By using ECSS site, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.
Accept
ECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic StudiesECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies
  • Home
  • International Relations
    International Relations
    Show More
    Top News
    Another obstacle on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam?
    June 5, 2020
    Varied paths of reform in Africa
    March 22, 2019
    G20 Membership Justified: Africa and the Road to the G20
    June 14, 2020
    Latest News
    Power Play: Why Is Azerbaijan Setting Its Sights on the Horn of Africa?
    May 22, 2025
    Trump’s Gulf Tour: US Economic Gains and Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape
    May 21, 2025
    The Future of the India-Pakistan Ceasefire
    May 19, 2025
    Trump’s Deal-Driven Approach: Priority Issues in His Middle East Visit
    May 14, 2025
  • Defense & Security
    Defense & Security
    Show More
    Top News
    A Multi-dimensional Affair: Women and Terrorism in Africa
    June 14, 2020
    On deradicalisation: Marc Sageman and the psychology of jihadists
    June 22, 2020
    Assessing Deterrent Measures and the Prospects of War: US Military Movement in the Gulf to Confront Iran
    June 22, 2020
    Latest News
    Navigating Security and Diplomacy: What Russia’s Delisting of the Taliban Means for Bilateral Ties
    May 17, 2025
    Lakurawa: Armed Bandit Violence in Nigeria
    May 12, 2025
    Europe amid US–Iran Escalation: Can It Play the Diplomat or Become Entangled in the Crisis?
    April 13, 2025
    Exploring Alternatives: What’s Next for Russia’s Military Influence in Syria?
    March 27, 2025
  • Public Policy
    Public Policy
    Show More
    Top News
    Sinai: A Strategy for Development amid Fighting Terrorism
    June 17, 2020
    Egypt’s Comprehensive Vision for Human Rights
    June 22, 2020
    The Right to Health in Egypt
    June 22, 2020
    Latest News
    Weaponization of Resources: The Role of Rare Earth Metals in the US-China Trade War
    May 25, 2025
    The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: A Catalyst or a Challenge for Egypt’s Export Ambitions?
    May 15, 2025
    The Suez Canal amidst Global Competition (3): National Strides Outpacing Time
    April 29, 2025
    Gaza’s Changing Demographics: The Toll of War and Blockade
    March 9, 2025
  • Analysis
    • Opinion
    • Analysis
    • Situation Assessment
    • Readings
  • Activities
    • Conferences
    • ECSS Agenda
    • Panel Discussion
    • Seminar
    • Workshops
  • ECSS Shop
  • العربية
  • Defense & Security
  • International Relations
  • Public Policy
All Rights Reserved to ECSS © 2022,
Reading: When Will Lebanon Fill the Presidential Vacuum?
Share
Notification Show More
Latest News
Weaponization of Resources: The Role of Rare Earth Metals in the US-China Trade War
Economic & Energy Studies
Power Play: Why Is Azerbaijan Setting Its Sights on the Horn of Africa?
Asian Studies Others
Trump’s Gulf Tour: US Economic Gains and Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape
Arab & Regional Studies
The Future of the India-Pakistan Ceasefire
Asian Studies
Navigating Security and Diplomacy: What Russia’s Delisting of the Taliban Means for Bilateral Ties
Terrorism & Armed Conflict
Aa
ECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic StudiesECSS - Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies
Aa
  • اللغة العربية
  • International Relations
  • Defense & Security
  • Special Edition
  • Public Policy
  • Analysis
  • Activities & Events
  • Home
  • اللغة العربية
  • Categories
    • International Relations
    • Defense & Security
    • Public Policy
    • Analysis
    • Special Edition
    • Activities & Events
    • Opinions Articles
  • Bookmarks
Follow US
  • Advertise
All Rights Reserved to ECSS © 2022, Powered by EgyptYo Business Services.
Arab & Regional Studies

When Will Lebanon Fill the Presidential Vacuum?

Rehab El Ziyadi
Last updated: 2023/04/02 at 4:01 PM
Rehab El Ziyadi
Share
15 Min Read
SHARE

Almost five months have passed since President Michel Aoun’s term ended on 31 October 2022, and the Lebanese parliament failed to elect a president on multiple occasions, most recently on 19 January. 

However, there have been some regional and internal shifts that could be a turning point in the crisis. On one hand, the Shiite duo of Hezbollah and the Amal movement have agreed on candidate Suleiman Frangieh. On the other hand, there are regional and international initiatives sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia to resolve the Lebanese issue in an effort to pressure the internal parties to elect the republic’s president. This is in addition to the Iranian-Saudi agreement, which was signed on 10 March, and its potential effects on the regional consensus on electing the president of Lebanon. 

This paper examines the process of electing Lebanon’s president and the factors that have led to the current impasse.

