Since Turkey became the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949 ^[1], relations between the two countries have swung between pragmatic cooperation and ideological discord. This ebb and flow has been especially evident in recent years, with recurring tensions—most notably the latest strain sparked by Israel’s aggression in Gaza, which many view as part of a broader ideological divide. However, the shifting geopolitical landscape, particularly following the collapse of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime—which reshaped the regional balance of power in favor of both Tel Aviv and Ankara—has reignited discussions about a potential recalibration of Turkish-Israeli ties based on strategic pragmatism. 

This raises critical questions about the nature and direction of these evolving relations, the underlying factors shaping them, and the interplay between competition and cooperation in their respective regional ambitions. Ultimately, exploring these dynamics offers insight into the possible scenarios that could define their relationship in the near future amid ongoing regional and global developments.

I. Determinants and Context of Israeli-Turkish Relations

Turkey and Israel share a long and complex history of fluctuating relations, shaped by a delicate balance between ideological differences and pragmatic approach which Ankara adopted since its recognition of Israel. While Turkey positioned itself as a strategic ally for Tel Aviv, especially amid Israel’s regional isolation, it also carefully navigated its ties with Arab countries during the Cold War. This balancing act ultimately led to Turkey’s recognition of the Palestinian state in 1988 ^[2].

While the relationship was initially shaped by Israel’s stance on the Palestinian cause, the wave of mutual visits and cooperation in the early 1990s signaled a shift beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict ^[3]. This era saw a deepening of diplomatic ties, culminating in key agreements in 1996, including landmark defense cooperation and free trade deals—both of which solidified collaboration across military, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence sectors ^[4]. Reflecting this growing partnership, bilateral trade surged from $304 million in 1994 to over $1 billion by 2000. Today, trade and tourism between the two countries are estimated at $9.5 billion ^[5].

By the early 2000s, tensions between Turkey and Israel had begun to rise, fueled by the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdogan initially suggested a continuation of positive relations but gradually shifted toward a more assertive stance, particularly as the Palestinian cause became embedded in Turkish political discourse. This ideological shift manifested in increased criticisms of Israel, beginning with Turkey’s condemnation of Israeli military operations in 2008-2009, followed by the 2009 Davos incident and Israel’s attack on the Turkish Mavi Marmara ship in 2010 that resulted in the death of nine Turkish citizens ^[6].

The crisis prompted Turkey to downgrade diplomatic ties to the second secretary level and suspend military agreements ^[7]. Efforts to mend relations through a 2016 agreement ultimately fell through ^[8], and tensions escalated further in December 2017 when US President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, triggering additional diplomatic fallout ^[9]. However, by 2022, amid Ankara’s economic struggles and its broader policy shift toward easing tensions with regional neighbors—including efforts to strengthen ties across the Middle East and North Africa—Turkey’s strategic interests aligned with Tel Aviv, particularly in countering Iran. This convergence paved the way for the full restoration of diplomatic relations, with both countries reappointing ambassadors ^[10].

In the lead-up to the October 7 events, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had discussed deepening normalization between Tel Aviv and Ankara during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 20, 2023. The meeting, held at the Turkish House in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, focused on expanding cooperation in energy, technology, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity ^[11]. 

Despite the volatility and instability that have defined Turkish-Israeli relations over the past two decades, several key factors and variables have consistently shaped their interactions, the most notable of which are:

1. The Shifting Turkish Domestic Landscape and Domestic Policy Considerations: The transformations within Turkey’s domestic sphere have been a key determinant in shaping its foreign policy behavior toward Tel Aviv. This became particularly evident with the rise of the AKP, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which infused a religious dimension into Turkish politics. Erdogan leveraged the Palestinian cause as an ideological backdrop to rally his conservative electoral base and reinforce his control over Islamic circles amid domestic political challenges. By portraying his government as a staunch defender of the Palestinians, he sought to consolidate support against opposition forces.

Observers also suggest that Erdogan’s depiction of Israel as a national security threat—within the evolving dynamics of regional power, including concerns over Iran and the Kurdish presence in northern Syria—serves as a political tool in his maneuvering to divert attention from internal challenges ^[12]. Furthermore, this narrative bolsters his legitimacy as a leader of the Muslim world, employing religious and historical rhetoric to garner domestic and regional support for the gradual realization of what is often referred to as “neo-Ottomanism” ^[13].

In this context, some of Ankara’s actions toward Tel Aviv have intersected with this broader strategy. For instance, the Turkish president’s electoral base suffered a major setback in the municipal elections on March 31, 2024. In addition to his defeat by the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) in major cities like Istanbul and Ankara, he also lost several strongholds in peripheral regions to Islamist opposition parties ^[14]. Some analysts attributed this shift to the defection of Erdogan’s former supporters toward other Islamist political parties, such as the New Welfare Party, particularly after he signaled a willingness to maintain trade relations with Israel ^[15]. However, in April 2024, Erdogan imposed a unilateral trade ban on Israel, followed by a complete suspension of commercial ties in May 2024 ^[16]—an attempt to neutralize a key political tool available to his Islamist rivals ^[17]. Therefore, this decision was not solely an ideological expression of solidarity with the Palestinians but was also driven by domestic political considerations.

Additionally, Erdogan escalated his rhetoric against Tel Aviv to an unprecedented level, even threatening on July 28, 2024, that Turkey could “enter Israel” in the same manner it had intervened in Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya. He further warned that after Gaza and Lebanon, Israel would not hesitate to open a new front against Turkey ^[18]. His loyalist media outlets have also recently intensified propaganda portraying the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as collaborating with Israel. This narrative has resonated within Turkish domestic politics, as evidenced by pro-Palestinian protesters in Diyarbakır equating the PKK with Israel in their slogans—an indication of the effectiveness of this messaging ^[19].

