The UAE, the United States and Israel surprised us by announcing a tripartite agreement that included, in short, two main points; the first is postponing the annexation of the settlements, a project that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was adopting and is rushing to implement, and the second is normalizing direct bilateral relations between the UAE and Israel at all levels. This agreement provoked mixed reactions. In contrast to the Arab positions that supported the UAE’s intent to sign the agreement, the rest of the positions varied between opponents, especially the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood factions throughout the Arab World, while some other countries refrained from expressing their positions.
The nature of the Arab position on strategic developments
Throughout the years, Arab history has witnessed divergent stances towards strategic initiatives related to Israel and the Palestinian cause. The evidence for that is many, starting with Egypt’s acceptance of Resolution No. 242, the “Rogers” initiative embraced by the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and accusing Nasser of betraying the Palestinian and Arab cause. Then the matter was repeated with the cease-fire in 1973, the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the “Mena House” talks, and the subsequent accusation of President Sadat of treason. The Arab division was also embodied during the invasion of Kuwait, between countries that rejected Arab colonialism and Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and others that supported it.
Some Arab countries, especially those involved in managing the Palestinian issue, used to set high standards for dealing with the issue. However, for the sake of their own interests, they might aim for much lower ones. Perhaps the experience of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations that began in Washington between “Rabinovitch” and “Hikmat Al-Shehabi” and were supplemented by a meeting with President “Hafez Al-Assad” and “Clinton” in Geneva, provide an important example of this, as President Al-Assad acknowledged at the time that his country was ready for full normalization in exchange for lasting peace. The two countries nearly signed a peace agreement that initially faltered due to the international borders between the two countries, as Syria requested that these borders reach the “Tiberias” waters, while Israel insisted on removing it 3 kilometres, given that that land is Palestinian and not Syrian. The agreement was almost accomplished by persuading Turkey to pump double quantities of water to compensate for what Syria had hoped for from Lake “Tiberias”, but the killing of “Rabin” stopped the operation. Thus, the Syrian interests had priority.
The Arab disparity has crystallized over the past years with regard to the regional powers that seek to dominate the region and its capabilities, not only at the level of Israel, but also at the level of Iran, which Arab countries see as the first enemy whose sectarian practices aim at striking Arab interests. Likewise, Turkey, where Erdogan seeks to build his Ottoman project to dominate the region. These are all scenes that have greatly illustrated the Arab division.
The evidence here is that Arab positions throughout modern history have not been unified, and that the differences are the origin, and that the disparity of visions is an inherent element among the Arab countries.
Another evidence is that the so-called “joint Arab position” has turned into mere words without real meaning, and that there are no factors that could guarantee a unified position towards what threatens Arab national security. Rather, bilateral and regional alliances have become the framework that governs the region.
Timing of the agreement
The tripartite agreement took place within exceptional circumstances that the Arab region is going through; the matter that can be explained as follows:
1- The difficult situation that the Palestinian cause is going through, especially after Trump’s decisions regarding Jerusalem and “the deal of the century” that missed many Palestinian rights and foundations of the issue, and overtook all that was agreed upon in Madrid and Oslo. The Arabs and the whole world stood unable to confront this or influence on that policy and the losses it causes to the Palestinian cause.
2- The apparent Palestinian inability to interact positively with these developments, and entrenchment behind rejection and denunciation without responding to calls for confrontation through dialogue. As well as the continuation of the Palestinian division, which sets a justification for Israeli policy. Perhaps what Hamas and some of the factions supporting it do of operations against Israel from time to time will not result in any gains except for further mobilization of the Israeli Right-Wing Party to justify its continuous steps to liquidate the Palestinian cause.
3- The Arabs proposed the Arab initiative as a framework for negotiation, and the League and the Arab countries were satisfied with it, however Israel rejected it; and the Arabs did not move to activate or develop it in accordance with balance equations and current international politics, as if they were content with expressing their positions only, the thing that led to stagnation in the negotiation process. At the same time, some Arab countries see avoiding commitment to collective positions at this level, and the inability of the Arab summits to take decisions that might turn into developments is a sufficient evidence of this.
