Jordan is currently navigating a delicate period as regional geopolitical dynamics continue to shift. Iran’s regional influence is waning, marking a period of noticeable decline, while Turkey’s regional ambitions is surging rapidly, capitalizing on the voids left by its regional adversary. Meanwhile, Israel persists in its broad regional confrontation across multiple fronts. These dynamics are redefining the balance of power and influence in the Middle East, giving rise to new regional alignments and significantly affecting the strategies and operations of non-state armed actors. In parallel, a new American administration is set to take office on January 20. However, it has not been distant from the unfolding developments in the Middle East, which appear to have been bracing for a second Trump administration. This intricate regional environment brings with it security and political challenges that jeopardize Jordan’s strategic interests and national security.
This analysis examines the key threats currently facing Jordan, including the collapse of the Syrian regime and the rise of Islamist factions, the resurgence of Israeli ambitions to annex the West Bank, and Trump’s return to power.
Three Crucial Challenges Ahead
Three major concerns have emerged on both regional and international fronts, each presenting significant security, political, and social risks to Jordan in the upcoming period. These can be examined as follows:
The Fall of the Syrian Regime and the Rise of Islamists: Jordan is adopting a careful approach to the evolving situation in Syria. Despite enduring a range of security and political threats since the onset of the Syrian civil war—such as drug and weapons smuggling along the border and the looming presence of Iranian militias in the south—the new developments in Syria are not substantially different, continuing to impose several challenges to the Hashemite Kingdom, which can be outlined as follows:
1. Disrupting Iran’s logistical supply lines to its allies via Syria could force the search for alternative routes, with Jordan emerging as a potential corridor to fill the gap left by Syria’s exclusion from Iran’s smuggling network. To achieve this, Iran may turn to a mix of organized crime syndicates and militant groups, using covert intelligence operations to funnel weapons into the West Bank through Jordan and Iraq. This concern comes in the wake of Jordan’s official complaint to Iraq in August 2024 regarding the Popular Mobilization Forces’ proximity to its borders. Jordanian investigations have uncovered multiple Iranian smuggling networks exploiting the Kingdom as a conduit to transport arms from Syria and Iraq to the West Bank, with smuggling activities escalating over the past year. In March 2024, Jordan successfully intercepted an attempt to smuggle a weapons shipment, part of which was destined for the West Bank, while the remainder was meant for a Muslim Brotherhood cell operating within the country.
In September 2024, Israeli officials confiscated 74 Glock pistols and 61 magazines at the Wadi Araba Crossing near Eilat, located in southern Israel, which were being smuggled from Jordan into Israel. Then, in November 2024, the Israel Security Agency uncovered substantial Iranian weapon caches intended for smuggling across the Jordanian border, including anti-tank missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, and explosives such as Semtex and C-4. The growing security risks emerging from Jordan could undermine the diplomatic relationship between Israel and the Kingdom.
2. Undermining the regional Iranian Shiite project, which aimed to integrate Jordan into its sphere and use it as a launch point for attacks against Israel, does not eliminate the threat to the Hashemite Kingdom. Jordan now faces the Turkish project, which spearheads a Sunni Islamic axis, representing the pinnacle of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ambitions and promoting a secular model with Islamic underpinnings. This agenda threatens Jordan’s political stability by encouraging the ambitions of local Islamists, particularly in light of widespread public dissatisfaction driven by economic struggles and high unemployment rates. Thus, the possibility of a domino effect, drawing inspiration from the successes of Islamists in Syria, continues to pose a serious concern for Amman.
3. The Israeli military encirclement of Jordan along its northern strategic front, bordering Syria, has intensified with the Israeli army’s penetration into southern regions, occupying Mount Hermon and parts of Daraa, Quneitra, and Rif Dimashq (now just 25 kilometers from the capital, Damascus). Israeli tanks are now positioned only a few kilometers from Jordanian territory. This shift creates a new strategic, military, security, and political reality in the southern Syrian region, which serves as Jordan’s southern flank and is crucial to its national security. Furthermore, the situation poses significant risks to Jordan’s water security, particularly with Israel’s control over the Yarmouk River sources–the primary tributary to the Jordan River. This control exacerbates Jordan’s existing water shortage, as it does not receive its full allocation of 375 million cubic meters per year from the Yarmouk River, due to Syrian policies.
4. Future scenarios carry significant risks as rebuilding the Syrian state and establishing a stable political system appears to be an extensive, multi-step undertaking that has yet to make any substantial progress. While leaders of the new Syrian administration, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, have offered optimistic assurances about building an inclusive political system representing all segments of Syrian society, the current field and political developments suggest that the truce phase could soon collapse, leading to a new eruption of armed violence. The multiplicity of armed factions within Syria, each with differing ideologies and objectives, the lack of a unified goal beyond the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the widespread and difficult-to-regulate distribution of weapons across the country, and the growing signs of sectarian violence in coastal areas between the Alawites and the new administration are all raising alarms.