Ultimately, this discourse of “state survival” serves to neutralize opposition forces, particularly the CHP, by framing national security as an overarching priority. It establishes a social narrative that leaves little room for public debate on issues beyond security concerns.

2. The Interest-Driven Framework and Balancing Ideology with Pragmatism: Given the perceived political and economic costs associated with the previously mentioned determinant—costs that the Turkish president is compelled to bear, especially amid Turkey’s deteriorating economic conditions—the Turkish administration has consistently sought to maintain trade relations and protect its direct economic interests. This pragmatic stance has driven Ankara for years to uphold a balanced approach toward Israel. Rather than severing ties with the Jewish state, Erdogan has adopted a contradictory policy: maintaining ambassadorial-level relations with Israel while simultaneously fostering close ties with Hamas and allowing its members to reside in Turkey.

Following the events of October 7, 2023, despite Ankara taking some measures against Israel—such as Turkish Airlines suspending all direct flights to Israel on October 10—reports indicate that Turkey preserved its long-term trade relations with Tel Aviv across key sectors, including energy, textiles, and technology, some of which contributed to Israel’s war efforts. Additionally, Turkey continued facilitating the transit of Azerbaijani oil to Israel through its territory ^[20]. Even after Ankara was compelled to impose a unilateral trade ban on April 9, 2024, restricting 54 strategic products, including cement and steel, and subsequently expanding it to a complete halt of trade with Israel on May 2, 2024 ^[21], reports suggested that the embargo was circumvented. Investigative journalist Metin Cihan and others revealed that trade between the two countries did not cease entirely, with allegations emerging that Erdogan’s son was involved in business dealings with Israel post-October 7 ^[22].

Moreover, several reports indicated that Turkish goods continued reaching Israel, often under the pretext of being destined for Palestine. Alternative business routes were established via intermediary Mediterranean ports, with Palestinian companies in the West Bank acting as “official recipients” of the goods. These companies reportedly received commissions from the transactions before the products were transferred to Israeli companies—the actual trading partners of Turkish firms ^[23]. Statistical data supports this trend; according to figures from the Turkish Exporters Assembly, exports to Palestine surged by 1,180% compared to the previous year ^[24].

These maneuvers reflect how geopolitical considerations have been managed in a way that minimizes direct economic repercussions, aligning with the pragmatic approach of the Turkish administration—maintaining a pro-Palestinian stance to satisfy its political base while preventing any escalation that could trigger broader domestic unrest. This pragmatic approach has long shaped Turkish-Israeli relations, where economic ties have paradoxically strengthened despite periodic political tensions. Despite Erdogan’s repeated declarations of suspending “military and trade relations” with Israel after almost every crisis, Turkish-Israeli economic relations have expanded significantly over the past two decades. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), bilateral trade volume grew from $1.41 billion in 2002 to $8.91 billion by 2022, with Turkey consistently maintaining a trade surplus ^[25].

In this context, rhetoric on both sides often serves as a façade aimed at securing domestic political gains, while expanding economic interests remains the priority. This dynamic underscores how Turkish-Israeli relations have consistently prioritized economic interests over political factors ^[26].

3. Tel Aviv’s Centrality in US Strategy Toward the Middle East: The growing recognition within Turkish leadership of Tel Aviv’s centrality in US strategy toward the Middle East has been a key driver in fostering relations between the two sides in recent years, given Ankara’s need to improve its ties with US administrations. With the election of the new Republican administration led by Donald Trump—the first US president to impose five separate sanctions on the Turkish government ^[27]—who also has strong ties with Tel Aviv, Ankara is likely to work toward easing tensions with Israel, especially given the appointments in Trump’s new administration, the majority of whom are known for their strong support for Israel. This would serve as a gateway to alleviating Turkey’s strained relations with Washington, which had deteriorated due to Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia and its purchase of the S-400 missile systems, which led to US sanctions, Turkey’s exclusion from acquiring F-35 fighter jets, and a ban on purchasing US military technology, including F-16 aircraft. However, this issue was resolved in January 2024 following Ankara’s approval of Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO ^[28].

This trend is further reinforced by statements from the AKP spokesperson Omer Celik, who indicated that the Turkish government is working on a roadmap to enhance relations with the new US administration ^[29]. Meanwhile, key appointments within the US government have increasingly appeared unfavorable to President Erdogan ^[30]. For instance, Tulsi Gabbard, one of Erdogan’s fiercest critics, has been appointed as the new US Director of National Intelligence. In a statement prior to assuming office, Gabbard accused Turkey of “supporting jihadists” and publicly described Erdogan as “one of the most dangerous dictators in the world,” emphasizing that she does not view the Turkish president as an ally ^[31]. Similarly, Marco Rubio, the nominee for US Secretary of State, has previously criticized Erdogan on multiple occasions over Turkey’s policies toward the Kurds in northern Syria and its poor record on freedom of expression and human rights ^[32].

In this context, Celik expressed hope that the past statements made by newly appointed US officials would not negatively impact bilateral relations ^[33]. In addition to this challenge, Ankara faces another hurdle in improving its ties with the new administration—its recent attempts to join BRICS, including participation in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summits. The SCO aims to challenge US dominance in global trade by promoting de-dollarization ^[34].

4. Turkey’s Role as a Counterbalance to Iran: The shifting dynamics in Syria, particularly with the fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, have raised the possibility of the United States relying on Turkey as a Sunni counterbalance to Iran. This would help fill the local power vacuum through Ankara’s strong ties with armed groups in Syria, thereby serving both US and Israeli interests. Turkey’s pragmatism and its emerging need to strengthen relations with the new US administration could further facilitate coordination on Kurdish-related issues.

