabia’s Accession to the Abraham Accords: The push to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords, started by Biden but derailed by the 2023 Gaza war, was not a central focus of US-Saudi discussions in Riyadh. Trump displayed flexibility, allowing the Kingdom to determine the appropriate timing for joining. Riyadh prefers to postpone this step until a satisfactory resolution to the Gaza conflict is reached, given the significant political costs it would incur by normalizing ties with Israel amid ongoing Israeli aggression in Gaza. Such a move risks undermining Saudi Arabia’s symbolic status as a leader of the Islamic world and sparking widespread public backlash. Guided by the America First doctrine, Trump’s securing of massive economic deals, coupled with Saudi and Emirati commitments to substantial investments in the US economy, appears to have been sufficient to grant the Kingdom concessions on delaying normalization.
Moreover, the geopolitical incentives that drove the 2020 Abraham Accords have diminished due to changes in the regional environment. The normalization of ties between Iran and Gulf states, following the 2023 Saudi-Iran agreement brokered by China and subsequent détente, has reduced the need for geopolitical hedging against Iran and the justification for the security umbrella underpinning the Accords. Furthermore, Israeli strikes weakening Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Syria have pushed Tehran toward a more cooperative stance with its Arab neighbors. Successful U.-Iran nuclear negotiations have also undermined a key rationale for the Abraham Accords. Conversely, if the talks fail, Gulf states may lean toward de-escalation and economic integration with Iran while intensifying their military programs, particularly if the United States is unwilling to provide robust security guarantees.
Nevertheless, normalization remains on the US and Saudi foreign policy agendas. Saudi Arabia hopes it will enhance access to Israeli technology and attract investment opportunities in technology, agriculture, water, and energy—sectors where Israel holds significant expertise. Additionally, the United States seeks to complete the chain of Arab-Israeli normalization to bolster Israel’s security, technological, and economic integration in the Middle East.
Absence of Initiatives on the Gaza War: Trump’s Gulf tour did not include any initiatives aimed at securing a ceasefire in Gaza or establishing effective mechanisms for delivering aid. Neither Trump’s statements nor those of Gulf leaders referenced the Egyptian reconstruction plan, which had garnered Arab consensus at the emergency summit held in Cairo in March 2025. This omission raises concerns about continued political stagnation surrounding the plan’s implementation, particularly given the lack of concrete funding commitments or a timeline for its execution. Trump’s stance suggests persistent US reservations about certain aspects of the plan, especially those concerning Hamas’s future role in managing Gaza’s governance and security in the post-war period. Similarly, Saudi leaders’ statements made no mention of preparations for the upcoming High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution conference, co-chaired by Saudi Arabia and France, scheduled for June 17–20 in New York, which undermines its potential impact on advancing a political resolution to the Palestinian cause.
In this context, Trump’s approach to the Palestinian cause was limited to addressing the humanitarian tragedy faced by Gaza’s residents, with implicit remarks holding Hamas fully responsible for the sector’s deteriorating conditions. This partial and incomplete approach sidesteps the core issue: the absence of a just and comprehensive resolution to the Palestinian question. Furthermore, discussions in Doha by US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, which coincided with Trump’s visit, lacked genuine pressure on Israel to withdraw from Gaza, indicating that withdrawal is not currently on the US agenda. Some media statements even suggest that Trump continues to entertain plans for Palestinian displacement, as he remarked that Gaza should become a “zone of freedom.”
In any case, Israel’s absence from Trump’s Gulf tour itinerary, alongside the success of US direct talks with Hamas, mediated by Qatar, to secure the release of American-Israeli hostage Eidan Alexander—forcing Israel to halt military and drone flights for several hours to facilitate his release just before Trump’s arrival in the region—signals Trump’s prioritization of US interests, even over those of its key Middle East ally. However, this approach does not reflect deep strategic differences between the two countries but rather indicates a focus on US interests over Netanyahu’s narrow personal calculations, with greater readiness to pursue Trump’s regional agenda while paying less heed to Israeli concerns.
In short, Trump’s Gulf tour was primarily driven by economic and defense priorities, overshadowing major regional concerns such as the Iran nuclear talks, Red Sea navigation security, the intensification of Houthi attacks, and the resolution of the Gaza conflict. Still, the tour conveyed distinct political signals, underscoring the Middle East and Arabian Gulf’s significance in US foreign policy and seeking to reassure regional partners about the continued US presence. It also made clear that the administration’s agenda prioritizes US strategic interests over those of its allies. Trump used the visit to project American power and demonstrate his capacity to achieve economic wins by redefining relationships with allies.