Additionally, the frequency of clashes is on the rise in cities such as Homs, Hama, and areas near Damascus, while Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) attempts to consolidate power and its reluctance to move forward with the transitional phase, adhering to the principle of “domination not participation,” exacerbate tensions. These dynamics increase the likelihood of Syria descending into a new phase of internal conflict or a second civil war, which would undoubtedly fuel fresh waves of refugees, some of whom would seek refuge in Jordan. This situation would also spark security turmoil along the borders, escalating cross-border smuggling activities, including drugs, arms, and terrorist elements.
Alongside the security threats arising from the factions and military groups in Daraa and Rif Dimashq, particularly given the lack of response to the new administration’s demands, tensions are becoming more evident. A prime example of this was the absence of Ahmed al-Awda, commander of the Eighth Brigade in Daraa, from the meeting between al-Sharaa and the armed faction leaders at the People’s Palace. The meeting was meant to address their demands for dissolution and integration into the new Syrian army, and while al-Awda was in Damascus, his absence signifies his refusal to comply with the new administration’s directives. Moreover, there is growing wariness among other southern factions regarding HTS’s expansionist agenda, which may lead to armed confrontations between forces loyal to HTS and those factions, or force the latter to form their own military structure, escalating the risk of unrest and security instability in southern Syria along the Jordanian border. In any scenario, even the establishment of a stable political system with a hardline Islamic ideology, supported by Turkey on the northern Jordanian border, presents significant threats, particularly in terms of the potential for the spread of this model across the region.
5. The volatile security situation in southern Syria, fueled by the power struggle between HTS and local factions, sets the stage for potential clashes, creating security vacuums that facilitate the growth of cross-border threats, whether terrorist or criminal. Daesh, currently spreading through the southern regions in small local groups, could re-establish its operational capacity. At the same time, organized crime rings are resurfacing, adopting new tactics and methods, with ongoing smuggling of drugs and weapons. On January 1, 2025, the Jordanian army reported the killing of several smugglers and the destruction of their vehicles as they attempted to cross the border from Syria. Additionally, five smuggling attempts involving drones carrying narcotics were intercepted and thwarted in the preceding days.
6. Another pressing threat involves the possible return of armed Jordanian elements to Syria. In its early stages, the HTS incorporated Jordanian jihadist leaders before it fractured and formed the Hurras al-Din [Guardians of Religion] Organization. The new Syrian army has also seen Jordanian figures rise to leadership positions, including Abdul Rahman Hussein Al-Khatib, a Jordanian of Palestinian descent, who was promoted to brigadier general. Additionally, Jordanian fighters continue to serve within the ranks of Daesh and other armed organizations operating in Syria.
Resurgence of Israeli Ambitions to Annex the West Bank: Amman has endeavored to strike a careful balance between public sentiment and the kingdom’s vital strategic interests with both Israel and the United States, particularly regarding the Israeli aggression against Gaza over the past year. However, the ambitions of some figures within the Israeli far-right, fueled by field victories on both the Palestinian and Lebanese fronts and the weakening of the regional resistance axis, have raised significant concerns in Amman regarding reviving the idea of Israeli annexation of large swathes of the West Bank —a notion that the Jordanian military establishment views as an overtly hostile act. Such a scenario might include Israel forcibly displacing Palestinians from Area C to Area B and eventually to Area A, creating both demographic and economic pressures on Palestinian Authority-controlled areas, while potentially pushing Palestinians to migrate willingly towards Jordan. Additionally, Israel may invoke legal measures to deport families of Palestinian youth involved in operations against Israeli forces.
While the first Trump administration withheld approval of Netanyahu’s 2020 West Bank annexation plan, the likelihood of full or partial annexation has grown significantly with Trump’s second term. This shift is largely due to the pro-Israel stance of figures appointed to critical positions within the new administration, such as Pete Hegseth, nominated as Secretary of Defense, and Mike Huckabee, nominated to serve as US Ambassador to Israel. Moreover, the notion of annexation is no longer a mere rhetoric or a fringe idea in Israeli politics but has become a concrete objective for certain ministers, including Bezalel Smotrich, the Minister of Finance. Jordan views this development with great concern, as it threatens to disrupt the current political stability equation. Given profound sensitivity of Jordan’s position on the Palestinian cause, both regionally and internationally, the realization of such a scenario would present substantial security risks to Jordan across multiple dimensions as follows:
1. Positioning Jordan as a fallback homeland for Palestinians could result in the displacement of thousands from annexation-threatened areas. Among them, around 250,000 holders of permanent Jordanian passports currently living in Palestinian territories might seek refuge in Jordan, compelled by Israeli coercion. Jordan, bound by legal obligations, would be unable to deny their entry, further straining its demographic landscape. With nearly 60% of the population already of Palestinian origin and significant numbers of refugees from Syria and Iraq, the demographic burden would grow. This situation could reignite debates about ensuring the demographic composition’s influence on national elections and political representation.
