French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Morocco last week marked a significant milestone in the warming of ties between the two countries. During his first trip to Morocco since 2018, Macron reiterated his country’s updated stance on the Western Sahara issue, endorsing Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara and emphasizing that its present and future lie firmly within its sovereignty.
This shift paves the way for a new chapter in French-Moroccan and French-Algerian relations while highlighting President Macron’s decision—albeit temporarily—to set aside a key objective of his foreign policy: enhancing ties with Algeria and advancing historical reconciliation between the two countries. Meanwhile, mutual recriminations persist between France and Algeria over the factors behind their deteriorating relations.
By mid-2023, relations between France’s leadership and the two Maghreb countries had reached a low point, with prospects for further deterioration looming, despite the extensive and multifaceted ties spanning politics, culture, arts, economics, security, and military cooperation, as well as deep connections between their peoples. The French leadership ultimately determined that mending ties with Morocco would be the less challenging path. This assessment hinges on various factors, including the differing memories of colonial history in Morocco and Algeria, the distinct economic systems of each country, and the areas of mutual interest and alignment between Paris and Rabat in cultural and Francophone matters as well as security cooperation. Additionally, hostility toward France is a cornerstone of Algeria’s national narrative, whereas Morocco’s official narrative highlights pride in its heritage while embracing openness to others. Furthermore, relations with Morocco do not incite the same internal polarization and tensions within France that ties with Algeria do. For its part, Morocco has demonstrated a strong commitment to fostering deeper connections with French society, elites, and influential circles.
Profound Ties between France and Morocco
France is home to a vibrant Moroccan community, numbering between 850,000 and 1.5 million people of Moroccan origin or nationality, alongside French citizens born in Morocco. These individuals are well-represented across various elite domains. Notable figures include former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (born in Rabat), Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the left-wing La France Insoumise party (born in Tangier), Rachida Dati, the current Minister of Culture (with a Moroccan father), Audrey Azoulay, UNESCO Director-General and former Minister of Culture (of Moroccan Jewish descent), her father André Azoulay, a French-Moroccan journalist and adviser to Moroccan monarchs Hassan II and Mohammed VI, as well as a former head of the Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue. Other prominent figures include Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, former Minister of Education (born in Morocco), Naima Mouchou, Vice President of the French National Assembly, Eric Besson, former Minister of Industry (born in Marrakech), Othman Nasrou, Minister of State for Citizenship and the Fight against Discrimination, and Karim Bouamrane, a rising star in the Socialist Party. Notable writers and thinkers include Tahar Ben Jelloun, Saphia Azzeddine, Leila Slimani, late Fatema Mernissi, and Leila Basen. The entertainment industry also boasts individuals like actors Jamel Debbouze, Gad Elmaleh, and Jean Reno, David Serero, David Guetta, and prominent broadcaster Ruth Elkrief.
Additionally, several prominent businessmen and industrialists of Moroccan origin have made their mark in France, including Richard Attias, who has ties to former President Sarkozy’s family, and Gabriel Banon. Within President Emmanuel Macron’s circle of advisors, individuals of Moroccan origin hold notable positions, including Yassine Belattar, whose involvement in Macron’s recent visit to Morocco stirred controversy in France for reasons too extensive to detail here. It is sufficient here to highlight that the president and his team frequently seek Belattar’s counsel on matters concerning Muslim-majority suburbs and their relationship with the state, particularly regarding the Gaza conflict’s domestic repercussions. Notably, Moroccan expatriates and French citizens of Moroccan descent play a prominent role in the technology sector, supported by the steady stream of skilled professionals emerging from Mohammed VI University.
Beyond these figures, a considerable number of elites maintain connections to Morocco through marital bonds, friendships, shared interests, and collaborations in academic, cultural, and administrative fields.
