The re-engineering of the Syrian landscape since the fall of the Assad regime and the rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) under Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly al-Jolani) has unfolded under sustained Turkish strategic oversight—perhaps even careful orchestration. It is now evident that Ankara holds the reins in Syria, shaping the transition and wielding considerable sway over the country’s emerging leadership. It is no stretch to say that Syria has shed its geopolitical identity as part of the Axis of Resistance, emerging instead as a centerpiece of Turkey’s expanding regional project and a testament to its strategic success. This transformation is reshaping the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape, strengthening Ankara’s foothold in Syria and beyond while significantly restricting Iran’s geopolitical, ideological, cultural, and sectarian influence.
This shifting regional landscape prompts questions about Syria’s strategic significance within Turkey’s broader regional ambitions. This article will explore how Ankara views Syria as a linchpin for its expansionist goals—linking it to the Blue Homeland doctrine, Turkey’s drive to become an energy hub, and its ambitions to solidify its role as a global trade nexus.
Fulcrum Points
With the fall of the Assad regime and HTS emerging as the de facto government, Turkish officials—each within their respective ministries—swiftly issued statements and commitments to assist Syria, foster bilateral cooperation, and propose future strategic initiatives. These initiatives, largely centered on trade, transportation, maritime border demarcation, energy pipelines, and military installations, align with Turkey’s broader regional ambitions. Turkey’s maneuvering in these areas can be broken down as follows:
Control over Transport and Trade Routes: Turkey’s Minister of Transport outlined ambitious plans to invest in Syria’s land, sea, air, and rail networks as part of post-war reconstruction. Key projects include high-speed rail development, construction of metro lines in Damascus and Aleppo, and reviving cross-border railway connections, beginning with the reactivation of the Mersin-Aleppo train line after a 12-year hiatus, with a potential extension to Damascus. Additionally, plans involve launching maritime transport routes from Antakya and Mersin to Latakia and addressing infrastructure deficiencies at Damascus airports by offering expertise in runway refurbishment, radar system enhancements, installation of X-ray detectors and safety equipment, as well as upgrades to weather radar systems. It is evident that Turkish officials deliberately draw on Ottoman-era symbolism when promoting strategic transport projects, framing the railway connection between the two countries as a revival of the long-suspended Hejaz Railway.
Indeed, the discourse around reviving the historic Hejaz Railway extends beyond mere infrastructure repair; it seeks to rekindle a powerful symbol of Ottoman unity, religious significance, and economic integration. While fully restoring the entire railway remains an unrealistic goal—at least in the foreseeable future—due to political, security, logistical, and operational challenges. The project’s historical trajectory itself was never fully realized, stopping in Medina rather than reaching Mecca as originally planned due to operational and security constraints. Nevertheless, even the partial rehabilitation of sections linking Turkish and Syrian border cities will be framed in political and media narratives as a step toward reclaiming a key strategic asset of the Ottoman era.
Beyond its symbolic significance, Turkey’s control over Syria’s transport infrastructure and the establishment of land, sea, and air links between the two countries serve to bolster Turkey’s geopolitical and strategic position. By leveraging its geographical advantage and investing in critical infrastructure, Turkey aims to cement its role as a global logistics hub and a key transit point for major international trade routes, including the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor, also called the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Additionally, Ankara is advancing regional connectivity projects such as the Zangezur Corridor and the Development Road Project. Therefore, Turkey aims to strengthen its role in regional trade by revitalizing the North-South route, positioning it as a competitive alternative to the India-Middle East-Europe corridor from which it was excluded, thereby enhancing its ability to navigate the geopolitical landscape of global economic corridors. Moreover, reactivating the trade route through Syria as a gateway to the Arab region and the Gulf could help revitalize Turkey’s market and exports, which have suffered since 2011 due to the Syrian civil war and Ankara’s decision to halt trade with Syria in favor of alternative routes through Egypt and Israel—resulting in a decline in its Gulf market share.
Besides the economic and logistical benefits, Ankara’s control over Syria’s transportation infrastructure aligns with its long-term military objectives, ensuring that developments are tailored to its strategic priorities. Addressing Syria’s weak highway network, Transport Minister Abdul Qadir Uraloglu underscored the critical role of highways in wartime, highlighting the strategic importance of the M4 and M5 routes. He also outlined plans for new bridges and highways to cater to the operational requirements of the Turkish Ministry of Defense, particularly as Ankara seeks to cement a permanent military presence in Syria and legitimize it through a formal defense agreement.