2. There is also a potential risk that peaceful protests in Jordan, condemning Israeli actions and supporting Palestinian rights, may escalate into criticism of government policies and demands for significant political reforms that reflect demographic changes and the prevailing anti-Israel sentiment. This is particularly concerning given the growing accusations that the government prioritizes political and security commitments with Israel and the United States over defending Palestinian rights. Such sentiments could fuel demands to cancel the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty and sever all ties with Israel. This scenario raises fears of an emerging wave of anger among groups that have traditionally upheld political stability—those residing in or near Jordan’s major cities and forming the backbone of the armed forces and security apparatus.
3. The rising popularity of Islamist factions, amplified by the regional resurgence of Sunni political Islam following HTS’s ascendancy in Syria, signals a significant shift. Although the Islamic Action Front’s 2014 electoral success—winning 31 of 138 parliamentary seats—does not immediately endanger Jordan’s stability, it underscores a growing acceptance of Islamist politics within Jordan’s political sphere. This acceptance, driven by the party’s alignment with the pro-Palestinian sentiment prevalent among youth and Jordanians of Palestinian descent, could strengthen its political foothold in the future. Further compounding this challenge is the presence of pro-Hamas elements within the Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front’s success in integrating influential tribal figures into its electoral lists. The tribal connections with the Muslim Brotherhood could jeopardize the current political situation, especially considering the historical role Jordanian tribes have played as a crucial stabilizing force within the political system and them being an essential component of the political apparatus, wielding considerable influence over the security institutions.
4. The rise in anti-Israel sentiment threatens the stability of the Jordanian-Israeli peace established under the 1994 peace treaty. Recent cross-border attacks underscore this danger. In September 2024, a Jordanian truck driver killed three Israelis near the King Hussein Bridge, the Jordan-West Bank border crossing. The following month, two Jordanians opened fire on Israeli soldiers near the Dead Sea, wounding some before being killed. In November, an attack near the Israeli embassy in Amman left three police officers wounded and the assailant dead. If Israel intensifies its measures in the West Bank, these incidents could escalate further, triggering retaliatory violence from the Israeli military and a cycle of conflict that jeopardizes regional peace.
Trump’s Comeback to the White House: While Trump’s first presidency saw some positive developments in Jordanian-American relations—such as increasing economic aid to $1.3 billion annually and the removal of US Ambassador Alice Wells in 2017 at the request of King Abdullah II—bilateral ties were largely stagnant during Trump’s final two years. This stagnation was exacerbated by the Deal of the Century, which alarmed Jordan due to its potential to marginalize the Kingdom’s pivotal and historic role in the Palestinian cause, particularly in safeguarding Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem. This decline in bilateral engagement mirrored Jordan’s waning regional influence amid the ascendance of other players. Although the regional context has evolved and Trump’s foreign policy team will differ from his first term—excluding figures like Jared Kushner, who had a strained relationship with Jordan—Amman’s apprehensions persist, especially regarding the potential annexation of the West Bank, along with other unresolved issues, including the following:
1. Jordan’s regional role and political influence face potential erosion as other regional players gain strategic prominence, driven by the expanding normalization with Israel. Up until 2020, Jordan’s unique peace agreement with Israel, alongside Egypt’s, provided the Kingdom with a strategic edge, solidifying its role as a reliable moderate security partner for the United States. However, the Abraham Accords and their potential extension to new countries, eager to collaborate across diverse sectors such as technology, security, energy, and services, are reconfiguring regional alliances. This shift diminishes Jordan’s strategic uniqueness, thereby threatening its established regional position.
2. The rising internal sensitivities regarding the Palestinian cause threaten Jordan’s national security, exacerbated by Trump’s support for the Israeli right-wing agenda. This alignment may lead to extensive Israeli gains, including the possible resurrection of the Deal of the Century, whether under a new guise or with modified terms, as well as renewed cuts to funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). These measures would severely impact Jordan’s interests and compromise its security.
In conclusion, Jordan continues to grapple with significant security and political pressures on its northern and eastern strategic fronts, while its internal situation remains precarious due to the economic crisis and the growing influence of Islamists. With Jordan’s internal stability closely tied to external dynamics, the risks of unrest are growing. As such, Amman seeks to establish communication channels with the new administration in Damascus, address security concerns, explore opportunities for collaboration, and carefully navigate its strategic relationships with the United States and Israel, all while remaining mindful of domestic public sentiment.