There are more than 50,000 French residents in Morocco (compared to 20,000 in Lebanon, for example), most of whom live in coastal cities and tourist areas. The warm weather plays an important role in Morocco’s attractiveness, in addition to the low cost of living, attractive tax legislation, and the many job opportunities in Moroccan administrations and Moroccan and foreign companies, especially in the fields of energy, aviation, the automotive industry, and tourism. France is the top foreign investor in Morocco, with investments exceeding €15 billion. There are a thousand small and medium-sized French companies operating there, and 700 companies affiliated with large French companies, creating employment for more than 100,000 individuals.
Morocco holds a favorable standing within most French political, economic, cultural, academic, intelligence, and military circles, aside from some leftist groups advocating human rights issues. This positive image stems from several factors, namely Morocco’s rich history, Sultan Mohammed V’s efforts to protect Jews during World War II, the proficiency of Moroccan elites in French and their awareness of France’s internal dynamics, and the Kingdom’s reluctance to dwell on colonial grievances. Moreover, there is the French elite’s commitment to delivering a message to Muslim public opinion that robust and constructive relations, based on friendship between peoples rather than mere interests, are attainable with Islamic countries. Another factor is Morocco’s appeal as an accessible tourist destination, its moderate and inclusive religious discourse, its involvement in secret diplomacy and Palestinian-Arab-Israeli dialogues, and the Moroccan intelligence agencies’ sharing of information on active and dormant terrorist networks operating in Europe with their European counterparts..
Furthermore, according to the French Foreign Ministry website, military cooperation is emphasized, with France playing a key role in coordinating and activating aspects of this partnership through consultation and oversight to support the modernization of the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces. France also offers training opportunities for members of the Moroccan military, both in France and within Morocco. Additionally, efforts have been made to expand French language instruction within military circles. France particularly depends on its military mission and a dedicated unit that supports defense cooperation, along with a network of experts assigned to work within or alongside the Royal Armed Forces.
Over the years, this historic partnership has gradually evolved to include an operational dimension, focusing on enhancing coordination capabilities between units through the exchange of expertise, knowledge, and the development of joint crisis-response mechanisms. Notable examples include the bilateral air combat exercise Tafilalt in 2019 and the annual joint naval exercise. However, the Moroccan military has increasingly leaned toward a partnership firmly rooted with the United States, furthering its military industry in collaboration with both the United States and India, leading to a noticeable decline in the French role.
Decline in Relations over Recent Years
Journalists and experts tracking French-Moroccan relations recognize the challenge in documenting the deterioration of relations during President Macron’s initial six years in office, as both parties engaged in a back-and-forth of blame and accusations. What is clear, however, is that Morocco was uneasy with Macron’s efforts to reshape French-Algerian relations through so-called “memory policies,” which involved acknowledging France’s historical wrongs, including its involvement in the deaths or assassinations of key figures from the Algerian revolution, and the pursuit of a shared historical narrative. Indeed, memory policies pose significant challenges, chief among them being their tendency to heighten internal and external tensions by reopening old wounds and unresolved issues, as well as the ambiguity surrounding the legal and political implications of such acknowledgments—whether they necessitate obligations like reparations, alignment, or other forms of redress. Furthermore, any admission of wrongdoing toward one country inevitably triggers demands for similar acknowledgments from others.
Alongside the shift in France’s relations with Algeria and Morocco into a zero-sum equation—where any progress with one triggers setbacks with the other—a series of crises has erupted between France and Morocco, the most prominent of which, according to the French presidency, include Morocco’s alleged wiretapping of President Macron’s mobile phone—a tool central to his management of state matters—and the votes cast by his party’s representatives in the European Parliament endorsing resolutions that criticize the Moroccan regime. Notably, the head of the party’s parliamentary bloc, who played a pivotal role in mobilizing these criticisms, later became the party’s Secretary-General and Minister of Foreign Affairs, replacing a minister noted for her cordial relationship with Morocco.
Between 2017 and 2023, investigations in France, Belgium, and Italy scrutinized various activities linked to Morocco’s operations in Europe. These included intelligence-related efforts, such as recruiting security personnel and countering terrorism, alongside monitoring Algerian movements. On the financial and political front, corruption cases in the European Parliament revealed that Qatar and Morocco had allegedly paid undisclosed sums to sway the decisions, policies, and actions of EU institutions, particularly regarding Western Sahara and agreements on fishing and agriculture.