Expanding Influence and Control in the Eastern Mediterranean: Ankara has seized the rise of a pro-Turkish administration in Syria as an opportunity to replicate the Libyan scenario, aiming to secure a maritime border agreement similar to the one signed in 2019—one that sidesteps international legal precedents, including the 1962 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and ignores the maritime claims of Cyprus and Greece. This development threatens to reignite geopolitical tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, as regional and European powers are likely to perceive such an agreement as a provocative and destabilizing act, intensifying disputes over energy resources and territorial sovereignty.
Ankara’s strategic maneuvering in the Syrian theater, particularly its push for a maritime jurisdiction agreement based on the equidistance principle rather than Syria’s historical adherence to natural borders, underscores its capacity to navigate an intricate and evolving geopolitical landscape. This shift, which has removed a key obstacle to maritime border negotiations with Turkey, also highlights Ankara’s broader objective: integrating its policies across the Libyan and Syrian fronts to consolidate its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, reshape regional geopolitics, and tilt the balance of power in its favor.
This potential agreement expands Turkey’s exclusive economic zone by granting it 7,660 square kilometers, effectively establishing a new geopolitical reality in the Eastern Mediterranean. In doing so, Ankara aims to preempt any shifts in regional alliances while strengthening its stance against maritime competitors such as Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt, as it negates Cypriots and Greeks’ claims to an exclusive economic zone east of the island. Such an agreement not only expands its geopolitical influence but also unlocks strategic opportunities for harnessing the region’s hydrocarbon reserves and fisheries resources.
Providing a Focal Point for Turkish Military Deployment in the Middle East: Turkish journalists with close ties to the government have revealed Ankara’s ambition to expand its military presence in Syria. With around 10,500 troops already deployed across seven brigades in northern Syria—positioned at 49 key bases, including 13 in western Aleppo, 30 in Idlib, and three each in Hama and Latakia—Turkey is now seeking a formal defense agreement with the new Syrian administration. Such an agreement could encompass key initiatives, such as assisting in the reconstruction and restructuring of the Syrian army, as well as providing military training. Turkey may achieve this by deploying advisors to Syrian military academies or facilitating training programs for Syrian officers and personnel at Turkish military institutions.
While these steps should not be underestimated—as they effectively shape Syria’s military doctrine to align with Turkey’s strategic interests—their most significant dimension ties directly to Ankara’s broader geopolitical ambitions. This involves establishing military bases in Palmyra, Homs, and Damascus by deploying additional forces and equipment or repositioning Turkish personnel and vehicles from northern Syria, while also considering the establishment of a naval base in Tartus or Latakia and the operation of air defense systems to secure Syrian airspace.
These measures align with Turkey’s decade-old strategy of establishing overseas military bases, serving not just military but also political objectives—chiefly reinforcing Turkey’s role as a dominant regional power. Expanding and legitimizing Turkey’s military presence would secure a lasting foothold in Syria, completing the interconnected web of Turkish influence across military, political, economic, cultural, service, and social spheres. This expansion would also bolster Turkey’s position against the People’s Protection Units and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party while shifting the military balance in Ankara’s favor—particularly against its regional rival, Iran, whose militia forces, a key pillar of its regional ambitions, have suffered heavy losses that have significantly weakened their role in the regional power equation. Notably, the proposed Turkish bases in Palmyra, Homs, and Damascus—including the T4 airbase in Homs—sit at the heart of Iran’s former land smuggling routes and militia strongholds, effectively allowing Turkey to sever the so-called “Shiite Crescent” in the region. Beyond countering Iran, this move also extends to Turkey’s strategic positioning vis-à-vis Israel, which has recently expanded its control over southern Syria. A Turkish military base in Damascus would enable Ankara to counterbalance Israel’s presence in the south by achieving direct geographical proximity, placing Turkish forces within direct reach of Israeli military positions in Quneitra and Daraa.
In this sense, Syria becomes a key staging ground for Turkey’s broader military expansion in the Middle East, extending its reach beyond the al-Rayyan base in Qatar. Over time, this positioning could serve as a logistical and operational hub for Turkish military activities in neighboring countries such as Iraq and as a forward base for cross-border missions. Additionally, the deployment of air defense systems would leave Syrian airspace entirely exposed to Turkey’s control, enabling Ankara to monitor foreign warplane movements and ensure that no operations take place without Ankara’s coordination. Moreover, the establishment of a Turkish naval base on the Syrian coast carries significant strategic weight, bolstering Turkey’s naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and safeguarding its hydrocarbon exploration interests. This would also grant Ankara greater authority over regional maritime traffic, given Syria’s proximity to vital sea lanes and energy corridors in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Besides, Turkey’s oversight of the new Syrian army—shaping its doctrine, training, armament, and organization—entrenches Turkish military strategies within Syrian state institutions. This not only paves the way for joint defense strategies but also integrates Syria into Turkey’s defense ecosystem, opening the Syrian market to Turkish defense industries and fostering intelligence-sharing and military coordination between the two countries.
