As part of efforts to elevate Egyptian-Turkish diplomatic ties to a presidential level following President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s February 14 visit to Cairo, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi embarked on his first official trip visit to Ankara on today, September 4. This follows a thorough reassessment of relations aimed at resolving key disputes and fostering mutual understandings on regional issues while acknowledging divergent interests. The visit also featured the inaugural meeting of the Turkey-Egypt High-Level Strategic Coordination Council, which was formed during Erdogan’s visit to Cairo.
Laying the Ground for the Visit
The period between Erdogan’s visit to Egypt and al-Sisi’s visit to Turkey saw efforts to strengthen bilateral ties, steering them towards a stable trajectory and reaffirming their return to normalcy. These steps included the following:
Exploring Defence and Military Collaboration: In April 2024, General Osama Askar, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, visited Ankara, marking the first high-level military visit from Egypt to Turkey since 2013. During his meeting with Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Metin Gurak, they discussed a future defense partnership that would add a strategic, long-term dimension to relations between the two countries. Promising areas of collaboration include drone technology and the joint production of military components such as drones, warships, and ammunition, with Ankara’s sophisticated military industry enhancing its role in the global defense arena.
During his visit, Askar took an extensive tour of prominent Turkish defense firms to explore their latest technologies. At Baykar Defense, he viewed the Bayraktar Kızılelma drones, designed for aerial combat. His tour also included Turkish Aerospace Industries Inc. (Tusas), where he checked out the Hürjet advanced training and light attack aircraft, the Bayraktar TB2 drone, and the T129 ATAK helicopter. Before Erdogan’s visit to Cairo in February, Turkish Ambassador to Cairo, Salih Mutlu Sen, had previously disclosed that Turkey would supply Egypt with combat drones and other advanced defense systems.
Strengthening security and defense ties will foster greater trust between the two countries and help them pursue their strategic goals. For Egypt, drone technology is essential to achieve a military balance in the Middle East, where advanced drone systems are prevalent among regional competitors and non-state actors like Iranian militias and terrorist groups. Beyond boosting Egypt’s defense capabilities, this technology offers a tactical edge in combat, with Turkish drones renowned for their versatility in missions such as reconnaissance, surveillance, and precision strikes.
Initiating Investment Projects: Throughout the period of diplomatic tension between Cairo and Ankara, economic and commercial interactions remained the primary avenue for Egyptian-Turkish engagement as both countries sought to isolate economic cooperation from political discord. As relations improve, this sector is expected to experience notable advancements. A prime example is the Eroglu Garment project, initiated by the General Authority of the Suez Canal Economic Zone in collaboration with Turkey’s Eroglu Global Holding Group. This $40 million project, located in the West Qantara Industrial Zone, covers an initial area of 64,000 square meters with plans for future expansion to 400,000 square meters. Upon full operation by January 2025, the facility is projected to provide 2,750 employment opportunities.
Furthermore, several Turkish companies in Tenth of Ramadan City have expanded their production lines. Jade Textile recently opened a new factory specializing in textiles and sportswear, bringing its total number of factories in Egypt to five, spread across the governorates of Sharqia, Alexandria, and Ismailia, with 300 production lines and $250 million in investments. Kervan Gıda, a candy manufacturer, plans to add over 12 new production lines in the coming years. Additionally, the Egyptian Group for Multipurpose Terminals (EGMPT), affiliated with the Ministry of Transport and Turkey’s Doğuş Group have signed an agreement to establish a Turkish logistics industrial zone in the Gargoub Economic Zone. The project is set to attract $7 billion in direct investments and generate around 20,000 jobs.
Carrying out a Joint Naval Exercise: A limited naval exercise was conducted between the Turkish warship Kınalıada and the Egyptian El-Fateh frigate, showcasing the strengthening ties between Egypt and Turkey. The Kınalıada, which had made goodwill visits to various countries, including Japan and Qatar, docked at the Alexandria Naval Base on August 18 and 19, 2024 for the purposes of the naval exercise.
Significance of the Visit
President al-Sisi’s visit to Ankara is notably important given its context and implications, signaling a return to established diplomatic practices. The importance of the visit can be underscored as follows:
The visit highlights the ability of both countries to reinvigorate high-level diplomatic channels, marking a return to presidential-level engagement that is crucial for strategic decision-making. Following a period marked by significant tensions and a confrontational approach, this visit reflects a notable political maturity, enabling both countries to make gradual but steady progress towards clearing their relations of ideological and personal biases, aiming instead to foster trust, bridge differences, and find common solutions to complex issues. Perhaps Cairo has recognized this early on, leading it to avoid engaging in confrontational rhetoric or provocative actions. This approach has been key in keeping the path open for mending relations and restoring diplomatic relations, adhering to the political notion that “there are no lasting enemies or unwavering allies.”