In this vein, the evolving power map in Syria, which has benefited both Ankara and Tel Aviv, presents an opportunity to expand the “coordination of necessity” that has emerged due to these shifts. This could extend to joint efforts in other strategic areas, particularly Central Asia and the Caucasus. A notable example is the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, where Israel might seek tactical coordination with Turkey to undermine Iranian influence. This could be part of a potential trilateral alliance involving Israel, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Such cooperation aligns with Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions in the region, particularly its vision of neo-Ottomanism, which includes opening the Zangezur Corridor. This corridor would not only connect Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan enclave via Armenian territory but also provide Turkey with a direct route to expand its influence into Central Asia and access resource-rich, Turkic-speaking regions ^[35]. This arrangement could also serve Israel’s interests by balancing Turkey’s expanding presence in Syria and mitigating its impact on Israel’s strategic domain in the Middle East.

5. Converging Perspectives on a Common Threat: The presence of a shared threat and common adversary has contributed to the absence of direct geopolitical conflict between Tel Aviv and Ankara, serving as a catalyst for strengthening ties in recent years. In the post-Cold War period, both countries’ strong opposition to the Syrian regime fostered closer cooperation ^[36]. Similarly, concerns over Iran’s growing influence have provided a foundation for implicit collaboration, even amid periodic tensions ^[37]. This was reflected in Turkey’s neutral stance regarding Israeli operations targeting Iranian and Hezbollah positions.

In mid-2024, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan expressed hope that Israeli efforts to weaken Iran and Hezbollah would create a power vacuum in Syria, indirectly benefiting Turkey’s regional ambitions ^[38]. In this context, reports have surfaced suggesting a US-brokered Turkish-Israeli coordination that facilitated the scenario leading to the fall of the Syrian regime. This aligns with Israeli analyses prior to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, which viewed his leadership as a facilitator of Iranian military expansion in Syria ^[39].

II. Boundaries of Competition and Cooperation between Ankara and Tel Aviv

The collapse of the Syrian regime marked a pivotal shift in regional geopolitics, fundamentally altering the dynamics between Turkey and Israel. This shift has the potential to introduce new challenges and test the resilience of their relationship. Below is an overview of the opportunities for cooperation, as well as the factors driving conflict and competition.

Opportunities and Drivers of Cooperation

1. Coordinating Roles in the Syrian Arena: As part of its efforts to reassure both the international community and Tel Aviv regarding the armed factions under its influence—such as the Syrian National Army, which recently expelled the Kurdish YPG from Tell Rifaat in northern Aleppo—Ankara has signaled its growing control over the situation. Turkish security officials have also announced their forces’ dominance over most of Manbij, a key Kurdish-held city ^[40]. Beyond this, Turkey’s web of alliances extends to other factions, most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which remains closely linked to Ankara. These reassurances have been echoed in statements from leaders of armed groups that took control of governance in Syria. For instance, Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of HTS, explicitly stated his lack of intent to escalate conflict with Israel, saying: “We don’t want conflict either with Israel or with other countries. Syria won’t be used to target other countries. Syrians are tired and just need to live in peace” ^[41].

Simultaneously, Turkey has requested advance updates from Israel regarding its military strikes in Syria—an indication of the evolving regional power balance. This marks a major shift in the regional hierarchy, replacing Russia’s influence with Turkey’s expanding military presence in Syria ^[42]. Within Israeli domestic circles, this request has been perceived as a positive sign of Turkey’s willingness to avoid friction with Tel Aviv, and, by extension, the new US administration. Israeli analysts argue that it is in Israel’s best interest to engage in dialogue with Turkey to clarify positions and prevent unintended escalations, especially given that Ankara’s request followed Israel’s intense military campaign against Syrian army assets, during which nearly 80% of its military capabilities were destroyed.

However, some Israeli experts view Turkey’s request as an attempt to cement the new power map in Syria. Israeli commentators have gone as far as to claim that “Syria has become a province of the Ottoman state” and that “Julani is now the new Ottoman governor of Syria” ^[43].

2. Pressure on Hamas: Given the de facto coordination occurring between Ankara and Tel Aviv in Syria, Israel may explore ways to extend this cooperation into other strategic areas. One potential avenue could involve Turkey exerting increased pressure on Hamas leadership to show greater flexibility in its conditions for the ceasefire deal. Ankara might see value in such a move, as securing a ceasefire agreement could help ease domestic political pressures while also supporting its broader roadmap to improve relations with the new US administration.

In return, Turkey may seek Israeli intervention with Washington to ensure alignment on the Kurdish issue, addressing Ankara’s concerns and obstructing any efforts toward establishing Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border. Additionally, Turkey has a vested interest in playing a role in the long-term reconstruction of Gaza, which could take years to complete.

3. Turkey’s Strategic Role in US Policy toward the Region: Over the past decade, Turkey has expanded its regional influence across multiple arenas, from Libya to Syria, as well as in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, Ankara has pursued a “zero problems” with regional actors, solidifying its role as a significant player in emerging geopolitical equations. In light of these developments, Washington may recognize Turkey’s strategic value and the benefits of its coordination with Israel. In exchange for Ankara’s cooperation, the Turkish government may seek political and economic concessions to strengthen its domestic standing and legitimize its newfound regional influence.

Drivers of Conflict and Competition

1. Diverging Visions for Syria’s Future: Turkey envisions Syria as a unified state under a government closely aligned with Ankara ^[44]. This perspective is driven by several key considerations, foremost among them being the need to prevent Syria’s regional fragmentation, which could lead to competing power structures seeking autonomy—similar to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is affiliated with the PKK in northeastern Syria. Another major concern is avoiding new waves of refugee displacement due to instability. A stable transitional period would allow Turkey to channel economic aid into Syria, creating conditions conducive to refugee repatriation.

