In the past hours, the 24-year reign of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime came to an end, with armed opposition factions participating in Operation Deterrence of Aggression, spearheaded by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), advancing and securing control over multiple fronts. These armed factions managed to swiftly seize control over multiple areas, beginning with the city of Aleppo, which fell within just two days of the campaign’s launch, followed by the capture of Hama and Homs, before advancing towards Damascus.
Simultaneously, factions of the Southern Operations Room, formed on December 6, managed to seize control of the provinces of Daraa, al-Quneitra, and as-Suwayda, following the successive retreats of Syrian army forces from these regions. This paved the way for opposition factions to penetrate Damascus, after rumors spread about Bashar al-Assad fleeing the country and army leaders notifying their troops of the regime’s collapse and their dismissal from duty.
Drivers of the Downfall
A combination of factors led to the collapse of the Syrian regime, which can be outlined as follows:
1. The Internal Dynamics: The worsening living and economic conditions faced by citizens drove many to take to the streets in protest against the regime over the past year, particularly in regime-controlled areas such as as-Suwayda and Daraa in the south.
2. The Diminishing Prospects for a Political Settlement: This unfolded against the backdrop of the Syrian regime’s unwillingness to engage with Arab or regional efforts aimed at progressing the political process, reviving the Constitutional Committee’s activities, and securing a resolution aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.
3. The Opposition’s Actions to Mitigate the Worries of Local Communities: By leveraging the regime’s fragile grip and limited public support, the armed factions sought to portray themselves as a secure alternative committed to fulfilling citizens’ basic needs, including providing safety and protecting minority rights to religious practice. This was highlighted by the spread of images showing Christians praying in churches, accompanied by statements emphasizing that they were under the protection of the Military Operations Command.
4. The Decline in the Syrian Army’s Readiness: Many reports attributed the Syrian army’s failure to confront the opposition’s progress and its repeated withdrawals to the exhaustion resulting from over 13 years of conflict. This, coupled with significant human losses, defections, and evasion of mandatory conscription, caused the army to lose nearly half of its original strength of 300,000 soldiers.
5. The Element of Timing: In the past few years, the regime’s reliance on Russian and Iranian military and human reinforcements has grown, enabling it to preserve and occasionally extend its control. Yet, this dependency gradually eroded the Syrian army’s operational preparedness. The opposition factions took advantage of this weakened state by launching their operations at a moment when Russia and Iran were preoccupied with their respective crises.
Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has diverted its military attention from Syria, reflected in the redeployment of Russian forces and equipment to support the Ukrainian front. Additionally, the timing of the recent operations in Syria aligned with critical events in Ukraine, such as the unexpected Ukrainian assault on the Russian Kursk region in August 2024 and the United States granting permission for Ukraine to strike Russian depth with long-range missiles. This shift in focus led to a waning Russian interest in the unfolding developments in Syria, especially as the latter’s territory has increasingly become a focal point in the Iranian-Israeli confrontation.
On the other hand, the increasing frequency and intensity of Israeli strikes on Iranian militia positions in Syria forced these militias to constantly reduce their numbers and redeploy. This resulted in a significant decline in their combat effectiveness within Syria, compounded by the attrition and losses they sustained in terms of both capabilities and military leadership during their prolonged confrontation with Israel, now lasting over a year.
Arrangements for the Post-Assad Era
The opposition’s capture of Damascus as part of Operation Deterrence of Aggression triggered a series of strategic shifts, set to directly influence the future trajectory of the Syrian crisis.
1. The HTS Leader’s Reassurances to the International Community: Throughout the twelve days of military operations, Ahmed al-Shar’a, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani, sought to present himself as a civilian politician in an effort to shed the “terrorist” label associated with his organization. In an interview with CNN, al-Julani refused to classify his organization as a terrorist group, emphasizing its primarily political nature. He also highlighted his opposition to certain “extreme Islamist practices,” which led to a split between his organization and other jihadist groups, resulting in the severance of ties. During the interview, al-Shar’a further elaborated on “plans to create a government based on institutions and a council chosen by the people.”
Following his takeover of Damascus, in his inaugural speech, he commanded that his forces to refrain from encroaching on public institutions, which would remain under the supervision of the former prime minister until the official handover, and prohibited the firing of celebratory gunshots.
His efforts appear to have paid off, as the New York Times reported that in recent days, the United States has conveyed warnings through the Turkish government to the HTS, cautioning them against cooperating with Daesh. In response, the HTS reaffirmed that it has no intention of integrating Daesh into its organization. The newspaper, citing American officials, further noted that President Biden is currently in discussions with his senior advisors about “the extent to which they should engage directly with the rebel groups going forward.”
In a related vein, the Al-Hurra reported, citing a senior White House official, that the United States intends to “engage” with the HTS as a unifying force for various opposition groups, in a manner that aligns with its national security objectives. Meanwhile, British Minister Pat McFadden stated that the British government is considering whether “the Islamist HTS group should remain classified as a terrorist organization” following their success in leading operations that toppled al-Assad’s regime. Additionally, Germany and the European Union announced plans to reassess HTS based on its future actions.