A major source of tension emerged in the fall of 2021 when French authorities significantly reduced the number of visas granted to Moroccans, citing Morocco’s lack of cooperation in repatriating its citizens who had been ordered to leave France. This move was described as “catastrophic for bilateral relations” in French media and deemed “humiliating” in Morocco. Although France reversed the decision by late 2022, it left lingering resentment, particularly within families divided across the two countries. Morocco voiced its dissatisfaction through various actions, including delaying the appointment of a new ambassador to Paris and declining France’s offer of humanitarian aid following the September 2023 earthquake.
October 2023 marked the appointment of a Moroccan ambassador to Paris, a renowned media figure rather than a seasoned diplomat, who holds both Moroccan and French nationalities. This choice was seen by the French media as an indication of a willingness to diversify communication beyond conventional political and diplomatic frameworks and a step toward ushering in a fresh chapter in bilateral relations.
Bridging the Rift between France and Morocco
The mutual interest in enhancing relations is driven by several factors, including France’s deteriorating ties with Algeria, exacerbated by Algerian rhetoric during the “suburban uprising” in France in the summer of 2023, and Algeria’s growing alignment with Russia, China, and Italy. This shift coincides with the decline of French influence and its tarnished image across Africa, particularly in the Sahel, the Sahara, and Libya, where it has lost key allies, alongside worsening relations with Tunisia. For Morocco, the Kingdom is keen to diversify its alliances beyond the American-Israeli partnership, attract French investments, and capitalize on the familiarity of its elites with France’s language, culture, and political landscape, which makes engagement relatively smoother.
Despite the appointment of a foreign minister with established ties to Morocco from 2022 to early 2024, no substantial improvement in relations was observed. Her successor, however, visited Morocco in late February 2024 and emphasized France’s commitment to strengthening its relationship with the Kingdom. This visit followed a working lunch in Paris between the Moroccan king’s sisters and the French president’s wife, which took place ten days earlier. According to media reports, efforts by Emmanuel Bonne, the president’s diplomatic advisor, and Fouad Ali El Himma, the king’s advisor, were pivotal in bridging the gap, along with contributions from former Economy and Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire and Culture Minister Rachida Dati. The same reports highlighted that changes in French intelligence leadership had diminished Algeria’s influence by eliminating a key ally.
At the end of June, France announced a pivotal shift in its stance on the Western Sahara conflict, aligning itself with Morocco’s position and declaring that this alignment would guide its future policies. A presidential statement affirmed, “The present and future of Western Sahara fall within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty,’ and further emphasized, “For France, autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the framework within which this issue must be resolved. Our support for the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco in 2007 is clear and constant.” The statement also described the Moroccan autonomy plan as “the only basis for achieving a just, lasting, and negotiated political solution in line with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.” It also highlighted the importance of the region’s continued economic and social development, commending Morocco’s efforts and pledging French support for initiatives benefiting the local population. In response, Morocco’s Royal Court welcomed the announcement, calling it “a significant and critical advancement in bolstering Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara,” especially coming from a permanent UN Security Council member.
Strengthening Ties: The French President’s Visit to Morocco
In the last week of October, the French President arrived in Morocco with a substantial delegation exceeding 120 members. Among them were the Presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate, nine ministers—including those of Interior, Defense, and Finance—40 business leaders, a selection of art and sports celebrities, university professors, and the French-Moroccan activist Yassine Belattar. Belattar’s inclusion drew criticism in both France and Morocco. In France, he had received a suspended prison sentence, while in Morocco, his appearance before the King in inappropriate attire provoked disapproval.
On October 29, the French President addressed the Moroccan Parliament, reaffirming France’s stance on the Western Sahara issue. The visit also witnessed the signing of dozens of agreements valued at nearly €10 billion. These contracts encompassed projects for high-speed trains and their related infrastructure, desalination plants, green energy initiatives, the sale of a satellite, facilities for aircraft engine maintenance and repair, and the development of a port.