In contrast, Israel appears to favor a fragmented Syria, with a shift from the concept of “nation-states” to “ethnic states” ^[45], alongside the establishment of buffer zones to ensure security against groups such as HTS and other factions. Ankara strongly opposes this approach—not only because it rejects the creation of a Kurdish state under PKK influence, but also because even without a Kurdish state, Syrian territorial fragmentation would undermine Turkey’s strategic success in the conflict. Accordingly, Turkey seeks to strengthen HTS’s control over a unified Syria to safeguard its strategic interests.

This divergence in priorities could escalate tensions, particularly if HTS attempts to challenge Israel’s growing influence in Syria by expanding its territorial control, or if Israel actively works to weaken HTS. Given the new geopolitical reality—where Turkey and Israel have effectively become de facto neighbors due to Ankara’s military, intelligence, and civil operations in HTS-controlled areas—Turkey’s close proximity to Israel’s borders could create new flashpoints for conflict.

Recent developments have already reflected these growing tensions. Turkey has vehemently condemned Israel’s actions in the buffer zone, with Erdogan accusing Israel of exhibiting an “occupation mentality” ^[46]. In response, Israel countered with its own accusations against Turkey, stating that “Turkey is the last country that should talk about occupation in Syria” ^[47]. This escalation resurfaced during Erdogan’s address to his ruling AKP parliamentary bloc on January 14, 2025, where he demanded that “Israel withdraw from Syrian territory immediately.” The Israeli Foreign Ministry responded with a statement urging Erdogan to “avoid unnecessary threats,” further asserting that “the aggressive imperialist actor in Syria—as well as in northern Cyprus, Libya, and other areas in the Middle East—is Turkey itself” ^[48].

Thus, the shifting power dynamics in Syria are increasingly shaping a competitive, rather than cooperative, relationship between Turkey and Israel. The potential for geopolitical rivalry between the two regional actors could lead to further escalations, posing new risks for broader conflict in the Middle East.

2. The Perceived Threat of Turkey’s Political Islam Project in the Region: Tel Aviv views the rise of radical armed groups in Syria—many of which maintain strong ties with Ankara—with suspicion and concern. There is a growing fear that this development could replace Iran’s Shiite hegemony with a new form of political Islamist dominance led by Turkey. Ankara’s political system ideologically aligns with the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization with a historically hostile stance toward Israel and its presence in the region ^[49].

This concern is shared by several Arab states, particularly in light of Erdogan’s expansionist rhetoric under the banner of “neo-Ottomanism.” Commenting on events in Syria, Erdogan stated: “Every event in our region, and especially Syria, reminds us that Turkey is bigger than Turkey itself. The Turkish nation cannot escape from its destiny” ^[50]. Erdogan positions this “destiny” as a continuation of Turkey’s Ottoman legacy and its role as the leader of the Islamic world.

Consequently, this perceived threat could serve as a catalyst for conflict between Ankara, Tel Aviv, and several Arab states. Washington and Tel Aviv may seek to capitalize on these tensions to accelerate regional alliance-building efforts, particularly by expanding the Abraham Accords. One key objective of these agreements has been to counterbalance perceived security threats, including Iran’s influence—an effort that could now extend to addressing Turkey’s ambitions in the region.

3. The Kurdish Issue as a Major Flashpoint: The Kurdish issue remains a significant point of contention that could lead to heightened tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Turkey is determined to neutralize Kurdish forces along its borders, aiming to establish a buffer zone of no less than 30 kilometers to prevent the formation of an autonomous Kurdish entity ^[51]. However, the US military presence in northern Syria complicates Ankara’s efforts, as Washington provides protection to Kurdish forces in the region. Israel’s stance on the matter further exacerbates tensions. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar has openly expressed Israel’s view of the Kurds as allies ^[52]. Tel Aviv considers Kurdish forces a strategic asset—both as a counterbalance to Islamist armed groups and as a safeguard against Iranian-backed militias operating in Iraq. Additionally, the Kurdish issue serves as a bargaining chip in Israel’s broader geopolitical calculus against Turkish ambitions.

As such, Israel may push to ensure that the new US administration—despite its isolationist tendencies—does not abandon the SDF. Tel Aviv is also likely to engage with key Republican senators who are well-versed in the Kurdish issue, advocating for a firm US stance to secure continued support for the Kurdish forces operating in strategic areas of northeastern Syria, known as Rojava ^[53].

4. Geopolitical Competition in the Eastern Mediterranean: In line with the Turkish doctrine known as “Blue Homeland,” introduced in 2006 by Admiral Cem Gurdeniz, Ankara has been working to expand its regional influence in surrounding countries. This is reflected in its strategic moves in the Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea, as well as its actions in Syria and the Red Sea—efforts aimed at strengthening economic and energy independence. According to Turkey’s security doctrine, its vast maritime borders represent both a vulnerability and an opportunity—posing a potential weakness on one hand while offering a pathway for economic expansion and self-sufficiency on the other. This perspective, deeply rooted in Ottoman history, has driven the Turkish president to launch an ambitious naval expansion initiative, known as the MILGEM project (National warship program), to bolster Turkey’s maritime power ^[54].

This trajectory increases the likelihood of confrontation between Ankara and Tel Aviv in an area of critical importance to Israel’s energy security. Israel is actively seeking to establish itself as a regional competitor to Turkey in the energy sector and has pursued this objective through close coordination with Cyprus and Greece—both of which have longstanding tensions with Ankara. A key aspect of this strategy is the development of the EastMed pipeline, which is designed to supply Israeli gas to Europe via Cyprus. Turkish media has frequently referred to this Israeli-Greek-Cypriot alliance as the “Axis of Evil” ^[55].