2. The Consolidation of Local Actors’ Power in Syrian Regions: As opposition factions advanced to secure control over regime-held areas in the south and the Syrian coast, the Turkish-backed National Army initiated a concurrent operation dubbed Dawn of Freedom against the Syrian regime forces, the People’s Defense Units, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Since then, National Army elements have reported gaining control over Tal Rifaat and Manbij.
Further, in response to the Syrian army’s successive withdrawals, the SDF established full control over the city of Deir Ezzor in eastern Syria, while also reinforcing their positions in al-Hasakah and Raqqah.
Meanwhile, during the military operations, fighters from the Free Syrian Army, supported by the United States and based at the Al-Tanf base, made notable advances, seizing positions and military equipment belonging to Syrian army forces in the Syrian Desert [Badiyat ash-Sham] within the administrative borders of Rif Dimashq Governorate. Additionally, they gained control over strategic points in the Jabal Ghurab area and several checkpoints along the Damascus-Baghdad road.
3. Shifts in External Actors’ Influence: Operation Deterrence of Aggression has altered the balance of international influence within Syria, potentially reshaping the dynamics of foreign presence in the crisis. While Iran’s field, political, and demographic presence has been the most prominent in Syria over the past years, aimed at ensuring Damascus remains within Iran’s sphere of influence in the region, thus serving its regional agenda of facilitating proxy movements and maintaining supply routes between Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon via Syria, the collapse of the Syrian regime, coupled with the army’s withdrawal from various regions and ongoing military strikes have significantly increased the likelihood of Iranian influence in Syria being curtailed, if not altogether diminished.
However, recent statements by Iranian officials, as reported by Reuters, reveal that Tehran has “opened a direct line of communication with the new leadership in Syria” to avert the emergence of a “confrontational path” between the two countries. This move underscores Tehran’s effort to secure a foothold in the evolving Syrian landscape, despite persistent US-Israeli efforts to diminish its influence.
For Russia, its prominent leadership position since 2015 means that the fall of al-Assad’s regime will have profound and direct repercussions for its role in the Syrian crisis. The uncertainty surrounding future relations between opposition factions and Moscow raises questions about the implications for Russia’s strategic interests, including its air and naval bases along the Syrian coast. In this vein, Russian reports highlighted contacts between Russian officials and representatives of the armed Syrian opposition, during which opposition leaders reportedly assured the security of Russian military bases and diplomatic missions in Syria.
Conversely, Turkey stands out as a key backer of Operation Deterrence of Aggression. While the Turkish Foreign Minister initially refuted claims of his country’s involvement in the operation, the Turkish President subsequently expressed optimism that the armed opposition factions would advance towards Damascus—a stance that can be understood against the background of al-Assad’s unwillingness to engage in discussions with Ankara about the future of bilateral relations. Indeed, these operations grant Ankara a strategic leverage, with its ties with the opposition factions ensuring Turkey’s position as a pivotal actor in shaping Syria’s future. Additionally, the National Army faction’s capture of Tal Rifaat and Manbij, which were central to Turkey’s goal of deepening its northern Syrian safe zone, strengthens Ankara’s hand, allowing for potential direct military intervention to secure its strategic interests in the region when the timing is favorable.
On Syria’s western frontier, Operation Deterrence of Aggression resulted in Israel imposing a new status quo on the Syrian-Israeli border. In addition to continuing its airstrikes on Syrian military sites, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared on December 8 the termination of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement with Syria and the occupation of the Golan Heights buffer zone and adjacent command centers. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz clarified that the operation’s objectives included “creating a security zone free of heavy strategic weapons and terror infrastructure posing a threat to Israel” and disrupting the flow of arms from Iran to Lebanon via Syria.
In conclusion, the potential outcomes of the current situation in Syria remain uncertain. It is yet to be seen whether the unfolding events will lead to the stabilization of Syria or ignite another round of chaos with negative implications for the Middle East. The new Syrian leadership endeavors to demonstrate its commitment to stability, as reflected in ongoing talks about forming a new government, attempts to project an image of managing post-regime chaos, towards reestablishing local institutional functions and, thereby, enabling the restoration of normalcy in Syria.
Nonetheless, significant challenges still endure. Chief among them is ensuring continued cohesion and shared objectives among the opposition factions, their acceptance of the HTS leadership, and their ability to create a unified regular army to avert a descent into chaos or civil war or the division of regions according to factional control. The second challenge pertains to how far Syria’s minorities will accept the rule and authority of the HTS, which advocates for a model of moderate Islamic governance, as it claims. The third challenge concerns the HTS itself—whether its founder will take the step of dissolving the organization to circumvent its classification as a terrorist entity, or if Western countries will eventually decide to lift the ban on the group, particularly given that many Western powers have reportedly started evaluating this prospect.