4- The Arab disabled position before “the deal of the century”, including the loss of the Palestinian territories, raises the question concerning the losses that could result after the tripartite agreement? Whereas, the possibility of stopping the annexation in return for bilateral relations could have an effect on the Israeli interior and create a positive atmosphere if “Joe Biden” succeeds in the American elections, where negotiations resume once again, absorb some of the negative effects of the annexation decision, and open the door to new initiatives.
Dimensions and Fallout
There is no doubt that the agreement represents a kind of geopolitical movement in the region, whether we agree or disagree with it, as it introduces the region into a new equation of balance. Postponing annexation in return for normalization has moved the static Palestinian file and pushed the other party to postpone annexation in exchange for open relations, which sets a new formula that can be invested either by countries that have relations with Israel, or those that are about to establish those relations to initiate a dialogue that might stir the stalemate of Palestinian negotiations, if it is properly invested.
It will be the right of the UAE and any country likely to have relations with Israel to stop some areas of normalization to put pressure on the cessation of settlements if it wants, which might require some kind of dialogue and discussion between those countries, the Palestinian side and the Arab countries with influence within a new strategy that is inspired by some of the agreements included in “Oslo” agreement, and that might stop the bleeding of losses in the Palestinian issue and bring back the idea of a two-state solution to the negotiating table.
This movement could also have an impact on the Israeli interior by calming tension and hostility, and reducing the impulse towards the extremist Right-Wing Party, if it is properly invested through a method of movement and dialogue. It is necessary here to formulate an Arab strategy that benefits from this influence through political movement and dialogue with the Israeli interior so as to stop the impulse towards the extremist Right-Wing Party.
There is no doubt that the Turkish and Muslim Brotherhood opposition to the UAE’s move clearly reveals the political hypocrisy practiced by Turkey. Its relations with Israel are stronger than those of any of the Arab countries with which it has established relations, whether at the military, intelligence, or deep economic level. The international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood did not express its rejection of the level of these relations at a time when it criticized and attacked the UAE. Indeed, some of the positions through which Erdogan tried to express his concern for the Palestinians, such as his attack on Peres at the Davos conference, were recently exposed to the public, as its former Prime Minister Davutoglu explained that he personally wrote the letter of apology that Erdogan sent to Peres apologizing for that step which was celebrated by large sectors of Palestinians and Arabs.
If it is natural to imagine the Palestinian rejection of the agreement, the Palestinian institutions are, however, called to go beyond the stage of rejection and turn to formulas to deal with the American and Israeli positions seeking to settle the issue, which would allow a kind of penetration into the Israeli society, and to benefit from any new data to achieve some gains for the Palestinian cause.
In my opinion, the Israeli prime minister, who agreed compulsively to postpone the annexation, will not give up his plan in this regard, considering that it is a strategic goal that makes him the historical leader of Israel. However, this does not prevent, in light of the current Arab situation and the existing international balances, from working on restructuring the Arab strategy, and dealing with Israel, managing this deal through collective stances – as far as possible – does not make concessions for free, which requires reformulating the political and media positions of the countries that decided to establish relations with Israel and considered that this is their sovereign right, as it is not conceivable that it suffices to reject, denounce and not exceed that.
In addition, the American position that accompanied and adopted the preparation of the agreement targeted primarily the direct interest of President “Trump” in his election campaign. Although he was the owner of “the Deal of the Century”, he adopted the Emirati request to postpone the annexation and put pressure on Israel to do so.
What the UAE did has caused a shock that many see as positive in the region, and it affirmed the right of any country to define its interests and the means it deems appropriate to achieve these interests, in light of a fact that needs to be studied that the Palestinian issue is not the responsibility of the UAE alone, and that what it has done does not go beyond what the Palestinians and the Israelis agreed upon before in the “Oslo” agreement (mutual recognition, normalization, cessation of resistance, and security coordination).
The region is witnessing a major geopolitical change in which the domination strategies of regional countries, especially Iran, Turkey and Israel, interact. It is necessary that this change be dealt with objectively. The Emirates, which is the fourth party to establish relations with Israel after Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians, will be followed by other Arab countries that establish broader relations between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, but in secret. The Palestinians must conduct a dialogue with the concerned parties to serve the Palestinian cause, away from accusations and denunciations.