Currently, tensions between Greece and Turkey remain high, exacerbated by growing security cooperation between Athens and Tel Aviv. Last month, Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias presented to parliament a comprehensive plan for a nationwide air defense system, involving a €2 billion investment in partnership with Israel. Additionally, on December 23, 2024, Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen visited Greece to sign an agreement with his Greek counterpart aimed at expanding bilateral cooperation in energy—particularly natural gas. The visit also included discussions about plans to strengthen infrastructure corridors for goods and energy, linking Asia with Europe through the Gulf states, Israel, and Greece. 

Turkey perceives these deepening Israeli-Greek ties as a direct confrontation and a shared threat ^[56]. This perspective was reflected in Turkish media responses to Greece’s growing defense partnership with Israel. The pro-government Takvim newspaper labeled Greece’s defense plan as a “military alliance against Turkey.” Similarly, Yeni Şafak, a newspaper closely aligned with Erdogan’s administration, claimed that Athens was seeking to bolster its capabilities out of fear of Turkey’s increasing strength. Meanwhile, Sabah newspaper highlighted Greece’s military restructuring plans, referencing Erdogan’s past warnings that “after Palastine and Lebanon, the next target that Israel will set its sights on will be Turkish territories” ^[57].

Notably, Ankara’s recent announcement of a potential exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement with Syria’s new government ^[58] mirrors its 2019 maritime deal with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA). The latter agreement granted Turkey a strategic foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean, reshaping regional dynamics in its favor. It appears that Ankara is now employing a similar approach in Syria, using interconnected geopolitical maneuvers to strengthen its influence in the Mediterranean, with moves in one arena amplifying influence in the other.

However, such a move is likely to provoke strong opposition from European partners. Greece, Cyprus, and other European powers are expected to view a Turkish-Syrian EEZ agreement as illegal and destabilizing, further polarizing regional dynamics and intensifying disputes over energy and sovereignty ^[59]. Tel Aviv, too, is closely monitoring Turkey’s strategic maneuvers, particularly given Ankara’s increasing assertiveness in geopolitical zones of vital importance to Israeli economic and security interests.

While these dynamics suggest that this issue could fuel rivalry and conflict between Tel Aviv and Ankara, it may also serve as leverage for Tel Aviv, with US backing, to counterbalance Turkey’s presence in Syria within the framework of their emerging necessity-driven coordination. At the same time, Israel may leverage the Kurdish issue as a counterweight to Turkey’s actions in the Eastern Mediterranean. This dynamic explains Ankara’s swift efforts to bolster its strategic position, preempting potential Israeli and American pressures through its characteristic quid pro quo approach to securing national interests.

4. Diminishing Perception of Iran as a Common Threat: The shifting regional power balance, which has seen a noticeable decline in Iran’s influence, has weakened the previously significant factor of a shared Israeli-Turkish threat that played a significant role in fostering cooperation between Tel Aviv and Ankara. While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is likely to maintain a confrontational stance against Tehran—especially with potential backing from a returning Trump administration—the immediate threat posed by Iran’s proxies has substantially diminished. Similarly, while Turkish-Iranian rivalry will persist in Iraq and the Caucasus, the weakening of Assad’s regime and Hezbollah has made other regional fronts more manageable for Ankara. 

These changes in regional power dynamics indicate a declining Israeli reliance on Turkey compared to previous years. However, this does not eliminate the “coordination of necessity” that has emerged from the evolving situation in Syria. Additionally, Israel’s accelerated normalization with Arab states—particularly under the Abraham Accords, which may soon include Saudi Arabia—could further reduce its dependency on Turkey. Several Arab countries, wary of Syria becoming a conduit for Turkey’s political Islamist agenda, may remain neutral or even side with Israel in any renewed tensions with Ankara and Damascus. This development, coupled with Turkey’s expanding regional influence, could further shift the balance of power in the Middle East, reinforcing Tel Aviv’s regional alliances at Ankara’s expense.

III. Potential Scenarios

The future trajectory of Ankara-Tel Aviv relations—particularly in light of developments in Syria—is likely to follow multiple pathways. The current uncertainty in the regional and international landscape, particularly regarding the direction of the new US administration, plays a crucial role in shaping these potential scenarios. Key potential scenarios can be outlined as follows:

1. A Mutually Beneficial Relationship: This scenario is supported by Turkey’s pragmatic approach toward Israel, as demonstrated by its continued trade relations despite political tensions. Additional indicators include assurances from Turkey-backed armed groups in Syria to Tel Aviv and Ankara’s request for prior coordination with Israel on military operations to avoid direct confrontation. These indicators might lead Tel Aviv to view Erdogan’s past hostile rhetoric as a political tool for his domestic electoral battles rather than a reflection of a deep ideological stance. This scenario is further driven by the “fait accompli” dynamic, shaped by Ankara’s regional maneuvers over the past decade, solidifying its recognition among Western policymakers as a key player in Middle Eastern affairs.

Consequently, Washington may find itself compelled to engage with Turkey while offering some flexibility regarding the political and economic concessions Ankara seeks. In return, Turkey could provide guarantees to protect Israeli and US interests in areas controlled by Turkey-affiliated groups in Syria. This scenario would allow Ankara to preserve its regional gains while avoiding the risks associated with a direct confrontation with Tel Aviv and Washington, particularly given Turkey’s fragile economic situation, which limits its ability to engage in costly geopolitical maneuvers.