Institutionalizing bilateral relations through routine meetings of the Strategic Coordination Council strengthens relations by facilitating the exchange of ideas, tackling issues, and resolving conflicts towards preventing relations from deteriorating irreversibly. This process highlights both countries’ commitment to dialogue and outlines the framework for cooperation in diverse areas such as trade, economy, tourism, education, health, technology, defense, energy, construction, transportation, communications, culture, and industry. It also offers presidential endorsement for agreements reached at lower levels.
The delegation accompanying President al-Sisi, along with the topics of discussion and agreements to be signed, highlights the visit’s key priorities, objectives, and anticipated outcomes. Al-Sisi was joined by a group of Egyptian business leaders and ten ministers. The visit’s agenda included talks on cooperation in health, tourism, defense, renewable energy, mining, liquefied natural gas, media and communications, and universities. Further, several agreements will be signed in the areas of commerce, economics, culture, and health. These focus areas suggest that progress on internal bilateral issues will likely advance more rapidly than on regional issues, as economic and service-related topics are less influenced by strategic disagreements and external pressures. Therefore, reaching agreements in these areas depends primarily on bilateral commitment and the availability of resources and expertise.
Economic cooperation is crucial for both countries, given their shared challenges of high inflation and currency volatility. Both countries aim to leverage their respective strengths—Turkey’s advanced industrial expertise and Egypt’s affordable labor and specialized industrial zones, like the Suez Canal Economic Zone—to create significant investment opportunities for Turkish investors in Egypt. Notably, Turkish investments in Egypt are estimated to total around $3 billion, generating approximately 70,000 direct jobs and about 100,000 indirect jobs through 200 Turkish companies operating in the country, including leading companies like Arcelik, Sisecam, TEMSA, and Yildiz Holding.
Both countries are also aiming to boost their trade exchange from the current $10 billion to around $15 billion. In 2023, non-oil trade between Egypt and Turkey reached approximately $6.6 billion, with $3.8 billion in exports and $2.8 billion in imports, solidifying Egypt as Turkey’s largest trading partner in Africa. Egypt’s exports to Turkey mainly consist of fuel and mineral oils, plastics, and fertilizers, while its imports from Turkey include iron and steel, electrical machinery and appliances, and fuel and mineral oils.
The commercial aspect of relations may involve discussions on resuming the Ro-Ro shipping line, which was suspended in 2015 due to impracticality for Egypt. This maritime route has gained strategic significance for Turkey in light of the ongoing tensions with Israel over the Gaza war, which have disrupted Turkey’s access to the Haifa port, a key gateway for Turkish exports to the Gulf. However, a balanced formula for reactivating the route should cater to both the interests of both countries, ensuring that Egypt benefits by facilitating the export of perishable agricultural goods to Europe through Turkish ports, while Turkey can use Egyptian ports like Damietta and Port Said to transport goods from Mersin and Iskenderun to the Gulf via Mina Al Arab on the Red Sea.
The inaugural meeting of the High-Level Strategic Coordination Council takes place amid a turbulent regional environment where fragile stability achieved through reconciliations is being tested. As such, pressing regional issues like Gaza, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya will likely top the agenda of the meeting, adding a broader dimension to bilateral relations and paving the way for shared understanding and coordination. As key players in the Middle East, Egypt and Turkey have the potential to mitigate ongoing crises and prevent them from spiraling into uncontrollable conflicts—provided they find common ground on their interests and strategic approaches.
Considering that global and regional dynamics have historically influenced the ebb and flow of bilateral ties, the current regional landscape—marked by the Gaza war and its ripple effects across the region—presents a timely political opportunity to navigate contentious issues and engage in discussions about the future of the Middle East post-conflict. All involved parties recognize that the Gaza war will have lasting consequences, ushering in new variables that will reshape the regional balance of power and likely lead to shifts in the strategies of key players. Furthermore, the possibility of new security agreements between Arab, regional, and international actors pushes countries to defuse tensions in anticipation of future developments that may impact their interests or national security. Notably, the Gaza conflict stands out as one of the few regional issues where Cairo and Ankara have found common ground, united in their calls for an immediate ceasefire, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and efforts to prevent the conflict from spilling over into a wider regional crisis. Both countries are keen to avert a broader regional war, with Ankara especially concerned about the involvement of regional actors—namely Iran—due to the potential threats to its national interests and foreign policy, compounded by ongoing geopolitical rivalry between the two countries.