Creating a Demographic Reality Favorable to Loyal Separatist Entities: Turkey has long leveraged demographic engineering as a means of ethnic division, particularly to disrupt Kurdish territorial cohesion in northern Syria. Now, it appears poised to use the same strategy—this time to carve out ethnically homogeneous cantons in key geographic areas that align with its regional expansion ambitions. The Turkmen, Syria’s second-largest ethnic group after Arabs—estimated at 3.5 to 4 million out of a total population of 20 to 22 million—emerge as a crucial asset in this plan. Their presence, particularly along the Syrian coast, offers Turkey an opportunity to dilute Alawite homogeneity in the region, strategically advancing its goal of securing access to the Mediterranean.
The past period has seen Turkmen families returning to their villages in Bayirbucak, Latakia, celebrating their homecoming by raising both the Turkish flag and the blue Turkmen flag over mosques and schools. Yet, despite their presence, the Turkmen remain Syria’s weakest ethnic group in terms of organization, political influence, and military strength. Unlike the Kurds, they lack a unified front, a separatist agenda, or territorial military leverage. So far, Ankara has shown little interest in mobilizing the Turkmen as a strategic asset, but they remain a dormant card that Turkey can play at any moment. Given Ankara’s historical stance as the protector of Turkmen minorities beyond its borders—and its view of Syrian Turkmen as natural allies—this potential remains significant. Notably, resigned Rear Admiral Cihat Yaycı, architect of the Blue Homeland doctrine, has even suggested the possibility of establishing a Turkmen autonomous zone along the Latakia-Qamishli line should a Kurdish autonomous region materialize.
Serving as a Regional Energy Hub: The shifting dynamics in Syria paves the way for Turkey’s resurgence as a key player in the global energy landscape, enhancing its geopolitical significance for Europe as a strategic hub for transferring energy from regional producers to European markets. This aligns with efforts to diversify energy supplies away from Russia, leveraging Turkey’s well-developed energy infrastructure, which includes seven gas pipelines, five LNG terminals, three floating storage units, and two underground storage facilities. Syria’s strategic location along international trade routes and its direct geographical link to Turkey further bolster Ankara’s prospects of becoming a major energy transit hub. This was evident in the swift response of Turkish officials following the fall of the Assad regime, as they eagerly revived long-standing plans to transport natural gas from the Arab region to Europe via Syria and Turkey, including a pipeline route to carry Qatari gas to Europe through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey, with the possibility of integrating it with the Arab Gas Pipeline—which originates in Egypt and runs through Jordan and Syria—at Damascus, from where an extension could be built to Turkey, ultimately supplying European markets.
However, there is no clear timeline for the construction of the proposed pipelines, nor are there estimates regarding their capacity or cost. These projects still face significant logistical, political, financial, and operational challenges, raising doubts about their feasibility. In the case of the Qatari gas pipeline, additional obstacles have emerged beyond the Syrian conflict itself, including the lack of reliable guarantees for long-term security and political stability in Syria. The prolonged transitional period, the resurgence of Daesh activity in the central Syrian Desert, and the unresolved status of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces add further uncertainty—especially with the looming possibility of a Turkish military operation in the north. These factors increase the risk of Syria sliding into another round of civil war, which significantly hampers energy investment decisions. Energy companies are unlikely to invest billions of dollars in transnational pipelines—such as the estimated $20 billion cost of the proposed project—unless they have strong assurances that the transit country will remain stable for at least the next 10 to 15 years, the time frame typically required to recoup such an investment.
Moreover, interest in the Qatari gas pipeline project has significantly declined, as the EU moves forward with its plan to phase out natural gas by 2050, prioritizing total shift toward renewable energy. By 2030, Europe is set to reduce financial contributions to gas supply projects and instead prioritize investments in renewable energy infrastructure. Additionally, Qatar itself favors exporting its energy resources as liquefied natural gas, a strategy it accelerated after the Ukraine war to secure European gas supplies—an option that is also far more cost-effective than constructing expensive cross-border pipelines. Meanwhile, US enthusiasm for the project has diminished. Once a major advocate, Washington’s stance shifted after Russia’s dominance in the European gas market was significantly reduced, allowing both the United States and Qatar to supply LNG to Europe. Moreover, Qatar is actively seeking stakes in Eastern Mediterranean gas production projects, a move that strengthens its geopolitical influence in the region while also offering a more geographically convenient route to European markets.
In conclusion, the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria marked a watershed moment for Turkey, allowing it to redefine the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape by displacing Russian and Iranian influence while bolstering its own regional and global standing, thereby reshaping Syria’s political and regional dynamics to align with its strategic ambitions.