Accordingly, Erdogan’s delicate balancing act between his domestic priorities and diplomatic maneuvers is expected to remain pivotal in Turkey-Israel relations. At the same time, Netanyahu’s need to maintain security cooperation while navigating complex regional dynamics mirrors Erdogan ’s tightrope walk between appeasing his domestic base and engaging in realpolitik. Additionally, shifts in US foreign policy under the new administration could play a role in redefining regional strategies and alliances for both countries. 

2. Geopolitical Confrontation and Competition: This scenario remains a plausible outcome, particularly given the escalating points of contention outlined earlier. If Tel Aviv seeks to assert its regional dominance in a way that undermines Ankara’s influence, Turkey may be compelled to recalibrate its approach toward Israel. This could involve moderating its pragmatic stance while simultaneously working to preserve its current geopolitical gains. To counterbalance Israel’s growing presence, Turkey may resort to leveraging its broader geopolitical strategy, particularly through its alliances with political Islamist movements, as a means of exerting pressure on Tel Aviv. 

However, such a scenario carries significant risks, including the possibility of direct confrontation with Washington. Additionally, Turkey may find itself increasingly isolated by certain regional actors—particularly those within the Abraham Accords—who view Ankara’s ambitions as a direct threat to their strategic interests. Moreover, Turkey’s domestic political and economic landscape may further constrain its ability to engage in aggressive geopolitical maneuvers.

In conclusion, the major geopolitical shift triggered by the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime—reshaping the regional balance of power in favor of both Tel Aviv and Ankara—has altered the dynamics of their relationship. This shift, driven by the previously mentioned forces of cooperation and rivalry, adds a new layer of complexity to their interactions. In the past, their ties fluctuated between pragmatism and ideological divergence, but the latest developments, which have effectively made the two nations neighbors by circumstance, have further sharpened the balance of their relationship.

HTurkey’s expanding intelligence, military, and civilian activities in HTS-controlled areas near Israel’s borders, along with Ankara’s efforts to solidify its geopolitical influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, could lead to new flashpoints for conflict. These factors are likely to heighten Tel Aviv’s concerns, as it may view Turkey’s growing presence as a potential constraint on Israel’s strategic military latitude in the region.

However, based on Turkey’s history of pragmatic engagement with Israel and its internal political and economic vulnerabilities, Ankara may ultimately seek a “coordination of necessity” approach with Tel Aviv. This approach would help Turkey avoid direct confrontation with Washington while neutralizing the Kurdish issue—an area where both Israel and the United States could exert pressure. Turkey would also seek to secure political and economic gains that would, in turn, expand its maneuvering space in dealing with domestic economic pressures. This, to some extent, explains Ankara’s current efforts to strengthen its strategic position, allowing it greater flexibility for negotiation and trade-offs to safeguard its interests in the face of the new US administration, which is expected to be naturally aligned with Israel.

References

[1] Soner Cagaptay, Lose-Lose for Turkey and Israel?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Jun 7, 2010. Accessed date: December 30, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lose-lose-turkey-and-israel

[2] Türkiye´s Political Relations with the State of Palestine, Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accessed date: December 30, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_s-political-relations-with-the-palestinian-national-authority.en.mfa

[3] Nurlan Muminov, Cooperation and conflict in Turkish–Israeli relations since the 1990s, Israel Affairs, Vol 30, Issue (1), December 26, 2023. P.p. 25–39. Accessed date: December 31, 2024. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2024.2295604

[4] Ibid.

[5] Meliha Altunisik, “The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol 36, No. 2, 2000. P.p. 172–91. Accessed date: December 31, 2024. Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284076

[6] Nurlan Muminov, Op.cit.

[7] Jonathan Ghariani, Comparing Israeli-Turkish Relations: The 1990s versus post-October 7, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, April 11, 2024. Retrieved from: https://dayan.org/content/comparing-israeli-turkish-relations-1990s-versus-post-october-7

[8] Ibid.

[9] Shira Efron, Jerusalem Embassy Move Sparks Turkey-Israel War of Words, RAND, January 2, 2018. Accessed date: December 31, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2018/01/jerusalem-embassy-move-sparks-turkey-israel-war-of.html

[10] Isabel Kershner, Israel and Turkey to Restore Full Diplomatic Ties, New York Times, August 17, 2022. Accessed date: January 1, 2025. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/17/world/middleeast/israel-turkey-relations-ambassadors.html

[11] Humeyra Pamuk, UN General Assembly: Erdogan, Netanyahu meet for first time as relations thaw, Reuters, September 20, 2023. Accessed date: January 1, 2025. Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-general-assembly-erdogan-netanyahu-meet-first-time-relations-thaw-2023-09-19/

[12] Aslı Aydıntaşbaş and Kevin Huggard, Understanding Turkey’s response to the Israel-Gaza crisis, Brookings, December 7, 2023. Accessed date: January 1, 2025. Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-turkeys-response-to-the-israel-gaza-crisis/

[13] Pattnaik, J. K. and Panda, C. K., Interrogating Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman geopolitical imagination, Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, Vol 8, Issue (3), 2022. P.p. 338-355. Accessed date: January 2, 2025. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.47305/JLIA2283338p

[14] Jean Marcou, “Defeat of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP in local elections in Turkey: the start of a new era?”, French Research Center on Iraq (CFRI), April 17, 2024. Retrieved from: https://blog.sciencespo-grenoble.fr/index.php/2024/04/02/defaite-de-recep-tayyip-erdogan-et-de-lakp-aux-elections-locales-en-turquie-le-debut-dune-nouvelle-ere/?lang=en

[15] Ragip Soylu, Turkey local elections: How Erdogan’s Israel policy backfired, Middle East Eye, April 5, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/turkey-local-elections-erdogan-israel-policy-backfired-how