With no major developments currently shaping bilateral relations, the two presidents will address familiar topics such as Gaza, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, Sudan, Somalia, and Syria during their discussions. Despite diverging strategic interests, which influence the prioritization of these issues and their approaches to resolution, the resumption of presidential and ministerial-level engagements between Cairo and Ankara offers a platform for both sides to articulate their views and outline their respective solutions. However, this renewed dialogue does not imply the alignment of policies or the resolution of all contentious matters. Rather, international relations are shaped not by a “zero problems” policy but by the pragmatic management of ongoing challenges. Thus, the presidential discussions are expected to address the Eastern Mediterranean issue. It is almost certain that Turkey will broach the topics of maritime border demarcation and joining the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, while Egypt will likely emphasise that any boundary agreements must adhere to international treaties and conventions, ensuring they do not conflict with the interests of its Mediterranean partners. However, it’s important to recognize that this issue transcends the bilateral dynamic between Egypt and Turkey, remaining entangled in the broader structural disputes involving Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. As a result, any substantial shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean landscape will depend on the interests, agendas, and goals of all concerned parties.
Similarly, discussions of the Libyan and Sudanese crises are a staple of any Egyptian-Turkish meeting. These issues are as vital to Egypt’s national security as Syria and Iraq are to Turkey’s, given their direct challenge to Cairo’s immediate national security. This mutual recognition of security priorities, while accepting divergent political interests, aids in fostering understanding between the two countries. Moreover, the growing rapprochement between the two countries helps dampen destabilizing activities in the region.
Regarding Libya, both countries show a readiness to engage with political and military actors from both the West and East. This marks a constructive step toward forging security, military, and political agreements that address Egypt’s concerns about ongoing political divisions, unrest, and the proliferation of mercenaries, seen as a significant security risk by Cairo, while also acknowledging Turkey’s political and economic interests. The warming of ties between Cairo and Ankara could serve as a catalyst for advancing a Libyan political process aligned with international mandates, setting the stage for elections that reflect the Libyan people’s will, ultimately paving the way for ending institutional divisions—be they political, military, or financial—disarming mercenaries, and embarking on reconstruction.
In the context of the Sudanese conflict, Egypt and Turkey are aligned on the need for a political solution. Additionally, they are united in opposing Ethiopia’s attempts to establish a naval base and lease the port of Berbera via the separatist Republic of Somaliland. Both countries have a vested interest in stabilising the Horn of Africa due to Egypt’s water concerns and Turkey’s economic and military interests. Concerning Syria and Iraq, Egypt’s firm position against foreign military intervention and its call for a political resolution to the Syrian crisis resonate with Turkey’s own rejection of separatist projects in northeastern Syria, reflecting a shared commitment to maintaining territorial integrity and opposing military solutions.
The recent thaw in Egyptian-Turkish relations is closely tied to Ankara’s shift in foreign policy. This shift was evident in Turkey’s efforts towards regional reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel (prior to the Gaza conflict), reflecting a move away from ideological stances towards more pragmatic approaches and the decline in Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, whose political project faltered across the region. Perhaps this shift was driven by Ankara’s desire to mitigate the fallout from its ‘precious loneliness’ policy, which had exacerbated economic challenges for Ankara, intensified opposition criticism of Erdogan, and affected the Justice and Development Party’s prospects, particularly in the recent local elections at the end of March 2024. This is particularly relevant as Erdogan’s current presidential term is his last unless he either amends the constitution to extend his tenure or calls for early elections. Eager to leave behind a legacy as a leader who elevated Turkey to a key position on the global stage and enhanced its regional influence, Erdogan has been leveraging personal diplomacy and reshaping foreign policy to strengthen Turkey’s international relations. Yet, his efforts are not only aimed at enhancing Turkey’s global and regional influence but also at improving the electoral prospects of his Justice and Development Party in the forthcoming elections.
In summary, while the revival of bilateral relations via established diplomatic avenues—encompassing presidential exchanges, ministerial meetings, the High-Level Strategic Coordination Council, and business councils—does not promise a final resolution to all contentious issues, it does set relations on a constructive path, focused on identifying areas of common ground and addressing complex political challenges across various fronts, with both countries recognizing the necessity of a pragmatic approach to overcoming differences and focusing on shared goals, which fosters improved coordination on regional issues and ensures greater stability and balance in the region while safeguarding their national security and regional influence.