How Lebanon’s President Is Elected

Lebanon has experienced three presidential voids throughout its history. The first occurred on 22 September 1988, when President Amine Gemayel’s term came to an end. This vacancy persisted for a year and 44 days before President Rene Moawad was elected in 1989. The second started when President Emile Lahoud’s term ended on 23 November 2007, and it lasted for about six months before General Michel Suleiman was elected on 25 May 2008, in accordance with a Doha agreement. The third vacuum, however, has lasted the longest in Lebanon’s history. It began on 25 May 2014, when Michel Suleiman’s two years and five months in office came to an end, and lasted until 31 October 2016, when Michel Aoun was elected president as part of a deal with the March 14 Alliance forces, who at the time had won the majority of seats in Parliament. Back then, Hezbollah was able to install Michel Aoun as president in exchange for the appointment of Saad Hariri, the leader of the Future Movement, as prime minister, and the Lebanese Forces (LF) party was able to secure a sizable portion of the Hariri administration.

According to Article 49 of the Lebanese constitution, “The President of the Republic shall be elected by secret ballot and by a two thirds majority of the Chamber of Deputies. After a first ballot, an absolute majority shall be sufficient. The President’s term is six years. He may not be re-elected until six years after the expiration of his last mandate. No one may be elected to the Presidency of the Republic unless he fulfills the conditions of eligibility for the Chamber of Deputies.”

However, the current parliament’s make-up meant that no political force in Lebanon had an absolute or balanced majority. As a result, no bloc could elect a candidate to the presidency without the support of the other blocs, such as Hezbollah and its allies, the opposition forces, and independents “forces of change”, all of whom can’t agree on a way out of the impasse. According to the LF party, the presidential candidate must be a sovereign, which means that he cannot support Hezbollah. For its part, Hezbollah disqualifies any candidate who does not back the resistance. Suleiman Frangieh is also rejected as a candidate by the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) because he is running against Gebran Bassil, and he also faces rejection from the Samir Geagea-led LF Party because the party views Frangiehas a continuation of the previous agreement due to its close ties to the Iranian-Syrian axis. Prime Minister Michel Moawad is being nominated by the opposition parties, but Hezbollah does not want to back him because it will not back the resistance.

Previous sessions’ failure to elect a president can be attributed to the disruption of the election process caused by the blocking third and session boycotts. The political forces are adamant about using the blocking third to obstruct the presidential election, which failed to elect the president for the eleventh time, the last of which was on 19 January, due to a lack of quorum in the second session. The Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, departed without announcing when the legislature would reconvene to vote on the election of a president. In the first round of the most recent session, 111 of the 128 members of parliament cast ballots, with Michel Moawad receiving 34 of them while 37 parliamentarians cast blank ballots. 

A candidate can win in the first round with 86 votes, but if the first round fails to produce a winner, subsequent rounds are held with a 65-vote majority. However, the political forces in Lebanon used to create what is known as a blocking third by about 43 parliamentarians abstaining from the electoral sessions, which impedes the process of electing the president. Suleiman Frangieh, the leader of the Marada Movement, and Michel Moawad, the opposition candidate and the son of the late president of the republic and member of the March 14 Alliance, who received the most votes during the presidential election sessions over the past few months, are two names that have been floated as potential candidates. Joseph Aoun, the current Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, is also in the running.

Motivating Setting

Some developments, both domestic and regional, have occurred over the past few days that could help Lebanon’s presidential election crisis be resolved. These developments include:

• External Efforts to Resolve Lebanon’s Crisis: Within the framework of Saudi-French coordination, several meetings have taken place recently to discuss ways to end the Lebanese crisis, with both countries’ stressing the importance of holding new elections for president and prime minister and developing a new reform agenda. During a five-way meeting in Paris on February 6, attended by the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar, Saudi Arabia stated that its vision is to select a reform-minded president capable of leading Lebanon out of its current crisis. On 21 September 2022, the leaders of France, the United States, and Saudi Arabia met again and issued a joint statement emphasizing the importance of holding presidential elections in Lebanon. The French plan calls for Suleiman Frangieh to become president and Nawaf Salam to become prime minister given his favorable Arab and international relations.

These meetings were an extension of other initiatives launched on the sidelines of the second Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership, which was held in Jordan on 20 December 2022. At the Baghdad Conference, French President Emmanuel Macron, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati consulted on the crisis. On the sidelines of the 2023 Arab Forum for Sustainable Development, a meeting was also held between Nabih Berri, Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. After the meeting, Aboul Gheit stated, “Lebanon will soon have a new president; it is only a matter of time”.