See also:

Dorian Jones, Protests grow over Turkey’s role in supplying oil to Israel, Voa News, June 17, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.voanews.com/a/protests-grow-over-turkey-s-role-in-supplying-oil-to-israel/7659337.html

[16] Habiba Ali, Turkey’s Trade Ban on Israel: A Critical Appraisal, Modern Diplomacy, May 31, 2024. Retrieved from: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/05/31/turkeys-trade-ban-on-israel-a-critical-appraisal/

[17] Soner Cagaptay, Will Turkey Cut Ties with Israel?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 8, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/will-turkey-cut-ties-israel

[18] Lazar Berman and ToI Staff, Turkey’s Erdogan appears to issue open threat to invade Israel over war in Gaza, July 28, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.timesofisrael.com/turkeys-erdogan-appears-to-issue-open-threat-to-invade-israel-over-war-in-gaza/

[19] Diyarbakır’da ‘katil İsrail işbirlikçi PKK’ sloganları yankılandı, yenisafak, October 6, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.yenisafak.com/video-galeri/gundem/diyarbakirda-katil-israil-isbirlikci-pkk-sloganlari-yankilandi-4648931

[20] Turkey reportedly still loading Azerbaijani oil for Israel despite “total trade ban”, Bne IntelliNews, May 5, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.intellinews.com/turkey-reportedly-still-loading-azerbaijani-oil-for-israel-despite-total-trade-ban-323947

[21] Habiba Ali, Op.cit.

[22] Journo’s posts on Turkish companies’ trade with Israel restricted upon former PM’s requests, Duvar English, December 8, 2023. Accessed date: January 2, 2025. Retrieved from: https://www.duvarenglish.com/journos-posts-on-turkish-companies-trade-with-israel-restricted-upon-former-pms-requests-news-63459

[23] Hay Eytan Cohen, Erdogan ’s New Front: Exploiting Israel for Regional and Domestic Leverage, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), October 15, 2024. Retrieved from: https://jiss.org.il/en/yanarocak-erdogans-new-front/#_edn22

[24] Dean Shmuel Elmas, Turkish exports to “Palestine” skyrocket, Globes, August 7, 2024. Retrieved from: https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-turkish-exports-to-palestine-skyrocket-1001486160

[25] Türkiye-İsrail ekonomik ilişkileri ne durumda, ticaret hacmi AK Parti iktidarında nasıl değişti?, Euronews, October 11, 2023. Accessed date: January 2, 2025. Retrieved from: https://tr.euronews.com/2023/10/11/turkiye-israil-ekonomik-iliskileri-ne-durumda-ticaret-hacmi-ak-parti-iktidarinda-nasil-deg

[26] Yusuf Can and Seda Güneş, Turkey-Israel Relations After October 7: Layers of Complexity and Posturing, Wilson Center, October 17, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/turkey-israel-relations-after-october-7-layers-complexity-and-posturing

[27] Kasım İleri, Trump döneminde Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine yaptırımlar damga vurdu, Anadolu Agency, January 19, 2021. Retrieved from: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/trump-doneminde-turk-amerikan-iliskilerine-yaptirimlar-damga-vurdu/2114839

[28] Matthew Lee US approves F-16 fighter jet sale to Turkey, F-35s to Greece after Turkey OKs Sweden’s entry to NATO, APNews, January 27, 2024. Retrieved from: https://apnews.com/article/us-turkey-sweden-nato-ukraine-russia-02418dd7644bc8865fdafdff4c848dbd

[29] Melih Kadir Yılmaz, Son dakika… AK Parti MYK toplantısı sona erdi! ABD seçimlerinden sonra harekete geçildi; Çelik, Erdogan ’ın talimatını açıkladı, Mynet, November 15, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.mynet.com/son-dakika-ak-parti-myk-toplantisi-sona-erdi-omer-celik-ten-cumhur-ittifaki-iddialarina-yanit-hedeflerine-kararli-bir-sekilde-iler-110107190669

[30] Hay Eytan Cohen, From Cold Shoulders to Unpredictability: U.S.-Turkey Relations from Biden to Trump, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), December 1, 2024.Retrieved from: https://jiss.org.il/en/yanarocak-from-cold-shoulders-to-unpredictability/#_edn24

[31] Turkish Century, Trump’s new Director of National Intelligence #TulsiGabbard attacks fellow #NATO member Türkiye’s President Erdogan is not our friend. He’s a dangerous dictator”, X Website, November 14, 2024. Retrieved from: https://x.com/TurkishCentury/status/1856999970282622983?lang=ar

[32] Rubio Speaks On U.S. Policy Toward Syria, Marco Rubio Website, December 10, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.rubio.senate.gov/rubio-speaks-on-u-s-policy-toward-syria

[33] Melih Kadir, Op.cit.

[34] From Cold Shoulders to Unpredictability: U.S.-Turkey Relations from Biden to Trump, Op.cit.

[35] Mohab Adel, The Geopolitical Variable and Its Impacts on the Management of the Iran-Israel Conflict, International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah), Journal for Iranian Studies, Issue 18, October 2023. Accessed date: November 8, 2024. Retrieved from: https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/11/The-Geopolitical-Variable-and-Its-Impacts-on-the-Management-of-the-Iran-Israel-Conflict-.pdf

[36] Haşim Tekineş, Shifting Geopolitics of Turkey-Israel Relations After Assad, Institude, December 20, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.institude.org/opinion/shifting-geopolitics-of-turkey-israel-relations-after-assad

[37] Dorian Jones, Turkey-Israel Rapprochement Threat to Iranian Ambitions?, Voanews, May 31, 2017. Retrieved from: https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-israel-rapprochement-iranian-ambitions/3881562.html

See also:

Mehmet Rakipoğlu, Turkey stuck between Iran and Israel, Daily Sabah, Jul 9, 2022. Accessed date: November 10, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/turkey-stuck-between-iran-and-israel

[38] Haşim Tekineş, Op.cit.