In early October, just weeks before the visit, there were concerns that relations between France and Morocco might further deteriorate after the new French Interior Minister, Bruno Retailleau, indicated that he might reinstate the policy of reducing the number of visas unless Morocco made progress on expelling illegal immigrants and responded to requests for facilitating deportations. However, by mid-month, Retailleau reversed his stance, praising Morocco as a large, safe, and friendly country. Meanwhile, French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noel Barrot emphasized the need to “learn lessons from past mistakes” and suggested that immigration should be addressed within the framework of a permanent partnership and international dialogue. A centrist French MP weighed in on the issue, declaring that the era of “arm-twisting” was over, stating that such an approach was no longer viable.
Retailleau, who accompanied the presidential delegation, met with his Moroccan counterpart Abdelouafi Laftit as well as Minister of Islamic Affairs Ahmed Toufiq. According to Le Figaro, officials from both countries pledged to collaborate in order to “shorten the timeframes” and “improve efficiency” regarding deportations. “The objective is to establish a discussion framework that fosters greater effectiveness,” explained aides to the French minister ahead of the meeting. This could include providing the ability to urgently share lists of deportees with senior Moroccan officials. The French presidency clarified that France seeks to focus on “facilitating legal movement” while simultaneously tackling “illegal immigration.”
Hence, the two sides has successfully avoided undermining the atmosphere of reconciliation with a public disagreement on this contentious issue. The topic of immigration was addressed in a joint statement signed by President Macron and King Mohammed VI on Monday, October 28.
The ministers also addressed another contentious matter: the fight against drugs. In a striking statement, the French Interior Minister warned that France was reaching a “turning point” or “sliding point” in the drug economy and trade, as both the scale and financial magnitude had grown. Official reports, including a Senate report from May, indicated that drug networks have become transnational and multinational, operating in cities and rural areas, heavily armed, and recruiting an increasing number of underage youths. Minister Retailleau shocked many by warning that France was heading towards “Mexicanization,” referring to a scenario similar to that of Mexico. Some in France have dismissed the issue as politically motivated, but the Senate, typically cautious of cheap political tactics, released a comprehensive report last May, pointing to countries, including those in the Gulf and Maghreb, as becoming a “rear base” for drug trafficking. Although both sides praised their cooperation on the matter, pre-visit media coverage suggests that the problem remains unresolved.
During the visit, the French President extended an official invitation to King Mohammed VI for a state visit to France, which the Moroccan Sovereign accepted.
Conclusion
French-Moroccan relations are multifaceted, rooted in strong foundations and generally characterized by smooth interactions at both the government and popular levels. Disagreements are not, however, out of the question, and when they do arise, they can escalate quickly and become profound. However, overcoming these challenges is always possible, thanks to the presence of broad, significant, and diverse social groups with political, intellectual, and identity interests that drive efforts to resolve tensions.
Some leftist movements argue that the Moroccan regime excels at managing public relations networks and campaigns in Paris and other European capitals to promote its image and defend its interests. They argue that the wider Moroccan population does not sufficiently benefit from the gains of these close relations with Western countries, or that these relationships support repressive policies. However, this argument presupposes that foreign relations inherently benefit all societal segments equally and suggests that the convergence of interests would dissipate if royal and governmental support were to wane. There is, however, no solid evidence to substantiate this claim.
Macron’s recent visit has undoubtedly ushered in a new phase in French-Moroccan relations, paving the way for a promising future. Both sides possess the expertise, tools, and resources necessary to achieve a well-balanced partnership, with the potential for the relationship to evolve into a highly strategic and exceptional one. However, bureaucratic hurdles, institutional inefficiencies in handling day-to-day issues, the unpredictable behavior of France’s volatile elites, and the possibility of shifts in French-Algerian relations suggest that the emergence of future crises remain a plausible risk.