Following the Iranian-Saudi agreement, additional meetings were held between the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri, and the Saudi ambassador to Lebanon, Walid Bukhari, on 13 March, and between the Advisor to the Royal Court, Nizar Al-Aloula, and the Advisor to the French President for North African and Middle Eastern Affairs, Patrick Dorrell, on 18 March. On 10 March, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan paid a visit to Paris and met with France’s Catherine Colonna to coordinate efforts to resolve the Lebanese crisis. In addition, there has been discussion of holding a Lebanese dialogue conference in Egypt, Iraq, or Oman to help end the crisis and negotiate a deal along the lines of the Taif Agreement in 1989 and the Doha Agreement in 2008.

• Candidate Prospects: Suleiman Frangieh has been endorsed as a presidential candidate by both Hezbollah and the Amal movement. Frangieh, who is an ally of Hezbollah and the grandson of the late president of Lebanon, maintains cordial ties with the Syrian government. Hezbollah initially wavered between endorsing Suleiman Frangieh, the leader of the Marada Movement, as a candidate for the March 8 Alliance and endorsing Gebran Bassil, his ally and the head of the FPM. However, not all political forces in Lebanon endorsed Frangieh’s candidacy. The Christian majority, including the LF Party led by Samir Geagea, opposes Suleiman Frangieh’s candidacy because it does not want an ally for Hezbollah, and suggests electing a president who defends Lebanon’s interests and refuses to repeat the experience of former President Michel Aoun, especially given Frangieh’s regional alliances with Iran and Damascus. Frangieh’s chances as a compromise candidate may improve, however, in light of recent regional developments and efforts to reintegrate Syria into the Arab fold. 

The Commander of the Lebanese Army, Joseph Aoun, on the other hand, has the support of Paris, Washington, and Saudi Arabia due to his accomplishments while in charge of the military institution, besides support from all internal parties, including Hezbollah, with the exception of Gebran Bassil (since Joseph Aoun refused, during Michel Aoun’s presidency, the army’s intervention to suppress the 2019 October protests). The opposition parties alternate between supporting Joseph Aoun and Michel Moawad. Aoun will still have to face the challenge of amending the constitution in order to be eligible to run for president because Article 49 of the constitution states that “it is also not possible to elect judges, Grade One civil servants, or their equivalents in all public institutions to the Presidency during their term or office or within two years following the date of their resignation and their effective cessation of service, or following retirement.”

Consequences of the Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement: Normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran is likely to have a positive impact on the Lebanese file in general and the selection of the Lebanese president in particular, and will facilitate the selection of the president of the republic with external sponsorship in light of Tehran and Riyad’s agreement to limit Iranian interference in state affairs. Hezbollah, for its part, applauded the Saudi-Iranian agreement, saying it would open new horizons throughout the entire region and in Lebanon. This could pave the way for a resolution to the presidential election crisis, particularly because Lebanon serves as a focal point for both regional and global interests.

In conclusion, there is a motivating context for internal and external parties to reach a compromise candidate. This, however, is contingent upon the concessions made by these parties in order to potentially resolve the crisis, or the status quo in the event that Hezbollah and its allies choose to delay the resolution of the crisis. Given the current unrest in Iran and the pressure that sanctions have placed on the country, Tehran may be tempted to keep the card for choosing the president of Lebanon in reserve for use in negotiations with regional and international parties.

Related Posts

Trump’s Gulf Tour: US Economic Gains and Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape

Ethnic Frontiers: What Drives Israel’s Escalatory Actions in Syria?

Gains with Strings Attached: Demarcating the Lebanon-Israel Land Border

A Nuclear-Free Middle East: Rethinking the Arab Strategy Thirty Years On

TAGGED: Featured
Rehab El Ziyadi April 2, 2023
Share this Article
Facebook Twitter Whatsapp Whatsapp LinkedIn Telegram Email Copy Link Print

Stay Connected

Facebook Like
Twitter Follow
Instagram Follow
Youtube Subscribe

Latest Articles

Economy First: Implications of the Russia-Africa Summit
African Studies July 28, 2023
Fifty Years on: The Realities of the October War (4)
Opinions Articles October 10, 2023
Growing Risks: Roles and Challenges for the EU Mission Aspides in the Red Sea
Defense & Security February 29, 2024
Widening the scope: Ethiopia’s diplomatic activity amid unrest
International Relations March 4, 2021

Latest Tweets

International Relations

  • African Studies
  • American Studies
  • Arab & Regional Studies
  • Asian Studies
  • European Studies
  • Palestinian & Israeli Studies

Defence & Security

  • Armament
  • Cyber Security
  • Extremism
  • Terrorism & Armed Conflict

Public Policies

  • Development & Society
  • Economic & Energy Studies
  • Egypt & World Stats
  • Media Studies
  • Public Opinion
  • Women & Family Studies

All Rights Reserved to Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies - ECSS © 2023

Removed from reading list

Undo
Welcome Back!

Sign in to your account

Lost your password?