[39] Ehud Yaari, How Israel Lost the Syrian Civil War, The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, June 2023. Accessed date: December 30, 2024. Retrieved from: https://jstribune.com/yaari-how-israel-lost-the-syrian-civil-war

[40] Syrian rebels enter northern city of Manbij, Turkish source says, Reuters, December 8, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-rebels-enter-northern-city-manbij-turkish-source-says-2024-12-08

[41] “Ḥaṣrī – Aḥmad al-Sharaʿ khilāl liqāʾ ṣaḥafī dawli ḥaḍarahu mūfid Frans 24: Suḥiqū wa-uḥriqū… Iḍṭihād al-Sūriyyīn kāna mūhawilan” [Exclusive – Ahmed Al-Shara‘ in an International Press Meeting Attended by a France 24 Reporter: “They Were Crushed and Burned… The Persecution of Syrians Was Horrific], France 24, dECEMBER 17, 2024. Retrieved from: https://f24.my/Aoly

[42] מאיה כהן, לא להאמין: ארדואן בפנייה חדשה ובלתי נתפסת לישראל, Maariv, December 29, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.maariv.co.il/news/world/article-1159768

[43] Ibid.

[44] Mehmet Celik, Analysis: Turkiye’s road ahead in a post-Assad Syria, Aljazeera, January 7, 2025. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/7/turkiyes-road-ahead-in-a-post-assad-syria

[45] ד”ר אל”מ במיל’ חנן שי, סוריה עכשיו: ההגמוניה של ישראל במזרח התיכון מייצרת הזדמנות נדירה, The Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, December 15, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.misgavins.org/shai-a-rare-opportunity/ 

[46] Turkey condemns Israel’s ‘occupation mentality’ after advance into Syria, Alarabiya, December 10, 2024. Retrieved from: https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/12/10/turkey-condemns-israel-s-occupation-mentality-after-advance-into-syria

[47] Foreign Min: ‘The last country that can speak about occupation in Syria is Turkey’, Israel National News, December 17, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/400884

[48] Isrāʾel tarudd ʿalā tahdīdāt Ardūghān baʿda muṭālabatihi lahā bisaḥb quwwātihā min Sūriyā [Israel Responds to Erdogan’s Threats After His Demand for Troop Withdrawal from Syria], Russia Today, 15 January 2025. Retrieved from: https://ar.rt.com/z3dy 

[49] Shirit Avitan Cohen, Assad, al-Julani, or Erdogan in Syria? It’s all the same, Israel Hayom, December 17, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.israelhayom.com/2024/12/17/assad-al-julani-or-erdogan-in-syria-its-all-the-same/ 

See also:

David Wurmser, Prepare for Disintegration of Syria and Rise of Imperial Turkey, The Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, December 1, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.misgavins.org/en/wurmser-prepare-for-disintegration-of-syria-and-rise-of-imperial-turkey/ 

[50] Turkish President Erdogan : Turkey Is Much Bigger Than Its Territory Of 782,000 Square Kilometers; People Who Ask What Turkey Is Doing In Syria, Libya, Or Somalia, Do Not Understand Our Vision, Memri, December 18, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.memri.org/tv/turkish-president-erdogan-cannot-limit-our-horizon-cannot-escape-destiny

[51] Turkey announces determination to create a buffer zone in Iraq and Syria, Medyanews, July 12, 2024. Retrieved from:

See also:

Ghazal Golshiri and Marie Jégo, Syria: Turkey wants to extend its buffer zone by pushing back Kurdish forces, lemonde, December 12, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/12/12/syria-turkey-wants-to-extend-its-buffer-zone-by-pushing-back-kurdish-forces_6735985_4.html#

[52] מאיה כהן, Op.cit.

[53] Eran Lerman, Mapping the Post-Assad Landscape, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), December 16, 2024. Retrieved from: https://jiss.org.il/en/lerman-mapping-the-post-assad-landscape

[54] William Armstrong, Turkey’s foreign policy takes hawkish turn over ‘Blue Homeland’, BBC Monitoring, July 6, 2020. Accessed date: December 30, 2024. Retrieved from: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c201vkcr

See also:

İlhan Uzgel, The “Blue Homeland” and Turkey’s new forward defence doctrine, Duvar English, June 25, 2020. Accessed date: December 30, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.duvarenglish.com/columns/2020/06/25/the-blue-homeland-and-turkeys-new-forward-defence-doctrine

[55] Hay Eytan Cohen, Turkey at the Eastern Mediterranean Crossroads, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), December 18, 2024. Retrieved from: https://jiss.org.il/en/yanarocak-turkey-at-the-eastern-mediterranean-crossroads

[56] אבי אשכנזי, אנה ברסקי, טרקו לטורקיה את הדלת: הנקמה הישראלית בארדואן יצאה לדרך, Maariv, December 23, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.maariv.co.il/news/politics/article-1158365

[57] Ibid.

[58] Egecan Alan Fay, Details on the pending Türkiye-Syria maritime agreement, Turkiye Today, December 25, 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.turkiyetoday.com/region/details-on-the-pending-turkiye-syria-maritime-agreement-97430/ 

[59] Emadeddin Badi and Abdullah al-Jabassini, Turkey’s Syria and Libya strategies add up to a Mediterranean power play, Atlantic council, January 13, 2025. Retrieved from: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/turkey-syria-libya-strategy-mediterranean-power-play/